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Catholicism, war and the
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Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism

The Cañada Blanch / Sussex Academic Studies on Contemporary Spain

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To my Dad.

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Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism

The Juventud de Acción
Popular in Spain,
1931-1939

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The Cañada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies

In the 1960s, the most important initiative in the cultural and academic relations between Spain and the United Kingdom was launched by a Valencian fruit importer in London. The creation by Vicente Cañada Blanch of the Anglo-Spanish Cultural Foundation has subsequently benefited large numbers of Spanish and British scholars at various levels. Thanks to the generosity of Vicente Cañada Blanch, thousands of Spanish schoolchildren have been educated at the secondary school in West London that bears his name. At the same time, many British and Spanish university students have benefited from the exchange scholarships which fostered cultural and scientific exchanges between the two countries. Some of the most important historical, artistic and literary work on Spanish topics to be produced in Great Britain was initially made possible by Cañada Blanch scholarships.

Vicente Cañada Blanch was, by inclination, a conservative. When his Foundation was created, the Franco regime was still in the plenitude of its power. Nevertheless, the keynote of the Foundation's activities was always a complete open-mindedness on political issues. This was reflected in the diversity of research projects supported by the Foundation, many of which, in Francoist Spain, would have been regarded as subversive. When the Dictator died, Don Vicente was in his seventy-fifth year. In the two decades following the death of the Dictator, although apparently indestructible, Don Vicente was obliged to husband his energies. Increasingly, the work of the Foundation was carried forward by Miguel Dols whose tireless and imaginative work in London was matched in Spain by that of José María Coll Comín. They were united in the Foundation's spirit of open-minded commitment to fostering research of high quality in pursuit of better Anglo-Spanish cultural relations. Throughout the 1990s, thanks to them, the role of the Foundation grew considerably.

In 1994, in collaboration with the London School of Economics, the Foundation established the Príncipe de Asturias Chair of Contemporary Spanish History and the Cañada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies. It is the particular task of the Cañada Blanch Centre for Contemporary Spanish Studies to promote the understanding of twentieth-

century Spain through research and teaching of contemporary Spanish history, politics, economy, sociology and culture. The Centre possesses a valuable library and archival centre for specialists in contemporary Spain. This work is carried on through the publications of the doctoral and post-doctoral researchers at the Centre itself and through the many seminars and lectures held at the London School of Economics. While the seminars are the province of the researchers, the lecture cycles have been the forum in which Spanish politicians have been able to address audiences in the United Kingdom.

Since 1998, the Cañada Blanch Centre has published a substantial number of books in collaboration with several different publishers on the subject of contemporary Spanish history and politics. A fruitful partnership with Sussex Academic Press began in 2004 with the publication of Christina Palomares's fascinating work on the origins of the Partido Popular in Spain, *The Quest for Survival after Franco. Moderate Francoism and the Slow Journey to the Polls, 1964–1977*. This was followed in 2007 by Soledad Fox's deeply moving biography of one of the most intriguing women of 1930s Spain, *Constanca de la Mora in War and Exile: International Voice for the Spanish Republic* and Isabel Rohr's path-breaking study of anti-Semitism in Spain, *The Spanish Right and the Jews, 1898–1945: Antisemitism and Opportunism*. 2008 saw the publication of a revised edition of Richard Wigg's penetrating study of Anglo-Spanish relations during the Second World War, *Churchill and Spain: The Survival of the Franco Regime, 1940–1945* together with *Triumph at Midnight of the Century: A Critical Biography of Arturo Barea*, Michael Eade's fascinating reevaluation of the great Spanish author of *The Forging of a Rebel*.

Our collaboration in 2009 was inaugurated by Gareth Stockey's incisive account of another crucial element in Anglo-Spanish relations, *Gibraltar. A Dagger in the Spine of Spain*. We were especially proud that it was continued by the most distinguished American historian of the Spanish Civil War, Gabriel Jackson. His pioneering work *The Spanish Republic and the Civil War*, first published 1965 and still in print, quickly became a classic. The Sussex Academic Press/Cañada Blanch series was greatly privileged to be associated with Professor Jackson's biography of the great Republican war leader, Juan Negrín.

Our publications in 2010 were inaugurated by the fascinating study by Ramon Tremosa i Balcells of the economic future of Catalonia and of the role being played in that future by the region's ports. They are continued now with *Catholicism, War and the Foundation of Francoism: The Juventud de Acción Popular in Spain, 1931–1939* by Sid Lowe. This deals with one of the least known elements on the road to civil war in Spain. The mass Catholic

youth movement, the Juventud de Acción Popular, contributed to the polarization of politics within the Second Republic. After the right-wing defeat in the elections of February 1936, a large proportion of its militants went over to the overtly fascist Falange. They played a crucial role in the Falangist militias, both in frontline fighting and in rearguard repression.

PAUL PRESTON
Series Editor
London School of Economics

Series Editor's Preface by Paul Preston

This study of the genesis, evolution and activities of the largest mass movement of the right in 1930s Spain, the *Juventud de Acción Popular*, is a remarkably sophisticated piece of work. It is based, in the first instance, on an impressive array of primary sources which have been assembled from virtually every one of Spain's fifty provinces. Assembling this entirely new material has, in itself, been an altogether significant achievement involving painstaking detective work. The author's work has thereby filled the gap left by the destruction of the organisation's records during the Spanish Civil War. The book is also invaluable for its exhaustive examination of the extensive secondary literature on the subject of the political right before and during the Spanish Civil War. The scholarly credentials of the author are thus impeccable. The originality of the documentation unearthed gives the book considerable freshness. However, even more striking is the intelligence and maturity with which this hard-earned material is handled.

The youth movement of the mass Catholic party, *Acción Popular* (which later in 1933 was expanded to become the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* or *CEDA*), was one of the most crucial protagonists of the breakdown of political co-existence in the Second Republic and went on to play a major role in the coalition of right-wing forces that won the war. The book clearly analyses the development of the *Juventud de Acción Popular*, its fascist-like cult of personality around the *CEDA* leader, José María Gil Robles, the internal contradictions between advocates of moderation and enthusiasts for violence, the relations between the *JAP* and other sections of the Spanish Right and its eventual fusion with the fascist *Falange*. This fusion was the prelude to *JAP* members playing a crucial role on the Francoist side in the Spanish Civil War, as front-line militias, in the 'dirty work' of the repression of liberals and leftists and also in the articulation of the future Francoist dictatorship.

The social and political analysis underlying Sid Lowe's work demonstrates how much of the mass support and the political culture which permitted the long-term survival of a dictatorship imposed by military action derived from this radical, mass Catholic youth movement. What is

striking is that the author effectively demonstrates why many on the left in Spain believed that both the CEDA and the JAP were fascist movements. In reconstructing the mass mobilisation of Catholic Youth, Dr Lowe locates Spain's 'fascist moment', showing how the dynamic introduced by the JAP changed the politics of the right beyond recognition. In demonstrating how radical Catholics in Spain became fascists, Dr Lowe undermines the conventional wisdom of much of the historiography on Spain in the 1930s which has limited analysis of Spanish fascism to the initially marginal and subsequently subordinate party, the Falange.

Rather, Sid Lowe conclusively demonstrates that Spain's Catholic youths flooded the JAP because they were attracted by its fascist rhetoric and its rejections of 'old' politics. In that sense, the JAP played a key role in the polarization of politics during the Second Republic and thus also in fomenting civil war. Moreover, his account of the fusion with the Falange is startling original showing how the latter benefitted from the JAP's masses and thus acquired the radical mobilisation of which it had been incapable. Moreover, what Dr Lowe contributes on youth politics in 1930s Spain links not only with recent Spanish work on anarchist, Socialist and Communist youth politics but also with European research which is similarly exploring the often violent role of youth movements in the 1930s. In telling this story, perceptively and, indeed, with real narrative verve, Sid Lowe explains as never before the transition from apparent moderation to explicit violence that took place in the wake of the right's defeat in the elections of February 1936. The result is a beautifully written work which is a major original contribution to the historiography of the causes, the course and the consequences of the Spanish Civil War.

Acknowledgements

This book has been a very, *very* long time in coming. The fact that it got finished at all owes an enormous amount to a lot of people. My sincere thanks to all of them.

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Orestes provided me with a copy of his unpublished memoirs. Manuel Giménez Fernández's daughter Ana María Clavijo generously responded to my request for information, inviting me to Jérez, talking about her father and showing me some of those papers of his which have not been deposited in Seville. Pablo Beltrán de Heredia in Santander kindly provided me with material on Gil Robles.

My requests for information and advice have been met with great generosity by Paul Preston, Michael Richards, Tim Rees, Martin Blinkhorn, Stanley Payne and Samuel Pierce, plus Sandra Souto and Nigel Townson, while Philip Deacon played a big part in getting me into Spanish history (and therefore this fine mess) in the first place. My thanks, as well, to Ian Kershaw, Tim Baycroft and Bob Moore. As my secondary supervisor and internal examiner Bob had the unenviable task of getting me to submit the thesis and then having to read it.

Their Spanish counterparts have been even more helpful. Julián Sanz Hoya, Ramón Morote Pons, Rafael Valls, Alfonso Rojas Quintana and Eduardo González Calleja were like an unofficial interlibrary loan, all of them kindly providing me with copies of their doctoral theses, as well as responding to queries and offering advice, information and material. Rafael Valls gave me a copy of the Informe Costa Serrano while Alfonso Rojas Quintana was very generous with material. The fact that I have reached completely different conclusions to him does diminish my gratitude.

Julio Prada kindly gave me a copy of his article on the JAP in Orense and patiently explained my queries. Vicente Comès Iglesias helpfully responded to queries on the JDRV and Luis Lucía, clarifying a number of issues. Luis Miguel Moreno Fernández made quite an effort to get hold of me, as well as helping me find a couple of key texts I couldn't get in Madrid. And Emilio Grandío Seoane has been extremely kind to me with suggestions and information, particularly during the early days of my research. Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrrouze opened my eyes to research avenues and has always been generous with books and advice. Francisco Torres García and José María García Escudero provided material and suggestions. José María García de Tuñón was exceptionally welcoming, giving me a copy of his book, seeking out JAP references on my behalf in Asturias and putting me in touch with Ernesto Andrés Vázquez. Xosé Manoel Nuñez Seixas kindly provided me with material from oral history collection of the Fondo HISTORGA.

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return for tea. It's his turn. My parents frantically chased up references and notes, and my dad read through countless drafts, always asking the right questions, picking up on things I hadn't even noticed. My supervisor Mary Vincent probably never really thought I'd get here – but if so she never said. She was a constant source of advice, knowledge and encouragement. She read and re-read drafts, and then when she'd finished was forced to read them again.

Paul Preston examined the original doctoral thesis with unexpected enthusiasm – and was instrumental in bringing it to print. Tony Graham from Sussex Academic Press saw the project through with great patience and skill. Víctor Fernández helped restore some of the images.

And then there's Claire, who helped with literally everything else. Her love and support has been vital. A decade later, it's finally finished. Without her, it wouldn't have been.

Glossary and Abbreviations

ADGP	Archivo de la Dirección General de la Policía.
AFL	Archivo Familia Lucia.
AGGCE	Archivo General de la Guerra Civil Española, Salamanca.
AGMA	Archivo General Militar de Ávila.
AGR	Archivo Gil Robles.
AHN	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid.
AHP	Archivo Histórico Provincial.
AHPOu	Arquivo Histórico Provincial, Ourense.
AM	Archivo Municipal.
AMGF	Archivo Manuel Giménez Fernández.
AMS	Archivo Municipal de Sevilla.
AN	Acción Nacional (National Action), forerunner of Acción Popular.
AP	Acción Popular (Popular Action), the JAP's parent party.
APCE	Archivo Partido Comunista de España, Madrid.
Asoc. Pol	Asociación Política.
BDPO	Biblioteca da Deputación Provincial, Ourense.
C.E.D.A.	The CEDA's newspaper.
<i>Cacique</i>	Local political boss.
Carp	Carpeta (folder).
CEDA	Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas.
<i>Cedista</i>	Member of the CEDA.
CG	Causa General.
DRV	Derecha Regional Valenciana (Valencian Regional Right).
<i>Españolismo</i>	Spanishness, the embodiment of Spain.
Exp	Expediente (file).
FDA	Fondo Diego Angulo.
FFCC	Fondos Contemporáneos.
FFGC	Fondos Gobierno Civil.
FPÁv	Fondo Pérez Ávila.
FS	Federico Salmón.
GC	Gobierno Civil.
<i>Hispanidad</i>	Hispanicity.
<i>J.A.P.</i>	The JAP's newspaper.

JAP	Juventud (or Juventudes) de Acción Popular. Youth of Popular Action.
<i>Japismo</i>	Informal term for JAP-ism.
<i>Japista</i>	Member of the JAP.
<i>Japo</i>	Informal term used for a member of the JAP.
JDRV	Juventud de la Derecha Regional Valenciana.
JEFE	Chief, a Spanish equivalent to <i>Duce</i> or <i>Führer</i> .
JONS	Juntas de la Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista.
JPÁv	José Pérez Ávila, leader of the JAP in Orense.
JURD	Juventud de la Unión Regional de Derechas
<i>Juventud</i>	Youth. Used throughout to refer to the JAP.
Leg	Legajo (box).
MGF	Manuel Giménez Fernández.
<i>Patria</i>	Fatherland.
PS	Político-Social.
PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party).
RAH	Real Academia de Historia, Madrid.
<i>Reconquista</i>	Reconquest (specifically the reconquest of Spain from the Moors).
TS	Tribunal Supremo.
TSR	Tribunal Supremo Recursos.
USC	Universidad de Santiago de Compostela.

List of Illustrations

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Introduction

'Immense shame, physical repugnance' Responding to the Republic

The proclamation of Spain's Second Republic on 14 April 1931 was met with an outpouring of popular jubilation. Municipal elections two days before had returned a majority of monarchist candidates nationally but even the most trenchant supporters of King Alfonso XIII recognised that success in the countryside, where voting could be easily manipulated by political bosses or *caciques*, was meaningless in the face of a sweeping urban victory for republicans and socialists. In all but seven of Spain's fifty-two provincial capitals, the monarchy had been defeated. Mass politics had definitively announced its arrival, delivering a devastating mandate against a king who was left with little support and little option but to go into exile. Spain had ended overnight a monarchist tradition that went back centuries, installing a genuinely democratic régime for the first time – and without a single shot being fired.

Yet little more than five years later, with extreme polarisation having taken hold and political coexistence having become ever more precarious, Spain was plunged into a bloody civil war. There were a number of inter-related reasons for so rapid and spectacular a collapse. Promising more than the simple substitution of a president for a king, the Second Republic was welcomed as an opportunity to reform an essentially backward country but it had inherited severe social, economic, religious and even regional cleavages. If political power had changed hands, socio-economic power had not yet done so and there was little patience from those sectors of society that demanded solutions to the crisis. The Republic had also come into existence at a time that was far from propitious. Spain announced a democratic régime just as much of Europe was turning its back on liberalism in favour of authoritarian solutions, with the example of Fascist Italy proving especially seductive to the right and the Soviet Union offering a utopian vision to the left. Meanwhile, there were significant differences between those who made up the Republic's founding coalition, espousing different and occasionally conflicting concepts of what the new régime actually represented.

But, as Shlomo Ben-Ami notes, far from being too broad, one of the greatest potential threats faced by the new régime 'lay in the fact that the republican movement was not heterogeneous enough.'¹ Indeed, its 'sectarian' nature would prove a stick with which it was repeatedly beaten over the following five years. Celebrating crowds may have poured onto the streets of Spain's major cities on 14 April, but while this gave the veneer of unanimity, the reality was rather different. The right had not welcomed the Republic; it had, rather, been in disarray and thus unable to prevent its imposition. It was not invited into the Republic and nor therefore did it succeed in shaping the new régime in the aftermath of the abdication of Alfonso XIII. It played no role in the constituent Cortes, which the leading right-wing politician dismissed as 'tyrannical', or the writing of a new constitution.² For the right, the arrival of a reformist Republic did not represent hope but a significant threat that went well beyond the question of loyalty to the crown, even if this was a banner to which some would cling.

For much of the right, the Republic was the antechamber of revolution, the bearer of anarchy and disorder. It challenged the economic hegemony of the country's traditional elites, the unity of Spain and the predominant position of Catholicism, which was removed as the official religion of the state by the new constitution. It was this challenge, reflected in the declaration of the left-wing republican and future president Manuel Azaña that 'Spain is no longer Catholic', that would prove perhaps the Republic's greatest mistake. Worse still, this was given physical expression in the burning of convents in May 1931 – an outbreak of popular anticlerical violence immediately and irrevocably associated with the new régime. On a more immediate level, the prohibition of some religious events caused bitterness and confrontation, with some Catholics protesting against the practical implications of a secular state.³ The religious question became a core issue around which the right would cohere and mobilise, doing so not merely in opposition to the prevailing government but the Republic itself, playing a hugely significant role in its destruction.⁴

The 'assault' upon Catholicism was a rallying call, 'the seed' for a reaction which occurred swiftly, centring mainly on the influential Catholic lay organisation, the Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas (ACNP), its agrarian bodies, and its extensive press network, led by the Catholic daily *El Debate*.⁵ It also drew on the networks of the ostensibly apolitical Acción Católica. It was out of this initial reaction that Acción Nacional (National Action) was born. Described as 'an electoral organisation to bring together the elements of order', *El Debate* stressed that Acción Nacional was 'not a new political party' and although it was increasingly to take on the appearance of one that statement was, on one level at least, to prove quite correct:⁶

this loose, amorphous and heterodox movement, originally envisaged as a defensive reaction to the threat posed by the new régime, would never truly have the internal cohesion, organisation, structure, or function of a political party. It was, rather, a body whose function was the delivery of power and this limitation was what ultimately brought its destruction when it failed to capture and re-shape the Republic.

Acción Nacional was hugely successful in mobilising amongst elites, the provincial middle classes and the smallholding peasantry of the countryside, providing the core of what would become the first mass right-wing 'party' in Spanish political history. Although its ideology was broadly rooted in the Carlist Traditionalism for which its leader's own father had been a key thinker, Acción Nacional's ambiguity and flexibility made it attractive across the board. It came to represent a huge swathe of the right, from moderates to authoritarians. Having been forced to change its name to Acción Popular after a government decree preventing any non-state institutions from declaring themselves 'national', it claimed to represent some 619,000 members at its first assembly in October 1932.⁷ Acción Popular was led by the lawyer José María Gil Robles, editor of *El Debate*, son of the Carlist ideologue Enrique Gil y Robles,⁸ and the young protégé of the ACNP leader and leading right-wing political strategist Ángel Herrera Oria.

Gil Robles later admitted in his memoirs that 'the immense majority of the members of Acción Popular were dedicated monarchists' that 'all coincided in [just] one thing: the insuperable repugnance they would feel at declaring themselves republicans.'⁹ They were also Catholics, the majority of whom rejected the liberalism of the new régime and instead sought a corporate state whose implicit models were Portugal and Austria, as well as Italy. Nonetheless, the founders of Acción Popular recognised that the Republic was a *fait accompli* and the return of the king a chimera. They therefore adopted a gradualist tactic known as 'accidentalism', the premise of which was that the form of states and political régimes was 'accidental'; what really mattered was their content. Rather than overthrow the régime, Acción Popular would thus seek to capture it through legal means and alter that content.

The primacy of the accidentalist tactic was reinforced by the abject failure of the *Sanjurjada* military coup on 10 August 1932, which demonstrated that a 'catastrophist' tactic aimed at the overthrow of the régime by violence was unrealistic. Gil Robles had known about plans for a coup as early as July but had been told by general Francisco Franco that it was both unnecessary and unlikely to work. Although this judgement was proven to be absolutely right, that did not stop some members of the party remaining

determined to destroy the régime by force.¹⁰ For these, it was simply illegitimate to countenance a régime that had overthrown the King, promised agrarian reform and challenged the privileged position of Catholicism from its very inception. Coexistence was impossible; the Republic must be destroyed.

Internal debates came to a head in October 1932 and led to the departure from Acción Popular of those whose commitment to monarchy or uncompromising rejection of the Republic meant they were unprepared to accept a legal approach. This decision was described by those who stayed as 'entirely respectable'; after all, the political identities of these now divided camps remained broadly the same, even if their choice of tactics did not.¹¹ Chief amongst those who departed were Antonio Goicoechea and José Calvo Sotelo, who would go on to form the upper-class, authoritarian Alfonsist monarchist party Renovación Española. A former finance minister during the Miguel Primo de Rivera dictatorship and an open sympathiser of fascism, Calvo Sotelo would remain committed to the violent overthrow of the régime and a fierce critic of Acción Popular tactics until 1936. But this did not make republicans of Acción Popular. Accidentalism was a tactic and the party refused ever to make a declaration of loyalty to the new state, whilst Gil Robles kept open the option of a military coup should it be required and was careful to ensure that the exiled king did not read genuine republicanism into his policy.¹² As he later recalled:

Because of the ease with which I was able to act in parliament many have deduced that I am a dedicated and consummate parliamentarian. How little they know me! They cannot have understood the immense shame, the almost physical repugnance, that I felt at having to act within a system whose defects were so clear to me. My doctrinal formation, my family ties and my sensibility rebelled every day against the system within which I found myself obliged to act. The more I was involved in Parliament the firmer was my conviction that it would be difficult to remedy with a Republic and a democracy the problems of the fatherland [*patria*].¹³

Yet Gil Robles was a pragmatic politician and for all that the régime provoked his repugnance, it offered one huge advantage: the key to power. Whilst catastrophism seemed, for the time being, to have failed, accidentalism was succeeding. Acción Popular was joined by other right-wing parties, including Luis Lucía Lucía's powerful Derecha Regional Valenciana (Valencian Regional Right, DRV), in founding the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-Wing groups, CEDA) in February 1933.¹⁴ This new umbrella body

represented 735,058 people with membership ultimately growing to over a million under the leadership of Gil Robles, making it the biggest party in Spanish political history.¹⁵ Having drawn upon the extensive logistic and economic resources of this network, the right organised sufficiently for the CEDA to win the November 1933 general elections, gaining 115 seats to 102 for the clientelist right-leaning republicans of the Radical Party and 58 for the Socialists of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE). But while the CEDA was the largest single party in parliament it did not have an absolute majority. Because of its ambivalent position towards the Republic, nor was it invited to form a government.

This left Gil Robles to pursue a careful tactic of granting and withdrawing support for a succession of governments, periodically provoking crises with the aim of securing ministries and clawing his way closer to power by exhausting all possibilities until his possession of the prime minister's office remained the only solution. It was a tactic succinctly summarised by *El Debate* in November 1934, a time when the CEDA had just been invited to share the government with the Radical leader Alejandro Lerroux: 'First support Lerroux; second, collaborate with Lerroux; third, replace Lerroux.'¹⁶ Small wonder Radicals and opponents did not trust the CEDA. The CEDA would gain three ministers in October 1934, later boasting five, and Gil Robles himself was to occupy the ministry of war, but he never succeeded in leading the cabinet. This situation left much of the party in the paradoxical position of being a movement that held power and could, to some extent, control the composition and direction of the government, yet nevertheless acted as a virulent opposition. As this opposition was turned against a presidential régime that broke its own political rules and refused invite the CEDA to lead the government – one which the right increasingly saw as embodying all that ran contrary to 'Spain's interests' – so the aim ultimately shifted from capturing the Republic to destroying it.

This attitude was all the more pronounced amongst the youth wing of the party, the Juventud de Acción Popular (Youth of Popular Action, JAP), which underwent a process of political radicalisation inspired by the authoritarian examples of other major European countries. The youth wing was founded as a 'vanguard' and a 'school of political formation' in February 1932, still under the auspices of Acción Nacional. 'We are the future,' its manifesto declared, 'and we must prevent Moscow's materialist civilisation replacing a civilisation so spiritual [as ours].' The Juventud de Acción Nacional (JAN) announced: 'we are men of the right' and 'declar[ed] war on communism and masonry [which] . . . allied to an exploitative and sectarian bourgeoisie negates Spain's traditions and in so doing negates

Spain herself.¹⁷ Ideologically, these postulates were not new, having their roots in anti-liberal, theocratic Carlism and having been borrowed from those of the pre-Republican right, as well as the anti-liberal papal encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*. Many of the leading figures came from Catholic associations, including its first president José María Valiente, who was also president of the ostensibly apolitical Juventud Católica de España (Catholic Youth of Spain, JCE). Thus, one contemporary wrote in 1933 that 'the JCE was the seed that is today bearing fruit in all areas of the Fatherland'.¹⁸

But if the ideology was not a radical departure from the traditions of the Spanish right, the style with which it was presented was new and as the JAN evolved into the JAP and grew more powerful so its outlook began to shift. This went hand in hand with an increase in its political protagonism, with the JAP taking on an ever more active role, challenging established hierarchies at a local and national level to push for a project which was not merely a reactionary response to the foundation of the Republic and the emerging power of the left, but had a more genuinely millenarian focus. And while Catholicism always seeped through the JAP's every pore, a key part of its identity, religion was not the central plank of its political ideology.

A year after the foundation of the Madrid JAP, its members or *japistas* were told: 'the ideal would be for youngsters to begin intervening in politics as late as possible, in the meantime completing their education in Acción Católica [the theoretically apolitical Catholic lay association]. However, these are days that demand that youth enters politics.'¹⁹ The JAP's increased political protagonism was not though entirely dictated by circumstance, but was rather a product of its demands for greater prominence. After the departure of the JAP's first president José María Valiente following his involvement in clandestine meetings with the exiled king in the summer of 1934, Gil Robles took on the post of 'supreme chief' of the JAP. At the same time, José María Pérez de Laborda, a lawyer and childhood friend of Gil Robles, took over the *Juventud*'s presidency and its day-to-day running. Committed to a more modern, increasingly fascistic right-wing agenda, Laborda's leadership accelerated a process of political activism and radicalisation in which the JAP forged an identity of its own – one it would attempt, with varying degrees of success, to impose on the wider CEDA.

For those on the left who looked towards Italy and Germany, this identity was worryingly familiar. The JAP was well aware of the European political epoch in which it found itself and although it did not seek openly to *copy* fascism, arguing that to do so would be to negate its purely Spanish origins, it underwent what Ismael Saz has described as 'fascistisation'.

According to Saz, fascistisation is a 'process that drives certain sections of the classic right . . . to adopt a series of elements whose novelty and function is clearly attributable to fascism, so much so that the result may not strictly speaking be fascism but nor is it exactly the same as what the right was before its encounter . . . with fascism.'²⁰ The JAP certainly was not the same as the 'old-style' right and by the time general elections were called in 1936, huge numbers of contemporaries understandably considered it virtually indistinguishable from fascism.

That the JAP should experience such an intense process of fascistisation was all the more significant because of its success. 'Spanish fascism' in the shape of Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx) was a latecomer onto the Republican political scene. By the time it was founded by the aristocratic son of the former dictator, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, in October 1933, the Falange found that its political space had already been occupied by the JAP. It was this that most directly determined the failure of his party, rather than the lack of any discernible fascist constituency.²¹ That was most starkly demonstrated by the Falange's eventual take-off during the spring of 1936 and, more importantly, the early months of the Spanish civil war: it was erstwhile *japistas* that provided the foundations from which the Falange, previously a political irrelevance, could become a mass party for the first time. It is a central tenet of this book that the phenomenon of fascism in Spain cannot be adequately explained without the JAP.

The Juventud de Acción Popular was by far the largest youth movement on the Spanish right, embracing mass politics and mobilising behind a Manichean message that saw politics in terms of a physical battle between Spain and the 'anti-Spain'. It helped to create a politicised, mass body for the right and manned the ideological barricades of the CEDA, contributing decisively to a process of polarisation that was to have fatal consequences for the Republic, providing the conditions for the coup against the régime on 18 July 1936. Here, the JAP offered a 'bridge' between conservatism and fascism, driving the only genuine force on the parliamentary right towards an openly authoritarian solution, challenging conservative political orthodoxy in a bid to impose a 'new', paramilitary politics that would be 'virile' and 'youthful'. It thus revealed the vital contradiction between the desire to destroy the Republic and dispense of democracy and the CEDA's adoption of a legal tactic towards securing power, helping to lay bare that accidentalism and catastrophism were not in fact mutually exclusive concepts. This role was of continued significance beyond the end of the Republic as the JAP provided the Nationalist war effort with a ready-made ideology of crusade, men for the front, and the social basis of a new régime, led by Franco.

Although they were to become the official parties of the state, the true origins of the dictatorship that ruled over Spain for almost four decades are not so much to be found in the politically marginalised Falange Española or the anachronistic Carlist movement the *Comunión Tradicionalista*. Nor are they to be truly found in the monarchist movement *Renovación Española*, which never succeeded in becoming much more than an aristocratic pressure group. Rather, the party-political basis of the Franco régime is more properly sought in the radical wing of the CEDA and the JAP, which did much to provoke the conditions necessary for the rising and the foundation of the New State and closely foreshadowed the nature of that régime.



Surprisingly, the JAP has never been the subject of a full-length study. A number of texts on the Second Republic and the origins of the civil war offer passing remarks – and, in any case, these are nearly always the same passing remarks – but the *Juventud* has received startlingly little treatment considering its significance. It is virtually impossible to distinguish trends in the historiographical treatment of the JAP because the paucity of studies means there are not any specific trends. José Báez y Pérez de Tudela has published two interesting articles on the JAP in which he argues that it was something of a paper tiger, eschewing violence and proving incapable of acting without the support of the state. Far less developed is the superficial portrait of Olga Cuquerella Gamboa – whose two accounts, where there is any primary research at all, are drawn almost entirely from the JAP's short-lived and politically insignificant Ávila newspaper. She presents the JAP as a traditional Catholic movement bordering on liberalism, criticising any attempts to see it in a fascistised context and presenting it as essentially moderate despite placing it within Stanley Payne's category of 'authoritarian nationalism'.²² A third contribution is Elías Laferriere's study of the JAP's national newspaper, published over thirty years ago.²³ The national newspaper does at least provide a far more realistic portrait of the *Juventud* than the Ávila paper which, but for a special edition to coincide with the El Escorial rally, ceased publication in January 1934.²⁴ Nonetheless, Laferriere's article is a curious combination of formal examination of the newspaper, including a list of advertisers and even the paper's measurements, and a discussion of some of the JAP's ideological facets, not always taken wholly, or even mainly, from the paper itself. His conclusion that the JAP cannot be seen as totalitarian for the 'simple reason that it was neither in power nor had the opportunity to bring to fruition in any way its ideologico-political [*sic*] position' seems both flawed and rather simplistic.²⁵

There has also been a recent, fascinating and convincing contribution from Xulio Prada, which examines the internal battles for control of the JAP in Orense in light of local political cleavages.²⁶ All of these contributions are re-visited in this book but they cannot be seen as amounting to a full study.

A different view of the JAP than that offered by Báez and, especially, Cuquerella Gamboa has been presented by José Ramón Montero. His two-volume study of the CEDA includes an important and lengthy section on the JAP, which makes a greater contribution to its study than the aforementioned articles and is supplemented by a shorter piece specifically on the *Juventud*. He argues the JAP serves as a yardstick by which to measure the fascistic personality of the CEDA.²⁷ Other students of the CEDA have also provided some coverage of the JAP. Paul Preston's *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War* sees the JAP as a kind of strong-arm back up for Gil Robles and concurs with Montero in utilising the *Juventud* to place the CEDA in a fascist context, while Richard Robinson distances the JAP from fascism.²⁸ Robinson's text is also the only account in English to include the JAP's codified programme, the 19 Points. Javier Tusell's *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, meanwhile, has surprisingly little to say about the JAP despite its attempt to analyse the nature of the CEDA.²⁹ In addition, accounts of the right from a regional perspective provide valuable detail,³⁰ while Francisco Torres has published two very useful articles on the role of Gil Robles, his confidant Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez and the JAP militias that the latter led during the civil war.³¹ The JAP is also treated, if briefly, in some histories of fascism in Spain.³²

Quite apart from the JAP's apparent submergence within the CEDA, which *has* been subject to a number of interesting studies,³³ and the temptation to see it as 'just' a youth movement, one explanation for the lack of a full-length study could be a kind of historical 'back-projection'. In the search for the origins of the Franco régime and the civil war, it is natural to look elsewhere. The JAP (and indeed the CEDA) was, after all, to play no formal part in the New State. But while the Falange and the Carlists were merged to become the state party, a study of the Republic-era Falange is of limited value in terms of understanding what the Nationalist coalition really was and where its origins genuinely lay. In fact, it is of little real value in understanding what the Falange itself became. Between 1933 and 1936 the Falange never escaped the fringes of the political scene; only when it welcomed significant numbers of *japistas* into its midst did success become a possibility.

That the JAP has been largely ignored here is nonetheless understandable, even beyond a comprehensible investigative tunnel vision trained only on the Falange. This is because this historical 'back-projection' is also

reflected in the primary material. The foundation of the Francoist New State under the auspices of the Falange and the *Comuni3n Tradicionalista* served to write the CEDA-JAP out of the script. Indeed, this anonymity was something about which *japistas* would complain bitterly during the civil war. Surviving accounts – and, indeed, the survival of accounts – are conditioned by the speed and the manner in which the Falange and the Carlists grew to become the party of the state and the manner in which the CEDA collapsed, becoming something of a political outcast in the Nationalist zone. This can, for example, be seen very clearly in the reports of the Francoist Causa General, the investigation which was set up to record the actions of those who supported the rising on 18 July (and, of course, those who did not and had therefore to be tried for ‘rebellion’). In the vast majority of cases the prosecutor, by then working within a state in which the single party was the FET y de las JONS, a fusion of Carlist and Falangist parties, simply sought out six statements: three from Carlists and three from Falangists. Neither had any desire to reveal the importance of the CEDA-JAP. Besides, the nature of the questions they were expected to answer encouraged a more insular, self-recollecting account. Likewise, where ‘rightists’ were interviewed they often scrambled to prove their nationalist credentials, glossing over their *cedista* or *japista* past.³⁴

The CEDA’s disappearance as a political entity and its marginalisation during the Franco r3gime also means that the JAP neither has an on-going concern to preserve its historical memory nor maintains a presence, as the Falange and the Carlists do. Despite placing adverts, visiting ex-combatants’ associations, setting up a website, and attending 20 November commemorations leaflets in hand, I have only been able to speak to two surviving *japistas*. Equally, the wealth of Falangist and Carlist memoir material, often sponsored and/or put together by their respective organisations (the only ones allowed to exist under the Franco r3gime and the only ones to have found a market since), is striking against the silence emanating from the CEDA-JAP. This stands in stark contrast to the balance of books actually published *during* the Republic.³⁵ Often it can seem that every Falange leader from every tiny town has published memoirs since the civil war, no matter how insignificant, while there has been nothing from the CEDA’s leading figures – with the sole exception of the disingenuous memoirs of the consummate politician, Gil Robles himself. Written in 1968, by which time he had reinvented himself, Gil Robles’s memoirs are rather schizophrenic, both loudly claiming credit for the rising and also presenting himself as a democrat who did all he could to maintain peace.³⁶

The search for primary material on the JAP is therefore a long and fragmented one, which may well be another reason why there has been little

work done on the *Juventud*. There is no surviving CEDA archive and Gil Robles's house was sacked at the start of the civil war.³⁷ The papers in his archive, deposited at the University of Navarra by Pablo Beltrán de Heredia,³⁸ therefore almost all date from after the rising. Gil Robles's correspondence underlines his political manoeuvring during the war while this archive also includes annotations for publication – amongst them is a follow-up to *No fue posible la paz*, for instance. The difficulty here is that these particular papers thus represent a largely retrospective vision of the CEDA leader's political trajectory and one that he wished to portray, while the archive as a whole surely represents a mere fraction of his activity.

In addition, not even all the relevant books published by or about the JAP are available at the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid – the case, for instance, of *Trabajo y Capital*, *¡Presente y Adelante!* and *¡España: levántate y anda!*, amongst numerous others.³⁹ Nonetheless, the JAP's national newspaper has survived, as has the newspaper published by its Ávila branch, the CEDA organ and *El Debate*, along with a huge collection of other newspapers including the Salamanca daily *Gaceta Regional*. The Causa General papers at the Archivo Histórico Nacional require careful reading and patient searching but offer ample and extremely interesting insight, the Fondo Diego Angulo contains a useful collection of propaganda, and information can also be gleaned from the Communist Party Archive and the archive of the Dirección General de Policía in Madrid.

Most of the other primary material is scattered across Spain, from Manuel Giménez Fernández's papers in Sevilla, to the few unreleased papers still held by his daughter in Jerez; from the correspondence of Federico Salmón to membership records for the Gijón JAP, both held in Salamanca; from the JAP's Cieza-based newspaper in Murcia and its Mallorca daily in Palma to the oral history collections of the University of Santiago de Compostela, and the countless snippets of information in Provincial Archives (AHP) all over the country – from Albacete to Oviedo and beyond. In many cases the material held by these archives has not survived or is incomplete, however. Although civil government collections should theoretically contain membership lists of every association in the province, for instance, a complete list of JAP membership has only survived in Almería.⁴⁰ Even the civil government registry books of political associations cannot be fully relied upon to build a picture of the *Juventud*'s distribution in Spain: according to the registers of Pontevedra, Zamora and Segovia the only JAPs organised locally were to be found in the respective provincial capitals, yet in none of these three was this actually the case.⁴¹

By the far the most valuable material is to be found in Orense, where the Fondo Pérez Ávila is held in two batches, one at the provincial government

and the other at the AHP. The Fondo Pérez Ávila contains the papers, almost a thousand of them, of the leader of the JAP in Orense, José Pérez Ávila.⁴² This collection includes minutes from meetings, membership lists, identification cards, press cuttings, letters and even the JAP's flag. These papers shed new light on the relationship between the JAP and the CEDA and highlight the breakdown of the party in 1936, as well as the very real difficulties faced by *japistas* during the civil war. They also unequivocally demonstrate the involvement of the JAP's national leadership in the conspiracy against the Republic in July 1936. As such, these papers are a vital part of the empirical foundation of this book. Although I am conscious of the fact that Orense was hardly typical of the JAP throughout Spain, that the political reality of Galicia was different to that of JAP heartlands such as Salamanca, and that Pérez Ávila was more moderate than many of his contemporaries, these concerns are balanced to some extent by the number of circulars and letters to and from *japistas* in other parts of Spain, including a significant correspondence with Pérez de Laborda, while during the war *japistas* from Orense fought alongside counterparts from Salamanca, Valladolid, León and the rest of Spain. This material has also, of course, been corroborated with other sources wherever possible.



This book aims to readdress a number of key questions that help to explain Spain's descent from democracy into civil war and the creation of an authoritarian dictatorship that would last forty years. It seeks to fill a hugely important historiographical void by providing the first real analysis of the Juventud de Acción Popular during the Second Republic and the civil war, thus offering an alternative prism through which to re-assess fundamental issues about the breakdown of the Republic, the reality of accidentalism and catastrophism – hitherto erroneously considered mutually exclusive – and the nature of the 'moderate' right. José María Gil Robles's claims to have been a convinced democrat are revealed to be unsustainable, and the crippling divisions within the CEDA are laid bare. This book demonstrates the weakness of the easy assumption that 'fascism' in Spain was limited solely to José Antonio Primo de Rivera's Falange Española y de las JONS and proposes a new and more accurate perspective on the political right, not least by establishing the origins of the military rising on 18 July 1936 and highlighting the significant contribution of the 'parliamentary' right in conspiring against the Second Republic. In doing so, it demystifies the role of the Falange, underlining that 'old shirts' were less significant than has traditionally be presupposed, requiring the support of a shift in right-wing

politics before success became even a remote possibility. It thereby alters the emphasis in the search for the social, ideological, political and logistical origins of the Franco régime.

The process of fascistisation experienced by the JAP and the manner in which it sought to impose this new character upon the CEDA is a particular focus, as is the occupation of political space. This book charts the rise of the *Juventud*, its contribution to the polarisation of the Second Republic, the rejection of political coexistence and the manner in which this helped to reveal that accidentalism was a circumstantial response to the threat of mass politics rather than an act of republican loyalty. The 'legalism' of the bulk of the Spanish right in the guise of the CEDA is re-evaluated and the JAP's role sheds new light on the controversial and often confused nature of the CEDA. The CEDA and the JAP's key role in mobilising the right is central to this analysis. So too is the process whereby they subsequently collapsed, handing their masses on to those that would continue much the same project but by different means. By doing so, this account proposes a new lens through which to view the origins and nature of the Falange, the Nationalist war effort and, by extension, the Franco régime.

This book is divided into six broadly chronological but also thematic chapters. The first looks at the emergence of a 'new politics' and the manner in which the JAP embraced a style and rhetoric which distanced it from traditional conservatism and became profoundly similar to fascism, thus altering the nature of the mainstream right. This new political identity hinged on youth and paramilitarism, offering a combative response to the emergence of the left which was given practical expression in the JAP's reaction to the October Revolution of 1934. The second chapter outlines the JAP's authoritarian plans for a new state in the wake of the revolution, its continued radicalisation and its growing disillusionment with the CEDA, highlighting a division that would be exacerbated during the run-up to the February elections in 1936. It analyses what this meant for the Republic in light of the way in which the JAP brought sectors of the mainstream right into the orbit of the radical right, blurring divisions amongst those that would ultimately make up the Nationalist coalition. The elections, which provide the focus of the third chapter, were to prove a point of no return for both the CEDA-JAP and indeed the Second Republic. That the CEDA entrusted the JAP with its electoral machinery undermined its credibility as a loyal, legalistic party, both reflecting and exacerbating the polarisation of Spain, while the problematic naming of candidates deepened still further the rift between the youth and sections of its parent party. The JAP presented the elections as a final, decisive battle in the crusade against the anti-Spain, making it virtually impossible to continue as a democratic

opposition in the wake of defeat. Here it tried to bring about a brotherhood that would only be achieved with the coming of war, rejecting liberal elements of right-wing politics in favour of increasingly open authoritarian ones.

The impact of defeat is examined in the fourth chapter, demonstrating the JAP's involvement in the rising against the Republic and the growing fascistisation of those who remained politically active, expressed in an increased indulgence in violent politics. It also outlines the significant membership haemorrhage suffered by the *Juventud* in the spring of 1936 and the reasons for this but challenges the traditional view that the JAP passed *en masse* to the Falange, arguing that the response of many members was one of inertia born of the structural crisis of the CEDA. This provides a new and previously overlooked perspective on the Falange's take-off. The real collapse of the JAP and the definitive take-off of the Falange did not occur until the outbreak of the civil war and this is the subject of chapter five. This chapter explains why the JAP failed to react effectively to the challenge thrown down by the war, becoming virtually irrelevant. If the JAP's role at the outset of the Republic had been to mobilise the radical young men of the right, at war it failed to do just that and effectively lost responsibility for recruitment to the army, the Carlists and the Falange instead. Here, it also suffered for its perceived 'softness', a legacy of the contradictions of accidentalism, and fell victim to a whispering campaign that destroyed any chance it had of a genuine political recovery. This chapter shows how Carlists and Falangists took advantage of the JAP's weakness to become the new representatives of the Spanish right. The final chapter examines the JAP's contribution to the Nationalist 'crusade', arguing that this was not a new invention but was in fact ready-made in the JAP's Republican discourse. The rhetoric of sacrifice and redemption was especially important for the JAP as it became completely marginalised in the Nationalist zone despite its belated attempted to re-mobilise, culminating in the decree of unification in April 1937. This decree founded a régime that was in many senses *japista*, one which the JAP and its members had actively participated in bringing about and one they would continue to man for decades. The JAP had broken onto the political scene in 1932 and within five years it had officially ceased to exist. The impact of its appearance in Spanish politics was, however, to be felt for rather longer.

'The youth of the new Spain'

The Crusade to Save the Fatherland

On 22 April 1934, in driving sleet and freezing temperatures, the *Juventud de Acción Popular* (JAP) closed its first national assembly with a mass rally at El Escorial, Philip II's imposing monastery-palace north of Madrid. There, at the 'sanctuary of our race', the 'youth of the new Spain' declared a 'crusade' to 'cleanse' the nation. Amidst those 'old and austere stones', the 'essence of our spirituality' and Spain's 'glorious past,' the JAP unfurled banners, standards and flags adorned with the names of historic figures indelibly linked to the martial traditions of Spanish *Reconquista* and empire such as El Cid, Hernán Cortes, Pizarro and Jaime el Conquistador. These provided the backdrop to and the inspiration for the JAP's promise to deliver the 'rebirth' of the 'Fatherland'.¹ As one JAP member, or *japista*, put it: 'while our history delights us, our present shames us.' Spain had become infected by a foreign disease, a twentieth-century incarnation of the Moors – embodied by liberalism, marxism and separatism – and the JAP would react to bring about its salvation, re-conquering the nation and banishing the invader.²

The crusade had been entrusted to a new generation taking inspiration from Spain's Golden Age but representing a 'new politics', unsullied by the impurities of the country's tumultuous recent past. Untainted by involvement in any previous political régime, *japistas* were Spain's great hope 'for in youth there is purity, sacrifice, and spirituality'.³ The JAP declared itself the vanguard of a 'thrusting national movement', claiming the role of both foot soldiers and generals of the crusade. The JAP was not a political party but a 'militia' prepared to lay down its life for God and the Fatherland. This was a glorious calling: those *japistas* who died in the service of Spain earned martyrs' crowns, their sacrifice held up as a shining example and their names met with ritualistic chants of '*¡Presente y Adelante!*' [Present and Forward!] These members had not died in vain and the *Juventud* insisted

upon the redemptive quality of their sacrifice: 'Every drop of blood that we have to spill is a seed that God shall make flourish.'⁴

The man 'chosen by divine providence' to lead this crusade was José María Gil Robles y Quiñones, the 34-year old Salamanca-born politician at the head of the biggest right-wing organisation in Spain and the JAP's parent party, the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA). But beyond his role as the foremost politician of the right, Gil Robles was the JAP's Chief or '*JEFE*', a Spanish equivalent of *Duce* or *Führer*. The Chief's importance was stressed by the fact that *JEFE* was invariably written in block capitals and, while Gil Robles lacked the physical presence of the classic charismatic leader, boasting neither the intensity of Adolf Hitler nor the imposing stature of Benito Mussolini, a powerful leadership cult developed around him. On the courtyard of El Escorial, *japistas* were asked: 'do you promise obedience to our supreme *JEFE*, following decisively [*paso firme*] the path that he leads, without discussion and without hesitation?' The reply, offered in theatrical unison, was unequivocal: 'Yes! Yes! All my life!'⁵ Following Gil Robles's lead made sense: he was the very incarnation of Spain, the authentic 'Caudillo' – a title later adopted by Franco, of course – who, according to the JAP's political creed, which here borrowed directly from Italian fascism, 'never makes mistakes.'⁶ Under his leadership, the JAP would lead Spain to salvation, 'crushing' its enemies and building a new imperial nation.

El Escorial demonstrated that together Gil Robles and the JAP had the man-power, the spirit and the commitment to do just that. Party organs gleefully claimed that some 50,000 people had attended, their pages awash with the JAP's patriotic enthusiasm and new hopes. Despite the seductive logic of its calculation, ostensibly founded not only on the number of cars pressed into service and the quantity of train tickets bought for the event but also the capacity of the palace's 18,000m² western courtyard, 50,000 was an exaggeration, although a figure in excess of 30,000 would not be unreasonable.⁷ Some left-wing sources, though aware of the growing size of the right, sought to diminish the significance of Gil Robles's mobilising capabilities, alleging that the event had not been a success with fewer than 20,000 present. Meanwhile, one foreign correspondent reported that many peasants 'cheerfully admitted' that they had only attended in return for a day's pay.⁸ That was probably so and there is little doubt that many of the numerical references to the party's strength made throughout the republican years were deliberately inflated, but such accusations failed to recognise the genuine size and significance of the El Escorial rally or the profound effect that the JAP would have on Spanish politics during the Second Republic.

As the closing event of the JAP's first national congress, for many on the right El Escorial was a triumphant demonstration of the *Juventud*'s coming of age. One excited observer told how the rally 'put into relief the numerical importance . . . and fervent enthusiasm of the JAP.'⁹ Certainly, it reflected a shift being experienced throughout much of Europe, in which the right turned to a consciously populist project of mobilisation in response to the emergence of democracy. It also reflected the importance to this project of the mobilisation of a generation previously absent from the political arena, ushering in a genuinely new mass right-wing project distinct from traditional conservatism. While this shift was discernible amongst large sections of the CEDA, it was most apparent in its youth-wing; the JAP declared itself 'populist with legitimate pride', breaking with the apoliticism attributed to them to play a central role in changing the nature of the Spanish right.¹⁰

Here, their status as newcomers was an asset not a hindrance; it was their very 'youth' that defined them. Some critics did not see it that way, detecting something less than credible in the *youth* of Acción Popular. The Falange claimed that the JAP seemed to think that the 'best age to reach your "youth" is 60'.¹¹ Similarly, the republican daily newspaper *Luz* asked of El Escorial 'where are all the youths?', 'because the bulk of those attending was made up of men over 30.' Alongside, it printed a photograph of three rather decrepit, sad-looking pensioners with the ironic caption 'The Youths of Acción Popular.'¹² Such criticisms may have stung – and expressions of youthfulness could on occasion appear jarringly forced¹³ – but they mattered little to *japistas*. Youthfulness was more a moral condition than a physical one: they were a new force, untainted by previous political failures.

While the right saw in El Escorial the JAP's coming of age, for opponents and many political commentators, this was Spain's first mass fascist rally – further evidence of the growing, muscular threat posed by Gil Robles and his followers. Fascist groups had appeared on the scene since the advent of the Republic but none could boast anything like the presence of the CEDA or the JAP and none would ever succeed in getting even close to holding a meeting of such magnitude. Falange Española, founded in October 1933 and led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the late dictator general Miguel Primo de Rivera, failed to make significant inroads into the Spanish right. As it sought members from amongst the country's radicalised youth, the Falange found the JAP encroaching upon its potential constituency. According to the calculations of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), by June 1933 the JAP already had around 60,000 members, representing a significant force that must be stopped, compared to the avowedly national-syndicalist JONS (which would later merge with the

Falange) and the Carlist *Tradicionalistas*, both of whom had 'little numerical strength.' By the following month, the PCE was reporting with concern that the JAP had a presence in the majority of the provinces of Spain and by April 1934, with the CEDA as the largest single party in the Spanish parliament since the general elections of November 1933, it had grown still further.¹⁴

Deeply concerned, the left thus denounced the El Escorial rally as a 'fascist provocation' and demanded that it be prohibited. That the CEDA officially worked within the constraints of the Republic, publicly eschewing insurrectionary politics to follow a 'legal' tactic, did little to assuage their fears. The left dismissed Gil Robles' 'accidentalism' – the acceptance of the Republic as a form of government – as little more than tactical and circumstantial, all too aware that Hitler had taken the legal road to power in Germany.¹⁵ *El Debate*, led by its Germany correspondent, the *japista* Antonio Bermúdez Cañete, was often fulsome in its praise for Hitler and his 'racist militias with [their] torches and flags, trembling with emotion and pride' and the JAP's own ambiguity towards fascism hardly helped.¹⁶ While the JAP usually rejected the fascist tag, conscious that it had already acquired a stigma, it did not always do so. Ávila's JAP responded to charges of fascism on the eve of the rally by declaring indifferently 'let them call us what they want' and the Madrid JAP would later prove more ambiguous still, asking: 'Fascism? And what is that? We are . . . ourselves. Should anyone want to classify us with some subjective criteria, so be it.' The JAP also showed little reluctance to be bracketed with fascism when, immediately prior to El Escorial, it claimed that its codified programme 'incarnate[s] the thinking of all of Spain's youth . . . that many know by a different name.'¹⁷

The threat of a well-supported 'fascist' movement commanding such support to a newly-founded, far from consolidated democratic Republic was clear. This threat appeared all the more acute for the fate that had befallen Weimar, conquered and destroyed from within, and the bloody repression of the Austrian Socialist party by chancellor Englebert Dolfuss – a repression that had been applauded by the Spanish right. Such was the level of concern regarding the intentions of the CEDA and the JAP that the left's protests met with some sympathy not just amongst its fellow travellers but also those who sought to consolidate the Republic. This was apparent for instance in the Republic's moderate conservative president Niceto Alcalá Zamora, who only acceded to the final go-ahead for El Escorial after receiving assurances from the minister of the interior Rafael Salazar Alonso that it would not be a 'fascist rally' – understood more in terms of the style than the substance of the JAP, thus underlining a concern with extra-parlia-

mentary politics. The conversation between the two men demonstrated amply Alcalá Zamora's fears, with the president of the Republic asking: 'And will they be bringing their flags? And will they do their salutes, extending their arms? And uniforms and symbols maybe? . . . ' To which Salazar Alonso replied: 'No, none of that. Flags? Yes, of course. But there won't be any uniforms; it won't be a fascist demonstration.'¹⁸

In fact, there was a uniform of sorts and many observers considered the event to have been a fascist one. And, if Alcalá-Zamora had been reassured, for the time being at least, the same could not be said of the political left. The pamphlet *Antifascismo*, put together by a self-styled 'single front against fascism' was illustrative of the left's attitude to the El Escorial rally, pronouncing: 'We need to bar the way to fascism, we need to make this fascist parade impossible . . . Stand up against the fascist scum [*canalla*]. Let's smash [*aplástemos*] this fascist rally.'¹⁹ When the rally was not banned, a general strike was launched in protest. This, the first general strike ever called by the Federación de Juventudes Socialistas (Federation of Socialist Youth, FJS),²⁰ appears to have been successful all over Spain and especially in Madrid, which was left at a virtual standstill. But protests would not stop at a strike. Socialists also sought to prevent the rally's completion through sabotage tactics.²¹ Trains and coaches were stoned and shot at, tacks spread on roads, railways lines blocked and blown up, and assaults made on *japistas*, demonstrating that coexistence had already become deeply problematic; political adversaries were not merely opponents but irreconcilable enemies.²² Rafael Roca Ortega, a young *madrileño* and member of the JAP was shot outside the party's offices on calle Serrano, no. 6, on 21 April, the day prior to the rally. He thus became the latest addition to the JAP's pantheon of martyrs, his death a 'guarantee of triumph.'²³

That the left should see fascism in the JAP's public display of strength was unsurprising. For the first time the right, faced with a régime that they did not control and could not overthrow by military force, sought to mobilise the masses – and they did so by making political actors of those who had not previously taken the stage. Women, mobilised as an untapped, un-enfranchised and supposedly 'natural' source of right-wing voters, had been the movement's initial targets.²⁴ Now youth was recruited as its ideological vanguard and the physical expression of its power, Gil Robles boasting that his was a 'citizens' army.'²⁵ El Escorial was a new departure, ushering in a novel type of theatrical politics that drew on the experiences of inter-war Europe. The JAP, Gil Robles would later admit, had been 'seduced by the great totalitarian movements of Italy and Germany.'²⁶

Nor was it just the JAP. Indeed, this seduction took its lead from the *JEFE* himself. Gil Robles visited Italy in January 1933 with a view to

studying Fascism's corporatist model, requesting information and meeting Mussolini, while one Italian Foreign Office official reported back that 'many of [the CEDA's] adherents openly sympathise with Fascism' and that the JAP was 'promising'.²⁷ Gil Robles also travelled to Germany in September to take in the Nuremburg rallies. Having dedicated his time to those 'unforgettable' show-piece events, spent two days studying the organisation of the Nazi party from its headquarters in Munich and three days in Berlin visiting its propaganda operation, concentration camps and the 'Hitlerian militias', he returned full of praise. In an interview with the Salamanca newspaper *Gaceta Regional* and an accompanying article entitled 'Anti-democracy', which he wrote immediately after, the *JEFE* described how the world was turning towards a 'new order' which Spain had a 'duty to take on [recoger] and harmonise with Catholic doctrine'.²⁸ This duty was reflected in study trips to Germany arranged for *japistas*.²⁹

Although Gil Robles rejected the systematic violence and the 'state pantheism' inherent in Nazism because of its encroachment into the sphere of Catholicism and the family, he saw great value in the 'racist' model, in 'its eminently populist roots and action; its exaltation of patriotic values; its deep anti-Marxist meaning; its enmity towards liberal and parliamentary democracy; its efforts to coordinate all social classes and energies; its youthful thrust, so soaked in optimism and so different to the desolating, enervating scepticism of our defeatist intellectuals.' He concluded: 'I insist. In the racist and fascist movements, apart from certain unacceptable things, there is much to applaud, as long as it can be moulded to our temperament and soaked in our doctrine.' Moreover, Gil Robles admitted that 'when I saw 120,000 racists parading at Nuremburg and when I contemplated 60,000 lads in perfect formation [*muchachos formados*] at the stadium,' he could not help but 'dream of seeing a political party in Spain whose members, dressed in uniform, parade in rows of twelve abreast for six hours with a rucksack on their backs, to the sound of trumpets and drums'.³⁰

Whilst unable to compete with the sheer enormity of Nuremburg, El Escorial was to bring that dream closer to reality. If observers invariably equated the JAP to fascism, this would only be reinforced by the rally and, despite the JAP's protests to the contrary, it was not merely the left that caught a glimpse of fascism at Philip II's palace. Ricardo de la Cierva, the Franco régime's official historian, has described it as 'morally impossible' for the left not to confuse the event with fascism, while for another commentator sympathetic to the right 'only those who had not witnessed' El Escorial could concur with Gil Robles's assessment that there was 'nothing fascist about it'.³¹ Even José Antonio described the event as a 'fascist spectacle', albeit one lacking the real heart and soul of fascism.³²

The reason for such unanimity was simple: if El Escorial lacked a fascist heart, it certainly did not lack its aesthetic. The 'look' of fascism, taking its lead from Mussolini's Italy, was in large part what stood it apart from more traditional conservatives and most fuelled the left's charges. Leadership cults, intensive propaganda and combative language were characteristic of the political style of European fascism and the JAP embraced these wholeheartedly.³³ There were lines of *japistas* in rudimentary uniform, the party's emblem stitched to their shirts or overcoats, organised in formation, by region, on the giant forecourt of the stone palace. There were salutes and chants of '¡JEFE!, ¡JEFE!, ¡JEFE!' [Chief! Chief! Chief!] directed at Gil Robles, and the singing of the JAP's hymn – written by the right-wing ideologue José María Pemán, adapted from an old German march and touched up prior to El Escorial to give it a more martial tone.³⁴ There was the reading of the names of the JAP's 'martyrs of the ideal', each followed by rousing shouts from the crowd of 'Present and Forward!' There were vitriolic attacks on Jews, freemasons, separatists and Marxists, and 'degenerate' democracy. And, just as the early fascist groups La Conquista del Estado and El Fascio condensed their ideology into a list of programmatic points and the Falange reduced its creed to 27 Points, so the JAP had a codified programme.³⁵ The ideological centrepiece of El Escorial was the JAP's 19 Points – 'rotund, snappy affirmations, forged with hammer blows', each of which was 'a declaration of faith, of security in fight and in triumph.' The 19 Points was a 'programme to live by', although the passage of time meant that some points would prove rather more central to the life of a *japista* than others, pushing the more overtly fascist to the forefront. The 19 Points were:³⁶

1. Spanish spirit. – Think of Spain. – Die for Spain.
2. Discipline. The leaders do not make mistakes.
3. Youth. –Faith. –Boldness. –Purpose. –Young spirit in the new politics.
4. Repeal of sectarian, socialising and anti-Spanish legislation.
5. Christian family against pagan modernism.
6. Fortification of the race. –Pre-military education. –Abolition of the quota soldier [*soldado de cuota*].³⁷
7. Freedom of education. –Children do not belong to the state.³⁸
8. Love of the region, the basis of a love of Spain.
9. Specialisation. –More preparation and fewer speeches.
10. Our revolution is social justice. –Neither egoistic capitalism nor destructive Marxism.
11. More property owners and a more just distribution of wealth.

12. War on decadent *señoritis*mo and professional vagrancy. –Recognition of all activities. –Work for all. –He who does not work shall not eat.
13. Anti-parliamentarianism. –Anti-dictatorship. –The people incorporated into the government in an organic and hierarchical manner, not through degenerate democracy.
14. Reconstruction of Spain. –War on the class struggle. –The economy at the service of the nation.
15. Spain, strong, respected in the world.
16. First, reason. –In the face of violence, reason and force.
17. Prestige of authority. –Strong executive power. –Prevention better than repression.
18. Before the martyrs of our ideal: Present and Forward! [*¡Presente y Adelante!*]
19. Above all, Spain, and above Spain, God.



El Escorial was to be the basic model for the JAP's political theatre, which was honed and perfected throughout the years of the Republic. Meetings were carefully choreographed, every one opening with mass, the recital of the 19 Points, a promise of fidelity, and the reading of the names of the martyrs, before closing with the singing of the JAP's anthem. Instructions were released in advance to ensure uniform behaviour, laying down the exact size of banners, badges and standards, as well as the slogans and anthems to be learnt.³⁹ In its style – and, indeed, its insistence on the importance of style – the JAP was virtually indistinguishable from fascism. Only the celebration of mass set *japistas* apart from their counterparts in Italy and Germany, or the Spanish Falange, as the youth wing, supported by and drawn from the Catholic community, embraced paramilitary aesthetics.⁴⁰ This was an external manifestation of the JAP's growing fascistisation, a shift towards radical politics.

An intense and often disturbing leadership cult developed around Gil Robles. Indeed, this was perhaps the most striking feature of the JAP's ideology and stood at the heart of its political liturgy, just as the emergence of charismatic leaders was central to fascist movements all over Europe. There was something consciously irrational about a political creed which hinged more on faith and community than judicial policy, headed by a leader in whom power and expectation was vested. El Escorial formed part of a trend in which meetings were invariably adorned with giant portraits of Gil Robles, he was greeted with delirious cries of '*¡JEFE! ¡JEFE! ¡JEFE!*', was given guards of honour and was the subject of gushing, often

ridiculous eulogies.⁴¹ He was even dedicated a *pasodoble* declaring 'long live the victorious, triumphant *JEFE*', a man with a 'great heart and a great character'.⁴² Barely a week after El Escorial, one Navarra-based *cedista* told his audience: 'Spain needs a man to liberate her from the nightmare of Revolution . . . God, who holds an especial providence over our Motherland, has given Spain a man who will bring her salvation, and a guide to lead her to the fulfilment of her destinies. This man is Gil Robles.'⁴³

The whole of the CEDA indulged in this messianism to some extent, but it was the JAP that took its adulation of the *JEFE* to the greatest extremes. This was not because the JAP necessarily believed in Gil Robles any more but because the ideological and psychological function of leadership was central to the *Juventud*. *Japistas* looked upon Gil Robles as their Chief, not the leader of the CEDA – indeed, these two roles were occasionally contradictory.⁴⁴ The *JEFE* was, Pérez de Laborda claimed, 'only comparable to the great Cardinal Cisneros. It is Gil Robles . . . who shall return to Spain the greatness that it obtained at the hands of a Queen from Castile and King from Aragón.'⁴⁵ When the censor ordered the *Juventud*'s newspaper, *J.A.P.*, to remove offending remarks, rather than leave the page blank or blacked out the word '*JEFE*' simply appeared as many times as was necessary to obscure the text. Happy at the effects of this, *J.A.P.*, which first started publication in October 1934, even continued the trend in the absence of censorship.⁴⁶ Later, in December 1935, one issue would include an article consisting entirely of the word '*JEFE*', which appeared 192 times. At the same time, the second conclusion of the JAP's fifth National Assembly was merely to shout '*JEFE*' twenty-three times.⁴⁷ *El Socialista* cottoned on to this rather ridiculous trend and began mockingly to dub Gil Robles '*el Jefe Jefe Jefe*'.⁴⁸ The Falange, too, saw fit to satirise the JAP, referring sarcastically in *Arriba* to its own '*JEFES*', 'always written thus, with capital letters; we don't want to do any less than *J.A.P.*'⁴⁹

Even away from the national arena the leadership cult prevailed and became genuinely internalised amongst *cedistas* as well as *japistas*.⁵⁰ After meetings, local JAPs regularly sent telegrams of obedience to Gil Robles and hung portraits of him at the headquarters. *Japistas* could purchase signed photographs of their *JEFE* in a choice of three sizes, while they were encouraged to buy and wear anti-revolution badges in his image. Smokers could even roll their cigarettes with Gil Robles tobacco paper.⁵¹ The *JEFE*'s presence extended as far as the football field: a competition between local JAP teams in Cádiz was dubbed the 'Copa Gil Robles', one team in Alicante took the name Gil Robles Club de Fútbol, and Galician nationalists joked that *japistas* who found the net shouted '*¡JEFE!*' three times instead of '*¡Gol!*'⁵²

Unlike José Antonio, the urbane, handsome leader of the Falange, Gil Robles did not have the obvious physical attributes for such a role. Left-wingers joked that such a 'podgy' man had no place emblazoned across walls and billboards and that they would never be responsible for such an affront to good taste because at least they recognised that Manuel Azaña was 'ugly'.⁵³ Nonetheless, Gil Robles was an accomplished political orator, a talented organiser and a skilled politician. There can be no doubt, either, that he had considerable charisma.⁵⁴ 'With a *JEFE* like Gil Robles', remarked Cándido Casanueva, the leader of the CEDA's parliamentary minority, 'even cleaning latrines is an agreeable task.'⁵⁵ The Catalan conservative Francesc Cambó later described him as 'a man of power, of formidable dynamism, a man with exceptional qualities when it comes to inflaming the masses . . . [the kind of] man who leaves a mark on the history of his country.'⁵⁶

Yet the leadership cult was to reach extremes barely explained by such personal devotion or Gil Robles's political qualities. The reason was reflected in the wording of the second of the JAP's 19 Points: '*Discipline*. The leader never makes mistakes.'⁵⁷ It was not that Gil Robles did not actually make mistakes, indeed some *japistas* privately questioned this assertion,⁵⁸ it was that as leader his decisions were by definition correct and must be obeyed; the leadership cult rested less on Gil Robles and more on *japistas*' capacity for discipline. Indeed, the Valencia delegate at El Escorial sought to make this explicit, suggesting unsuccessfully that the JAP's second point should instead read: 'God inspires. The leaders direct. He who obeys does not make mistakes.'⁵⁹

This was more about leadership than the leader, something that would later facilitate the transfer of rhetorical and actual obedience to general Franco after the outbreak of civil war, allowing the JAP quickly to fill a necessary political and emotional vacuum even as some members lost faith in Gil Robles. Equally, during the Second Republic, this eulogistic phenomenon was, in a sense, offered up in lieu of a coherent ideology: channelling much of its energy into an intense leadership cult papered over the cracks in the CEDA, blurring the often serious divisions within. Thus, Javier Tusell insists that of the three more or less discernible strands in the CEDA, the most significant had no real political identity and was, rather, 'basically *gilrobblista*'.⁶⁰ For the JAP, leadership was more important still. As a crusading 'army', a 'militia' not a party, discipline and unity were central to the JAP's self-identity. This was not exactly a Spanish equivalent of Ian Kershaw's concept of Nazis 'working towards the Führer', but it did go beyond the simple obeying of orders or lauding of Gil Robles to become a reflection of the JAP's militaristic, authoritarian style.⁶¹ As the JAP's

newspaper later insisted: 'discipline is the fundamental base of our movement, as it is with armies . . . Every man in his place! In a disciplined army, the last foot-soldier and the general both win the battle . . . the only voice of command is Gil Robles's voice; [we will] annul ourselves within the group.'⁶²

This paramilitarism was visible elsewhere too, most classically expressed in the JAP's use of uniform. Originally, the higher echelons of the JAP declared themselves hostile to uniforms and on one occasion in Madrid, Gil Robles, much to the amusement of *japistas* who saw the avowedly fascist Falange as a poor copy of foreign models, announced that 'parades, uniforms and dramatic arm extensions aren't necessary . . . to penetrate the Spanish spirit.' But despite Gil Robles's occasional discomfort, as Pérez de Laborda imposed his criteria on the *Juventud*, such early qualms were left behind and the JAP embraced this political style.⁶³ Coming into El Escorial, the CEDA's newspaper declared rather curiously, 'we are anti-uniform, but given the character of the meeting as an open-air Mass, we recommend . . . high boots, breeches and a country shirt, khaki [*crudo*] if possible', complimented by the JAP's Cruz de la Victoria [Victory Cross] emblem, for which the exact dimensions were stipulated.⁶⁴ Moreover, although the 'uniforms' of many who attended the rally, particularly given the cold conditions, consisted only of heavy overcoats with the Cruz de Victoria stitched upon them, this disguised the extent to which a uniform had already become part of the *Juventud*'s political style and was quite probably little more than a belated attempt to ensure the rally's authorisation.⁶⁵ After all, the 'recommendations' of the Madrid JAP had already been fully elaborated and justified elsewhere: the Ávila JAP announced with pride in April 1934 that its uniform was a symbol of the 'unity of our hearts', as well as its desire for a strong state and *japistas*' preparedness for mobilisation.⁶⁶

If parts of the CEDA remained hesitant about uniforms, they could only cede to the growing militarisation of the JAP. Approaching a meeting at Mulhacen in the Sierra Nevada three months after El Escorial, the *Juventud* issued instructions to 'remind our members that the regulation clothing is a khaki shirt with the JAP emblem.'⁶⁷ Thereafter the JAP embraced the uniform fully for all political rallies, meetings and propaganda events.⁶⁸ Although the reality of day-to-day politics was that uniforms were not worn except at specific party events and many, perhaps even most, *japistas* may never have pulled on the khaki shirt, they wore JAP armbands to receive the *JEFE* and members were encouraged to wear the Cruz de la Victoria pinned to their lapels when not at meetings.⁶⁹ This was fairly common practice with religious badges, such as those of local Catholic fraternities, but while the identity here was Catholic it was also clearly political. This

symbol of Spanish nationalism and the JAP's conquering zeal, a 'pure cross' in a 'sea of the blood of our martyrs', 'should always shine on our chests like a badge of honour and duty.'⁷⁰

The use of external symbols created a deeper sense of community which was to become an important facet of the JAP's identity, reinforcing a *japista* orthodoxy and unanimity which ran contrary to the often confused conglomerate structure of the CEDA whilst also reflecting the militaristic concepts of discipline, sacrifice, and physical prowess. Strength came in unity and this had to be externalised. It was natural then that the JAP's national committee claimed that, like uniform, a salute was essential as an 'expression of the internal flame of our enthusiasm, the unity of our thought [and] our feeling'. After some deliberation – during which Roman salutes were considered, underlining that there was some conscious mimicry of fascism – they opted for what was described as the 'old Spanish salute'. Instead of the typical fascist greeting, this was a 'martial gesture' in which *japistas* raised their right arm straight before bringing it back across their chests to their hearts. In this way, the *Juventud* was impelled to 'demonstrate [its] discipline with the old and noble salute of Spain: the firm position, the gaze, the raised arm, the hand on the heart.'⁷¹



For Stanley Payne, the JAP salute serves as a metaphor for its identity; in only raising their arms half-way, *japistas* demonstrated the CEDA's ambiguity towards fascism and their failure to be genuine members of Europe's newest political creed.⁷² The JAP took on some of the trappings of fascism but never took them to the fascist extreme, they stopped short of 'true' fascism. Michael Mann has taken this on, describing the JAP's salute as 'half-baked'. 'Try it,' he urges his readers, 'it feels too wimpish to be fascist, a fascism of the closet, ashamed to come out.'⁷³ On one level, Payne's metaphor is apt – not because the JAP stopped short of fascism, rather because of the way *japistas* expressed a 'Spanish' brand of fascism, the reluctance with which they imitated it. What made them different was not that they lacked a fascist salute but the way they performed it. Their greatest problem with fascism was not its content but its origin. Fascism was not pernicious but it was foreign and the JAP's salute reflected its ideology: 'Spanish thinking, Spanish salute.'

The JAP's rejections of the fascist charge – and it had indeed become a stick with which to beat political opponents – were invariably founded upon its foreignness. It declared its incredulity that anyone should look abroad to 'exotic figurines' when Spain had already suffered the ignominy of having 'put up with them for four centuries'.⁷⁴ José María Valiente, the

Juventud's first national president, rejected suggestions that the JAP was a fascist movement in February 1934 on the grounds that 'Fascism is an Italian phrase that refers to an Italian phenomenon that cannot be applied to us because even if it is true that we want a new state, it must be founded on an exact interpretation of the way of being [*manera de ser*] of our country, rather than with foreign patrons.⁷⁵ One JAP author's 'rationale' for dismissing accusations of fascism was even more lacking in precision: 'maybe we do coincide with Mussolini on some points', he conceded, 'but we are no more than Spaniards. Spaniards!'⁷⁶ José María Pérez de Laborda, Valiente's successor as president of the JAP, a friend of José Antonio and sympathetic to Spanish fascism, echoed this statement. The man who would later fight to preserve the radical, fascistic 'purity' of the JAP against the liberal right on one hand and intransigent conservatives on the other, rejected charges of fascism on three counts: its adoption of 'violence as a system', its 'absorbent statism' and its foreignness.⁷⁷

At a meeting in San Sebastián, a year after the El Escorial rally, Gil Robles continued along the same lines, lamenting that Spaniards should seek inspiration elsewhere:

When I see people looking beyond our borders for the model of future political organisations I ask myself, full of pain, does Spain need to copy slavishly its political institutions from foreign patrons? Have we renounced to such an extent in Spain our tradition and history that we cannot find a political organisation that can adapt the magnificent vestments of our tradition and history to modern times instead of looking for foreign patrons and models that [would] turn us into lamentable caricatures in the eyes of the world?⁷⁸

The JAP's answer to Gil Robles's rhetorical question was, of course, no; the traditions of Spain were inspiration enough for a truly national movement, Pérez de Laborda declaring it pointless to look abroad, 'when we have all we need in our history and our traditions.'⁷⁹ Much as the JAP took a lead from Salazar's Portugal, Dolfuss's Austria, Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, adopting a foreign creed was unacceptable for an ultra-nationalist vanguard like the *Juventud*.

This was an essential conundrum of fascism: how could it be hyper-nationalist, drawing on national myths, language and iconography, and at once be part of a political creed born in Italy, however attractive that creed was? Indeed, it has been famously posited that beyond Italy 'Fascism has no meaning'.⁸⁰ Similarly, the fascist leader Ramiro Ledesma Ramos insisted that 'international fascism' was an 'oxymoron', underlining that the JAP

was not alone in facing this contradiction.⁸¹ Although the JAP's few criticisms of the Falange focused on José Antonio's 'obsession with copying foreign examples up to the smallest details' and his party's 'total lack of Hispanic originality', he too became loathe to identify himself with 'foreign models' despite an initial willingness to adopt the fascist label.⁸² On one occasion, he even declared that the Falange had 'never called itself fascist, not even in the most long forgotten paragraph of the least important official document or the most humble propaganda sheet.'⁸³ That did nothing to prevent historians from having long accepted the Falange as an authentically fascist movement.⁸⁴

The JAP's nationalism was aggressive, intensive and all-encompassing. The Fatherland stood at the centre of its ideology and rhetoric. As the first and last of the 19 Points had it, members were impelled to 'think of Spain, [even] die for Spain', while 'above Spain' there was 'only God' – and for the JAP, Spain and God were intertwined. There could be no higher calling than the nation, in whose name all sacrifices were to be made. Manuel Álvarez de Toledo, elaborating on the JAP's first programmatic point during a series of conferences held the day before the El Escorial rally, bemoaned the 'drowning of the unitary sense of the Fatherland in individual, local and regional egotism.' He called for *japistas* to reverse this trend by thinking of nothing but Spain: 'In the fundamental decisions of our lives, always the interests of the Fatherland above our own! When choosing a career: Which job? The one that is most convenient for Spain. Family? Home? Pure Spanish wife . . . Children offered to Spain . . . Sacrifice of our habitual interests!'⁸⁵ The following day, Gil Robles declared his desire for 'Spanish sentiment to be exalted to paroxysm' and he echoed this at a rally in Covadonga five months later, telling *japistas* that they should laud Spain 'with lunacy, with paroxysm, with whatever!' 'I prefer,' he insisted, 'a nation of lunatics to a population of *miserables*.'⁸⁶ The JAP saw its 'crusade' not as political but as something purer – as a fight for the very survival of the besieged *Patria*. A palengenetic myth lay at its heart, the JAP's rallying calls invariably invoking the 'salvation' of the nation, its 'rebirth' or 'rediscovery.'⁸⁷

The language of nationalism used by the JAP, the Falange and, indeed, the whole of the Spanish right was underpinned by an intrinsic understanding of history, informed by the notions inherent in Spain's forging of unity and empire. Throughout the right there was a desire to emulate Spain's golden age and for the JAP nationalism was founded on conquest and re-conquest.⁸⁸ This was apparent right down to the external icons with which the CEDA's youth wing identified itself: 'the JAP's task is one of reconquest and no symbol better reflects this than this Asturian cross [the

Cruz de la Victoria], a cross with which 'we liberated ourselves from slavery.'⁸⁹ Similarly, the choice of El Escorial was neither a coincidence nor an isolated case. Major rallies were always held at historically symbolic venues and the importance of location was stressed. *Japistas* were to come together, for example, at 'Pelayo's Covadonga', and 'Ferdinand and Isabella's Granada', respectively the starting point and scene of final victory in the *Reconquista* against the Moors. Rallies were also held at other historic locations, the scenes of those battles that had made the nation – like 'legendary' Cuenca, Medina del Campo, Uclés, Zaragoza and Santiago de Compostela. In addition, the JAP's library stocked up on biographies and the pages of its newspaper, *J.A.P.*, included articles on the 'greats of Spain'. These focused on those historic figures that had played a part in Spain's national formation or her imperial aggrandisement, usually in war.⁹⁰ All were lauded for their historical role and the JAP's self-assigned task was the recovery of the Spanish 'greatness' that they had embodied, as reflected in the national, spiritual and imperial 'integrity' that their patriotism, Catholicism and martial spirit had forged. Those speakers who addressed the JAP worked to incorporate such references into their speeches.⁹¹

Michael Richards has argued that the Franco régime sought to 'appropriate time itself' through the cultivation of an historical continuity between an idealised past and the crusading spirit of the present.⁹² This was not new. The JAP adopted a very similar approach, as indeed did the Falange. Like fascists everywhere, *japistas* saw their role as the construction of a 'new' nation that took inspiration from a golden age. The JAP 'seeks tradition in order to improve upon it.' 'We do not,' *japistas* insisted, 'want to return to our magnificent 15th century . . . we are inspired by it but we look towards the 21st century.'⁹³ What the JAP desired was a national rebirth, a rediscovery of the 'immortal essence' of the Fatherland, necessarily forged in battle – even if this was more often a linguistic construct than a physical reality. Spain would rise phoenix-like from the ashes; it was both 'an affirmation in the past and a route towards the future.'⁹⁴ As the third verse of the JAP's anthem, sung at El Escorial, put it: 'A past of light and glory / cannot be stained or lost / because the past is not only memory / but inspiration, order and duty.'

Negative history was seen similarly. This, as was the case with all fascists allowed the JAP to be both 'traditional' and 'modern'; 'our ideal is as old as it is new.'⁹⁵ Its duty was to 'bury for good the corpse of the nineteenth century', to rid the nation of the 'old politics' of the liberal restoration and the political clientelism of *caciquismo*.⁹⁶ 'Old politics', as embodied by liberalism and democracy, were to be replaced by a 'new', 'virile', and 'youthful' politics, which would found a corporatist state, a 'deeply traditional' yet

modern twentieth-century incarnation of the rule of the Catholic Kings, Ferdinand and Isabella. This would be a totalitarian vision that would impinge upon society, seeking to educate and nationalise the masses; consciences had to be re-made, 'pre-military education' imposed on all school children. For the Marqués de Navarés, addressing leading *japistas* at their first national congress, 'Espanolismo' ['Spanish-ism'] should be made a compulsory subject at school,⁹⁷ while other party propagandists insisted that building a new nation meant building new citizens: 'we must reconstruct our national spirit and inculcate children and youth with it.'⁹⁸

Here the errors of Spanish history would be studied to ensure that they could not happen again. It was important, the Marqués de Navarés announced, 'to understand history [and] not just the glory', but also the ignominy, and to learn the lessons from this. The lesson was that Spain's problems had been the result of 'deviations' from its 'true essence.' The Fatherland had suffered when its leaders had unwisely rejected its traditions and embraced foreign models, or when it had been attacked from outside. In short, the root of Spain's problems had always been foreign; Islam, the reformation, the enlightenment, liberalism, and, of course, Marxism – but not, tellingly, fascism.⁹⁹ The Republic, founded as a liberal political project with the backing of the Socialist Party, was thus immediately and irrevocably associated with the blackest chapters of Spanish history.

For the JAP and the rest of the right, the Spanish 'race' [*raza*] was not limited by the physical borders of the nation. But this was not a question of eugenics and although anti-semitism maintained an important rhetorical presence, biological racism had little place – either for the JAP or the avowedly fascist right.¹⁰⁰ On the occasion of the Spanish Day of Race [*Día de la raza*, 12 October], Ernesto Giménez Caballero, Spain's principal fascist ideologue, attended a conference in Berlin which received extensive and sympathetic coverage in *J.A.P.*¹⁰¹ Giménez Caballero argued that 12 October meant 'exactly the reverse of its name' and should instead be called the 'festival of the *no raza*'; to be fascist did not necessarily mean being racist. Much as the archbishop of Toledo and primate of Spain, Cardinal Gomá, had done on the same date the previous year, he stressed the cultural, Catholic meaning of *Hispanidad*. Colour was simply unimportant for the Spanish. While Spain 'understood' the attitudes of German 'racists', it could not share them. To do so would be 'to cease to be universalists, and therefore, Spanish.'

Jews were a cultural danger, a group the *japista* Antonio Bermúdez Cañete insisted wanted 'to destroy Christian civilisation'. They were casually described as sinister; their loyalties lay outside of Spain and they served interests other than the nation's. As the general secretary of the CEDA put

it: 'Jewry is the principle enemy of the Catholic church . . . in this sense Gil Robles is an anti-Semite.'¹⁰² Judaism was seen as inherent in sworn enemies of the Spanish nation – separatists, freemasons, liberals and socialists for instance were often described as 'judaising' – and the Jewish expulsion from Spain in 1492 had been justified, albeit as a question of 'faith', not race. Giménez Caballero argued unconvincingly that the racial persecution of Jews never went beyond rudimentary tests on the nose [*lo de las narices*], proof of which could be found in the fact that there were 'converted Jews who pursued their racial brothers with more zealousness than Torquemada.'¹⁰³ And while an unmasked anti-Semitic streak emerged during the civil war,¹⁰⁴ the right continued publicly to reject the biological determinism of German racism. This argument was later reinforced during an approving interview with Giménez Caballero in *J.A.P.*, in which he insisted that fascism could 'only exist if it is universal and Catholic, [drawing on] Philip II, El Escorial.' This heritage, he claimed, 'is the true ideal of fascism for Spain.'¹⁰⁵

Spanish identity was by rooted in empire. One *japista* wrote of the need to construct Guinea in such a way as to 'incorporate its richness' into the Spanish economy and balance the trade deficit, while only Spain's all-too-evident military weakness in the wake of the loss of her final territorial possessions in 1898 precluded a genuinely expansive imperial policy that might have brought her closer still to the fascist models of Italy and Germany. This was hinted at by JAP claims against Tangiers. 'History, geography, spilled blood, Spanish interests, commercial interests, national defence and Spain's honour demand[ed]' that Tangiers be handed over to Spain but, the JAP admitted, '[while] we could go on about Oran, Argel, Gibraltar, we're only talking modestly of Tangiers.'¹⁰⁶ Yet although conquest was the foundation stone of the concept and while imperial designs existed in extremely limited forms (and extended only to Africa), this was not based – ideologically, at least – on empire, economics or race. Instead, it was founded upon culture, which meant Catholicism. The national myths that the JAP embraced were tied up in the conquest of souls.¹⁰⁷ A Hispanic identity, *Hispanidad*, was common to the peoples of Spain and Latin America and brought together, in the JAP's words, 'twenty sister nations, all of which speak our language, practise a single faith, have the same blood and look to Spain as the mother of peoples and a model of true civilisation.' 'We want empire,' announced the Mallorcan JAP, 'not an armed conquest with weapons of war, but a . . . spiritual dominion, [which is] therefore far more noble.'¹⁰⁸

The absence of an articulated territorial imperialism set the JAP apart from Italian and German fascism and, to a lesser extent, the Falange.¹⁰⁹ But

despite the implication that *Hispanidad* represented the embodiment of international equality or brotherhood, underpinning all of this was *Spain's* dominance, a sense of the Fatherland as sitting at the hierarchical head of a spiritual community. *Hispanidad* was about civilisation in very Spanish terms; about expressing Spanish characteristics, imparting Spanish wisdom, and spreading the Catholic faith, of which Spain was the greatest exponent – and doing so by force of arms if necessary. 'Our ideologue is Menéndez y Pelayo; Spain's ideologue is Menéndez y Pelayo', declared the JAP.¹¹⁰ In this, they coincided with much of the right, and Menéndez y Pelayo it had been who had dramatically staked Spain's claim as the most martial defender of Catholicism; the 'hammer of heretics' and 'sword of Rome'.¹¹¹

The CEDA's social basis was overwhelmingly Catholic – some JAP bodies even stipulated in their statutes that members must be Catholic – and the majority of *japistas* were educated in church schools.¹¹² Religion had been the motor behind the right's initial mobilisation and it infused the *Juventud* at all levels, while reaction against secular politics provided the basis of many of the CEDA's hard-and-fast policies: it had campaigned against lay education, divorce, and civic marriages and funerals.¹¹³ Catholicism was also central to the moral education of the JAP's members. Books on the lives of religious figures, as well as papal encyclicals, were required reading for young *japistas*.¹¹⁴ The mutual interdependence of the church and the JAP was acute. Mass was heard at JAP rallies, the JAP took the Virgin del Pilar as its national patron saint whilst locally it offered devotion to other religious icons, and the flags of newly founded JAP centres were invariably blessed by the local priest.¹¹⁵ The JAP's overt confession-alism, allied to its fascistic characteristics, was thus to provide a foretaste of the Franco régime not offered by the more politically secular Falange.

And yet the JAP's confession-alism does not negate its fascistic characteristics. With Catholicism so tightly bound up in Spanish identity, extreme nationalism was difficult to express without recourse to religion. As Xosé Manoel Nuñez Seixas notes: 'native fascism needed to be purely Spanish . . . hence it would be profoundly Catholic.'¹¹⁶ This was apparent in the stance of the Falange, whose blue shirt Giménez Caballero described as a symbol of a 'new Catholic universality'.¹¹⁷ While the national-syndicalist fascism of Ledesma Ramos eschewed religion, he still called for the 'maximum respect for the religious traditions' of Spain. Ónesimo Redondo, the man whose fascist group joined that of Ledesma Ramos, wanted a secular political creed but was so personally devout as to tremble when receiving communion. And José Antonio, whose ideological heritage unquestionably came from the political right, was also

unashamedly Catholic. He always reacted angrily to suggestions that fascism and Catholicism were incompatible.¹¹⁸

Moreover, Catholicism was an essential characteristic of the nation; religion was cultural not just religious.¹¹⁹ The process of fascistisation undergone by the JAP – and, indeed, much of the right – meant that Catholicism was redefined as a national attribute, a reflection not just of religious belief but the greatness of the Fatherland. Faith was a defining feature of Spanish nationality, the 'sole essence of the *Patria*.' Gil Robles underlined the interdependence of nation and religion at El Escorial: 'When we dig into our history [in search of national values] . . . we will find our religious spirit, our theological spirit, the spirit that is within us and forms the heart and soul [*entrañas*] of our nationality. The more Catholic, the more Spanish; the more Spanish, the more Catholic.'¹²⁰ For *japistas*, God and Spain were the same cause; those who burned churches did not just attack the faith, they attacked a nation.

That nation was embodied by the JAP, which boasted of having mobilised 'the whole of Spain'. A huge proportion of its rhetoric concerned the size and social diversity of its mass following. The party press was awash with declarations of the scale of its meetings, as well as the enthusiasm and faith that positively overflowed in every *japista* – indeed, every 'good Spaniard.' The JAP saw itself as the voice of the Fatherland: all 'healthy', 'decent' Spaniards followed their cause and the masses that joined were the power base of the 'new crusade.'¹²¹ The JAP rose out of two 'vice-filled, cowardly' years of 'corruption and ignominy', read one ideological tract. 'But it was not the Juventud de Acción Popular that rose; it was the race. It was glorious tradition, the flavour of the golden age. It was Spain. The Fatherland!'¹²²

The JAP's portrayal of itself as the embodiment of the Spanish 'race' meant opponents were not merely political adversaries, but enemies of the Fatherland. 'True' Spaniards were those who thought and acted like the JAP: '[Spain's] people . . . feel Catholic sentiment, repulsion towards marxism, a sense of the unity of Spain, [and] a healthy agrarianism.'¹²³ The JAP's propagandists stressed constantly the existence of two opposing, irreconcilable blocks. This did not mean that Spain itself was divided, however. Rather, the JAP's opponents, marginalised from Spanishness, were portrayed as aggressors against the nation: 'the fight is between Spain and a rebel, sectarian nucleus'; the left was the 'assassin of the Fatherland'.¹²⁴ Speaking at El Escorial, the CEDA deputy Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez summed up the JAP's approach when he claimed that:

It is not possible to talk of right and left, but rather Spain and anti-Spain

... there aren't two Spains fighting for different ideologies. There is only one Spain, faithful to itself, faced by a rebellious enemy that must be defeated and suppressed.¹²⁵

By denying its opponents status as Spaniards, the formation of a crusade ideology followed naturally. The JAP's nationalism was founded upon exclusion and in becoming the 'anti-Spain' political opponents would not merely be defeated; they had to be 'smashed', 'crushed', and 'annihilated', all verbs regularly employed by the JAP. If they were not, then the very future of Spain would be cast into doubt. Coexistence was impossible, pluralism rejected. It thus became entirely logical to employ the language and ideology of Spain's history to declare the need to 'reconquer' Spain – not from the JAP's enemies, but from *her* enemies. 'We must,' the JAP declared, 'end Marxism or Marxism will crush Spain. Us and not them. There can be no dialogue with the anti-Spain.'¹²⁶ This anti-Spain was made up of marxists, separatists, Freemasons, liberals and Jews and was occasionally joined by conservatism and *caciquismo*. The difference here was that while there could be no accommodation with the former, the JAP did accommodate the latter. Its attacks upon conservatism and *caciquismo* were often bitter and to many *japistas* were very real, but they were ultimately doomed by the reality of the CEDA's politics to be little more than rhetorical. Ultimately, anyone who did not confirm to the JAP's image of Spanishness must be destroyed. As Calzada Rodríguez concluded: 'All the rest – Jews, arch-heretics, Protestants, communists, Moors [*moriscos*], Encyclopedists, francophiles, Masons, Krausists, liberals, marxists – were and are a dissenting minority outside [our] nationality, and outside and against the *Patria* is the anti-*Patria*.'¹²⁷

Proclaiming the anti-national characteristics of these groups was an easy task: the anti-Spain was 'no more than a low minority, associated with international groups who are as cowardly as they are repugnant.'¹²⁸ The Spanish identities of regional separatists was denied by their whole *raison d'être* – the break up the 'historic unity' of Spain – and their 'loyalties' resided in the regions, not the 'supreme interests' of the Fatherland. Masons and Marxists were equally easy prey because, like regional nationalists, their 'loyalties' lay elsewhere, the JAP declaring that it 'could not accept ... those who obey orders from foreign Internationals,' and that 'sinister Freemasonry', which was accused of being in cahoots with Catalan separatists, was 'incompatible with Spain and must be smashed.'¹²⁹ Marxism, meanwhile, owed allegiance to an international brotherhood of workers anathema to Spanishness. Its goal was, according to one propaganda leaflet later designed by the JAP, to 'put Spain at the service of a foreign nation, Russia, as if the

Spanish, who have always been the first, and by the virtues of our people must be again, needed to live under the direction of a foreign power.'¹³⁰ The JAP's fifth national congress would resolve to 'declare war without quarter on cowardly and impudent marxism, on wild sectarianism and on masonry, proclaiming with more vigour than ever the indissoluble unity of Spain.'¹³¹



This declaration of war revealed the contradiction at the heart of the CEDA's approach to the Second Republic, demonstrating that its avowed 'legalism' was a tactic, not a matter of conviction. Accidentalism meant accepting – or, more accurately, tolerating – the Republic's liberal system as the best means to secure entry into government. That brought with it an accommodation with democracy, pluralism, and political opponents that was emphatically denied by the JAP's desire to destroy its rivals as the embodiment of the anti-Spain. It meant accepting the rules of a game that the *Juventud* did not want to play and the JAP's determined rejection of coexistence would leave many young radical rightists irritated with the parent party's failure to make a clean break from a régime that they did not embrace. The CEDA sought to claw its way to power slowly but the JAP grew impatient, accepting these tactics only on the promise that they would work – and even then this acceptance was increasingly grudging.

Declaring war on opponents was also consistent with the JAP's self-identity as the party's vanguard and this role was at once physical and political. *Japistas* were 'advanced guerrillas', a 'militia,' and it was here that the JAP's paramilitarism was reflected in an avowedly masculine, youthful identity.¹³² Indeed, one historian has described the JAP as 'the most overtly masculine movement' on the Spanish right.¹³³ This youthful, muscular identity reflected both an ideological aspiration and the reality of membership – even if others did question the JAP's credentials. Republican legislation officially prevented those aged under twenty-one from being members of political parties, and some potential JAP supporters may well have joined the Confederación de Estudiantes Católicos or the *Juventud de Acción Católica*, but legislation does not appear to have made a significant difference: those beneath the voting age were required to submit a parental consent form to join the JAP but no other restrictions were imposed and it is clear that even this criteria was often unfulfilled.¹³⁴ The result was that many *japistas* were certainly under twenty-one, although the JAP's membership was more mature than might be expected for a youth section. Despite the significant role played by family ties in affiliation to *Acción*

Popular and the JAP, nor though was the *Juventud* comprised of children signed up by over zealous parents.¹³⁵ Indeed, it was not comprised of children at all: this was a party of young adults.

The JAP's statutes dictated that members could be aged between sixteen (or 18) and thirty-five, or even older in 'special circumstances.'¹³⁶ While statistics for age are scarce, it appears that a significant proportion of the JAP's members had already celebrated their twenty-first birthday. In Almería, for instance, of 254 members for whom figures are available, only seventeen were under twenty years of age, while thirty-nine *japistas* were over thirty. The JAP's oldest member in Almería was 49 when he joined, but the average age of *japistas* in the city was 24.4 years and most passed into AP after reaching the age of 35.¹³⁷ This trend of maturity was more pronounced among the JAP's leading figures, especially in Madrid where Gil Robles's own contemporaries played decisive roles, whilst speakers at JAP events were often senior, though invariably radical, members of the parent party. This was also true of many of the JAP's local organisations and, although youthful members increasingly wrested control of their own bodies, the Falange singled the JAP out for ridicule – underlining the extent to which youthfulness was something to which the radical right aspired.¹³⁸ But while José Antonio once referred to *japistas* as being 'older than the bones of Carlos V,' much of the criticism was far from fair, if hardly surprising coming from the Falange, 60–70% of whose membership was aged under twenty-one.¹³⁹ The JAP was not a party of geriatrics, even though some rather mature Spaniards signed up and many more attended its rallies. Gil Robles, aged 32 when the Republic was declared, was among the youngest parliamentary deputies in the Madrid Cortes and the JAP was certainly a movement of *young* radicals and students in particular. It represented a new political generation.

It was also predominantly a movement for men, even though there were female *japistas* and some women's sections. Some local JAPs stipulated male membership in their statutes, even when there was not a women's section in the locality.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, there appear to have been relatively few women's sections set up, and in those areas where women were welcomed into the main JAP, the majority of activists were still men. There were exceptions, of course. The province of Valladolid particularly stands out; there were at least thirteen JAP Femenina centres set up here, a figure quite out of keeping with the rest of the country.¹⁴¹ Nonetheless, the extent of male dominance in the JAP is reflected by its local committees. Of over 125 committees whose members are known, only one – Jaén in March 1934 – included any women.¹⁴² Naturally, this reflected a notion of their political position as well as their numerical inferiority and the principal activities of

the JAP's *secciones femeninas* were gender-specific and consciously auxiliary. It was the always 'beautiful *señoritas*' who distributed meals, clothes and the like as part of the JAP's charitable programme of social assistance, as well as sewing banners, flags and emblems.¹⁴³

The JAP's most fundamental national myths – from which everything it proclaimed was drawn – were the intertwined concepts of empire and reconquest. The utilisation of such violent, martial analogies converted *japistas* into the ultimate expression of youthful masculinity: soldiers. Militarism was central to the JAP's propaganda. The masses who joined were presented as the power base of a new *Reconquista*, while *japistas* were told 'we are all soldiers in this great crusade.' *Japistas* were 'brave' and 'virile', 'militarised and disciplined soldiers in the army of citizenship and patriotism that is the JAP.'¹⁴⁴ Gil Robles claimed in his memoirs that the JAP had always stood up in the face of danger, and impassioned – if often patronising – eulogies of the JAP's embodiment of the militaristic qualities of braveness, sacrifice and organisation were common throughout the CEDA.¹⁴⁵ *Japistas* had 'hearts of fire'; 'wherever there is a *japista*, there is a young man ready to sacrifice himself for the triumph of Spain.'¹⁴⁶

The president of the JAP's oratory academy, Adolfo Navarrete claimed in April 1934 that the *Juventud* 'deplores violence as a norm of political and social action.'¹⁴⁷ Gil Robles famously criticised the Falange for 'sending lads of eighteen out to be *pistoleros*', insisting that while he had told *japistas* not to be cowards 'nor am I telling you to go along the route of assassins.' This attitude, he insisted, 'sets us apart from certain tactics that, according to some people, appear to coincide with ours.'¹⁴⁸ And José Báez argues that the JAP cannot be considered fascist because of its 'rejection of violence'; it lacked the combativeness of fascism, its rhetorical radicalism proving 'much ado about nothing'.¹⁴⁹ Certainly, the JAP's indulgence in violence was neither so indiscriminate, nor so serious, nor even so positively glorified, as that of the Falange and José Antonio's party considered the JAP half-hearted in comparison. Unlike the Falange, the pages of the JAP's newspapers were not full of gruesome tales of 'exciting' escapades or extollations of the virtues of physical conflict, nor a fully elaborated theory of the cathartic quality of violence.¹⁵⁰ One former Falangist, asked why he chose the party instead of the JAP, replied: 'Frankly, I don't know . . . there were some Falangists who fought the communists . . . [whereas] other right-wing parties were ballerinas.'¹⁵¹ Even as politics shifted onto the streets and the JAP came more open in its involvement in violence, it still largely insisted that its use of physical force was predominantly retaliatory or defensive – and it was true that the JAP's members and centres were often the targets of left-wing attacks.¹⁵²

But to describe the JAP as non-violent would be misleading and does not tally with the reality and rhetoric, the very identity, of the *Juventud*. Gil Robles admitted that 'violent solutions took root more and more amongst the youth' and there can be no doubt that at a local level episodes occurred even though these were rarely reported and were not especially common.¹⁵³ For instance, in Tarazona, Albacete, where the 'valiant and blessed JAP' found itself 'daily face to face with socialists', vigilante squads engaged in numerous struggles. After local socialists set fire to a church, the Confederación's newspaper, *C.E.D.A.*, declared with pride that it had been 'quite a job to . . . contain the *japistas* and prevent them from exacting bloody revenge.' During another night's patrol, four *japistas* were detained by the police and incarcerated. Far from condemning their actions, senior Acción Popular delegates paid daily visits to the jail to keep up their spirits, while the internees managed to convert a few of their 'miscreant' [*maleantes*] cell-mates to the cause. The level of Acción Popular's complicity here was demonstrated by one occasion when the region's JAP leader Antonio Bernabéu launched an aggressive harangue to rally sympathetic locals to take revenge on socialists who had shot at the town hall. The provincial AP *jefe*, Marcial de Fez, happily accepted 'full responsibility' for these JAP activities.¹⁵⁴

Moreover, as Eduardo González Calleja argues, a definition of 'violence' should not be limited to actual physical aggression. He sees physical violence as only the most extreme expression of a discourse of confrontation, a mode of communication not a breakdown in communication; violence forms part of a fluid, changeable political culture, reflected in rituals, myths, and language as well as physical combat.¹⁵⁵ This theme echoes that used by Kevin Passmore in his study of the Croix de Feu (CF) in France, which takes the premise that violence should not be considered narrowly synonymous with the actual use of force. This, he asserts, 'would be to relegate violence to the periphery even of the Nazi movement.' Passmore admits that the CF 'would not engage in offensive violence' and 'rarely, if ever attacked opposition meetings'. But he takes issue with a characterisation of the CF as non-violent, showing that violence still stood at the heart of Colonel La Croix's party, insofar as the ideology and imagery of paramilitarism – of strength, boldness, virility, etc. – was a vital component of its, and fascism's, self identity. First, Passmore argues that the CF's declarations that it alone was able to take on the left, coupled with the way in which its political foes were demonised as enemies of the *patrie*, legitimated violence against the left and fostered disorder. Second, he sees the readiness to envisage and express violence as one of the fundamental means by which the CF distinguished itself from the 'old' right. Third, paramilitarism was

an expression of the CF's assertion of masculinity and power. And fourth, the CF's claim to reunite the nation through extensive mobilisation brought it into conflict with the left's 'equally problematic assertion of hegemony over public spaces'. It is these factors that Passmore argues saw the CF cross from authoritarian nationalism into fascism.¹⁵⁶

These arguments could all be applied to the JAP; the similarity between the CF and the JAP is striking. Violent episodes fed off the tone of the JAP's rhetoric, which lauded the virtues of virility, demonised political opponents and drew heavily on martial analogies. 'In the decisive struggle to save Spain', the JAP claimed to have been the party 'that took the first trench, opened fire, broke the enemy's force, and the prestige of its generals, and is ready to continue in the vanguard until it achieves the final triumph.'¹⁵⁷ Antonio Bermúdez Cañete declared at El Escorial that it was 'not enough merely to believe,' *japistas* had to act too. 'And to act', he continued, 'today and always will be to fight . . . to fight for the Fatherland is heroism, to fight for the Fatherland and for religion is sainthood.'¹⁵⁸ The JAP also sought to entice the left into precipitate action and regularly proclaimed its readiness to do battle,¹⁵⁹ Gil Robles declaring at El Escorial, for instance, 'Let the revolution come onto the streets, we shall be there too!'¹⁶⁰ Comments like these were common and would certainly have been taken by some *japistas* as justifications of violence. Moreover physical prowess was an integral part of the JAP's identity.¹⁶¹ The JAP was proud that 'at the hour of truth' it would be 'firm as rocks, always fulfilling our duty', while Gil Robles privately boasted during the 1933 election campaign that the JAP was 'determined and armed [and would] intervene when things went bad and the police were not enough.'¹⁶²

The JAP's ideology brimmed over with calls for its members to be constantly ready. *Japistas* were expected to be supremely well prepared in all fields, hence the great stress laid on conferences, public speaking and study circles, as well as sport, defence sections and commissions. There was here a hint of the JAP's elitism: this preparedness made the *japistas* the perfect assistants for the CEDA but also groomed them for a future role in leading the new state; they were the foot soldiers of the crusade but they expected ultimately to lead operations, not merely carry them out. The JAP's structure was regimented to reflect that military status and such roles provided the perfect opportunity for the *Juventud* to display its spirit of sacrifice and self-abnegation in the fight for a greater ideal: Spain.¹⁶³

The masculine undercurrent to notions of youthfulness, virility and boldness was especially evident in the JAP's approach to sports. Each JAP had a sports section and *japistas* were encouraged to take care of their bodies as well as their minds. The use of the JAP's Madrid gymnasium was made

compulsory for members, and once in power the *JEFE* would ensure that daily physical education was mandatory for all school children, whilst also insisting upon the need for 'pre-military' education in order to forge a new generation of soldiers and patriots.¹⁶⁴ The JAP spoke of the need to build 'a youthful spirit of love of the Fatherland and harder bodies through healthy exercise, so that within every citizen there is a soldier should the Fatherland need him.'¹⁶⁵ Under the leadership of the former Real Madrid footballer Santiago Bernabéu, who had taken on the role of sports secretary in the JAP's national committee, physical activity was thus encouraged all over Spain. A number of JAP centres organised sports teams, matches and competitions were arranged among local centres and against other (ideologically compatible) groups, and *J.A.P.* included a regular sports round-up. The spirit of adventure, boldness, modernity and conquest also found a somewhat upper class expression in the JAP's flying club. This was both a membership hook and a reflection of the JAP's identity: sport was not merely social, it had an ideological value too. 'Rationally and prudently practised,' it was:

not just a school of physical education but also of citizenship and moral education: it educates the will, teaches discipline and obedience to orders of command; demonstrates practically the pure results we can reach with observation and with methodical and constant effort; it makes us feel and love nature; detest the rarefied atmosphere of talking-shops [*tertulias*] and cafés, with the advantages of physical and moral order that this brings with it; wisely directed, it is a school of honour [*cabellerosidad*], of healthy companionship . . . it requires rigorous and unwavering punishment for the sportsman who fails to conduct himself with honour.¹⁶⁶

Sport's greatest benefits were, though, physical; *japistas* should be strong in body as well as spirit. Physical preparedness meant that the JAP would be able to repel attacks when they occurred and the *Juventud* made it abundantly clear that they would not simply stand aside in the face of 'provocation'; 'the JAP does not let itself get pushed around.' As one warning, delivered in April 1934, had put it: 'the JAP doesn't have professional gunmen in its ranks but if it is attacked, if someone, confusing prudence with cowardice, should attempt to take it by force . . . the fight will be to death, to the annihilation of the enemy.' Given that the JAP would often respond 'pistol in hand', such fights could indeed be to the death.¹⁶⁷

This willingness to fight back was enshrined in the second of the JAP's 19 Points – first reason; in the face of violence, reason and force. If the use of force was originally to be the preserve of the 'authorities' or purely defen-

sive,¹⁶⁸ as the political climate grew more aggressive so this was elaborated to justify the use of force over the use of reason. 'We will strengthen our muscles in order to impose truth', the JAP proclaimed, 'we wish to regenerate and fortify the race!'¹⁶⁹ Besides, nor would the JAP stand alone as a fascist movement that insisted that the violence in which it engaged was purely 'defensive'. Both the Nazis and Italian Fascists claimed to be acting 'defensively' against a Marxist threat, while the British Union of Fascists rather dishonestly insisted that it was 'more sinned against than sinning'.¹⁷⁰ And while the claims of Mosley, Hitler and Mussolini's parties may not be entirely credible, it was certainly the case that the Fascieu in France and the Blue Shirts of Rolão Preto in Portugal, both of which are widely considered to have been fascist, very rarely engaged in physical violence.¹⁷¹

The violent tone of the JAP's entire political outlook, deliberate shows of strength by uniformed JAP stewards at political meetings, the interruptions of *japistas* at socialist rallies, the formation of 'defence squads' ready to 'smash those who rise against Spain', the virulence of the JAP's verbal aggression, and its refusal to countenance any tolerance of its political enemies forged a climate in which the stakes escalated rapidly and in which violence increasingly became seen as the only option.¹⁷² Moreover, the JAP would boast twenty-six 'martyrs' by 1936, a fact that alone casts doubt on its classification as non-violent.¹⁷³ These were men who died in the course of duty. The JAP's intense martyrology lauded death in a Catholic cult of redemption that recalled Nazi notions of blood and soil, glorifying violence and sacrifice as the path to the rebirth of the nation.¹⁷⁴ It was the martyrs who were the JAP's most prized members, their names carved in marble at the party's HQ and their sacrifice held up as an example for other *japistas* to follow, for 'in pleasure we are wasted, in pain we are made'.¹⁷⁵ As the JAP's 19 Points had it, everything the *Juventud* did was carried out before the 'martyrs of our ideal'. One book dedicated to those *japistas* who had died 'for God and the Fatherland' vowed 'upon your tombs . . . to resurrect the immortality of Spain.' The soil of the *Patria* would be 'watered with Iberian blood':

Spain lost you forever but found your youthfulness for all eternity, and in this exchange we have uncovered an unforgettable path: that of the redemption of a people. A supreme lesson is born at your tomb stones, where the promise you have already fulfilled is nurtured: the promise of sacrifice. We have seen our brothers fall, embracing the earth with the passion of lovers, and you appear in our memories like ghosts in the night. There in the shadows, lit up by the nobility of redemption and the glory of sacrifice, your youthful heroism has spelled out a word: duty.

Following this sublime trinity – redemption, sacrifice and duty – we will raise from your martyrdom a Christian edifice and a Reconquest . . . the memory of the fallen will be engraved with letters of fire into our emblem and into the foundation stone of a new race of heroes.¹⁷⁶

While death was the ultimate sacrifice that could be made in the name of the Fatherland it was not the only one. 'To die for Spain is not just to wait for the chance to spill blood on the battlefield; it is to sacrifice yourself constantly for the *Patria*, annul yourself, become anonymous, fulfil your duty.'¹⁷⁷ The riskier these duties the better and the JAP proudly claimed for itself the most dangerous tasks. Here, the shining example and the centrepiece of the JAP's identity was its *Movilización Civil*, which gave physical, practical expression to notions of preparation, organisation, mobilisation, paramilitarism and sacrifice in the service of the Fatherland. It was, Pérez de Laborda told Salamancan *japistas*, an expression of 'pure citizenship'.¹⁷⁸ The *Movilización Civil* was essentially conceived of and functioned as a regimented yellow union, the physical embodiment of the JAP's commitment to destroying socialism, underlining a reactionary core to the original intentions of the *Juventud*.¹⁷⁹ The Communist Youth neatly summed up its practical significance, describing the *Movilización Civil* as a key part of the 'fight against the best weapon the proletariat, young workers and peasants have: the strike'.¹⁸⁰ But it would come to have an emotional and tangible significance beyond these original aims.

The *Movilización Civil* was to take centre stage during what has become known as the October Revolution. During the autumn of 1934, Gil Robles had reached the conclusion that it was time to push for a CEDA presence in the cabinet by provoking a governmental crisis. This manoeuvre, which would be repeated periodically throughout the following year until Gil Robles finally made one vital miscalculation in December 1935, involved a withdrawal of support in parliament and a show of strength on the streets. It was there that the JAP came in, arranging a rally at Covadonga on 9 September. As at El Escorial, the rally provoked a socialist reaction with a general strike and roadblocks but the deployment of a Civil Guard escort ensured that it went ahead, adopting much the same political theatre as had been evident at Philip II's palace, the *JEFE* taking the stage under an arch of banners and flags.¹⁸¹ That Covadonga, the starting point of the *Reconquista* and therefore a belligerent statement of intent, was designed as a show of strength was further underlined by leader of the Asturias branch of *Acción Popular*, José María Fernández Ladreda, who chose this platform to declare that: 'the masses of *Acción Popular* will conquer power and bring about the reconquest of Spain, whoever stands in the way.'¹⁸²

Gil Robles formally withdrew support from the government on 26 September and the administration led by Ricardo Samper collapsed five days later. Although he was advised against the inclusion of the CEDA in a new cabinet, the president of the Republic, Niceto Alcalá Zamora, had little choice and entrusted the Radical leader Alejandro Lerroux with forming a government with a *cedista* presence. On 4 October, the cabinet was announced and it contained three CEDA ministers: Rafael Aizpún as minister for justice, José Oriol y Anguera de Sojo in the ministry of labour and the new minister for agriculture, Manuel Giménez Fernández. The left, which had vowed to act if power was handed to the CEDA, declared a general strike. This was a protest at what they considered the entry into government of the enemies of the Republic, thus demonstrating both their fears over the true intentions of the CEDA and the extremely narrow vision they had of what the Republic represented.

The strike was abortive all over Spain, except in Barcelona, where a short-lived independent Catalan state was announced 'within the federal Republic of Spain,' and Asturias, where the unity of left-wing groups and the expertise of the miners converted the strike into a 'revolution'. This turned into a long and bloody battle with the Army of Africa sent in to quash the revolution under the orders of general Franco. In putting down the revolution, the army and the Civil Guard were aided by the JAP who, according to Pérez de Laborda, 'fought like lions'.¹⁸³ Well-prepared and organised *japistas*, regimented according to their profession or specific skills, responded quickly under the leadership of the JAP secretary Avelino Parrondo. While Acción Popular looked upon these actions with sympathy and would later glory in them, the JAP mirrored SA-NSDAP relations in Germany by taking full responsibility for the mobilisation and organisation of its members; this was a task explicitly for the youth movement. Although joined by other right-wing groups, it was only the JAP that could provide the numbers and organisation necessary to make a genuinely telling contribution and they were pressed into service at the orders of the authorities to limit the revolution's effects and bring about its suppression. *Japistas* drove truckloads of troops, including the Moorish soldiers of the Army of Africa, patrolled cities after dark, guarded churches, ran factories, protected electrical substations, acted as a police force for the sale of essential goods, and ensured that right-wing newspapers reached their readership.¹⁸⁴ They were militarised and ready to fight alongside the army, defended Civil Guard posts, and carried out arrests. The spirit of sacrifice found expression in one possibly apocryphal story: despite suffering from 38 degrees of fever, a young madrileño on guard duty at Delicias station refused to go home, preferring to see out the whole of a twenty-four hour shift.¹⁸⁵

José Báez argues that these primarily auxiliary roles revealed the weakness and essential conservatism of the JAP: the *Juventud*, he argues, could not function without the support of the state and was thus destined to collapse when its parent party was removed from power.¹⁸⁶ Certainly, the JAP was conceived of as a force to be employed at the orders of the military and the government – as a bourgeois auxiliary police not a radical *squadristi*.¹⁸⁷ But this deference to authority was logical in the circumstances and was only plausible while the JAP considered bodies such as the Civil Guard and the army – but not, notably, the more explicitly Republican Assault Guards – to be ideological fellow travellers. Eulogies of the army were common, especially after October, but submission to military orders remained dependent upon compatibility. Far from shown respect, those military men deemed incompatible with the CEDA's vision were weeded out during Gil Robles's occupation of the ministry of war, while the conclusion of the JAP's fifth national congress vowed 'obedience to those military men that are prepared to defend the principles of our society.'¹⁸⁸ Moreover, the army's repression of the rising was not applauded as a defence of Republican legality but of Spain in the face of a revolution; the October Revolution was variously described by the JAP as anti-Spanish, anti-national, anti-Christian and anti-societal but never as anti-Republican. Once authority lay in other hands, the JAP's legalism was no longer sustainable and later, where it survived the 1936 election defeat, the Movilización Civil would often provide the basis of a force to support the rising against the régime. Then, its role often involved the very same tasks carried out in October 1934, from the guaranteeing of services to carrying out night-time patrols and relieving military conspirators.

The October Revolution was a triumph for the CEDA-JAP, proof that the *JEFE*'s tactic could work. The left had failed to block its entry into power. Indeed, Gil Robles had succeeded in helping to tempt the left to go beyond the legal constraints of the Republic and embark upon a suicidal revolution for which it was far from fully prepared – something of which the CEDA-JAP was later to boast repeatedly. 'I was sure that our arrival in government would immediately provoke a revolutionary movement,' the CEDA leader recalled, 'better that it do so before it is well prepared, before it defeats us . . . [We] precipitated the movement, met it and implacably smashed it from within the government.'¹⁸⁹ The CEDA had emerged from the crisis stronger than ever and with three members in the cabinet, giving it a governmental presence for the first time, proving that the cautious tactic of stealth could work even in the face of determined and physical opposition from the left. The right had been shocked by the strength of resistance in Asturias, thus bringing home that the military needed to be made more

robust to withstand any further 'communist' risings and ruling out any short-term praetorian intervention in Spanish politics. But with the assistance of the JAP it had nonetheless succeeded in disarticulating much of the immediate threat from the left, which limped from the conflict in a desperate and now criminalised state. And, finally, the revolution served to radicalise conservative opinion in Spain, bringing tangible proof of the Marxist threat and thus a hardening of attitudes on the right, as well as an immediate and significant influx of members to the CEDA – all the more convinced of the need to erect powerful barriers against the left.

It had also shown that the JAP was perfectly equipped to build those very barriers. The *Juventud* told how:

They had it all: thousands of pistols, bombs, machine guns, flamethrowers, enough dynamite to flatten mountains . . . three years of systematic, diabolical and scientific destruction of [the army's] defences. The careful, strategic selection of [military] posts so that they would be occupied by traitors or the inept. Weak, wavering authority that did not notice how a party was mobilising as an army . . . leaders with no lack of immunity or resources . . . professional gangsters – embittered souls only comparable to their paymasters, prepared to shoot a man in the back for a ruinous reward. Huge masses of workers conned by a press with no decorum or cowered by the threat of starvation . . . But Spain has nonetheless defeated the revolution, triumphing over the anti-Spain . . . We are proud of the JAP's Movilización Civil. We were the heart of the citizens' reaction all over Spain [showing] sacrifice, determination, boldness, bravery and decision, risking our lives at all moments for the Fatherland.

The October Revolution marked a before and after in the history of the Second Republic and indeed the JAP. Given tangible proof of its apocalyptic vision of separatism and marxism, the youth of the 'new Spain' would embark on an even clearer process of fascistisation. It also earned for itself a higher profile, launching its own national newspaper, experiencing an increase in membership and holding more rallies and meetings than ever before, while it was given free-reign to indulge its verbal extremism. Yet at the same time the JAP had sown the seeds of its frustration and, ultimately, its unravelling. It had enjoyed a taste of power, proving itself to be the perfect bulwark against the Revolution and demonstrating that its claims of sacrifice for the Fatherland were far from hollow: it would not just talk about rescuing Spain from the revolutionary threat, it would actually do so. But if it believed that its starring role during October, its increased radicalism and activity thereafter, and the CEDA's arrival in government would

accelerate the day in which the *JEFE* took 'all power', allowing this 'revolutionary vanguard' to force through its programme and bring to fruition the rebirth of Spain and the construction of the 'New State', claiming for itself a central role in the CEDA and the edifice of the Fatherland, it was to be disappointed.

'An iron fist against the anti-Spain' Bringing in the New State

The revolution defeated, José María Gil Robles proudly told *japistas* in Madrid that they had won 'a magnificent civic battle.' This, the *JEFE* insisted, was a victory born of their 'discipline,' 'serene and unwavering bravery,' 'silent and methodical organisation,' and 'deep, burning patriotism.' The JAP's heroes had willingly 'stuck [their] chests in the path of those same bullets which have on more than once occasion brought forth cascades of generous blood, spilled for God and for Spain.' Their success was glorious, proving an effective dyke in holding back the 'communist hordes.' With the aid of divine providence, the JAP had ensured that Spain had staged the 'only revolution in history to have failed.' But, warned Gil Robles, 'do not think, dear friends and companions of the JAP, that your work is done: the triumph over the anti-national and anti-social movement is but a mere episode in the fight. There are new challenges, new battles and new victories still to come.'¹

The immediate challenge was to ensure that having heroically defended the Fatherland the JAP could now protect it, rendering another 'anti-Spanish' rising impossible: 'the revolution has been defeated; now it must be liquidated.'² The CEDA was determined to punish those responsible for October and led calls for the implacable application of the death penalty.³ The JAP demanded the end of 'the revolution' and its 'accomplices' – liberals, republicans, and even the Republic itself, which had permitted the incubation of 'communism' – and began a search for those culpable of allowing the revolution to exist in the first place.⁴ It was determined to destroy the left and insisted upon the need to buttress the nation's defence by strengthening the army, to whom it expressed its heartfelt gratitude and even organised collections, so that it could 'dominate Spain's internal enemies and defend her from her external ones.' Reinforcements would come from society: encouraged by its success, the *Movilización Civil* would boast over 14,000 members by February 1935 and the JAP called for its institutionalisation in a state-led programme of 'civic reaction.'⁵ The idea

was to ensure that any future revolutionary movement would be stillborn, unable to 'paralyse the nation'.

The JAP sought to protect Spain not the Second Republic. Prevention was as important as cure and necessitated a wholesale change of the country's government. The banner headline on the front of the first edition of the JAP's national newspaper, launched in the immediate aftermath of the October revolution, screamed: 'We want a new state!' Witnessing one state 'collapse before its eyes', the JAP could 'glimpse a new horizon.' 'With braveness and decision', it prepared itself to 'open the way to a new state: new politically, socially and economically; more just, stronger and more Christian.' Ruling with an 'iron fist to smash those who act against society', the JAP's new state would bring about the 'rebirth' and the 'moral and material reconstruction' of the Fatherland.⁶ The JAP was well aware of the European political epoch in which it found itself and the new state would take inspiration from the experiences of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, as well as Dolfuss's Austria and Salazar's Portugal. Gil Robles insisted that 'political and economic liberalism is dead', while the JAP's newspaper announced: 'the world is going through decisive moments . . . a new civilisation, a new socio-economic structure is on the horizon.' 'New paths' were being sought out, with 'youthful vehemence in Germany, noble Christian and German feeling in Austria, [and] brilliant Latin clarity illuminated by an extraordinary political genius in Italy.'⁷

But while the JAP applauded the successes of Italy and Germany, it nonetheless saw their states as too all encompassing, its cultural journal warning against 'dangerous imitations.'⁸ 'Anyone with any sense knows we are not fascist because in the depths of our hearts we do not understand . . . the deification of the state', insisted the *Juventud's* Ávila newspaper. According to its national paper, fascism's 'pantheist', 'absorbent statism' was not Christian. Like José Antonio Primo de Rivera, it complained that such models 'buried the individual in the state', and undermined the traditional, Christian role of the family as well as that of the church itself; the JAP was 'doctrinally opposed to the State-God, [which is] anti-Spanish and anti-Christian, and absorbs everything.'⁹ In February 1934 the JAP's first national president José María Valiente had told the magazine *Blanco y Negro* that 'the state must recognise the family, the municipality, freedom of education . . . freedom of press, seriously regulated, and, above all, human freedom, understood according to our theology not liberal [doctrine]'.¹⁰ This concern was reflected in the seventh of the JAP's programmatic points – 'Freedom of education. Children do not belong to the state.' – which was a direct response to the Republic's interference in and closing of Catholic schools, and was borrowed from papal teachings.

The failure here to adopt a fully totalitarian state has been taken as 'evidence' that the JAP was not fascist.¹¹ And yet, to paraphrase Robert Soucy's writing on the French Croix de Feu – a radical right-wing movement that similarly defended church education under the guise of rejecting 'statism' – what the JAP 'objected to was not so much educational statism *per se* but educational statism that was politically incorrect, that is, educational statism that was anti-clerical and left wing.'¹² Indeed, as if to prove the point, the JAP demanded the 'suppression of laic education': children, it appeared, did not belong to the state unless that state was confessional.¹³ This is just one of a number of contradictions that help to demonstrate that the JAP's selective anti-statism was rooted in a concern that the Second Republic, while not in CEDA/JAP hands, might deny the right to private property, land ownership and Church freedom. This was, by definition, a conflict that would be ended with the reassertion of the confessional state. Nor was the JAP alone here: even Spain's avowedly authoritarian right, from Carlist Traditionalists through Alfonsist monarchists and even to the fascist Falange, all of whom occasionally used the liberalism of the Republic to their advantage, did not demand a fully totalitarian polity or the rejection of the right to private property.

Critiques of 'absorbent statism' sat uneasily with the JAP's calls for 'all power to the *JEFE*', as well as its glorification of sacrifice and death for Spain. Moreover, the JAP's objections did not prevent it from demanding that its 'new state' should be a 'strong state' – one that would be intrusive, repressive and authoritarian. If the JAP would 'not sink legitimate Christian liberties', there were few qualms about denying other liberties. Meanwhile, the desire to allow freedom of the press subject to 'serious regulations' was born of an awareness that it was a press network that spawned the CEDA in the first place and continued to employ some of its propagandists. Besides, even that soon gave way under Valiente's successor, José María Pérez de Laborda, to the intention simply to ban all newspapers that did not conform to the JAP's vision of Spanish society and politics, including 'scum' liberal papers like *El Heraldo* and *El Liberal*.¹⁴ Real press freedom, like real educational freedom, was pernicious.

The appeal for the application of an 'iron fist' did not exactly speak of reticence towards state power, especially in the context of the JAP's demonisation of political opponents as enemies of the Fatherland and the bloodshed of the revolution and its repression. Indeed, the JAP talked openly of the need to use the state's 'coercive power' to fulfil its goals, insisted that 'liberties' must be 'well-policed', and vowed that it could not allow coexistence with organisations 'based on the class struggle,' thus criminalising the left at a stroke. This was summed up in the cartoon that

showed a JAP fist crushing Manuel Azaña and other left-wingers, above the slogan: 'don't worry about those chumps, this iron fist has them in its grip.'¹⁵

Gil Robles later described the *Juventud*'s own spirit as 'absorbent' and its politics as leading inevitably to their becoming 'totalitarian politicians.'¹⁶ The expressed aim of using the state apparatus to 'smash', 'destroy' and 'annihilate' socialism, ban trades unions and close newspapers showed that there was no fear of over-riding state power, so long as it was in the right hands. Even the defence of private property did not prevent the JAP from insisting that all wealth must be placed at the 'service of the Fatherland'. For the JAP, this was a genuine desire, too: that the CEDA's policies failed to fit the rhetoric would deepen the rift between the parent party and its youth wing.

The fact that the JAP's new state would make demands of Spaniards that contradicted its defence of 'individual liberties' was underlined by the first edition of its newspaper, *J.A.P.*, whose clarion call was peppered with words like 'savage austerity', 'discipline', 'hierarchy' and 'morality'. And when the second edition of *J.A.P.* was published a fortnight later, it continued with the same theme. Its cover headline declared 'there can only be one state' and its subheading was explicit: 'If an entity, whether it is masonry, socialism or syndicalism, becomes anti-state, either the state crushes its rival or it withers.' The JAP certainly would not hesitate to eliminate the enemies of Spain which, with its arrival in government and the call for a new régime, now became enemies of the state too.¹⁷ It was of course this that most provoked fear on the left:¹⁸ the determination physically to destroy political opponents had always formed a central part of the JAP's outlook; now, in power, that could crystallise into something more tangible.

That the JAP's ostensible concern with individual liberties was dependant upon whose liberties were under threat was apparent in its model for a new state, which demanded that citizens had 'duties' rather than 'rights' and explicitly rejected pluralism and democracy in a bid to put an end to 'politics'.¹⁹ When Gil Robles later wrote to general Franco of the fact that Acción Popular had 'been born with the characteristics of a party because the political structure of Spain at the time demanded it but with the constant aspiration to be a huge national movement, above petty political ambitions,' he sought to curry favour but he also presented an accurate reflection of the *Juventud*'s perspective.²⁰ For the JAP, liberalism was a 'putrid corpse' and systems of political interest and lobbying were shameful. Individualism was always to be subsumed within the nation. In liberalism's stead, the JAP proposed corporatism – a 'complete system' which would 'cultivate a collective spirit.'²¹

According to the JAP, corporatism 'embraces the economic, social and political order. Its basis is groups of men organised according to communities of natural interests and social functions.' Corporatism would provide the foundation stone of 'a dignified régime of discipline, of authority, [and] of hierarchy, in which chaotic individualism is replaced by organic harmony and a corporate society, stimulated by power, but not imposed by power.'²² Quite where the division lay between stimulation and imposition remained unclear but the JAP declared that it would harmonise all sectors of society in the service of the Fatherland by working towards Spain's 'destiny'. Despite the evident similarities with fascist and authoritarian régimes in a continent turning its back on democracy, the JAP was quick to point out that this was not a copy of foreign political trends. 'Corporate integritism' was an 'old tradition of Spain' that had been reinvented in the social Catholicism of Leo XIII and Pius XI, as well as Italy, Portugal and Austria.²³

The keynotes of this state were unity and harmony. In practice, this meant the application of repressive force and the rejection of the very respect for individual liberty that the JAP claimed to defend. Not only did the leadership cult surrounding Gil Robles, with its exaltation of discipline and undisputed authority, suggest a dictatorship, but the JAP's approach to the 'anti-Spain' left socialists and republicans alike in little doubt as to the dark fate that lay in store. The JAP would not allow alternative visions of politics, society or the nation to co-exist because to do so would be to commit treachery against the Fatherland. As *J.A.P.* would declare a year after the October revolution: 'We cannot tolerate the freedom of thought, of press, of expression or of reunion that poisons and corrupts our people and awakens and stimulates the bloodthirsty instincts of the beast.'²⁴ This brought the JAP into conflict with the core of the Republic's existence; the CEDA accommodated, and was accommodated by, a liberal régime but its youth movement openly aspired to its dismantling. Liberalism, after all, necessarily opened the way to socialism; as one Valencian propagandist insisted the French revolution was a forerunner of its Russian counterpart.²⁵

Rejecting liberalism meant dispensing with democracy. 'We will,' the JAP vowed, 'use the weapon of universal suffrage to end its irrational existence' and it made no bones about its contempt for the democratic system.²⁶ Gil Robles had long-since dismissed parliamentary democracy as 'corrosive', claiming that it 'destroyed the internal unity of power' and encouraged anarchy.²⁷ Now, the *Juventud* declared it ridiculous to advocate a system of universal suffrage – a 'régime based on falsehood' in which the vote of an 'idiot' is as valid as that of the 'wise'.²⁸ But it was not just about wisdom or reliability: the centrality of a concept of authority and obedience

meant that even those who could be trusted to vote intelligently and in defence of the Fatherland would not necessarily be granted a voice, just as a soldier would not question his general. That obedience was prized above an opinion was demonstrated in the JAP's own internal workings. There was also no voting on motions at its first national congress at El Escorial, with decisions instead taken unilaterally by the presidency, while committees were chosen by 'acclamation'.²⁹ And although there were some local bodies that did vote on major decisions,³⁰ far more common was the system reported on by Acción Popular's Zaragoza-based newspaper after the JAP's fourth national assembly, held in the city in June 1935. 'The JAP hates the system of degenerate democracy,' it read. 'Agreements are unanimous; if an agreement cannot be reached the presidency decides.'³¹ This was even enshrined in the very statutes of the movement, which read: 'the JAP will give an authoritarian meaning [*sentido*] to their organisations and will be an example in combating degenerate democracy and suffrage . . .'³²



Yet the JAP's goals were not merely destructive, they were constructive too. It was not enough to defeat and repress the revolution, rescuing Spain, the JAP also wished to build a new nation. After all, as its seventeenth programmatic point put it, 'prevention better than repression.' If the CEDA was to prove, for all its contradictions, an essentially reactionary, conservative party at its core, the JAP publicly claimed a more modern millenarian vision.³³ While this insistence may have been less than crucial for many rank and file members, for the increasingly influential president Pérez de Laborda it was genuinely important. He demanded progress and change, not just a visceral defence of the status quo. Rhetorically at least, others concurred. Federico Salmón had spoken at El Escorial of the JAP's 'providential task' to 'bring about a profound social and political revolution' and the JAP's clarion call for a new state spoke not just of the need to defeat the anti-Spain but to build a 'twenty-first century Spain, making her a great and powerful nation'.³⁴ Corporatism was both a political end and a means towards the rebirth of the nation. Ramón Serrano Súñer, CEDA parliamentary deputy for Zaragoza, Franco's brother in law and later the mastermind of the Francoist New State, had produced the most detailed model of this ideal at the JAP's first national congress at El Escorial. 'The old political régime, with its formalistic, ritualistic democracy, entirely lacking in national substance, is finished,' he told *japistas*. Parliamentarianism and universal suffrage had 'failed entirely'. In their stead, the JAP would establish a post-liberal, organic

corporatism in which all political actions would be 'defined and legitimised in relation to the general interests of the nation.'³⁵

The nation in question was Spain: corporatism rejected the claims of peripheral nationalisms. Ricardo Chueca and José Ramón Montero have argued that the extreme nationalism central to Spanish fascism was primarily articulated through the concept of unity and this was certainly true of the JAP.³⁶ An integrative interpretation of the Spanish Fatherland blurred divisions between social classes, historic regions and even other Hispanic nations. Working towards the re-birth of the *Patria* provided an agglutinate to unite these disparate identities in Spanish society, while the realisation of the nation's 'destiny' would institutionalise this unification in a single state, a single class and a single faith. The JAP's system was thus necessarily centralist. The announcement of an independent Catalonia during the October Revolution had reawakened concern over the break-up of the nation, laying bare the threat of the 1932 autonomy statute – something that was reflected in the foundation of a first ever JAP in Barcelona in the aftermath of the revolution – but separatism had always been part of the anti-Spain.³⁷ The JAP glorified Castile, 'the guiding light of all . . . the indissoluble bond that unites us', as the 'mother' of Spain and the heartland of the essence of Spanishness (as well as its own support), bitterly attacked regional political aspirations, and was virulently opposed to 'separatism', which it defined in extremely broad terms.³⁸

Yet there was no push towards a Castilianisation of Spanishness. Nor was there a repression of regional language as there would later be under a Franco régime determined to bring reprisals against those it had defeated; one thoughtful *japista* noted privately that repressing regional identity created more problems than it solved.³⁹ The JAP called for the cultivation of the '[Castilian] Spanish language', but 'without prejudicing the [regional] vernacular', some JAP groupings, like those of Navarre and Galicia, declared their regional character, and others used languages other than Castilian in the production of minutes and official publications.⁴⁰ The Basque language was the 'oldest and therefore the most Spanish of our languages,' after all.⁴¹ That insistence summed up in a phrase the JAP's approach: it adopted an integrative nationalism, which drew upon the notion of the *patria chica*, the 'love of the region as the basis of the love of Spain.' The region was a cog in the corporatist nation.⁴² Or, as the Valencian delegate Manuel Atard had told the first national congress, a piece of fruit. 'Spanish unity is like an orange,' he claimed. 'Each segment is different and has its own characteristics, but all are united in the cortex of a common destiny.'⁴³ Here, cultural regionalism was a fortification of Spanishness; expressions of regional pride were an extension of Spanish patriotism. 'All

the popular characteristics of Catalonia', wrote *J.A.P.*, 'by the sheer virtue of being Catalan, are essentially Spanish and Spain is proud of them.'

This Spanish co-option could cause friction. The JAP's attempts to glorify Santiago as a 'Spanish' patron on the occasion of the Day of Galicia annoyed the Galician nationalist newspaper, *A Nossa Terra*, which complained that *japistas* had 'come to our Compostela – not theirs – and evoked falsehoods. Santiago, patron of Spain [?] For true *gallegos*, Santiago was no such thing.'⁴⁴ For the JAP, such complaints were inadmissible. By being Galician Santiago necessarily became a Spanish symbol. The JAP adopted a kind of national, 'Spanish' co-option of regional characteristics and local identity was always strictly subordinate to Spanishness. Spain's historic regions were approached as component parts of the Fatherland, rather than national, autonomous identities in their own right and each and every one would be called upon to help to fulfil Spain's 'destiny'. The JAP would infuse its local bodies with the 'patriotic ideal', meaning the *Spanish* patriotic ideal.⁴⁵ Its response to the foundation of its first centres in Catalonia in December 1934, for instance, was to urge its 'Catalan brothers' into the 'Service of Spain'.⁴⁶

Significantly, 'national unity' would be achieved regardless of the desires of the inhabitants of the regions themselves – separatism was entirely illegitimate as a political option. Adopting the kind of organic language so prevalent in the JAP, Gil Robles would later proclaim that 'the separatists who abuse Spain and declare their decision to break away from her cannot have a seat in a Spanish parliament . . . it would be like willingly injecting the national organism with a deadly poison.'⁴⁷ Furthermore, it was implicit in the JAP's message that the full integration of the regions into the Fatherland would be achieved by force if necessary, just as Spain had fought to prevent the break away of Cuba and the Philippines; 'Spain', *J.A.P.* would later announce, 'needs to re-conquer the regions.'⁴⁸

In the JAP's new state, decisions would be taken for the good of the Fatherland, not the region: 'central power must coordinate regional projects, thus maintaining the supreme and unifying principles of the nation.'⁴⁹ The JAP's organic approach meant that 'healthy' regionalism was essential for the successful functioning of the national body; regions, like the family and economic corporations, were organs that functioned together in harmony but were irrelevant on their own. Regional identity was defined not on its own terms, but by the manner in which it could assist the *Patria*. Its historic myths were tied up in the creation, protection and extension of the Spanish nation.⁵⁰ Lauding Spain's 'blessed and fruitful regional variety!' the Navarrese JAP for instance spoke of how 'like the fibres, tendons and bones of the body, the energies, the accents of personality [and] the pure

idiosyncrasies of the regions integrate and articulate the strengthening of the Fatherland. The stronger the body, the stronger and more robust the members, the better they fulfil their special duty in the supreme and fundamental functioning of the organism.⁵¹

The JAP's apparently pro-regionalist stance was centralism by a different tact. JAP congresses and meetings stressed folkloric regionalism. Those attending were encouraged to bear the flags of their regions, dress in 'typical' regional attire, carry and play regional musical instruments, and perform regional dances. The reduction of regional identity to music, dance and costume served to remove its political meaning, trivialising regionalism, as if its claims could be met merely by the occasional indulgence in a few 'typical' local dances. As Gil Robles admitted, the JAP had a 'special regional feeling', but this was 'always limited to the field of customs.'⁵² One Galician JAP president summed up this approach when he declared himself 'autonomist, yes; separatist, no – never.'⁵³ Here, the JAP could satisfy its need to be seen to adopt and support a regional agenda which reflected the confederate structure of the CEDA but which the Madrid-based directorate of the youth wing did not believe in. It hardly made sense for the *Juventud* to disenfranchise significant chunks of its potential constituency or to undermine its parent party (although this would eventually begin to happen).

That the JAP's outlook, beneath the pseudo-pluralist regional rhetoric was basically centralist was reflected in its internal structure; the JAP consciously rejected the federal organisation of the CEDA and Madrid's JAP effectively became its national directorate. Across Spain, local youth movements changed their names to the *Juventud de Acción Popular* rather than regional-specific titles borrowed from their respective parent parties. While it kept the name JDRV, in October 1935 the Valencia body unofficially broke from the Derecha Regional Valenciana to come in line with the national JAP and this was repeated elsewhere with the creation of an unofficial JAP coordinating committee that by-passed local CEDA bodies. This was a significant challenge to the CEDA, reflecting the JAP's bid for autonomy. All over the country, local youth bodies took their lead not from the parent party but from the leadership of the *Juventud* in Madrid as what Gil Robles described as a 'centralising spirit' came to define the JAP.⁵⁴

The JAP's new state would guarantee that, like Spain's historic regions, social classes functioned in harmony for the good of the nation. Gil Robles claimed at Covadonga to have an 'integral sense of our Spanish people, not a narrow vision of caste or class, but a feeling of harmony and mutual understanding [*compenetración*].'⁵⁵ The JAP boasted that its corporatist model would replace class consciousness with national consciousness and would,

as Pérez de Laborda told one meeting, work to achieve 'a just Spain, above the egotism of class, above bosses and workers.' It would bring about 'the unity of all social classes with a common yearning to make Spain great.' We will, he insisted, 'all be united, owners and workers, landlords and the landless, we will all be united in working for the Fatherland, common to all.'⁵⁶

'Social justice' was an obsession for the JAP. It even came to describe itself as 'extreme left' on this issue,⁵⁷ proposing a third way between labour and capital that was drawn from papal teachings but also reflected the ideological currents of European fascism in its synthesis of traits from right and left.⁵⁸ 'Social justice' would not be 'just a written programme', it was the 'heart and soul' of the JAP's ideology and its model for a new state, an expression of the *Juventud*'s faith and populist nationalism: Christians could not merely ignore those 'who have no work, suffer the cold and see their children go hungry' while, despite its predominantly middle class profile, the JAP insisted that neither it nor the CEDA was a party of vested interest. Indeed, it was not a party at all but a 'national movement' of all Spaniards. The JAP stressed constantly the social depth of its support; its members were always 'working class elements', the 'most humble', or 'peasants'.⁵⁹ Those workers who were high-profile members of the JAP, and indeed the CEDA, were paraded like trophies as living proof of the party's cross-class status: Dimas de Madariaga and Ramón Ruíz Alonso were the CEDA and the JAP's proudest possessions, evidence that this was a 'new' movement breaking with traditional moulds based on the haves and the have-nots.⁶⁰ The extent to which the CEDA harped on about Ruíz Alonso's status and the scepticism as to its real appeal amongst the working class was reflected in José Antonio's mocking references to 'Acción Popular's worker.'⁶¹ One *japista* recalls his family's hardship by noting that 'from three servants we were down to two.'⁶²

Pérez de Laborda told a Madrid meeting that the JAP's 'most fervent' wish was to 'improve the working classes, to look out for the peasants, for the abandoned workers in their slums [*barriadas*] and for all the humble.'⁶³ The JAP claimed to be serving the interests of the poorest sections of society, pronouncing for example its desire to end *caciquismo* and the wheat crisis – 'the scourge of the Spanish peasant' – whilst launching a programme of 'Social Assistance', run by the JAP's girl's section, which offered food to the poor in return for a rejection of Marxism.⁶⁴ The JAP's approach to the 'humble' primarily focused on the weather-beaten peasant rather than the industrial worker, however. This responded to more than just the simple fact that Acción Popular had significant success among these sections of society and comparatively little among the industrial working class. Indeed, the JAP adopted an ideological glorification of the Castilian countryside as

the source of honesty, sacrifice and Spanishness which was already well established on the right and would continue long into the Franco régime.⁶⁵

With every Spaniard integrated into corporatism's hierarchical system, social conflict would be a thing of the past. Serrano Suñer insisted that 'instead of the class struggle and the battles of political parties, all Spaniards, the young Spain with its public organs founded on moral and hierarchical lines, will work towards the realisation of a harmonious and total design.'⁶⁶ Here, the death of political liberalism went hand in hand with the death of economic liberalism. The JAP proclaimed the need to put economics at the service of the nation, dispensing with 'egotistic capitalism and destructive marxism' to seek a political alternative which hinged on the Fatherland. Antonio Bermúdez Cañete argued that by proclaiming 'Workers of the world unite!', Karl Marx was in fact advocating 'Workers and owners disunite!' The JAP's corporatist approach instead pitched workers and bosses together in the 'supreme interests' of the nation; businesses did not belong to owners 'but to all who collaborate in production.' Bermúdez Cañete preached national, not class, solidarity; the enemy of the Spanish worker was not his boss but the British worker whose competition kept food from his table and convincing the populace of this essential truth had been Fascism's greatest success. Achieving this required a 'strong syndical organisation' into which all who collaborate in production would be integrated, bringing the class struggle to an end and making strikes a thing of the past.⁶⁷

The dividing line between the 'harmonious total design' of 'complete' corporatism and 'totalitarian' fascist statism was fine indeed.⁶⁸ Certainly, they were not mutually exclusive. As the president of Acción Popular in one Extremadura town put it: 'Fascism? No, corporate state, which can be with or without fascism; I prefer it without.'⁶⁹ Meanwhile, Ramón Ruiz Alonso, the author of *Corporativismo!*, approvingly reproduced the 'corporatist laws of fascism'.⁷⁰ Federico Salmón, a 'friend of the JAP' and minister for labour, declared the party's politics 'profoundly revolutionary'.⁷¹ The JAP displayed an obsession with the nation's material wealth, proposed the nationalisation of certain key industries and considered autarky to be its ultimate economic ideal.⁷² It ran detailed articles about economic problems, as well as producing in-depth manifestos on ambitious public works schemes. And it declared the need for 'a strong state, to direct the economy with an iron hand, opposing injustice and prohibiting violence in social relations.'⁷³ But if the CEDA's rhetoric sought to palliate the effects of poverty and remove the conflict inherent in differences between classes, it did not seek genuine equality; the JAP called for social justice, not social parity, seeking to destroy neither private property nor free enterprise.

Moreover, its economic projects were embryonic, its studies of economic issues technocratic, subject-specific analyses that did not necessarily follow a firm ideological model, and its economic approach rested on notions of social justice and national reconstruction that were never fully elaborated into an avowed, constructive programme of state socialism or national syndicalism.



The JAP's desire to construct a new state underlined that it was not enough merely to help shape the political direction of the Republic, it was necessary to replace it, wiping out the legacy of its liberal, democratic and socialist founders. Having defeated the revolution, the JAP launched a campaign to bring about a 'profound and far-reaching' revision of the constitution, focussing especially on article 26, which removed church-state dependency. During the spring and summer of 1935, this campaign would be extended into a drive to impose an entirely new constitution as the cornerstone of the corporatist state which would usher in a new Spain.⁷⁴ Rather than the 'sectarian', 'laic' and 'anti-Spanish' 'insult' of the Republic's Constituent Cortes, this new constitution would reflect 'the heartbeat of the Spanish people.'⁷⁵

Succeeding in bringing about constitutional reform and founding a new state required the CEDA to capture the régime in its entirety. In the aftermath of the October Revolution the JAP's claims upon power thus became a demand for 'all power to the JEFE' that became the battle cry of the *Juventud* over the next fifteen months. If the arrival into government of three *cedistas* proved that Gil Robles's tactic could work, and brought the Confederación a ministerial presence for the first time, delighting the CEDA and its backers, the JAP was not satisfied.⁷⁶ Nor, indeed, was the CEDA's leader. For him, as for the JAP, this was merely the first step towards conquering the state. Manuel Giménez Fernández, Rafael Aizpún and José Oriol y Anguera had barely taken office when the JAP announced its discontent, declaring in the first edition of its newspaper on 27 October 1934: 'it is urgent that we deliver all power to the JEFE as soon as possible . . . we need a 100 per cent Gil Robles government.'

This was an expression not only of the CEDA's political ambition but also of the JAP's rejection of pluralism. It would not wait to see how a coalition worked, especially under the leadership of anyone other than JEFE. The *Juventud* instead simply rejected collaboration, insisting: 'any government in which different ideologies coexist is destined to fail . . . there can only be one leader: ours!' The only admissible ideology would be the JAP's

ideology and the youth wing would not rest until Gil Robles led a government in which the JAP's spirit was entirely dominant. 'We know,' the *Juventud* conceded, 'that it will be hard to satisfy our aspirations right away . . . but to give up now would be cowardly.' The JAP would therefore 'continue with our campaign call' to 'conquer all power' and end the very same 'weak politics' of crisis that had allowed the CEDA to force its way into government in the first place. Its hour had 'not yet arrived,' but it soon would.⁷⁷

Gil Robles's tactic had been reinforced by the events of October but his march had barely begun. 'We trust fully in the *JEFE*,' claimed *J.A.P.*, edited by Pérez de Laborda. 'He knows what to do, when he has to do it and how he has to do it. We will not tolerate criticism, nor murmurings, nor any attempts to pressurise him. The *JEFE* treads firmly and never takes a step backwards.' This was not only a demonstration of the *Juventud*'s discipline and its defence of their leader in the face of criticism that he had procrastinated rather than seized control with the aid of the army in the wake of October, but a piece of advice: the JAP was keen for Gil Robles to push for full and absolute power, and for him to do so without delay. Its patience, after all, had 'a limit and we will not go beyond that limit!' This threat had long been apparent, echoing remarks made as early 1932 that the JAP had 'faith in the legal struggle, but we must warn that we are reaching the limits of that faith.'⁷⁸ Without full power, the JAP's new state would be stillborn: if much of the CEDA saw power as an end in itself, this was so not true of the youth wing, which saw it as a means to a new state that would be a 'pure expression' of the *Juventud*'s spirit. It was determined that sharing the government would not mean diluting its programme. The CEDA's arrival in government made neither republicans of the JAP, nor *japistas* of the Republic.

At the turn of the year, the JAP laid down a marker for its approach to the Republic's coalition governments throughout 1935, remarking bluntly: 'collaboration is not identification.' 'An ideological abyss, a different concept of politics and of the mission of government separates Acción Popular from the Radical party', insisted the JAP, '[only] high patriotism . . . obliges the CEDA to collaborate. Let us make that very clear!'⁷⁹ This message, which would be repeated constantly, informed the JAP's apparently contradictory practice of attacking a government, and indeed a régime, in which the CEDA was a partner. Eventually, it would even inform the JAP's attacks on those who had 'infiltrated' its own parent party, bastardising its ideals. It also served to lay bare the JAP's discomfort at sharing power with a moderate party such as the Radicals and served as notice to those on the catastrophist right who criticised the CEDA's accommodation

with the Republic that this was not a policy that the JAP shared: governing within the régime was a sacrifice, not a point of principle. Here, the JAP's national newspaper sought to lead its rank and file in a more determined, intransigent approach to clinching power which reflected Pérez de Laborda's radicalism and growing significance within the movement. But it also followed the frustrations of members throughout the country.

Collaboration with moderate political forces was by definition problematic; only granting an unchallenged mandate to Gil Robles would solve the Fatherland's problems. 'The crisis that leads to a government with the *JEFE* having all power will be the *last* crisis,' the JAP declared. Given that the crises experienced by successive republican governments from October 1934 to December 1935 were invariably provoked by Gil Robles, this was quite correct. Here, the JAP was not merely announcing its desire but also Gil Robles' tactics, his policy of periodically removing support for a minority government in order to grab for himself an ever-stronger position. It also hoped to accelerate this process, advising their leader to proceed without vacillation. When in December 1934 Gil Robles assured 'those who are impatient' that 'if we go down this path it is because we are sure that the triumph is near,' the JAP was amongst his intended audience.⁸⁰ As that victory proved further away than initially hoped, so frustrations grew; as victory failed to arrive at all, so recriminations followed.

That the JAP offered its advice to the *JEFE* was significant given the centrality to its ideology of unwavering discipline, and showed that the JAP took its role as the vanguard of the CEDA seriously. It was the youth movement's duty to keep the 'flame of the ideal' alive not just amongst the *Juventud* but throughout the Confederación. The *Juventud* became obsessed with its own 'purity' and that of the parent party – something that came increasingly to be understood in terms of the commitment to social justice. It would take it upon itself to make sure that the *JEFE*, and indeed the CEDA, remained true to the ideals of its 'new politics' in order to lead the rebirth of the Fatherland. Accordingly, in the aftermath of the revolution the JAP began to reserve more consistent criticism for recalcitrant conservatives and the wealthy than for the left, increasingly portraying itself as the only defender of the working classes and, more specifically, Spain's peasants, drawing closer to European fascists in its determination to add a 'revolutionary' facet to its nationalist politics. In doing so, it made increasing demands upon, and revealed increasing divisions with, the CEDA.

The JAP's willingness to make demands was underpinned by its growing size and its successful role in the suppression of the October Revolution. It considered itself both deserving and well equipped to play the part of

guardians of the whole movement. 'The JAP is a no longer a promise, it is an important reality [*realidad de peso*] in Spanish politics,' it declared proudly at the start of 1935. 'It may appear to some prudent gentleman that we are advancing with excessive [speed] in some social and political aspects. That is our duty. We must counterbalance with all our authority the mill-stone [*remora*] that is old, petty politics and poorly understood conservatism – a dead-weight of private, false interests that . . . cannot be placed above the collective good.' Hinting at the potential divisions already opening up between the youth wing and some sections of the party, whilst also placating those *japistas* who had begun to wonder if these divisions might not prove permanent, the JAP's newspaper added:

We will put straight [*enderezar*] and purify those groups, whether they call themselves Acción Popular or the CEDA, that have become divorced from its true spirit. We will not isolate ourselves from them [by] constructing an independent youth organisation; we will instead inject them with the youthful spirit [*savia*] without which they would be irredeemably condemned to dishonour.⁸¹

The centrality of the JAP's cleansing mission *within* the CEDA and its growing sense of self-importance was demonstrated by its third national congress, held in Toledo on 6 January 1935. Singing their hymn, *japistas* departed from the party HQ in Madrid bound for Toledo where they heard mass in honour of the JAP's martyrs at the altar of the Virgen del Sagrario and were granted an audience with the archbishop of Toledo and primate of Spain, Cardinal Isidro Gomá y Tomás, whose ring they queued to kiss. The congress itself, which began in the afternoon and at which the JAP formalised its campaign for a new constitution, was to be most significant for its impact on the internal structure of the JAP and its relationship with the CEDA, revealing a *japista* desire to take control of its own destiny, as well as that of Spain, and opening up a process of greater radicalisation.

The JAP's 'thrust, steadfastness, initiative, generosity, and bravery has powerfully influenced the organisations of the CEDA; many [JAPs] . . . carry the CEDA,' reported the youth wing's newspaper, vowing: 'we will never tolerate a movement like Acción Popular, upon which the eyes of healthy Spain are turned and in which its hopes are deposited, becoming sullied because of outbreaks of *cacique*, personalist politics . . . which we must inexorably banish from Spain.' Nor was this an empty threat. Amongst the conclusions of the congress was a resolution to study the *Juventud's* statutes and the relationship between the JAP and the CEDA, as well as a request that local JAP bodies investigate the feasibility of ensuring

japistas gained access to political posts and report on what practical measures could be taken in order to 'bury any possible [manifestations of] *caciquismo* and acts of old politics in CEDA organisations.' In each case, the results would be reported back to the Madrid JAP, which took on the role of national leadership even though it officially served no such function, rather than the provincial CEDA directorates upon which local JAP bodies were, according to their statutes, dependent.⁸²

The insistence upon studying practical measures to wipe out any vestiges of 'old politics' reflected the JAP's rejection of traditional conservatism and a desire to forge a new nation. If at its inception the JAP's identity as the defender of Acción Popular's 'purity' was a vacuous one, now this took on a genuine meaning as the JAP grew larger, more confident and more determined to play a central role in the transformation and modernisation of right-wing politics. This role had been laid down at El Escorial nine months earlier, the first conclusion of its congress reading: 'The youths of Acción Popular constitute its vanguard: they mark out the ideal that should be reached.' But while the conclusions from El Escorial had stipulated that the JAP would 'impose upon [the CEDA organisations] the spirit of the *Juventud*,' they had also added that it 'must be in close contact with and dependent upon AP's respective organisations at all times.'⁸³ Now, that desire – though not the statutory article – had been dropped. Indeed, *japistas* now sought to overturn the traditional relationship of discipline towards elders; youthfulness was a virtue that must be imposed upon the party. In the prologue to one book on the ideology of the JAP, Federico Salmón referred to a previous publication about the CEDA, noting how the author 'seemed to want to justify the JAP in the eyes of mature men.' This was not something he intended to replicate: 'I want youth to remain youthful', Salmón wrote, '[their impetus is] even more necessary now that the CEDA has parliamentary deputies . . . they need to be reminded of the JAP's [19] Points so that they do not forget.'⁸⁴

As an ideological purifier, the JAP stayed out of the 'ruin of daily politics', keeping its sights fixed on the 'final ideal'; *japistas* saw their mission as being above the 'corruption' and 'decadence' of the parliamentary politics of the Republic.⁸⁵ In practical terms, this gave the CEDA a ready-made excuse should it fail to live up to the JAP's perfect image – it, after all, had to take pragmatic steps to fight its way through the rotten world of political intrigue. But while this allowed the JAP publicly to justify the 'failings' of the CEDA to maintain its 'true' spirit and kept alive hopes that its goals would ultimately be fulfilled despite the occasional evidence to the contrary, the youth wing remained determined to impose its character on the whole party. The most 'enthusiastically applauded' of the speakers in Toledo was

the president of the Badajoz *Juventud*, Fernández Martín, when he pointed out that the JAP in this Extremaduran town 'fixes the political direction of the whole of Acción Popular'. It was significant here not just that this was the most warmly received statement made at the congress but that the JAP's newspaper was so keen to report the fact.⁸⁶ This revealed *japistas'* concerns as to the CEDA's ability to fulfil the youth wing's programme and their commitment to a political ideal which, on occasions, the parent party did not share. It also reflected a determination to make genuine *japistas* of the whole movement, infusing it with the 'JAP spirit', as well as a desire to let it be known that they applauded and demanded a greater role for youth. As one JAP publication put it: 'the phrase "the youth of today are the men of tomorrow" needs to be changed: the youth of today are the men of today.'⁸⁷

Badajoz was not an isolated example. The JAP claimed not to seek to 'direct' the CEDA but to 'elevate and purify it', yet it enjoyed some success in shaping the political personality of the Confederación. In April 1935, it announced with 'legitimate satisfaction' that 'a good part of the CEDA's success is our success: the JAP's spirit has impregnated the organisations of the CEDA.'⁸⁸ This was a process it had to maintain, not allowing the wider party to rest on its laurels. The JAP would later publish an interview with the fascist intellectual Giménez Caballero who, it noted, 'seemed to be ever closer to the exalted ideals of the JAP', approvingly reproducing his insistence that the *Juventud* should 'be more intransigent, more enthusiastic, more national, more fanatical and more militarised with every passing day.' 'Today,' Giménez Caballero had added, 'it is the youth that must lead the country, not the so called sensible men.' A private letter from the president of the JAP in La Coruña to his counterpart in Orense noted this trend with satisfaction, boasting that: 'we are imposing a new personality on the party, earning ourselves eulogies from Giménez Caballero . . . [for our] new norms and new character.'⁸⁹

Italian foreign office reports in late 1934 had seen in Gil Robles a desire to adopt some fascist principles but not actually a fascist. There was, though, greater hope placed in the *Juventud*, with one communiqué to Rome expressing its optimism that the JAP could help push the CEDA towards a more decided compromise with fascism. To some extent this was fulfilled. By late 1935, Italian reports would describe the JAP's declarations as 'in essence, full of fascist content' and the *Juventud* led a process of radicalisation and political intransigence that would only confirm the fears of the Spanish left, agitate the right, intensify conflict and hasten the collapse of the Republic.⁹⁰ The defeat of the revolution, the launch of its national paper, and its growing membership gave the JAP a significant presence in Spanish politics. Gil Robles recalled in his memoirs how 'from October

1934 and especially during 1935, the JAP, with every passing day further from democratic tendencies, imposed with great vigour its characteristics on the rest of the party.⁹¹

The JAP's ideology was not fully developed, its plans for a future state were often vague and many of its declarations poorly thought out. Indeed, it complained in July 1935 that, having 'enjoyed such rapid growth', it had not had sufficient time to 'stop and elaborate a programme'.⁹² But if its 'real' nature had always been clear to the left, over 1935, as the JAP penetrated ever deeper the political territory of fascism, it now became inescapable for much of Spanish society. Even Gil Robles later admitted in his memoirs that the JAP demonstrated 'fascistic tendencies'.⁹³ One American observer recalled how these 'ardent youths were running amok at a critical moment', describing their newspaper as 'a masterpiece of indiscretion and political stupidity' and *japistas* as 'young fascists'.⁹⁴

What made this all the more concerning was that as far as many of its opponents were concerned, the JAP was the essential reference point for the CEDA – a gauge as to the party's ideological predilections, undiluted by the need to play the political game. Only sharing power tempered Gil Robles's actions; once he gained full control, he could unleash the destruction of the Republic. As one newspaper asked: 'what is the difference between the CEDA and Falange Española? Only this: the latter says openly what it is while the CEDA tries to disguise it, but does so in such a clumsy manner than you can still tell what it is and what it really wants.'⁹⁵ This was a fear expressed not just amongst the left's rank and file on the streets or in newspapers, it would also reach parliament.⁹⁶ Given the *Juventud*'s role as the CEDA's propaganda mouthpiece, the depth of Gil Robles's input into JAP ideology, and the overwhelming rhetoric of obedience to his leadership, even in those moments when the JAP felt forcibly distanced from the parent party, this conclusion was perfectly reasonable.⁹⁷ Indeed, it was the JAP's hope: the *Juventud* was aware that it could act with a purity and clarity which Acción Popular and certainly the CEDA could not and thus believed – or wanted to believe – that any discrepancies were merely the temporary product of its parent party having to coexist within a coalition government and an unwelcome political régime.

The left's judgement that the JAP was the yardstick by which to measure the CEDA's fascist proclivities is echoed by José Ramón Montero in his huge, two-volume history of the Confederación. He presents the JAP, 'the most important section [of the CEDA] during the Second Republic', as 'a reference point for the CEDA with its unavoidably fascist mind-set.' The *Juventud*'s fascism was, he writes, the 'unequivocal conclusion of José María Gil Robles's ambiguity.'⁹⁸ Paul Preston also uses the JAP to place the

CEDA in an explicitly fascist context, stressing its overwhelming discipline towards Gil Robles,⁹⁹ while Javier Tusell insists that there was no *ideological* difference between the JAP and the CEDA; it was just a question of tone. Unlike Preston, however, Tusell sees this as a reflection of the JAP's lack of fascism beneath the rhetoric, of its status as part of that swathe of the party that was characterised primarily by an anti-republican conservatism with little real ideological foundation other than support for Gil Robles.¹⁰⁰ More direct still are the conclusions of José Báez, who insists that the CEDA and the JAP were a 'compact body', 'perfectly identified [with each other]', enjoying 'total concordance.' There were, Báez writes, 'no differences in terms of the ideological content of one or the other.'¹⁰¹

This would, on the face of it, appear to be borne out by the recollections of the CEDA leader. Gil Robles claimed that ideological differences between the JAP and the CEDA 'never existed' and that it only seemed that they did because the JAP's removal from daily politics meant that it could therefore 'proclaim the absolute ideal, with the rigid criteria of unreachable purity.' Unreachable, that was, for the parliamentary CEDA: while the JAP could take on a 'brilliant, easy role', the CEDA leadership had the 'thankless task, full of difficulty and enormous responsibility, of leading the battle in the midst of contradiction, darkness and the heat of combat.'¹⁰² This was a similar argument to that which Gil Robles had often used against the catastrophist right: it was 'easy' to offer 'coffee house solutions when you have fifteen deputies'; the CEDA, by contrast, had a bearing on government and thus the 'weight of responsibility' upon its shoulders.¹⁰³ In short, as the *Juventud* always insisted, the JAP were the advance troops, the CEDA a consolidating force that followed in its footsteps, their destinations ultimately one and the same. The JAP never broke from its original claim to be the 'revolutionary' vanguard that would both carry and follow the *JEFE* to power.

On many levels the CEDA and the JAP were indeed as complimentary as had been originally intended. Although the JAP had begun life dependent upon and subordinate to the CEDA, its growing confidence would see it demand – and win – certain autonomy and influence, opening up divisions. But the CEDA hierarchy and its youth-wing were often mutually reinforcing. For Gil Robles, the JAP was a valuable tool with which to provoke and threaten the left, as well as to demand greater concessions from those who held the keys to government: the *Juventud* was a powerful and extremely visible demonstration of the CEDA's strength and its rallies were the living expression of this. The JAP's constant calls for elections over the course of 1935 and its confidence in winning them facilitated Gil Robles's bid for control: better to cede him some influence than go to the polls and

risk him claiming all power.¹⁰⁴ The JAP was also a vehicle with which to mobilise political sympathisers. It met the challenge of mass politics, the threat of the Republic and the left, as well as responding to the attraction of fascism. The JAP was the purest manifestation of the CEDA's populism, providing the Confederación with a modern identity in an age of mass politics. And, as Eduardo González Calleja suggests, the JAP could also function as a 'sounding-box' for CEDA policy, campaigns and ideas, the result of which was to make it more extreme: Javier Tusell rightly notes that it was the least tolerant passages of the *JEFE*'s speeches that received the greatest ovations.¹⁰⁵ The CEDA, meanwhile, gave the JAP a parliamentary presence, the support of the Catholic church, a huge press network and enviable resources. Above all, it promised power, even if this left the JAP dependent on Gil Robles's parliamentary manoeuvring.

As Gil Robles claimed, the JAP certainly succeeded in imposing some of its identity upon the CEDA, especially throughout 1935. Propelled by its success during October 1934, the JAP's membership grew and this was accompanied by growing radicalisation, with the *Juventud* showing few qualms about attacking those with whom its parent party governed. The CEDA shared power with republican conservatives, technocrats and Alejandro Lerroux's Radical Party but this coalition had not made the JAP allies of conservatives, liberals or Radicals and it defined itself in opposition to its partners at cabinet level. The JAP's newspaper was twice handed 5,000ptas fines by the ministry of the interior because of its attacks on ministers and it also appears to have suffered four, or possibly even five, suspensions, on top of seeing countless blocks of text wiped out by the censor. On one occasion, for instance, the JAP ran a list of the cabinet ministers with a commentary on each; not one of them survived the censor.¹⁰⁶ Nor did the JAP only attack when the CEDA found itself outside the government: *J.A.P.* was banned on 24 August 1935 for attacks on ministers despite the fact that since a 5 May reshuffle the CEDA boasted five members of the cabinet, including Gil Robles himself at the ministry of war.¹⁰⁷ And when it reappeared the following week it was far from apologetic, printing a front-page note to announce:

We can imagine the joy with which our return will be received by the organs of the sewers, those voices of anti-national disgrace, [the liberal newspapers] *Heraldo*, *Liberal* and *Libertad*, which had received news of our suspension with such satisfaction and congratulated the minister of the interior for it, wishing us an indefinite suspension.

Some of those papers dare to hand us the epithet of 'defamers'. Perhaps that's because we have consciously and repeatedly used the insults spy,

traitor to Spain, lackeys of foreign nations, in the pay of a certain embassy, and at the service of the lowest vices of humanity, to refer to those who offer the most repugnant eulogies of those rags [*papeluchos*]. We stand by our position . . .

We would like to formally assure [everyone] right now that the day, which is not far away, that the JAP spirit has any influence in the destiny of Spain, newspapers of such questionable morality [*moral catadura*] as *Libertad*, *Heraldo* and *Liberal* will be inexorably razed from the map because they are incompatible with public decorum and the prestige of our nation.¹⁰⁸

The ministry of the interior was not alone in suspending the JAP's newspaper. Gil Robles had also been forced to intervene on one occasion, blocking the publication of the 15 June edition. This suspension came after an attack the previous week on Manuel Portela Valladares, the minister of the interior, for allowing 'criminal hoards' to go unpunished despite 'assassinating members of Acción Popular'. According to Gil Robles, however, 'events such as this [suspension] served merely to demonstrate the absolute discipline of the *Juventudes*.' Certainly, the JAP's reaction to this suspension was rather different to its response to the ban laid down by the ministry of the interior. Upon its return, *J.A.P.* declared in block capitals that 'the *JEFE* never makes mistakes' and stated that it 'gladly accepted the measure.' The suspension had merely been due, *J.A.P.* insisted, to a 'verbal excess,' given that there was 'at no time any discrepancy' between the JAP and its Chief. Furthermore, the JAP accepted Gil Robles's decision because its 'concept of discipline takes precedence over any other consideration' and vowed to 'continue its unstoppable march with a virile shout of *¡Presente y Adelante!*'¹⁰⁹

This was a march with which the *JEFE* had little problem falling into step, despite the occasional difficulties it caused him and the discomfort felt by more moderate sections of the party. The CEDA deputy Javier Martín Artajo told Richard Robinson that Gil Robles was obliged to grant the JAP a certain degree of freedom in order to keep the youth wing's allegiance, while observers from Fascist Italy thought that the way Gil Robles addressed the *Juventud* showed that 'if you want to have youths, you have to speak to them in a fascist manner.'¹¹⁰ But, much as the JAP occasionally undermined his long-term plan to capture the state, the *JEFE* appeared anything but reluctant to indulge the JAP's increasing radicalism. Indeed, he too had felt the tug of more radical right-wing politics, not least because of its flattering projection of him to the status of unquestioned leader. The process of fascistisation undergone by the non-liberal right did not only

affect the rank and file but also its leaders, Gil Robles prominent amongst them. He constantly eulogised the JAP's rejuvenating effect upon the CEDA and recalled in his memoirs that: 'The big meetings of the JAP have brought me the most noble and intense emotions of my political life. It was from these meetings that I drew the strength necessary not to drown in the tense atmosphere of parliamentary intrigue.'¹¹¹

Over the course of 1935, the JAP held mass rallies at Medina del Campo, Uclés and Santiago de Compostela, all of which drew upon the fascistic style and political theatre of El Escorial.¹¹² Each of these rallies was used as a show of strength at a key time, just as had been the case with El Escorial and Covadonga the previous year. The Uclés and Santiago rallies were held at the midst of governmental crises, whilst Medina del Campo was also designed to add weight to the CEDA's campaign for constitutional reform. At all of them Gil Robles spoke; at none of them was the rhetoric, tone or content of his address out of step with that of the *Juventud*. Indeed, he took advantage of the Santiago de Compostela rally on 1 September 1935 to insist: 'the Juventudes de Acción Popular identify completely with the CEDA. The JAP is in its place; we are in ours. They hold an advanced position, as a vanguard force; we are behind them, constantly reinforcing our position.'¹¹³ That the CEDA saw little contradiction between its parliamentary profile and the increasingly fascistic stance of the JAP was further underlined by the youth wing's subsequent manning of the Confederación's national propaganda machinery as elections loomed in late 1935. And when the party's national organ ceased publication, its readers, young or not, were urged repeatedly to read *J.A.P.* The final edition of *C.E.D.A.*, published in December, would make the same demand six times in a single issue.¹¹⁴

For José Báez, this communion of interests serves to demonstrate that the JAP was both toothless and perfectly in-step with the CEDA. Its verbal radicalism was basically vacuous, a reality only while Gil Robles allowed it. It was therefore inevitable that the JAP would collapse as a movement when the *JEFE* lost his grip on power. The JAP was, in sum, 'much ado about nothing' [*mucho ruido y pocas nueces*] – an essentially weak appendage, entirely dependant on the CEDA. 'We should not think', Báez writes, 'that the JAP, with its verbal extremism, abandoned the orthodoxy of the CEDA.' He argues that this conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that a number of *japistas* would be included on the CEDA's electoral slates in February 1936 and he also notes that 'the CEDA guaranteed the JAP's loyalty through the very norms of the party.' 'The JAP's submission was . . . reflected in its regulations', he points out, as according to its statutes each JAP body relied on the approval of the provincial CEDA, whilst any national JAP proposals had to be cleared by the CEDA council.¹¹⁵

However, this argument is problematic, not least because there was no genuine CEDA 'orthodoxy' beyond patriotic Catholicism, nationalism and an ill-defined anti-republicanism. The CEDA was, as its very name suggests, a loose confederation of autonomous right-wing groups, held together only by the promise of power, which differed substantially from location to location and even within the same bodies. Whilst there were those within the CEDA, Gil Robles chief amongst them, that indulged the JAP, there were others who were uncomfortable with its open flirtation with fascism. The CEDA, after all, stretched from moderates to those, like the JAP, who experienced a profound process of fascistisation; from those who genuinely believed in a policy of 'social justice' to stubborn conservative landowners and industrialists who would not cede to the slightest reforms; from those who wanted to build a loyal, genuinely republican, moderate conservative party to those who wished simply to destroy the Republic. 'The great defect of the CEDA was that in reality it was never a party,' wrote the *cedista* minister Manuel Giménez Fernández, alluding to 'three sectors' within the Confederación in a reply to a questionnaire sent to him by Carlos Seco Serrano in September 1967. 'Only the left wing, drawing on Christian Democratic ideals and expressed through the ACNdeP and *El Debate*, offered anything positive, while the right-wing of big landowners [*latifundistas*] and their 'priestly' [*curilesco*] lackeys was ferociously conservative and looked at the Christian Democrats with even more distaste than they looked at Freemasons . . . and the centre, made up of the middle classes, only shared a desire to hide . . . and await their salvation at the hands of their messiah, first Gil Robles, then Calvo Sotelo, then Primo de Rivera and now Franco.'¹¹⁶ The CEDA was home to fascists and conservatives, spanning the entire Spanish right; this made it populist and popular, all things to all right-wingers, but it denied it internal cohesion and the ability to withstand defeat or crisis.

Moreover, this very amorphousness was one of the things that the JAP, which boasted greater internal unity and displayed few of the ambiguities of its parent party, rebelled against. The JAP's divide from the CEDA was apparent in a structural and organisational guise, with the former rejecting the latter's federalism: although the JAP's statutes made it formally dependent upon its parent party, this was a point of conflict and increasingly came under challenge. And although *japistas* were indeed included on CEDA slates in February 1936, they were far fewer than the *Juventud* had demanded, whilst its sworn enemies were also to represent the CEDA. Far from demonstrating a 'perfect communion' between the CEDA and the JAP, the election campaign would in fact cause serious bitterness amongst the youth-wing, laying the foundation of the party's collapse in the wake of

defeat. The JAP rejected the ambiguity of the parent party and wound up straddling two contradictory, irreconcilable strands of CEDA thought: it defended those who argued for social reform but utterly rejected their liberalism and accommodation with political foes; it supported the reactionary right's outright rejection of the Republic, distaste for democracy, yearning for a powerful state and wished definitively to crush the left, but did not share their failure to accept even limited social change. It was a third way. The *Juventud* would thus end up consciously distancing itself both from the more moderate wing of the CEDA and its 'old-style' conservative elites but without this serving to bring it into line with some kind of middle way acceptable to all and from which all appeared acceptable to it. Rather, the JAP was frustrated by its failure completely to succeed as a vanguard that carried the CEDA towards a new state of which it could be proud.

Over the course of 1935, the JAP brought many members of the *cedista* rank and file with it, leading a determination to smash the Republic and the left, closing down moderate options and embracing increasingly fascistic politics. But it was to prove less powerful within the CEDA than its rhetoric suggested or it desired, certainly at the level where it most wanted its influence to be felt: at the top. Rather than willingly submitting to their inevitable fate, accepting their secondary status as the natural corollary of youth and embracing without question the policies dictated by their parent party, this provoked enormous disappointment amongst *japistas*. Ultimately, it also provoked the turn of some of the JAP's most exalted members to the less ambiguous fascism of the Falange, where there was no contradiction between rhetorical radicalism and cautious parliamentarianism, nor conflict between a youth wing and a parent party. In the Falange the youth wing *was* the parent party, its entire existence represented the subversion of age hierarchies: it was, as one contemporary dubbed it, a rebellion of students.¹¹⁷ In the JAP, by contrast, bringing youth to the front line meant challenging authority within a party where hierarchies were already entrenched, something that would prove extremely difficult and ultimately frustrating. Thus, while much of the CEDA seemed willing to be associated with the JAP, the feeling was not always mutual; if the CEDA was not unhappy at the JAP's radicalism, the JAP was increasingly concerned about the CEDA's comparative lack of it. And, although the JAP's obedience to Gil Robles was never seriously challenged in public, given the centrality of the leadership cult to the *Juventud*'s very identity, the JAP began to pull away from the CEDA.

While the JAP constantly declared its complete identification with 'the cause', this focused explicitly on the *JEFE* rather than the political party he led and divisions certainly opened, often flagged up and exacerbated by the

catastrophist right. José Calvo Sotelo's Bloque Nacional, in particular, not unreasonably saw in the JAP a movement closer to their ideals than the bulk of the CEDA. Indeed, the sheer number of denials offered up by the JAP and Gil Robles spoke volumes of the doubts that surrounded the relationship between the CEDA and the JAP; over the summer and autumn of 1935, barely a week went by without *J.A.P.* declaring 'once again' that 'now more than ever' it was 'totally at one with the *JEFE*'.¹¹⁸ In fact, there were significant fault lines. To cite but a few examples: although the JAP publicly accepted Gil Robles's suspension of *J.A.P.*, privately the measure was not well received; *japistas* in Cuenca were irritated at not getting authorisation to hold a planned meeting; Orense-based *japistas* complained to the national committee of the JAP that the local CEDA had failed to recognise their internal statutes; their counterparts in Santiago were infuriated by the CEDA's failure adequately to back the rally held in the city on 1 September 1935, either financially or organisationally; and the unexplained cancellation of a planned 'monster rally' in Madrid, pencilled in for October 1935, did little for relations, with the JAP offering a pointed and unconvincing: 'there will be no comment from us, we accept the decision'.¹¹⁹

But it was the CEDA's failure to deliver on social justice that proved the most publicly divisive issue. Gil Robles made great play of insisting that he was no 'snake charmer' proffering empty promises but, as Antonio Elorza insists, his commitment to any meaningful reform during the Second Republic ended up being 'never more than words'.¹²⁰ It was this sense of lost opportunity, the failure to deliver on such promises, that led to the Falange constantly referring to the CEDA's two years in government as the 'sterile biennium' or even the 'stupid biennium'. Many *japistas* felt the same way; certainly, Pérez de Laborda did. If Gil Robles's commitment to social justice was flimsy, the same was not true of the *Juventud*. When Sevilla-based *japistas* declared that they would 'construct a new Spain based upon the purest principles of a vigorous social justice' and insisted that they would not fall into the trap of merely offering the kind of 'sterile word-play, empty of substance, that only achieves the disillusionment of the people', it was not born of cynicism.¹²¹ To some extent it was, however, born of inexperience; the JAP was a movement of protest not of government and, as it would later concede, did not have to test its ideals against the reality of political compromise. Nonetheless, the JAP remained committed to some social reform, even in the face of opposition from the CEDA.

This was best illustrated by Giménez Fernández's tenure of the ministry of agriculture. Having taken office on 9 October 1934, Giménez Fernández attempted to introduce a series of reforms, including granting tenants of twelve years the right to buy the land they worked, increasing minimum

leases and establishing lease inspections. While far from revolutionary, these reforms did go some way towards ameliorating the misery of the peasantry that made up a significant chunk of the CEDA's mass base and represented the 'moral reserve' of the nation. Although the JAP and much of the party press lauded him for bringing the 'true spirit of Acción Popular' to the government, the reforms earned Giménez Fernández the opprobrium of the right. Significantly, this included a considerable number of CEDA deputies, amongst them the leader of the party's parliamentary minority Cándido Casanueva. Giménez Fernández was attacked for being a 'white Bolshevik' and a 'Marxist in disguise' as the CEDA divided and threatened to come apart. Rather than allow a split, Gil Robles sided with those lined up against the minister and opposition to his reforms ensured that the bill was amended to such an extent as to become virtually meaningless, leaving the *JEFE*'s words ringing distinctly hollow. A note passed to Giménez Fernández by Luis Lucía during his defence of the bill read: 'for God's sake, Manolo, Gil Robles asks you not to speak!' and when the party's leader forced another governmental crisis in May 1935, clinching five cabinet posts for the CEDA, the minister for agriculture was quietly dropped.¹²²

The JAP's backing for Giménez Fernández's reforms saw it attacked as a 'confessional left' – a title it did not mind. The JAP was furious at the destruction of Giménez Fernández's programme, its faith in Gil Robles openly and publicly challenged.¹²³ Following a week in which the *Juventud* had 'risen as one' to support Giménez Fernández, its newspaper, 'within [the limits of] our discipline towards the *JEFE*', announced that it was 'time to put our all into his defence'.¹²⁴ Telegrams of support poured in throughout the summer and well into the autumn. And while many of these were reproduced in the *Juventud*'s paper, they were not merely for public consumption. A number of private messages also reached Giménez Fernández from *japistas* all over Spain, including Pérez de Laborda and the joint editor of *J.A.P.* Cecilio Garcirrubio, demonstrating a genuine affection for the former minister and a commitment to his reform.¹²⁵ 'We write to express our total identification with you,' ran one typical (and personal) letter in the aftermath of Giménez Fernández's ousting. 'Take heart from the hundreds of youths who with their hands upon their shoulders offer you the JAP salute and shout: Manuel Giménez Fernández, ¡Presente y Adelante!'¹²⁶

If some individual *japistas* did not truly care, those who guarded their 'identity', like Pérez de Laborda, certainly did – and passionately. Consequently, this was not an issue the JAP would let lie. After a long period of reflection, *J.A.P.* re-stated its case in November 1935, claiming that 'if Giménez Fernández's programme had been followed it would have saved the labourer many tears and miseries and [prevented] the abuses of

those who traffic his sweat.'¹²⁷ Despite the implicit criticisms of the CEDA and Gil Robles, and conveniently ignoring the curtailment of the project, J.A.P. publicly argued that Giménez Fernández's reforms had been proof of the sincerity of the claims made by Acción Popular, whilst it continuously published articles defending the record of the CEDA in government.¹²⁸ Privately, however, it was a different matter. The JAP knew that it had not just been Agrarians, Traditionalists and conservative *caciques* who had brought the minister down, but *cedistas* too. The departure from government of a man who embodied the 'genuine spirit of the JAP' brought with it an awareness that this youthful vanguard had supplied the CEDA with a certain veneer and had hardened attitudes against the Republic but had not penetrated its reactionary heart. Worse still, while it still would not accept that the 'true spirit' of Acción Popular was not its own, the JAP was now forced to recognise that there were those in the party who did not share their vision of a new Spain.

The JAP vowed to maintain the CEDA's commitment to social justice, even threatening to boot out those *cedistas* who failed to comply.¹²⁹ But just as it had realised its impotence to change governmental policy so it realised that it did not have the authority to carry out any such measures. Indeed, far from the JAP exerting its authority over the CEDA, the CEDA could still occasionally exert its authority over the JAP. Isidoro López Martín, the president of the Seville JAP, wrote to Giménez Fernández in September, telling him that the '*japos* believe in you', adding: 'there are still some land workers who have faith in AP, despite what they have seen.' But a planned conference at which he had hoped that Giménez Fernández would speak in front of the JAP was refused authorisation by the local Acción Popular, which had ostracised the former minister of agriculture entirely. 'Would Acción Popular lose anything if these [people] suddenly left for the Agrarians, Renovación [Española] or *Tradicionalismo*, depending on their degree of *caciquismo*, frivolity or narrow mindedness?' a frustrated López Martínez asked in a private letter to Giménez Fernández. 'That is an indiscreet and risky question from a JAP president,' he admitted, 'which is why I write to you on plain paper without the JAP stamp.' He signed off with 'an embrace from someone who wishes to tell you so much more.'¹³⁰ If the Sevilla JAP feared that they were fighting a losing battle, confirmation came a week later when the local Acción Popular intervened to remove Isidoro López as president.¹³¹

Although this was an extreme case, the JAP was to become increasingly aware that while the CEDA had little problem indulging its authoritarianism, it would not carry through its 'revolution.' The Confederación had taken on those *japista* characteristics that would make impossible the

survival of the Republic, but not those that could, in some small way, have helped to consolidate it. Foreshadowing the Falange experience under Franco, the JAP's 'revolution' had been emasculated. It was telling that *J.A.P.*'s response to the liberal press after resuming publication in August 1935 had been to insist that it would ban them 'the day . . . that the JAP spirit has *any* influence in the destiny of Spain', at a time when the CEDA had five cabinet ministers.¹³² The Giménez Fernández episode had shown the JAP that its spirit had little say in the destiny of Spain because it did not even have much say within the party. The CEDA was not what it had promised and the JAP grew obsessed with defending its purity against those political opportunists who did not feel the 'true spirit' of Acción Popular (but rarely the CEDA) and sought only to ride its coattails to victory. It vowed to subject these members to special scrutiny to maintain the purity of the party, imploring *japistas* to 'be alert!', for *cacique* politics 'try to infiltrate us'.¹³³

Victory over the revolution and the CEDA's entry into government had provoked great expectations amongst *japistas*. On certain levels those expectations were met during 1935. The JAP experienced a process of fascistisation that imposed a new, youthful, 'virile' character upon its parent party, brought it an increase in membership and provided it with an extremely significant political profile across Spain, reinforced by the launch of a national newspaper that outlasted and superseded the CEDA's own organ. Increasingly, the JAP's voice was heard; increasingly, too, it was a voice the CEDA made its own – one that was more intransigent, authoritarian, and violently anti-democratic by the day. It applauded the army's crushing of the October Revolution and promised to complete the task of liquidating it, whilst also vowing to bury economic, social and political liberalism. If the exact nature of JAP's new state was not fully elaborated, the threat was unequivocal. Opponents, looking to Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Austria, believed they knew what lay in store.

But the contradiction between the JAP's radicalism and the *JEFE*'s cautious, legalistic approach to gaining power was an important one and the experience of 1935 was ultimately disappointing. The *Juventud* publicly applauded the record of the CEDA in government. Gil Robles's role was a particular source of pride as he set about building a military more in tune with the ideological predilections of the Spanish right. The *JEFE* had restored the 'prestige' of the army, raising government spending on the armed forces by 40%, embarking on a programme of rearmament and making a series of promotions that read like a *Who's Who* of the 1936 coup – generals Mola, Goded, and Fanjul were all handed strategically important posts, while Franco was made chief of the general staff and set about

imposing a spying system to root out the politically suspect from the military.¹³⁴ But the CEDA's work had been constrained by a failure to claim full power as the JAP had constantly demanded throughout the year and the imposition of its new state remained but a pipe dream. Coalition government did not work; there could be no compromising the JAP's ideals but they saw compromise all too often imposed upon the *JEFE*, however much he had come to be the dominant partner in the government and the virtual arbiter of Spanish politics. That much had been 'proven' by the curtailment of the Giménez Fernández's agricultural reform. While deep down the JAP realised that many of those who had brought down this reform were *cedistas*, it clung to the belief that the delivery of 'all power' would reveal that the CEDA were in fact real *japistas*. Once released from their chains, the *Juventud* would purify the ranks of the party to make sure this was so and the *JEFE* would carry through its programme in its entirety.

There was a problem, however: the *JEFE* was yet to claim all power. In a speech made to the Madrid JAP in June 1934, Gil Robles had been given a standing ovation when he declared: 'I have achieved [only] a fifth of my ideal . . . [but] this fifth is the solid ground . . . from which I shall conquer the rest.'¹³⁵ Over a year later, the CEDA had at various times boasted seven cabinet ministers but Gil Robles still did not sit at its head. And, although the JAP defended Gil Robles's tactic, lauding each step taken closer to his goal against those catastrophists who scorned his 'failures',¹³⁶ it grew increasingly irritated with the inability completely to capture the state. It had warned that there was a 'limit' to its patience and that limit had by now been crossed many times. The constant proclamations of the imminence of a victory that never came took its toll on the *Juventud*.

Belatedly, the solution appeared to arrive with the Estraperlo scandal that broke in October 1935 and led to the collapse of the governing Radical Party.¹³⁷ Its leader Alejandro Lerroux and his lieutenant Juan José Rocha resigned on 29 October, leaving his CEDA counterpart in a position of enormous strength within the cabinet. The *JEFE* then provoked the resignation of the prime minister Joaquín Chapaprieta by withdrawing CEDA support for his scheme for fiscal reform, put in place largely to pay for Gil Robles's own ambitious reforms at the ministry of war. When Chapaprieta walked away on 9 December, Gil Robles was the only man who the president of the Republic Niceto Alcalá-Zamora could realistically call upon to lead the government, having already exhausted virtually every other alternative. After countless set backs and uncomfortable compromises, the tactic appeared finally to have borne fruit. The *JEFE* would be handed power and the JAP would get a '100 per cent Gil Robles government' at long last.



'To win or to die'

The general elections

There remained one, ultimately insurmountable obstacle for the CEDA and the JAP: far from convinced of Gil Robles's good intentions, the president of the Republic was determined not to hand over power. Constitutionally, calling upon the CEDA leader to form the government would have been the natural step but Niceto Alcalá Zamora used his presidential prerogative to avoid having to do so, turning to a series of short-lived straw administrations destined to collapse without CEDA backing before conceding that he had no other choice but to call elections. For Gil Robles, this was further proof that the régime was sectarian and must therefore be destroyed: 'The Republicans and Socialists', he would subsequently complain, 'sought to make a Republic for themselves and themselves alone.'¹ For the president, by contrast, the decision reflected his conviction that Gil Robles's success was incompatible with the meaningful survival of Spain's Second Republic; inviting the CEDA to take power amounted to placing the régime in the hands of its enemy.

That conclusion was logical enough. The CEDA would not be content with governing from within the existing framework of the Republic. Many *cedistas* wished to change the régime entirely, calling for the reform of all the articles of the constitution and making little secret of their desire for an authoritarian state or their distaste for democracy. This threat had been made clear in the speeches, rallies and publications of large swathes of the party and was unavoidable in its youth wing. Either the Republic must change entirely or it must be destroyed – the question of a monarchy or a republic may not have been primordial but the form of the régime was no longer so 'accidental'.² The ambiguity of Gil Robles's political posture, his refusal to make a declaration of republican loyalty and the extremism of the party's campaigning message neither bode well for the future of democracy in Spain, nor fitted Alcalá Zamora's determined plan to pull the régime into the centre.³ This plan was hampered still further by the fact that the Radicals, fatally undermined by their governmental

alliance with Gil Robles and torn apart by a corruption scandal, had collapsed.⁴

Despite the desires of a kernel that leant towards Christian democracy, the CEDA had contributed decisively to the opening up of an insurmountable chasm between the two major blocs in Spain, making the survival of the régime still harder. As the leader of the Catalan Lliga Regionalista Francesc Cambó remarked: 'with every speech Gil Robles makes, the abyss that separates the left and the right grows even wider.'⁵ Alcalá Zamora had realised that any attempt to make a moderate conservative power of the CEDA was doomed to failure. Far from aiding the régime, Luis Lucía's wish to build a 'loyal and sincere' republican force of the CEDA served only to lose him control not just of the youth wing but also vast numbers of the main DRV in the Valencia region, highlighting the amorphous, almost circumstantial nature of the Confederación.⁶ The process of radicalisation experienced by the CEDA reinforced Alcalá Zamora's belief that even if figures such as Lucía and Manuel Giménez Fernández could be trusted, Gil Robles and much of the mass base of the party could not.

The mistrust was deepened by Gil Robles's tenure at the ministry of war. 'Señor Alcalá Zamora seemed to see behind every appointment an attempt to put the army in the hands of the enemies of the Republic,' recalled the technocratic prime minister Joaquín Chapaprieta.⁷ So concerned was the president that he had the ministry placed under special surveillance during the crisis and when the CEDA chief departed upon the fall of the cabinet, a tearful general Franco was fulsome in his praise, claiming that the army had 'never felt better led.' Given Alcalá Zamora's distrust of the military and the role that Franco had played in the bloody repression of the October Revolution – an emotive issue around which the left had begun to cohere – this could only harden his resolve to block the CEDA's legal road to power. Moreover, Alcalá Zamora's analysis of Gil Robles's democratic, republican credentials appeared to be confirmed almost immediately. The failure to invite him to lead a new government infuriated the *JEFE*, who darkly described the decision as 'the prelude to civil war' and sounded out senior army officers about the possibility of staging a coup only to be informed that the military were not ready to intervene – a point upon which he and the JAP would later repeatedly insist both publicly and privately.⁸

Nowhere was the concern with extremism more starkly reflected than in the Juventud de Acción Popular, particularly as the JAP had grown too large, too vociferous and too influential to be patronised as a bunch of kids or dismissed as an irrelevance. If Alcalá Zamora believed that he could bring some limited sectors of the CEDA into the Republican fold, he knew that this would be impossible with its youth wing. He had already demonstrated

his sensitivity to the JAP's fascist style in the run-up to the El Escorial rally and little had happened since to put his mind at ease. At its rally in Santiago de Compostela in September 1935, the JAP had called for a 'total revision' of the constitution, prompting Alcalá Zamora to tell Giménez Fernández 'this is fascism', while he later claimed that the rally at Medina del Campo unmasked the 'fascists' who lurked in the CEDA and their designs for a 'total and totalitarian upheaval' of the régime.⁹ The JAP was by definition incompatible with the spirit of the Republic. Worse still, Alcalá Zamora knew that the *Juventud* had begun to pull much of the wider party's rank and file with it.

According to Gil Robles, the process by which the JAP radicalised, leading the fascistisation of the CEDA and imposing an increasingly extremist character upon the Confederación, caused him 'not inconsiderable problems.' This was a typically duplicitous comment from a man who by the time he came to finish his memoirs sought to portray himself as a convinced democrat and a political moderate, glossing over the fact that he had contributed decisively and knowingly to that very process. Nonetheless, as far as this particular parliamentary manoeuvre was concerned, Gil Robles was right: the JAP's fascistic stance played a key role in preventing him from succeeding in his final grab for power. The *Juventud* had, according to Gil Robles, become an 'obsession' for the president: 'In the protocol conversations we had . . . in the few personal interviews I held with him, even in the councils over which he presided, he always found some reason to talk of the problems of the *Juventud* with direct attacks and veiled insinuations.' Nor was Alcalá Zamora alone. For Manuel Portela Valladares, promoted to prime minister from the ministry of the interior, the JAP was 'a source of grave fear', a movement about which he always had a 'bad word to say [*comentario molesto*].'¹⁰

Given the JAP's authoritarianism and its increasing importance within the Confederación, it was little wonder that Alcalá Zamora judged the CEDA's commitment to democracy to be paper-thin. According to Chapaprieta, the president of the Republic enjoyed a reasonable relationship with Gil Robles but did not trust the extremists to whom he so openly pandered.¹¹ '[Gil Robles] favours the fascist tendency within his party and is constantly surrounded by representatives who say ridiculous things,' Alcalá Zamora confided to Giménez Fernández. 'All this business of "all power" and talk of empire . . . simply foment civil war and makes coexistence more difficult.'¹² There were some within the CEDA who, like Giménez Fernández, concurred with the president but they had become increasingly marginalised, the Granada-based *cedista* Josep Palop complaining of the 'growing right-wing radicalisation' of the party that

led to his departure, and that of other *granadino* moderates, in January 1936.¹³

It was thus at least in part the JAP's aggressive demands for power, and the prospect of what that they would do with that power, that barred its leader's way to the prime minister's office at the close of 1935. The *Juventud's* catastrophist message, the destructive desire at its heart, undermined the party's accidentalist tactic – a contradiction that pitched it and the CEDA as an enemy both for the left and the right, sowing the seeds of its subsequent obliteration. The failure of the *JEFE's* final push for power came to represent the failure of his entire political tactic since 1932 and, indeed, the failure of politics itself. Accidentalism had not delivered power, which was the only thing it had going for it as far as most determined anti-republicans were concerned.¹⁴

These determined anti-republicans included substantial numbers of *cedistas* and the vast majority of *japistas* but, despite the doubts, accidentalism had until this vital miscalculation been appropriate and, most importantly of all, successful. The *Sanjurjada* had been 'suicidal', if 'heroic' and for a 'noble cause'. 'Acción Popular took protection [*se parapetó*] within legality . . . our attitude saved the right and now a great counterrevolution is possible. The programme of Acción Popular is being fulfilled – and ahead of schedule. Who can talk now of the failure of a tactic?' *J.A.P.* wrote in early November.¹⁵ Within a month, once Gil Robles had wrongly anticipated Alcalá Zamora's next move, the answer was everyone. The Falangist newspaper *Arriba* reported that 'in the ranks of Acción Popular there is disappointment [*desaliento*], and rightly so. In other ranks, where people wished for the failure of Gil Robles, there is barely concealed delight.'¹⁶

But the CEDA's tactic had not yet irrevocably failed. Gil Robles's plan had not borne fruit with an invitation to form the government but the calling of elections provided him with one final, definitive opportunity to take a legal path to power. This was an opportunity that was all the more real precisely because of the CEDA's tactic; the right arrived at 1936 in better shape than in November 1933 and unrecognisable from the disarray of 1931. 'Two years of sacrifice, which have not succeeded in leaving us weary or contaminated, have prepared the day of decisive triumph,' declared the JAP, 'the ground has been prepared. The fruit is ripe. Spain is ready to save herself.'¹⁷ There was an element of truth here and although Gil Robles had been forced to go to the polls, this outcome was neither unexpected nor, it appeared, entirely prejudicial for the CEDA. As early as October, Gil Robles had sent a formal telegram to CEDA and JAP bodies across Spain suggesting the party prepare for elections.¹⁸ When on 9 November *J.A.P.* declared that 'the *JEFE* will decide the moment in

which the Cortes will be dissolved and we shall go to elections,' it was designed to encourage Alcalá Zamora to call upon Gil Robles to form a government, following a well-worn path taken since October 1934, but it also expressed an underlying desire. Convinced of their capacity for mobilisation, the CEDA was, after all, avowedly populist, prepared for the campaign, and convinced that elections would provide it with a mandate to carry out its programme.¹⁹

If elections were cautiously welcomed by the CEDA there was greater enthusiasm from the JAP which had been growing increasingly perturbed by collaboration. Even though they continued to defend their leader in public, there were constant hints of *japistas*' irritation and these would become clearer still once the uneasy pact with the Radical party was definitively broken and campaigning began in earnest. Gil Robles's promises that Spain was 'falling into [our] hands' and that victory was 'closer than many think' were a double-edged sword: the fact that success did not prove so near as the *JEFE* had insisted provoked frustration.²⁰ Tellingly, an editorial in *J.A.P.* at the start of November 1935 had called upon *japistas* to curb their impetuosity, insisting that while Gil Robles was moving 'step-by-step', his progress was 'firm and sure' and he would 'not hold back when the opportune moment arrives.' 'Today, more than ever the JAP is fully behind the *JEFE*'s tactics, entirely united under his authority,' the *Juventud*'s newspaper added a few pages later, 'we follow the *JEFE*'s tactic because it is *the only efficient tactic* to take us towards the final triumph that draws near.'²¹

This underlined that democratic coexistence was a question of strategy not principle. It also showed the JAP had grown concerned at the delay and the ideological compromise Gil Robles's approach demanded of them – a cleavage that was revealed by *La Nación*, which constantly attacked the CEDA but not its youth wing.²² The split was embodied by the JAP president of whom his predecessor, José María Valiente, recalled: 'Laborda was the most emphatic [*tajante*] of all those in the JAP and one of those who most debated the politics of the CEDA, but he always did so with exemplary discipline and authority . . . the mood in December [1935] was desolate, especially amongst the lads of the JAP.'²³ Accordingly, there was a shift in *J.A.P.*, which was personally edited by Pérez de Laborda and Cecilio Garcirrubio and which began to proclaim the JAP's right, as the party's ideological watchdog, to speak out.²⁴ To do so undermined the second of its 19 Points, 'the Chief is always right', but the JAP had grown increasingly confident, while the belief that it *must* impose its character on a party at risk of becoming adrift had become entrenched. This did not entail an outright rejection of the principle of leadership and authority;

rather, it required a reworking of that principle. 'The best way of showing loyalty and discipline is speaking to the *jefes* with affectionate but bold, audacious clarity', *J.A.P.* wrote, deliberately choosing the word 'needed' over 'requested' to add: 'Our new politics must bury adulation and sterile acceptance. When our opinion is needed, it is our duty to give it.'²⁵

Here, the calling of elections helped insofar as it removed the doubts about the nature of the JAP's implication in the Republic and its parent party's collaboration with political forces that the youth wing despised. The JAP could now launch a bid to conquer the state in its entirety via the ballot box and it was more comfortable with this 'definitive assault', as well as boasting the manpower to launch it. 'Those of us who have our masses constantly on a war footing, those who are proving that we have a perfect mass of people, the likes of which has never been seen before and will never be seen again, those of us who have a mass of people that no one else can boast,' insisted Gil Robles, 'need not seek [our] strength in armed coup d'états,' but in popular support.²⁶ The irony of such a statement coming from the man who had first sounded out a military solution to his failure to secure power is inescapable but despite the contradiction between Gil Robles's words and deeds, popular support was genuine enough – and afforded the opportunity not only to deliver power to the *JEFE* but to deliver 'all power', unfettered by the need for compromise with republicans and a régime the JAP despised.

Gil Robles, the JAP insisted, would be 'rescued from undesirable company'. Having shaken off the bedfellows that destroyed their programme, the CEDA would deliver a final blow to the liberal, 'sectarian', secular Republic, concentrating authority in the hands of an undisputed *JEFE* backed by a strong *japista* presence which would enable him to carry out his programme without delay and with a degree of ideological fidelity and executive capability hitherto impossible. It was understandable that the CEDA had compromised more than its youthful cadres wanted, as the JAP grudgingly recognised. After all, it conceded, 'we do not have to measure daily the responsibility of our decisions'. But if it was understandable, it was also wrong: now the JAP's spirit and the JAP's men should prevent the CEDA from slipping back into sterility, 'suffocat[ing] and asphyxiat[ing]' in the atmosphere of a cowardly caution, of suicidal possibilism or criminal *caciquismo*; it must 'impose itself upon wavering, weak [*medroso*] possibilism, and indecision [by] surrounding the *JEFE* in the next Cortes with a numerous group of deputies determined not to waste the great opportunity that providence has given us to begin the construction of a new Spain that looks to the past and drapes itself in the glorious red and gold flag.' The JAP insisted that in collaborating the Confederación had 'left some of

its prestige along the way' but that the 'injection of youth into CEDA organisations' had prevented this compromise from proving fatal. Now, though, it declared: 'we are at the very limit of what prudence dictates . . . the decisive moment has arrived and we have to make a stand.'²⁷

Elections offered the JAP the chance to make this very stand. It did so by bringing the *Juventud* to the forefront of the CEDA to the detriment of some of the party's parliamentary deputies and the political allies with whom they had unwillingly shared power. Going to the polls raised the possibility of re-conquering the party as well as the state, with the JAP's control of the CEDA's campaign machinery assuring them a key role. If the JAP, as one Salamanican *japista* put it, had previously been 'down in the moat, occupying the defences [*barbacana*], the trenches [*fosos*] and the draw-bridge, fighting like heroes' while the parent party was 'up in the tower', now it was taking centre stage.²⁸ This was a welcome change. The JAP had grown numerically during Gil Robles' period of collaboration in government but it had struggled as the black and white political certainties in which it dealt turned a shade of gray. *Japistas* had grown frustrated at having to wait; now they could lead the way in propaganda, driving the mobilisation needed to conquer the Republic, dreaming of a new state without compromise with the political forces of a Radical party they rejected and the internal enemies they distrusted. The JAP was the heart, the soul and the muscles of the CEDA. This was reflected in the party's most famous propaganda poster, which covered the entire façade of a building in Madrid's Puerta del Sol and depicted the *JEFE* in front of row upon row of uniformed *japistas*. The slogan ran: 'These are my powers'.²⁹

Such enthusiasm for going to the polls did not make democrats of the *Juventud*, though. Elections, the JAP claimed, 'are only a means – the most appropriate [means] at the moment – by which Spain can get the government it needs, under the *JEFE*.' And, once that government was in place, there would not be a need for further elections: for all its populism, the JAP showed no desire to risk its political hegemony, or the fate of the Fatherland, at the ballot box. 'Why have a victory only to go back and do it all again?' it asked. 'To put our lives on the line every four years? No. We will triumph so that our triumph is total.' 'These could be the last elections that Spain has to *suffer* for many years,' added *J.A.P.*, while to a standing ovation Pérez de Laborda told a meeting in Madrid that: 'Spain cannot be allowed to put herself at risk in elections every two years . . . We go to these elections so that Gil Robles may stay in power for at least twenty years.'³⁰



Spain went to the polls amid an atmosphere of extreme political tension, which was only exacerbated by the JAP taking a central role. For both the Popular Front and the CEDA-led right-wing slate, the elections were 'transcendental' and 'historic'. Giménez Fernández warned against 'polarising the electorate along the most extreme of axes', writing: 'As an oratory tool to whip up a crowd lacking in intelligence [*falto de criterio*] . . . it is excellent but as a basic doctrine of a sensible movement of public opinion, it does not stand up to the most superficial of examinations.'³¹ Yet, much as they championed the former minister of agriculture as an authentic representative of the *japista* spirit, the JAP took no heed, underlining the dual split *japistas* faced within the CEDA: they might have embraced Giménez Fernández's social principles but they utterly rejected his moderation. The JAP, running the CEDA's electoral machinery, proclaimed polling day a clash not between political adversaries but between Spain and the anti-Spain; 'a question of life or death, a tragic dilemma'.³² It was the peak of a battle to the death that the JAP had predicted for the previous four years, the final fight in a long and glorious crusade – a twentieth-century *Reconquista* under the slogans 'Against the Revolution and its accomplices', '*¡A por los 300!*' and 'All power for the *JEFE*'.

For the left, the memory of Asturias still fresh, the elections were an opportunity to prevent Spain from becoming 'Hitlerian', a nation of 'concentration camps', 'hunger' and 'death'. Its take on the CEDA's *Puerta del Sol* poster showed Gil Robles surrounded by decomposing skulls above the slogan, '*these are my powers*'.³³ For the JAP, meanwhile, the campaign was about the very survival of the Fatherland. On the eve of the elections, it declared its willingness to 'Fight. Win. If necessary, die for Spain.'³⁴ A Popular Front victory, one CEDA reporter wrote, would be 'the first step in turning Spain into a Soviet [satellite]'; the JAP 'must smash the revolution forever or Spain will be faced by a red dictatorship'.³⁵ The historical significance of the ballot was outlined in dire terms that expressed the need for a heroic response, entrusting the JAP with the duty of leading the salvation and rebirth of the nation: 1936 was equated to 711, 1492 and 1808, all dates in which 'Spain' had risen up to expel a foreign 'contagion'. Only by looking beyond the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries and seeking inspiration in the martial values of conquest and re-conquest would the nation re-discover its essence. The JAP, as it had declared in May 1935, 'must continue the interrupted path of history' to get the Fatherland back on track. Pérez de Laborda announced during the election campaign that 'after two centuries of decadence people are starting to talk once more of empire.' Empire was not meant literally – not yet, at least – but was rather a watchword for Spain recovering its place in the world, a symbol of glorious

national identity 'shamefully' lost and threatened by extinction at the hands of 'the Revolution'.³⁶

'The Revolution' was the very antithesis of Spain and because the Fatherland was at threat opponents would not merely be defeated, they had to be 'annihilated,' prompting a stream of martial analogies and revealing that the country had reached the point of no return.³⁷ A Marxist victory meant 'arming the rabble [*canalla*], burning of banks, handing out of property and land, lootings, the distribution of women. Ruin! Ruin! Ruin!' It meant the left 'drink[ing] the blood of right-wingers from their empty skulls.'³⁸ 'Never before has "campaign" been a more accurate word: these elections are decisive', ran the editorial in the *Juventud*'s Mallorca-based newspaper, *Acción*, and it was that very decisiveness that subsequently made it impossible for the *Juventud* to remain loyal to the Republic in the aftermath of defeat. 'All power' had to be delivered to the *JEFE*, there could be no accommodation. As the JAP's electoral slogan had it, they must fight not just against the Revolution but also its 'accomplices' – a catchall title for those who in their liberalism and 'weakness' allowed the revolution to exist. In fact, these 'accomplices' included 'everyone' who signed the Pact of San Sebastián, thus wiping out the whole legacy of the Republic, as well as 'anyone who opposed the shooting of Pérez Farrás.'³⁹

No compromise could be made when 'Spain' herself was at stake. 'When you are talking about the destruction of society and the Fatherland, no good Spaniard can refuse to fight. 'Vote for the Right!' ran one JAP-designed flier. More often, though, the JAP appealed to voters to support the nation, with which they were coterminous. The JAP co-opted Spain in a way that the left was unable to do. 'Anyone who does not vote for Acción Popular is not Spanish', proclaimed one poster, while lapel badges and billboards invariably declared simply: 'Vote for Spain.'⁴⁰ A Vote for Spain would be a vote to overthrow the Republic in its current form, reversing the previous four and a half years. 'Spain', the JAP had declared, 'is determined to save herself and she shall be saved – to end forever political instability [*internidad*], to continue her history, to bring her moral and material aggrandisement, to give her a fundamental code that is a true reflection of our national thoughts, and a constitution that she wishes, without limitations or restrictions because no power can be allowed to stand in the way of a new Constituent Cortes, which is a real expression of the new Spain on the march.'⁴¹

The man leading that march towards salvation was, rhetorically at least, Gil Robles. Despite the question marks that were beginning to hang over him, the *JEFE* cult remained a central plate in the *Juventud*'s ideological armour, illustrating how entrenched leadership was as a concept as well as reflecting the fundamental fact that Gil Robles could still deliver power.

As such, the external symbolism of leadership was unaffected. One rally in Mallorca was typical. The *JEFE* arrived in an armed car and walked through a guard of honour made up of uniformed, saluting *japistas* to a stage emblazoned with the Cruz de la Victoria, huge portraits in his image and banners proclaiming '*¡JEFE! ¡JEFE! ¡JEFE!*'⁴² For one excitable biographer, 'a people face desperate times . . . the Spain that was forged in heroic feats and immortal epics, is in danger [of being] . . . destroyed for ever, without any hope of salvation.' The anti-Spain sought to 'hand her over, hands and feet bound, to other nations.' Fortunately Gil Robles, 'a man whose gaze reminds you of Hitler's', a 'Caudillo with the illumination of an apostle' and the 'moral and physical conditions' of a supreme leader, 'shows the way to save a nation' just as Jesus, Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler had done before him. 'Once he is in power – which will be soon! – a new era will begin in Spain, a new life, a new epoch which will construct the aurora of our Fatherland, in decadence due to the errors, clumsiness, shirking of duty [*claudiciones*], and cowardice of politicians who, without thinking of Spain, only worried about personal gain':

For some time now Spain has held its breath waiting for the man!

Spain needs A MAN to save itself!

Gil Robles is THE MAN!

Gil Robles is THE SAVIOUR OF SPAIN!

History will . . . write in letters of gold the name of [Spain's] saviour in her most anguished moments and he will be immortalised as one of the world's great figures.

Gil Robles! . . . Gil Robles!! . . . Gil Robles!!!⁴³

Amidst such essentially vacuous eulogies and in amongst the snappy slogans with which the JAP's paper was embossed, a plan for power was not always fully elaborated; political style had become a substitute for political substance. Neither the right's coalition, insofar as there was one, nor the CEDA itself even produced an official manifesto, although the JAP had already offered a 'condensed' version of Gil Robles's programme – 'some general norms' that 'interpret the common feeling of a new generation' and promised to 'project the imperial spirit of our race around the world.'⁴⁴ At the start of January, the JAP gave fifty reasons why it called for 'all power to the *JEFE*' in what one historian has judged 'as fascistic a manifesto as ever emanated from the Spanish right.' The first of the fifty were:

To give Spain a new constitution.

To annihilate the revolutionary spirit.

- To limit criminal liberties.
- To prohibit those organisations that preach the class struggle.
- To ensure the unbreakable unity of Spain.
- To end laic sectarianism.
- To strengthen the Executive Power.

And so it went on, the JAP insisting on an 'energetic programme of public order', 'the protection of our national industry', and the 'realisation of a colonial policy,' as well the need to 'return the crucifix to the classroom'. It would also intervene in the economy with progressive taxation, the imposition of social obligations upon the country's banks and a programme of electrification of Spain. If anyone doubted that this sounded very much like a fascist state, *J.A.P.* responded to a speech by José Antonio Primo de Rivera by remarking: 'it hardly needs saying that we agree with most of what he said.'⁴⁵

Moreover, the experience of 1935 and the calling of elections reinforced the convictions of many that fascism in Spain was embodied by the CEDA and the JAP, not the Falange. Jose Antonio's party may have been more extreme but it was little more than an irrelevance; it was the CEDA that frightened them. One liberal newspaper in Valencia insisted: 'In Spain, a country that suffers from fanaticism, ignorance and arrogance, especially amongst the ruling classes, the truly dangerous fascism is not that of the Falange but that of the CEDA.'⁴⁶ Although they had rejected the tag repeatedly, that the CEDA-JAP should be equated with fascism caused little real aversion amongst *japistas*, increasingly becoming an identification the youth wing embraced in the face of the Communist threat. 'There is only one dilemma now,' pronounced one JAP propagandist to applause, 'Rome or Moscow.'⁴⁷



Because the stakes were so high, the campaign was marked by a battle for public – as well as political and social – space. The JAP provided the right with a highly visible profile in the form of countless fliers, posters and leaflets, as well as a muscular, uniformed presence at polling stations and meetings.⁴⁸ This was a fitting role for youth. Proselytism was the JAP's *raison d'être*; no other section of the party could be so dynamic, so well prepared or even so brave. It was these young men who boasted of 'activity, spirit, modernity, [and] efficiency' and they organised electoral rolls, arranged mass rallies, took charge of stewarding, drove voters to booths, and designed, produced and affixed political posters.⁴⁹ This allowed Gil Robles

to enjoy the benefits of a combative message, indulging the JAP and those increasing numbers of the politically radicalised, but it also enabled him to disassociate himself from their excesses if needs be. *El Liberal* reported how 'every morning the streets are covered in Acción Popular posters [that are] ... an incitement to revolution.' But, *El Liberal* added, 'if anyone complains, Gil Robles says it is the JAP.'⁵⁰

The salvation of Spain would be born of the JAP's efforts and it would spread its propaganda, 'all over Spain. Come rain, sun, wind or snow. Obstacles do not matter; the enthusiasm of the *Juventudes de Acción Popular* overcomes them all, covering the whole of Spain, without sleeping or eating if needs be, because the JAP knows that with its heroic sacrifice all Spaniards will have shelter, sleep, and food.'⁵¹ The Mallorca JAP promised that the 'whole island' would be brought to its feet and this sentiment was repeated all over the country.⁵² The JAP's propagandists were already portrayed as igniting the flame of patriotism wherever they went, reaching the farthest corners and smallest villages of Spain. Typical of this approach was the report of a meeting in Zaragoza. 'That day', the *Juventud* proclaimed, 'even the hardest walls were shown to be elastic when enthusiasm fills the souls of fourteen or fifteen thousand people who manage to squeeze in where there is only room for ten or twelve thousand.' Now, the JAP's newspaper gave over double-page spreads to an exhaustive run-down of its meetings, in which it claimed that whole towns 'clamoured' to hear Gil Robles speak, audiences 'shook with emotion'. The *Juventud*'s newspaper gave over double-page spreads to an exhaustive run-down of its meetings, in which it claimed that whole towns 'clamoured' to hear Gil Robles speak, audiences 'shook with emotion' and even ex-Socialists were won over. Indeed, it was in the heartlands of the left that success was most gratifying. Despite its agrarian outlook, the JAP was keen to point out the support its propaganda enjoyed among the working class: 'The Gijón JAP scours the coal fields, acclaimed by the miners.'⁵³

A presence also came in propaganda posters. These were, the JAP declared, 'screams of redemption, of hope in crushing the revolution, of unity amongst Spaniards, of national solidarity, of the greatness of Spain.' They were also endless, the JAP insisting that it was breaking records with its 'pencil syndicate'. 'The printing presses,' it announced proudly, 'are struggling under the weight of our orders'; 'without interruption, without dismay, with growing intensity, every surface is covered with new posters of all colours, of all sizes, of all tones.' The JAP crowed that the left simply could not keep up with a campaign whose intensity underlined the extent to which the CEDA was more an electoral machine than a coherent political party.⁵⁴ Observers expressed their amazement at the sheer magnitude

of it all. 'In Ávila,' raved one local newspaper, 'there are leaflets *everywhere*!' while in Madrid citizens were forced to wade through the sheer numbers of leaflets that littered the streets.⁵⁵ One foreign observer described it as the 'greatest political movement [*concentración*] in history,' while the US ambassador Claude Bowyers told how he 'marvelled at the speed with which Gil Robles had plastered the walls with lurid posters.'⁵⁶ On a single weekend, twenty-two different meetings were held in the province of Asturias, while in Zaragoza alone the JAP's propaganda required a team of 1015 men and its own 'propagandamobile', a Ford Cayetano that was the branch's pride and joy.⁵⁷ By the middle of January, *El Debate* claimed that Acción Popular had already produced 50 million leaflets and posters.⁵⁸ The resources and effort the CEDA threw into winning power were certainly impressive. The JAP gleefully reproduced a report from the pages of *El Liberal*, which noted:

the right's campaign is much more intense than the left's. They have money for propaganda! The acts held by the left last Sunday are insignificant compared to those of Acción Popular. The electoral posters, inspired in defamation and made with the cleverest techniques to surprise and confuse the reader, belong solely to the right. There aren't any left-wing posters! It remains to be seen what the consequences of this American-style propaganda are for Spain [but] it is extremely grave in the current circumstances, because it excites the mood and sends passions to boiling point [*por la excitación de ánimos y efervescencia de las pasiones*].⁵⁹

El Liberal's analysis was an accurate one. Increasingly, propaganda proved the catalyst for confrontation as the campaign became physical as well as political. For *japistas*, leading the party's campaign was a dangerous task but a glorious one. If, as the *Juventud* claimed, 'in affixing posters we take a necessary risk,' this was a calling they embraced wholeheartedly. 'The JAP', one typical headline put it, 'must always man the most dangerous posts,' and the elections revealed how obsessed the youth wing had become with its physical contribution to the crusade. 'Defence squads at the ready!' *J.A.P.* had urged as the campaign drew near in late 1935, 'men of the JAP, be prepared! You know your role.' They certainly did: the JAP had to be made 'more robust in view of the coming elections' and the need to engage in physical activity was stressed to that end. Here, the hours spent in the *Juventud's* gym would pay off.⁶⁰

The JAP was not merely the CEDA's ideological guardian: stress was laid upon 'defending' the women who could deliver victory at the polling booths and the JAP relished the physical duties that befitted a 'virile' youth movement. Typical here were the uniformed *japistas* that guarded Acción

Popular's Madrid headquarters on calle Serrano and the khaki-wearing *japistas* bearing the Cruz de la Victoria emblem who 'protected' meetings in the province of Salamanca, while propaganda teams were made up not just of those who put up posters but also those 'guards' who made sure they stayed up.⁶¹ This very role cost two lives but the *Juventud* warned that it would not be cowed, seeing confrontation in every act and refusing to turn the other cheek, 'even if it does increase the list of martyrs.' 'We must sell our papers, firm in our position and all set to respond, a clenched fist at the ready, hovering at eye level', the JAP insisted. 'If the battle is to be fought out on the streets we will be there too – wherever there is one man, there will be another, braver and more determined.'⁶²

As the JAP's sixteenth programmatic point had it, in the face of violence, the *Juventud* would react with 'reason and force.' 'If they choose civil war, we will stand up to that', the JAP promised, 'the streets will not be for criminals but for honourable citizens.' That 'honourable citizens' was shorthand for the right and that the JAP's desire to defend public order, claiming for itself the role of political policemen, was entirely one-sided was reflected in its vow that, 'we will not permit anyone to take away our victory. We will die next to the ballot boxes if needs be, determined to win on the street, if that is where the battle must be fought, because we are the carriers of truth, reason and justice.'⁶³ And while attacks upon the JAP certainly occurred and public order was often breached, the JAP's task was far from entirely defensive.⁶⁴ The *Juventud* took secretly to putting up left-wing posters in an attempt to provoke a reaction from its own members and those fellow right-wingers they wished to mobilise, as well as being a uniformed presence at their opponents' meetings as well as their own. The JAP would 'crush those who oppose their will' and the physical struggle for Spain was a fitting tribute to the most revered of *japistas* – the martyrs who had given their life for the cause.⁶⁵ We must 'fight for the blood of our brothers,' declared one JAP propagandist in Salamanca, for this was 'the best seed for a great, just, united and imperial Spain.'⁶⁶

The language of extirpation justified violence, which impregnated every utterance of the JAP. Posters that were 'shouts of combat and victory, struck into the hearts of all Spaniards,' came from the JAP's 'war barracks' where they prepared the 'blessed fight for Spain and God.' Even going to vote was seen in violent terms, as an act of martial reaffirmation. Martín Alfáraz, a prominent *japista* in Salamanca declared: 'we are all soldiers in this great crusade; we must all work for the cause, for the resurgence of Spain. Everyone with voting slips in hand, as if they were daggers, ready to thrust them into the heart of the revolution!' ⁶⁷ Inevitably, this rhetoric fed a cycle of confrontation and the JAP was involved in serious violent episodes.

Indeed, in some areas violence was so common that those meetings where there was *no* trouble were reported on, as if they were a novelty.⁶⁸ One local JAP director wrote proudly of how the visit of Gil Robles had brought out some left-wing 'agitators', who 'certainly won't be trying to annoy us again', boasting that 'if the civil guard had not dispersed them first they would have had a very bad time' and a few days later another socialist interruption was 'quickly suffocated in an uncompromising manner.'⁶⁹ In Malaga, meanwhile, the seller of *Mundo Obrero* was killed on 24 January following a brawl involving *japistas*. That same week another fight forced the intervention of the civil guard and five *japistas* were arrested, two of them carrying guns.⁷⁰ This was not an event the JAP was keen to report: although it bragged of its strength, employing a bravado that exaggerated its physical prowess, it did not admit to killings.

The JAP's own deaths were a very different matter, of course, and the election campaign provided an addition to the JAP's already large pantheon of martyrs when Mariano Martínez Fernández was killed in the town of Auñón, Guadalajara, on 5 January. According to the party press, a group of Socialists had travelled to the town to disrupt a JAP fund-raiser the following day. In response, *japistas* patrolled the streets until they had 'expelled those seditious socialists from the town'. Not, though, without casualty. Whether or not any of the Socialists were seriously hurt is not documented, but Martínez Fernández was shot, being rushed to hospital where *J.A.P.* made great play of the fact that his *compañeros* offered him their blood for a life-saving transfusion before he passed away. The significance of martyrs and the embracing of violence as a means of political discourse were reflected in the fact that the JAP's national president Pérez de Laborda and secretary Gregorio Santiago Castilla attended the funeral, at which Martínez Fernández's name was met with a shout of *¡Presente y Adelante!* The local JAP wrote to the national body the following day to promise that: 'today more than ever we will work under the orders of the *JEFE* to liberate Spain from the parasitic scum that has imbedded itself in her venerable flesh and wants to rip it apart and hand a portion out to everyone; to liberate Spain from occult and mysterious powers that seek to hand her over to the voracity of other nations.'⁷¹



Beyond the Fatherland, faith and the willingness to do battle, there was a more prosaic need for propaganda: votes. Infatuated with power, its rhetoric and very survival hinging on victory, the JAP was all too aware that for all the fliers and the billboards, for all the uniforms and the muscles, it still

needed a cross on a piece of paper. The JAP resented its reliance on votes to prove that it was the authentic heartbeat of the nation, revealing the essential conundrum at the heart of the accidentalist tactic and making it vulnerable. Success in the elections brought tactical victory and power; failure brought obliteration. Victory promised the JAP and the CEDA a mandate to ensure that the fate of the Fatherland never again depended upon the caprices of an 'inorganic' system but it could only come via that very system.⁷² This meant two things. On the one hand, it ensured that the JAP became obsessed with mobilising voters. On the other, it obliged the CEDA to strike electoral agreements that could only hasten the party's internal decomposition. It had long since built an elaborate network of volunteers which guaranteed that supporters were included on the electoral register.⁷³ Now the JAP made a huge effort to make sure it got its vote out. After all, its very survival was at stake: a party without a clear agenda beyond a Manichean vision of Spain in peril and a desire to secure power, an electoral front that failed even to produce a manifesto, that had no provision for opposition and that rejected the existence of a republic in any one else's hands, was condemned to collapse if victory failed to arrive. 'To victory or to die,' screamed *Más*, the newspaper of the Alicante JAP, 'we will win our right to life through the ballot box'.⁷⁴

In an interview with the Bilbao-based newspaper *La Nervión* on the eve of elections, Pérez de Laborda insisted that the JAP's most important duty was to 'avoid abstention within the right' and the *Juventud* displayed a determination to drag the CEDA's natural constituency out to vote which could on occasions be both strikingly blunt and rather contradictory.⁷⁵ The JAP proclaimed its desire to defend the interests of the poorest sections of society, releasing pamphlets eulogising the Castilian peasantry that provided much of its mass base and even promising Segovia's small-holders that they would buy their wheat.⁷⁶ It called upon voters to hand 'all power to the *JEFE* so that he can relieve the misery of the peasant [*labrador*],' complaining that the 'accomplices of the Revolution' had booted the CEDA from power just as Giménez Fernández was 'about to solve the agrarian problem.' It vowed to 'defend with energy and determination your rights in the face of capitalism and those owners who do not fulfil their social obligations.' It also promised to build cheap housing, extend higher education to all, and introduce social security and sickness payments, while ending unemployment 'forever'. But reproduced alongside this call to the Spanish worker, on the very same page of *J.A.P.*, was another call to the self-preservation of the workers' tormentors, in which the JAP urged the 'businessman, industrialist, property-owner, [and] professional' to 'look around, think about the relative tranquillity you enjoy, your family life,

your business,' and to think what a Popular Front victory would mean for their prosperity.⁷⁷ Another poster declared: 'if you want to conserve the well-being you enjoy, sacrifice your egotism on 16 February and don't fail to vote, even if you have to queue like a vulgar citizen.'⁷⁸

The JAP recognised that it was the middle and upper classes that would vote Gil Robles into power, demonstrating a respect for social hierarchies that was maintained despite the rhetorical defence of the humble. Nonetheless, the contradiction here was one the *Juventud* struggled with. That the CEDA's natural constituency might not bother to turn up to polling stations provoked the disdain of *japistas*, who saw themselves as political activists rather than political beneficiaries. This said something about the divisions within the party and the JAP's growing disaffection with the conservative wing of the Confederación, as well as its self-assigned identity as 'revolutionaries'. It also shone through in some of its propaganda, which attacked the very constituency the JAP courted. 'If you do not vote, you are a deserter. The motherland is in danger and we must come to her defence,' ran one poster, while another added: 'He who does not present himself [to vote] is a traitor and a criminal.' Failing to vote was suicidal.⁷⁹ The JAP, which had already warned 'may the comfortable find no excuse for inactivity or a lack of interest when polling day comes round and they cry like women over what they failed to defend like men,'⁸⁰ declared that right-wingers who neglected to vote had sold out on the Fatherland and vowed to publish blacklists of those who had been complicit with the Revolution. 'Spain,' it warned, 'will not forget the names of its traitors.'⁸¹

What made the prospect of the wealthy failing to show at polling stations even more galling for the JAP was the realisation that the Confederación had pandered to their whims at the expense of that 'true spirit of Acción Popular' the JAP claimed to represent. Moreover, this suspicion was to be confirmed as the CEDA set about forming alliances and building electoral slates across the country. The JAP was well aware that the emergence of the Popular Front and the existence of an electoral system that favoured broad coalitions obliged the CEDA to court conservatives and moderates, seeking pacts in order to have a realistic chance of securing power but the manner in which this was resolved during January and February 1936 was to leave it deeply disillusioned. While the JAP manned the ideological and physical barricades, it played no part in decisions on electoral tactics, pouring its heart into a campaign for candidates that, all too often, it did not believe in. When Gil Robles sent a telegram to local CEDA bodies throughout Spain, insisting that 'there shall be no pact without consulting central organisations,' and promising to send detailed instructions, he closed by declaring: '*¡Presente y Adelante!*'⁸² To angry

japistas, this was to be the only concession he made to the *Juventud*. Having defended a collaborationist tactic about which it had serious reservations, this was a bitter pill to swallow.

Just as the calling of elections represented an opportunity for the JAP to lead a full assault on the state, claiming for itself a predominant position, so it saw a chance to purify a party now freed of the obligations of shared power. Accordingly, the JAP insisted upon the need for a coalition with the catastrophist right whom it considered ideological brothers in arms. The JAP was well placed to launch this call; while much of the far right had criticised the CEDA and the *JEFE*, it had on occasion seen good in its youth section, praising the *Juventud* and using the juxtaposition of quotes from the JAP and Gil Robles to imply a split which certainly was not merely a figment of their imagination. This potentially made the JAP into a bridge, affording them an opportunity to re-shape national politics, bringing the non-liberal, authoritarian right together as they often were on the streets, where they fought in the same battles, attended the same meetings and read each other's newspapers.⁸³ 'We hope to have the sympathy of the young men of a new party [the Falange], whose doctrinal differences to us are washed away with our spilled blood,' insisted the JAP, while its unity with the Carlists was given physical expression by a meeting in Toledo that was stewarded by *japistas* and Carlists standing shoulder to shoulder.⁸⁴ 'We are,' insisted *J.A.P.*, the voice and concerns of the youth wing's president José María Pérez de Laborda again clearly discernible in its editorial, 'united with the right on so many doctrinal principles and we will go into the elections together with them in order to do battle once and for all with the revolution'. With elections becoming increasingly likely in late 1935, the *Juventud* had declared:

So, you are with the JAP, dear friend and fellow traveller [*coreligionario*] of the extreme right? Good, we are pleased. But with the JAP is the *JEFE*, so that means – and this fills us with satisfaction – that you are with the *JEFE* too. This is not the time for sterile discussions but to prepare ourselves to win the final stage of the battle. The JAP is the vanguard, without the responsibility of the men who in every moment and in the heat of the battle, had to lead and carry politics. We are united with the doctrine of Acción Popular and its tactic because it is the only tactic that works.⁸⁵

Within this message lurked a multitude of intentions, designed for consumption across the political right. On one, simplistic level those who ran the JAP from Madrid merely wanted to demonstrate their affinity with what they called the 'extreme right', reflecting the fundamental beliefs of

rank and file members all over the country. They also wished to make it clear to Gil Robles that they supported a coalition with the 'extreme right' and not with the erstwhile partners of the CEDA in government; this had become a particular bone of contention for those that wrote, edited and produced *J.A.P.* from the party's headquarters on calle Serrano. The JAP wanted, too, to reassure catastrophists that, despite the experience of government, it shared their ideological make-up, defending Gil Robles's tactic not as a matter of conviction but as a necessary evil – the only approach which prevented the right from losing forever the chance to clinch power. In doing so, it hoped to foster the conditions for a *rapprochement*. More opaquely, the JAP also expressed its satisfaction at having been spared the attacks meted out to the *JEFE* and thus tentatively distanced itself from the CEDA should the JAP's programme not be fulfilled. At one meeting Pérez de Laborda admitted that 'the JAP's position is a truly difficult one because, within our discipline to the *JEFE*, we represent the rectitude that looks only at the ideal, beyond the obstacles posed by reality.' Describing the JAP as a 'counterweight to excessive prudence', he dropped a heavy hint as to the JAP's frustrations in adding: 'you cannot choose your collaborators . . . Acción Popular got power and we, like other youth movements, were kept out of power.'⁸⁶ The Falange sneered that the CEDA-JAP were 'allies of little liberals [*liberadoiros*], democrats [*democrateros*], masons and everything we detest'; this was exactly the same critique the JAP made of its parent party in government.⁸⁷

The JAP expended great energy in justifying the *JEFE*'s tactic, at once revealing both that collaboration was circumstantial and that this policy was not a path chosen by the *Juventud* itself. The CEDA's failures in government were the result of the constraints of collaboration, not a flaw in its ideology. 'Gil Robles,' the JAP declared as much in hope as conviction, 'is undoubtedly in harmony with other prestigious leaders of the right.' To prove this, the JAP justified not its radicalism but its moderation, excusing rather than lauding its tactics and record in power: 1935 had been 'a tough, tiring year of obligation and sacrifice in an unpopular position,' a year in which Gil Robles had to 'defeat his own feelings,' a year of 'collaboration forced by the needs of the Fatherland,' a 'sacrifice'. The JAP had 'rescued' Gil Robles from 'a policy that was not ours!' and in leaving power, Acción Popular had 're-found itself'. 'All the *JEFE* needs to regenerate Spain now,' the JAP insisted, 'is to govern without obstacles.'

If this did not convince the right, it confirmed the worst fears of the left. The JAP spent much of its time attacking those parties with whom the CEDA had shared power and the moderate conservatives with whom some, minor sectors of the CEDA still wished to collaborate. The dividing line

between conservative republicans and radical, authoritarian right-wingers was clearly drawn – and the JAP was unequivocally on the side of those that sought the destruction rather than the consolidation of the Republic. While it courted Calvo Sotelo, lauded the Carlists and sought understanding with the Falange, figures like Melquiades Álvarez, José Martínez de Velasco, Manuel Portela Valladares and Miguel Maura, were singled out for particularly bitter attacks as the JAP launched an invective against a fast-collapsing centre. Particular venom was reserved for the CEDA's erstwhile partners the Radicals, who the JAP described as 'a confused conglomeration of disparate threads held together by the leader.'⁸⁸

The *Juventud* could just as easily have been talking about the CEDA, and any hopes that they harboured of imposing genuine unity on the Confederación were soon dashed. The fact that the CEDA's ideological vanguard launched such visceral attacks upon its former partners and moderate conservatives did not prevent the Confederación from going into elections alongside them. This did not, however, reflect the cynicism of the JAP; rather, it reflected the cynicism of the CEDA. Indeed, the JAP had openly challenged *El Debate*, complaining of 'one daily that is sympathetic to Acción Popular and even gets wrongly seen as a spokesman for Acción Popular, [which] talks of centring politics – something that is really incomprehensible.' The JAP complained about *El Debate*'s sympathetic coverage of a Maura speech, an act it rejected because 'victory would be irrelevant if we had to share decisions with the agrarians.' The 'excessive prudence' of centrist politics would only usher the arrival into power of the revolution.⁸⁹

If *El Debate* talked about shifting the axis of power towards the centre out of conviction, determined moderation most certainly did not explain the majority of the party's electoral alliances. Political running mates were chosen according to their ability to provide votes in a given constituency, not to share a political programme, the CEDA leader insisting that 'not one pact would last a day beyond 16 February.'⁹⁰ In those areas where the CEDA was strong, it sought alliances with the far right or ran its own extremist campaign, freed from the constraints of possible defeat; in those areas where it was weaker, it moderated its tone and reached agreement with the centre or local *caciques*, for the simple reason that they could deliver victory. In a sense, this was a continuation of the awkward and uneven experience of collaboration, inspired only by the desire to secure power. With hindsight, this appears an eloquent comment on the entire career of Gil Robles, the consummate, chameleonic politician.

As Paul Preston has written, summing up the CEDA's contradictory approach with telling parsimony: 'In Badajoz, Giménez Fernández was dropped as a candidate because the local right regarded his social

Catholicism as dangerous leftism. In Salamanca, the alliance was with Carlists and agrarians only; in Asturias, with the local Liberal Democrats of Melquiades Álvarez; in Pontevedra, with the Radicals; in Navarra, with the Carlists; in the Balearic Islands, with the all-powerful local boss Juan March. In the great Republican strongholds of Catalonia, there emerged a highly implausible coalition of the CEDA, the Radicals, the Carlists and the Lliga . . .⁹¹ In Lugo, meanwhile, the CEDA struck a pact with Portela Valladares, a man who, by the *JEFE*'s own admission, was a master of electoral falsification and whom *J.A.P.* had attacked bitterly. Gil Robles later claimed that sharing a slate with the prime minister provoked his 'repugnance' but, he asked, 'how else could we prevent our defeat?' The only party on the right with which the CEDA did not reach any agreement was the Falange – and that was based not on doctrinal differences but José Antonio's inflated sense of his party's importance. As slates were finalised, Gil Robles revealed: 'we have made pacts in the provinces, sometimes to our satisfaction, sometimes out of compromise, and sometimes even with revulsion.'⁹²

The JAP, certainly, was disgusted. The clarity that elections were supposed to bring had not been delivered. Instead, there were deeper suspicions. Real politics had once again won out against the *Juventud*'s much-lauded ideological purity. The youth wing's position, not for the first time, had been undermined by its parent party and the CEDA had been revealed for what it was: less a political party, more a loose, fluctuating alliance designed only to deliver power. Furious, the JAP even contemplated presenting a rogue JAP-Falange slate in Cáceres, only to have to abandon the plan when it was uncovered.⁹³ All it could cling to now was the hope that, as Gil Robles insisted, all alliances were circumstantial and that these unwanted electoral partners would be shed in the wake of a cleansing victory; that the pacts sought by the CEDA in those areas where it was strong – pacts invariably struck with the far right – represented its real aims. In this sense, the promise of power and the prestige of Gil Robles was all that held the JAP and the CEDA together.

The JAP's growing disillusionment went deeper than the cynicism of Gil Robles's temporary allegiances, however. While much has been written of the disunity of the right at the February elections – meaning between the CEDA and the rest of the right – rather less had been made of the debilitating lack of unity from within the Confederación itself, which extended all the way across the right of the political spectrum, taking in democrats and fascists, committed ideologues and mere opportunists. The Almería-based candidate who complained that his own party's representatives had 'not acted as they should have done' was typical of the splits that afflicted the CEDA in much of the country during the run-up to elections but divi-

sions were felt especially keenly by the JAP.⁹⁴ For *japistas*, it was not just those with whom they would have to share power that did not impress them, it was also their own representatives. Their irritation went beyond the fact that the CEDA's running mates were hated Radicals, conservatives and even Liberal Democrats, rather than the Carlists, Falangists and Alfonsists with whom they felt a genuine affinity. It went beyond, too, the limited numbers of *cedistas* on each slate – far from returning the 300 deputies that the JAP demanded in a 478-member parliament, the CEDA had fielded just 178 candidates. Instead, their fury was provoked by the identity of many of the men who made up the candidacy of their own party. 'Numbers are not enough,' insisted Pérez de Laborda, 'we need quality too'.⁹⁵ And the quality did not impress the JAP.

'New politics' demanded new politicians. As the CEDA's vanguard, the source of its ideological purity, the JAP vowed to be especially vigilant of those who represented the party in the elections. Calling on the *Juventud* to 'be alert!', *J.A.P.* declared that victory would be 'pointless if suffocated by an atmosphere of cowardly prudence' or if 'financial interests were to impede our march.' A CEDA majority would be 'worthless if the parliamentary representation of Acción Popular does not represent its real spirit.' That 'real spirit' was of course, the spirit of the JAP – the fascistised, modernised identity imposed on the CEDA by its youth wing. But for this process to be completed, for the JAP to fulfil its dream of a new Spain, it needed positions of power. Accordingly, the *Juventud* called for a 'big representation' of those blessed of the JAP spirit, of those who were 'at least morally young [even] if not physically so', on CEDA slates. These included candidates who were not actually *japistas* but who the JAP championed. The *Juventud*'s national assembly, held in Madrid in December 1935, vowed that the JAP would fight against old politics and battle to 'promote those with the *Juventud*'s spirit,' taking 'special care' to watch over those who were named CEDA candidates for the elections. Meanwhile, 'last minute members who did not fight in times of trouble but give their name to the triumph should be subjected to particular vigilance . . . the JAP will denounce the failure of CEDA members to follow its social laws.'⁹⁶

What this clarion call really showed was that the JAP recognised the CEDA's limitations and wanted to wrest some control of the party, directly taking a share of power, not just laying down its programme. If this reflected its irritation at the fact that those who lacked their ideological commitment and sacrifice had taken posts of importance within the CEDA, their frustration would only increase. The obsession with political preparation, the use of the JAP's library, the study circles and commissions, the ideological unity, and the projection of itself as the guardians of a party, all

underlined the extent to which the JAP had groomed its members as a generation that must take control of the Confederación, inverting the traditional hierarchical structure of party politics to bring youth into its heart. While this desire was rarely made explicit and was normally subjected to 'rigorous discipline' and couched in terms of 'JAP spirit' rather than JAP men, the *Juventud* was not merely carrying the CEDA into government, it was readying itself for that task too. In late October 1935, the JAP's national paper had expressed its hopes for a new generation to take power, declaring it time to 'prepare ourselves for government', and a circular from Pérez de Laborda ten weeks later told *japistas* of the urgent need to get 'men of the JAP's spirit into the next parliament'.⁹⁷

On the eve of the elections, the JAP proudly announced a list of twenty-two candidates made up of *japistas* and 'friends' of the JAP – men such as Ramón Serrano Súñer, Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez, Antonio Bermúdez Cañete, and Ramón Ruíz Alonso, as well as Pérez de Laborda, Mariano Serrano Mendicuti, the president of the Zaragoza JAP Antonio Cremades and Antonio Bernabéu, president of the JAP in Albacete. 'We have enough of a presence to make our voice heard. Our candidacy will be a counter-weight to excessive prudence', *J.A.P.* claimed, echoing the sentiments of Pérez de Laborda in an interview a couple of days earlier.⁹⁸ In truth, however, the JAP was disappointed at how few candidates it had fielded and the way it had been treated. Twenty-two candidates represented a poor return for Pérez de Laborda, who had sought to get at least one JAP representative on every CEDA slate in the country, while *japistas* had been shunted about throughout January in favour of those whose politics they did not share, showing that here its discipline could work against it. Pérez de Laborda himself was replaced on the Madrid slate at the last minute, but at least his substitute was Serrano Mendicuti and he was given a slot on the Lugo slate instead. By contrast, in Gijón, the JAP president Argentiño Tuyá was simply ditched and the president of the Orense JAP José Pérez Ávila's hopes of being named a candidate were also unfulfilled.⁹⁹

But it was not just that *japistas* were being left out that stung, it was who they were being left out for. In Santander, the JAP protested at the inclusion of Ricardo Sánchez de Morellán, one of three *cedistas* on a five-man slate, while the case of Orense showed how bitter the internal battle had become in many parts of Spain, revealing the fault-lines within the CEDA.¹⁰⁰ Here, the JAP suggested a candidacy including the *japistas* Pérez de Laborda, the Marqués de Navarés and Pérez Ávila, but this was rejected by Benito Blanco Rajoy, a powerful figure in the regional CEDA and a representative of the JAP's despised 'old politics'.¹⁰¹ Instead, the man chosen for the slate was Ramón Villarino de Saá. This decision infuriated the local JAP so much that

Pérez Ávila wrote directly to Gil Robles to complain, angrily outlining the reasons why Saá was 'totally contrary' to the spirit of Acción Popular and 'an enemy of the JAP'. Quite apart from the significant personal points of tension that influenced politics in the province,¹⁰² Pérez Ávila alleged that Saá had undermined the JAP's rally in Santiago de Compostela, 'advising people not to go', was motivated purely by personal interest, was a representative of the '*ancién régime*' who had plotted against the party locally, seeking to commandeer it for his own ends, and had repeatedly failed to attend JAP meetings.¹⁰³ In one small town, his supporters had even infiltrated the local JAP, causing a split within the *Juventud*, one exasperated member writing to Pérez Ávila to urge him to come and found an alternative. 'I am totally against [the candidacy]', he wrote. 'I refused to sign the telegram accepting it but most of the JAP here did . . . they are not real *japistas*, they are dependents of Ramón Villarino de Saá.'¹⁰⁴ For those who declared themselves 'real *japistas*', Saá was, in short, exactly the kind of man of whom the JAP should be especially cautious.

Not content with registering his protest, Pérez Ávila took the matter further, bypassing local, regional and national CEDA bodies to bring his complaints directly to the attention of the Madrid JAP. The weight of telegrams protesting at the decision, the exchange of letters between the two, and the carefully elaborated protests of the national JAP reflected the extent to which this was a clash that was being played out elsewhere.¹⁰⁵ The secretary of the Orense JAP reported back after one telephone conversation, telling his president that he had spoken to representatives of the Madrid JAP, who were 'not prepared to let themselves be fiddled or pushed around [*mangonear*], especially as we have not got any of the three posts.' Some *japistas* announced that they would refuse to carry out propaganda in protest.¹⁰⁶ This was a situation repeated all over Galicia, where numerous local Acción Popular groups tried to reclaim control of propaganda from the JAP because of fears that the *Juventud* would not distribute the correct candidate lists.¹⁰⁷ Pérez de Laborda, meanwhile, was scathing of the CEDA's new arrivals and the party's accommodation of them, a private circular sent to *japistas* nation-wide declaring:

with decisions on the [CEDA's] candidates currently being taken, all sorts of shameful personal ambitions are coming to the surface. . . . These are days of great activity for sly con-men [*cucos*] and personal politics. . . . Unfortunately, they may have some success because they can call on methods that men who truly feel the spirit of AP cannot. The JAP is not prepared to give its blood to the CEDA [only] to be represented by those who do not feel the spirit of the movement.¹⁰⁸

The JAP's national press would subtly call on *japistas* to heed this circular, defending the *Juventud*'s position against that of the CEDA.¹⁰⁹ Behind the scenes, Pérez de Laborda and his collaborators were furious, as were active *japistas* across the country. And yet, ultimately, the JAP was forced to swallow the decisions of its parent party; the prospect of a left-wing government was, after all, far worse. 'I got your letter and, like you, I agree that the confection of our candidacy has not been correct . . . but right now we must keep quiet for victory,' wrote one *japista* to the provincial president, 'let me know which candidacy the JAP should support.'¹¹⁰ 'The locals are now prepared to vote for Saá when they were going to reject him', added a Trivés-based *japista* reluctantly.¹¹¹ Similarly, a letter from the general secretary of the CEDA – not, significantly, the JAP – in Madrid sought to draw a line under the conflict, telling Pérez Ávila: 'Despite your complaints, we trust that you will give the candidates the maximum support in the province.'¹¹² Through gritted teeth, the JAP would indeed back the CEDA candidate but in defeat these resentments would resurface with a vengeance.

'In these hours when the candidacies close, [these] hours of ambition, personal interest, ruinous passion and craftiness, those who fish in troubled waters do not realise in their blindness that the fate of Spain is at stake,' moaned *J.A.P.* 'If Spain's right wing politics are not purified . . . if our organisation is not purged of those elements that clash with the *JEFE* and the spirit of *Acción Popular* . . . all [we have done] will be worthless.' This showed that the JAP saw its mission as being more than a merely defensive one; it not only wanted to gain power but to use that power to build a new Spain. The JAP's spirit, it insisted, 'must be taken into parliament. In these decisive moments the JAP should exercise all its influence so that our doctrines are not just a romantic vision but a reality: our triumph will be crushing but the key is in our position after the elections. We must rid the revolutionary spirit out from within even our own trenches where it has infiltrated us.' The JAP, as its national newspaper insisted, would 'Fight. Win. If necessary die for Spain'. But there, under the banner headline, was a telling subheading: 'We do not fight for the names on our slates, we do so for God and Spain. After the triumph we will annihilate the revolution and its accomplices, steamrolling old politics, which stands in the way of a United, Just and Strong Spain.'¹¹³



The JAP's marginalisation at this moment of truth was even harder to take because as well as seeing itself as the most ideologically 'pure' section of the

CEDA, it also considered itself the strongest. Not only did their commitment lead *japistas* to anticipate a central role in the party and a prominent position in its candidacy, so too did their sheer numbers. The *Juventud* had grown impressively during 1935 and the election campaign brought further new recruits who came for two main reasons. First, the party's intensive electoral propaganda, which saw groups of *japistas* covering substantial distances and visiting untouched villages arranging meetings and events, projected an image of strength and concern for local communities, while bringing with it the foundation of many new (if potentially uncommitted) JAP centres.¹¹⁴ Secondly, there were those who expected the CEDA to win the forthcoming elections and sought to jump on the bandwagon. Many previously non-mobilised young rightists saw this as an exciting time to be joining the JAP's national 'crusade' and others were seduced by the *Juventud*'s apocalyptic portrayal of the elections as a transcendental struggle against Marxism and the 'anti-Spain.' Given the 'grave danger' facing the Fatherland, their consciences would not allow them merely to see out this battle from the sidelines.

Just prior to the general elections of February 1936, *La Nación* ran an article on the JAP. Taking up a double-page spread, it included figures indicating that the JAP had some 225,000 members in 1,000 local organisations across Spain, making it more numerous than any other right-wing party in the country. The JAP's own newspaper did not seek to modify these figures or even to make them more precise, suggesting that *La Nación* had erred on the side of generosity or simply accepted the figure given to them by the *Juventud*'s representatives, but the JAP had certainly expanded and evolved considerably since 1932 and could now mobilise huge numbers of young, Catholic right-wingers.¹¹⁵ A figure somewhere over 200,000 members on the eve of the elections is not at all unreasonable. Meanwhile, the estimate of the number of JAP centres was probably exaggerated in order to reach the psychologically significant watershed of one thousand, though it was likely to have been as high as nine hundred: a survey of the JAP's presence in Spain shows that it had centres in every town of consequence.¹¹⁶

The CEDA-JAP was a genuine mass movement which left the rest of the right firmly in its shadows. Compared to the JAP, let alone the CEDA, Carlism and Alfonsism were minor parties limited to the political fringes while the Falange, the party that most closely resembled the fascistised JAP, was simply minuscule.¹¹⁷ One old shirt claimed that 'the Falange does not have the numbers that AP [does] but because of their selflessness and boldness [*desinterés y arrojo*], each one is worth five'.¹¹⁸ This was typical of the Falange's critiques and was reinforced by the Falange's younger identity. For

José Antonio, despite originally concluding that much of its programme was 'excellent',¹¹⁹ the JAP was little more than a superficial copy: its fascism was 'stale', 'decaffeinated', and its members were overgrown boy scouts not national revolutionaries.¹²⁰ The Falange's attacks on the JAP were extremely bitter, José Antonio insisting that the JAP was the 'only example of a party where it is the youth wing that is the detritus', a home for those who sought personal gain. It was 'the dross from *Dolfussism* [sic], itself a second-hand reheating [*recuelo*] of fascism, caricature of caricatures.'¹²¹ On one occasion, the Falange newspaper *Arriba* printed a photograph of a group of *japistas* alongside one of pigs in swill with the captions below them swapped around. The same issue showed cows grazing in a field, accompanied by the description: 'JAP rally in Uclés.'¹²² Of course, the Falange's criticisms, and especially its claims to be Spain's *bona fide* national revolutionaries stemmed above all from irritation at the JAP's success. As one historian of the Falange judges, José Antonio's party attacked the JAP precisely because it was the CEDA's 'most important sector'.¹²³ There was no escaping the bottom line: Falangists were very few – 'one man and his dog', [*cuatro gatos*] as a former member recalls.¹²⁴

The Falange was in such a perilous state in late 1934 that it found itself unable to pay its light and heating bills and by August 1935 things had changed little, with José Antonio complaining at being 'pretty much ignored'.¹²⁵ Recognising that the Falange was in need of 'a bit of attention', he provided a rather desperate prologue for a book about the party, entitled *¡Arriba España!* and written by the right-wing political opportunist J. Pérez de Cabo. 'It was so amazing that anyone should dedicate any attention to the Falange, let alone a book, that I asked for a copy and read it in one sitting,' José Antonio wrote. The author, who had previously tried to wrest control of local JAP organisations before turning his attention to the Falange, added: 'If you are an enemy of the Falange but love Spain you probably do not really know us. This book is aimed at you.'¹²⁶ Such correctives and appeals achieved little, however, just as criticism of the JAP failed to carve a successful political niche for the Falange – or even to concern its political competitors. The Falange's attacks upon the JAP may have provoked mild aggravation among *japistas*, but most of all they provoked condescension. *Arriba* had constantly bemoaned the JAP's 'populism', by which it really meant its popularity. 'The Spanish fascists don't worry us', responded *J.A.P.* with ample justification, 'they lack masses, because the people are with us, more and more each day.'¹²⁷ José Antonio was, as Hugh Thomas has put it, a 'hero in an empty room'.¹²⁸

While the JAP boasted membership in the hundreds of thousands, plus the back-up of a parent party that claimed a million in total, the Falange

had a maximum of 10,000 'front line' [*primera línea*] members in February 1936 with the same number, or perhaps slightly more, in its student syndicate the SEU. Although figures vary, according to Stanley Payne, there is no way that Falange membership could be considered to have been more than 25,000 prior to the elections, and it is likely that it was lower still, claiming barely a tenth the numbers of the JAP, which had already conquered the allegiance of Spain's young radicalised right.¹²⁹ The failure of the Falange prior to 1936 has been interpreted as a reflection of the lack of a fascist constituency in Spain, but this conclusion is short-sighted.¹³⁰ The JAP displayed fascist characteristics in abundance and its ability to mobilise a fascist constituency should not be overlooked. The JAP was the real reason that the Falange failed; the CEDA-JAP's subsequent failure, in turn, would be the reason the Falange later succeeded.

José Ramón Montero has argued that while the CEDA was not fascist *strictu sensu*, it was, given the numerical limitations of the Falange, Spain's 'fascist threat'.¹³¹ As the CEDA's most radical wing, this was all the more true of the JAP. Moreover, the JAP's 'fascism' did not begin and end with the fears of the left, and Montero's argument should be expanded. The JAP accommodated those who might otherwise seek a political home in fascism and was also Spain's principal fascist *option*, even if it usually rejected the label. The JAP's radicalisation penetrated ever deeper into the political territory of fascism. It was to the JAP, not the Falange, that most of those who wanted to express their nationalism in bolder, more radical, and newer ways turned. That the JAP was its main competitor for the young men of the radicalised right was a fact of which Falangists were well aware.¹³² Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, the founder of the National-Syndicalist JONS, which later merged with the Falange, saw the principal obstacle to his success as the existence of fascistised groups, of which the JAP was the most significant:¹³³

Who are the fascistised? It is an easy task to point them out and name them: Calvo Sotelo and his Bloque Nacional. Gil Robles and his forces; above all those who belong to the JAP. Primo de Rivera and his groups, today still orbiting around the two previous groups, but surely not [doing so] tomorrow. Without forgetting, naturally, part of the army.

Moreover, not only were the ideologies and practice of the JAP and the Falange similar, their social constituencies were too, over and above the existence of bridge figures such as Antonio Bermúdez Cañete and the 'eminently *japista*' CEDA deputy, Ramón Serrano Suñer. Having been the Germany correspondent for *El Debate*, Bermúdez Cañete was a committed supporter

of the Nazi régime, famous for having translated *Mein Kampf* for a Spanish readership. He had also been a founder member of the early fascist newspaper *La Conquista del Estado* and of the National-Syndicalist JONS before becoming a key figure in the JAP.¹³⁴ Nor was Bermúdez Cañete alone. In Valladolid, the majority of those involved in Onésimo Redondo's Juntas Castellanas de Actuación Hispánica – a forerunner of the JONS, which later fused with Falange Española – were amongst the founders and key organisational figures of Acción Nacional and ideologically connected to Carlism. Indeed, Redondo himself had helped set up Acción Nacional in the province and sought a place on the CEDA slate at the 1933 elections.¹³⁵ Similarly, in Asturias numerous *japistas* had been amongst the founder members of the Movimiento Sindicalista Español, José Antonio's first foray into avowedly fascist politics, and joined him in acts in Madrid.¹³⁶ Serrano Suñer, meanwhile, was a CEDA deputy and close friend of José Antonio who later reinvented himself as a Falangist and did much to impose a pseudo-Falangist state, correctly judging that to do so was not ideologically incompatible with his political past or the desires of *cedistas* or *japistas*.

Exhaustive figures on the membership of the JAP and the Falange simply do not exist but this does not prevent a picture being built of the social profile of both. Data for the social composition of the JAP are available for the provincial capitals of Almería, Gijón and Orense, which show a fairly broad membership that nevertheless demonstrated a significant middle class bias. Based on a total sample size of 488 members, these three cities show that by far the most represented professional sectors of society amongst *japistas* were white-collar workers and employees, land-workers (many of whom were small-holders), and the qualified professional middle classes. These figures though are dwarfed by those for students, who account for almost a third of *japistas*, representing 153 of the 488 members for whom statistics are available.¹³⁷ Indeed, one former *japista* categorises the JAP as a student-youth body.¹³⁸

In some areas where the JAP's full composition is not available, information can be gleaned on individual members (often committee members and mainly the presidents), which also reinforces the middle class nature of the *Juventud*. Of just over sixty other, miscellaneous JAP members for whom information is available, more than a third were lawyers and all but nine 'workers' and two rope makers were middle or upper class.¹³⁹ Although exaggerating the position of the educated middle classes and those of a certain social standing, an analysis of local JAP directorate committees offers additional insight into the composition of the *Juventud*.¹⁴⁰ Figures based on twenty-four local committees with a sample size of 221 members show white-collar service employees (19.9%), lawyers (15.4%) and students

(12.2%) to be dominant with smaller but still significant numbers of industrialists (9%), 'workers' (7.2%) and the manual middle classes (7.2%).¹⁴¹ Lawyers dominate, too, among those CEDA Cortes deputies who proclaimed themselves members of the JAP or whom – as was more often the case – were appropriated by the *Juventud* as 'eminently *japista*'; some of course would not have been members of the JAP at all.¹⁴² Of the twenty-two '*japista*' deputies whose jobs are known, half held legal qualifications.¹⁴³

Even in the absence of membership figures for specific agrarian localities, it is clear that the JAP enjoyed considerable support amongst the rural population and small holders in the Spanish countryside.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, this provided the CEDA and the JAP with a populist base that belied glib claims that it was solely a party of privilege and genuinely worried the left.¹⁴⁵ Of the 66 confirmed *japistas* who left for Falange Española in the various small rural towns of the island of Mallorca, for instance, half were field workers.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, of the 1,000 followers that the JAP claimed in Ciudad Real in late 1935, for instance, only 201 lived in the provincial capital. The rest resided in the villages of the province's arid plain, with *El Debate* claiming that the JAP was set up in over forty separate localities in the province.¹⁴⁷ The JAP's substantial rural following was also reflected in the sheer number of centres set up nationally, over and above the country's most important population centres, and found echo in the JAP's agrarian ideological output. This did not give the JAP the character of a peasant's league, however. Although it eulogised the weather-beaten peasant as the depository of the Spanish race, it was provincial capitals that provided the JAP's most concentrated memberships, and it was in these cities that JAP committees set the political agenda and channelled the ideological output from Madrid. It was the activists in Spain's provincial capitals who gave the JAP its radical character, not the foot soldiers in the countryside.

The Falange insisted that 'all you *japistas* wear collars, ties and cufflinks [and that] many of you are wrapped in impeccable suits; there's no lack of marquises and counts; you are, in short, *señoritos*'. Despite Falange claims to be a proletarian movement, the real significance of this assessment was inadvertently revealed in the remark that Gil Robles was 'nervous that fascism will steal its support.'¹⁴⁸ That the JAP drew its urban support from among young, junior professionals – lawyers, white-collar employees and students – echoed the membership of the Falange, according to figures presented by Payne. Although its membership appears to have been proportionately slightly younger than that of the JAP, the Falange also had a predominantly lower- (or junior-) middle class personality. It was run by an aristocratic clique, but drew the immense majority of its members from amongst

Spain's students.¹⁴⁹ Here the JAP, which thrived in the university cities of Sevilla, Salamanca and Santiago as well as in Gijón – where a third of its members were students – represented a serious competitor.¹⁵⁰

Far from fascism stealing Gil Robles's supporters, Gil Robles had already enlisted much of fascism's potential constituency. Even if the JAP may not have had as many students proportionately among its ranks as the Falange, and while the Falange may have been the most active body on many campuses, the *Juventud* had substantially more in absolute numerical terms.¹⁵¹ The Falange's student numbers were 10,000 to 15,000. The JAP was attributed a membership of 225,000 and around 12% of its local directorate were students; a similar proportion of students among the rank and file would suggest a figure of 24,000 and the likelihood is that it was higher still, as is implied by the case of Gijón. Likewise, the white-collar and service employees who might have swelled the ranks of the Falange were also already enrolled in the JAP. In short, the JAP was strong among those very social groupings where the Falange might have expected to make some headway. What is more, the JAP also appealed beyond these groups – something the Falange failed conspicuously to do, never truly succeeding in becoming much more than a coterie of aristocratic playboys cohering around José Antonio until after February 1936.

Gabriel Jackson has offered a rationale for why Spain's 'typical middle class youth' made the political choices he did, arguing that: 'if his Catholicism was fundamental and he had no strong monarchist inclinations, he joined the JAP. If the ideals of hierarchy and legitimacy were as strong for him as Catholicism, he joined the Carlists or Renovación. If he admired Mussolini and Hitler, hated the Marxists and also the old privileged classes, he joined the JONS or the Falange.'¹⁵² Therein lies part of the answer, but only part. The JAP fulfilled *all* these criteria and Spain's typical middle class youth did indeed join the JAP rather than the Carlists, the Falange or Renovación Española. The JAP's Catholicism was fundamental, its political heritage monarchist and its ideological roots broadly Carlist, its sense of hierarchy and legitimacy a vital cornerstone of its ideology, and its hatred of Marxism acute. The JAP admired both Hitler and Mussolini and attacked the old privileged classes.¹⁵³ Our *Juventud*, declared *J.A.P.*, offering a portrait that reads like a checklist of fascist qualities,

represents a new spirit: national optimism. Faith in our people. Burning enthusiasm. Rigid discipline. Silencing of the putrid politics of *caciquismo* and personalism. Austerity. Constructive efficiency. Social justice. Sacrifice for the ideal. Youthful strength . . . a national movement that will recap-

ture the eternal Spain, with the unanimous objective of her moral and material regeneration, a regeneration soaked in our traditional essence . . . This is the JAP! . . . Imposing masses of all classes, electrified by rallies at the homes of our traditional greatness, spiritualised by the singing of our patriotic anthems and the sight of our standards and flags unfurling in the wind, by the memory of our martyrs that speak to us of sacrifice and abnegation. This is the JAP!¹⁵⁴

However, the reality of affiliation was probably more prosaic. In many areas the JAP was simply the only choice open to the young Catholic middle class, underpinned by its links to the church and its extensive professional and social associations. The JAP was more than just a political grouping; it served a significant social function, acting like a youth club organising study circles, libraries, competitions, treks and football teams. Emilio Grandío Seoane notes of the La Coruña JAP that its membership 'more than doubled in June [1935], mainly because of the creation of sporting and excursion sections'.¹⁵⁵ Juan Carlos Molano Gragera demonstrates the importance of apolitical, social groups – especially its football team – in the early mobilisation of the JAP in an Extremadura town.¹⁵⁶ And, asked why he joined the JAP rather than the Falange or any other party, one former *japista* responded succinctly: 'Because my friends were members and I shared their outlook'.¹⁵⁷ The Falange offered nothing that the JAP could not, with the possible exception of Saturday night punch-ups.¹⁵⁸ Ricardo Chueca argues that 'only the use of guns' separated the parties.¹⁵⁹ This is echoed by the former Falangist who recalls how his *cedista* family frowned upon his membership of José Antonio's party: 'not because of the ideas but because of the actions – the punch-ups, the beatings, the fights and the shootings'.¹⁶⁰ Yet fighting was a minority pursuit that would only later take on a genuine significance and it was not as if the JAP entirely shied away from violence either.

Much to the chagrin of its political rivals, the JAP also had the financial muscle to pull in new recruits, offering local networks through which it could offer work to members – 'like chasing flies with honey', or so the Carlists irritably put it.¹⁶¹ This reflected an inescapable reality: the CEDA-JAP boasted greater resources in every respect. Perhaps most significant was that the CEDA-JAP got there first, anchoring itself to existing church institutions, business and agrarian interests, and opinion formers in the media, occupied the political space, boasted an impressive network of newspapers and trades unions and had the prospect of taking power. Why join a party like the Falange, a struggling and small group, when the JAP had, especially following the role of its *Movilización Civil* in helping to put down

the October Revolution, proven itself the counterrevolutionary shock troops *par excellence* and had a future? This, however, was the catch. The most attractive quality the CEDA had was power – and power was about to be denied.

Immediately prior to the general elections in February 1936, J.A.P. signed off with an evocative eulogy of the sacrifices made by *japistas* to bring to fruition the salvation and re-birth of the Fatherland:

We are all workers in the construction of the new Spain . . . the forces that seek to destroy Spain shall not pass; marxism shall not pass, separatism shall not pass, masonry shall not pass . . . the youths of this crusade are returning to their barracks; more martyrs have fallen; [*japistas*] bodies are tired, but enthusiasm burns in their hearts; the fruit begins to germinate; the resurgence of a people looms on the horizon.¹⁶²

It was to prove a false dawn. The JAP-led resurgence did not occur, its dreams were broken at the ballot box. The results of the 1936 general elections underlined the collapse of the political centre and the polarisation of the country, with the Radicals plummeting to just eight seats. They also made clear the marginal status of the parties to the right of the CEDA and the irrelevance of the Falange – of those, in short, proposing a catastrophist solution. Having failed to agree terms to form part of a united counterrevolutionary front, the Falange would fight the February elections alone, only mustering a little over 40,000 votes nationally and nowhere receiving more than 4.1% of the vote.¹⁶³ In Madrid, Gil Robles polled 186,115 votes, while José Antonio gained just 4,995 despite the personal prestige that had seen him elected on an independent ticket in 1933.¹⁶⁴ As José Antonio insisted, many Falangists were underage and had therefore not voted, but there was no escaping that fact that the Falange had not won a single seat anywhere in Spain, while Renovación Española and the Carlists, bolstered by pacts with the CEDA, had secured just twelve and fourteen respectively.¹⁶⁵ The CEDA, meanwhile, had succeeded in gaining huge support from the Spanish middle-classes and amongst the smallholders of the countryside, picking up 4.5 million votes and winning 96 seats.¹⁶⁶ This, though, was not nearly enough for a party that had demanded the return of 300 deputies and 'all power for the *JEFE*'. Nor was it enough to form a government. The Popular Front coalition had won power. Gil Robles's tactic had definitively failed and neither he nor his party would ever recover.

IV

'We'll become Nazis if we have to'

The Ominous Spring

Defeat at the polls was catastrophic for the CEDA – and, ultimately, for the country. Having been on the verge of power, the Confederación was shaken to the core by an electoral failure that over the following five months led to the collapse of José María Gil Robles's prestige, the decomposition of the party, the obliteration of any lingering acceptance of the Republic and the fostering of a growing willingness to conspire against the régime. These shifts in turn contributed decisively to the definitive fascistisation and unravelling of the JAP, the emergence of the Falange as a genuine political force for the first time, the determination of a significant section of the military to intervene and as a result the plunging of Spain into civil war.

The effects of defeat upon the CEDA were both profound and immediate for four fundamental, inter-related reasons. The first was the fact that only the promise of victory under Gil Robles's leadership, allied to the fear of the 'communist' consequences that a Popular Front victory would bring, had kept the rather amorphous, heterodox CEDA united coming into 1936.¹ One activist had written during the week running up to the elections that: 'now is not the time for recriminations; we need to go into these elections with total enthusiasm. We should not make public our dissent because that would really damage the cause for which we all fight, above anything else.'² In defeat, those who had held their tongues for fear of provoking a catastrophe revealed their non-conformity. Or, indeed, simply turned away from the party altogether.

This was certainly true of *japistas*. The *Juventud* had been sold out by the CEDA in the run up to the elections; now, having lost, there was nothing to contain its disappointment nor maintain its loyalty to the parent party – all the more so as the CEDA was still obliged to maintain a parliamentary profile of sorts while the JAP was not.³ The inability to deliver victory also undermined the ideological and organisational basis of the JAP's political outlook as well as destroying the very *raison d'être* of accidentalism. Reconquest and triumph were critical to the JAP's self-perception and its

understanding of Spanish politics. Since its first edition, the *Juventud's* national newspaper had led with banner headlines announcing imminent victory and the conquest of power was the promise upon which the JAP's ideology hinged. Populist nationalism and the *JEFE* cult were expressed as total confidence in success. Gil Robles's authority was articulated through his leading the CEDA-JAP to 'total power' and the *Patria* to salvation. He was to be both the deliverer and the recipient of power. The JAP's perception of itself as the embodiment of 'Spain' was expressed in similar terms. The mobilisation, enthusiasm and sacrifice of *japistas* would be rewarded in the conquest of the state, upon which everything the JAP proclaimed was dependent. The re-birth of the Fatherland, the harmonisation of regions and classes in fulfilling Spain's 'destiny' and, above all, the destruction of the anti-Spain all rested on the acquisition of power. Defeat shattered the *japistas'* illusions: the *JEFE* had not delivered power, theirs was not the voice of the entire nation, and the 'anti-Spain' had *carte blanche* to destroy the nation from the inside.

The second, related reason why electoral defeat had a profound affect on the CEDA-JAP was that quite simply many – perhaps most – *japistas* and *cedistas* genuinely expected to win. Despite its impossibility, '*¡A por los 300!*' was a message of real faith in victory and the rank and file's internalisation of so confident a slogan meant that the ensuing defeat shattered their perception of the Spanish political game as well as their confidence in those who led them, leaving them unsure as to how to proceed. Unprepared for failure, they could not hide their devastation and some would not accept it. Although most of the accusations of electoral malpractice were directed at the right, many *cedistas* believed the results to be a fraud perpetrated by the left.⁴ One Oviedo-based *japista* responded to a question about the JAP's reaction to defeat with the barbed reply: 'It was not a defeat, it was a con.'⁵ For those *cedistas* previously prepared, however reluctantly, to allow suffrage as a system, defeat reinforced their belief that in republican hands democracy was not democracy at all. As far as the JAP was concerned, its disgust for liberal democracy was simply reaffirmed. Parliamentary politics were indeed rotten to the core, liberalism a 'putrid corpse'. Democracy had been solely a weapon with which to end its 'irrational existence'; defeat meant that it was of no use at all.⁶

Thirdly, defeat had significant consequences because the CEDA had the transitional support of those who pinned their hopes on what they assumed would be the winning side. Many such members turned away when it became clear that they had backed the wrong horse. In the immediate aftermath of defeat, *cedistas* insisted that 'parasites' and bandwagon-jumpers alone accounted for the party's deserters, and Gil Robles claimed that he

was 'happy' to see the back of them.⁷ The reality was rather different. Not only was the CEDA also losing less opportunistic followers, but such bravado failed to disguise the extent to which the party, obsessed with numerical strength, missed these supporters and their money: February 1936 brought a shift in the destination of economic support, with members of financial and landed élites choosing to divert funds towards more decided opponents of the Republic.⁸

For the JAP, equally important was a fourth factor: that the CEDA, led by its youth wing, had talked itself into a corner. Defeat conditioned the JAP's experience from February to July precisely because of its rhetorical extremism, its growing fascistisation and its increasing aggressiveness, both verbal and physical. *Japistas* were bound by defeat and their previous political posturing to fight back, desert the party or fall into inertia. Only loyal, democratic republican opposition was rendered impossible. Having demonised opponents and the Republic itself as the 'anti-Spain', refused to countenance lasting co-existence with liberalism, and declared political rivals the enemies of the *Patria* for which they were prepared to give their lives, it was impossible for *japistas* to continue as an active, legal opposition without backing down shamefully.⁹ For many *japistas*, it would be impossible to continue at all.

Defeat prompted immediate discussions about military intervention which would culminate in a coup d'état against the régime on 18 July 1936. It also sparked a process of soul-searching within the CEDA, bringing recriminations and setting in motion the hunt for an explanation, which exacerbated the finger-pointing and laid bare the party's divisions. These divisions are made abundantly – indeed exaggeratedly – clear by the musings and correspondence of Manuel Giménez Fernández, one of the CEDA's few genuinely republican Cortes deputies. He noted a number of reasons for defeat, ranging from a 'misjudgement of the political moment' to the existing electoral law and what he and his followers considered a 'shameful' failure to deliver on promises relating to 'social justice'. 'We lost an enormous number of votes because of that', he judged, complaining bitterly that: 'those who defended personal interest within our ranks will be satisfied. The worst enemies of this party are within – those ambitious men who prostitute our ideas, the villains [*malvados*] who dishonour them and the imbeciles who leave them looking ridiculous.'¹⁰

But if the failure to deliver social justice upset many on the party's moderate fringe and within the *Juventud*, it did not come as a surprise. A committed minority gathered around figures like Giménez Fernández and Luis Lucía yet it had already become clear that true advocates of social justice were not representative of the wider CEDA. In the wake of electoral

failure, one group of members wrote to urge the Confederación to take on a 'social meaning' that it 'currently lacks', correctly complaining that within the movement there were 'too many different postures'.¹¹ Similarly, Giménez Fernández lamented the lack of a 'fixed, decided and categorical political orientation'; the CEDA was a 'confused amalgam [of] incompatible politics [and] contradictory tactics', in which there was an uneasy co-existence of 'democrats and fascists . . . and those who hate democracy but try to hide the fact'.¹² These profound contradictions meant that the CEDA could not withstand defeat and just nine days after the elections the president of its workers' association in Barcelona, describing the former minister for agriculture as 'the only one who fulfilled our promises from power', asked bluntly: 'now where do we go? Do we stay within the CEDA or leave? The mass of working class people are pro-Manuel Giménez Fernández but not pro-CEDA any more, and they're now calling for a separation.'¹³

Here socially advanced sectors of the CEDA coincided with the JAP, rhetorically at least. José María Pérez de Laborda complained in a post-electoral circular that: '*cacique* politics ha[d] infiltrated our ranks, opposing social justice.' A triumph, he insisted, 'would have been worthless to us without a change of [social] system'.¹⁴ Such remarks revealed one of the fault-lines that existed within the CEDA and, allied to the speed with which these splits became apparent, serve to illustrate that the CEDA was already divided. But they were also an exaggeration: a triumph would have been far from worthless and just as important were those splits that ran along provincial, local and personal lines, or hinged upon fundamental issues about the nature of opposition to the Republic, the acceptance of democracy, and the use of violence. Indeed, much as moderates and *japistas* appeared united on social issues, profound differences prevented any meaningful partnership.¹⁵ Moderates were too moderate. As one perceptive *japista* told Giménez Fernández, the JAP 'feels ever-more disgust towards these nominal democracies which we suffer these days. I don't think you are in line with the youth now, we're . . . forcibly distanced, [even though] youth – all youth – agrees with your social justice.' In fact, he added, 'the divorce between the youth and other sectors of politics is, above all, down to the fact that they consider others incapable of bringing social justice to fruition. And if fascism attracts such sympathy it is, above superficial judgments, because they [*japistas*] hope that fascism, with the strong arm of national integration, will realise social justice.'¹⁶

These fractures were not a product of defeat. They had existed since before 1936 and were inherent in the competing political outlooks of those that huddled together within the CEDA. They were also all the more

damaging in light of the collapse of Gil Robles's prestige given that, as Javier Tusell argues, much of the party was 'basically *gilrroblista*'.¹⁷ The *JEFE*, who had defended the party's legal tactic as the best means to secure power, now found his position critically undermined and was so personally devastated and fatigued as to be rumoured to be quitting politics altogether.¹⁸ Although he dismissed these rumours as 'a load of fantasy' he did indeed take a break from active politics soon after the elections, temporarily leaving the party in Giménez Fernández's hands.¹⁹ The decision was met with virulent opposition but Gil Robles was well aware that this was not the time for further radicalisation.²⁰ Removed from power and fearful of reprisals upon Acción Popular's members, he was keen above all to cool passions and bide his time. For reconciliation and moderation, Giménez Fernández was the perfect candidate but he was not a faithful representative of his party's rank and file or even the bulk of its parliamentarians.

Because of this need to ease political tensions, Gil Robles's initial interventions in the Cortes were also infused by the kind of moderation that had been absent during the election campaign. On 20 February he surprisingly informed the new leader of the government, Manuel Azaña, that the party's parliamentary minority would support a vote for political amnesty for those involved in the Asturias rising and a few days later he insisted that the CEDA's opposition would be 'moderate and constructive' rather than systematic; they would not seek indiscriminately to block every project brought before the Cortes in an attempt to topple the government.²¹ Not that Azaña was convinced by Gil Robles's new tone: 'If they had won the elections they would not have bothered pacifying things,' he wrote in his diary, 'and, far from granting an amnesty, would have thrown into prison anyone who still had their freedom.'²²

It has been argued persuasively that the CEDA's early moderation was purely tactical, motivated above all by an awareness that the army was not yet ready to intervene. Gil Robles was aware that belligerent opposition could have hastened the collapse of the exclusively republican government, ushering in a socialist administration that might have acted far more decisively against the right and those who had begun conspiring to overthrow the Republic.²³ Whether his actions were quite so calculated is hard to ascertain, as is the claim that he was already awaiting the army, but his newfound moderation was certainly woefully out of step with the bulk of the CEDA membership. It thus served only to speed the party's decomposition and the definitive collapse of his own political authority, already virtually ensured by defeat. For those who believed in providence, defeat had been for a reason; Gil Robles was no longer God's chosen man. Worse still, he had opted for moderation precisely when most members, informed

by the party's own JAP-led propaganda, believed in the need for strong, decisive action against the 'revolutionary' Popular Front – the 'anti-Spain' that would destroy the *Patria*.²⁴

Small wonder that what limited chance Gil Robles had of recovering his crumbling prestige deserted him. A poll in the newspaper *Ya* would later show that the *JEFE* had ceased to be the preferred choice of leader among Spanish rightists and lagged behind both José Antonio Primo de Rivera and José Calvo Sotelo.²⁵ Nor was he the preferred choice of the country's economic ruling classes: money and support from wealthy backers and the press was diverted to other parties. The left-wing newspaper *El Mundo Obrero* noted the improved economic health of José Antonio's party, pointing the finger at the Mallorcan millionaire Juan March, an erstwhile backer of the CEDA.²⁶ 'Where,' it asked, 'is all the Falange's money coming from? . . . Two or three months ago they had none . . . suddenly succulent donations are springing up.'²⁷ Losing support and resources, Gil Robles was rapidly becoming a leader without a party and although he was a skilled parliamentarian any hints of a recovery proved both fleeting and illusory.²⁸ José María Areilza recalled how by April, the *JEFE* 'no longer controlled the CEDA'. The *JEFE* had, he insisted, 'given up and stood aside to let things happen – as he knew they would.'²⁹

That the *JEFE* had apparently thrown in the towel on parliamentary politics reflected a broader process of decomposition in which the CEDA ground to a halt. According to one account, in Cáceres the CEDA was so 'badly affected' by the elections that 'no-one even tried' to revive the party, leaving its headquarters 'deserted'.³⁰ Nor was this an isolated case. A *cedista* in Murcia, for instance, complained as late as 11 July – just one week before the rising – of 'our total isolation and the fact that the central organisation has completely forgotten about us', adding: 'we don't know what the situation is.'³¹ The editor of the Catholic daily *La Verdad*, meanwhile, noted that: 'the silence of the right is immense and the panic has reached such a level that there is nothing at all that can be done to keep our parties going now'.³²

This phenomenon extended to the JAP. Its newspaper, the principal national channel of activity, both institutionally and ideologically, ceased publication – 14 February was the last of its 53 editions – and other forms of direction were equally absent. Pérez de Laborda sent a post-electoral circular to provincial leaders in which he urged disillusioned *japistas* to display 'more enthusiasm than ever' in order to recapture the mobilisation of the previous months. This was not the time, he declared, for recriminations or internal division, rather the JAP should unite to bring about the reorganisation necessary to get back on track. For this to become a reality,

'more contact than ever' was required between the hundreds of JAP bodies throughout Spain, a clear allusion to the Madrid directorate's sense that JAP centres had fallen inactive and were slipping from its grasp. But despite Pérez de Laborda's protests this was due in no small measure to the inertia of the movement's leadership, nationally as well as provincially. And, despite the rallying call, he ruled out the possibility of publishing *J.A.P.* 'for at least a few weeks' as well as declaring that there were no plans to organise any kind of assembly, either of which might have helped to provide the *Juventud* with some much-needed direction.³³ Moreover, a JAP rally previously planned for March was cancelled without explanation.³⁴

Disillusioned by defeat, faced with a 'communist' state and effected by the collapsing prestige of their leader, rank and file *cedistas* reacted in one of three ways over the next five months. These reactions were influenced by, and in turn influenced, the inertia of those who normally channelled party activity and the increasingly apparent internal divisions that afflicted the Confederación. In each case they were conditioned too by individual *cedistas'* and *japistas'* previous political position within the CEDA umbrella and the realities of CEDA/JAP and Falange activity in their own localities, as well as their ability to access those who had begun plotting against the régime. Some drifted towards more moderate positions, seeking to disassociate themselves from the reactionary policy of the CEDA in government and the fascistisation of the JAP in the street. Others radicalised further, joining the conspiracy to overthrow the Republic, and/or engaging in violence – options which in some cases were allied to, or even dependent upon, a move towards the Falange. And still more simply did nothing at all.

The move towards moderation was for some *cedistas* a product of distaste at the radicalisation of the JAP and the fear as to where it might lead. In Murcia, one *cedista* complained in May that, despite his best efforts, nothing was being done to 'reanimate' the party along purely political lines and expressed his concern that the increased indulgence in street politics would lose the party members and ultimately force those who stayed into turning to violence. 'If initially [after the elections] we needed to stand up for ourselves in the streets, so as not to be attacked and overrun, now we need to stop acting like this or we will end up losing many of those friends who follow us,' ran the warning. 'I've said this already . . . but I've had no response . . . if nothing is done, we will all have to take up positions, because life is impossible in the current conditions.'³⁵

Nothing, though, would be done. Not only was the CEDA leadership inactive but there was also no interest in recuperating an already burnt-out and unpopular middle ground. Middle class opinion had hardened since

October 1934 and the party's rhetorical extremism had grown perceptibly with it, culminating in the February elections. This had been accompanied by membership increase, as more moderate right-wingers and the previously 'apolitical', frightened by the spectre of revolution, swelled the CEDA's ranks. In defeat, the majority saw the need for action, not moderation. When Giménez Fernández wrote to the general secretary of the CEDA in July 1936 demanding that they either unite with moderate elements or dissolve the Confederación and form a new, pro-republican party, he was whistling in the wind.³⁶ The failure of moderate politics had already been demonstrated by Luis Lucía's doomed involvement during April and May in negotiations to form a coalition with the reformist socialists Indalecio Prieto and Julián Besteiro and his party colleague Giménez Fernández, motivated by fear over governmental inability to control political extremism of right and left and maintain public order. Given that *cedistas* had rejected outright Giménez Fernández's agrarian reform in 1935 even when put forward by a right-wing government, there was no chance of them tolerating the same man now heading up an administration with socialists on board. Moreover, by the spring of 1936 Lucía had also lost authority over the JAP-affiliated Juventud de la Derecha Regional Valenciana and his grip upon other sections of the party was slipping: having long-since privately questioned Lucía's very moderation, a significant number of DRV figures turned decisively away from him and towards radicalisation, violence and conspiracy in the wake of election defeat.³⁷ Nor was this process limited to Valencia. *Cedistas* did not want moderation; 'what people want now,' wrote one Galician party member in June, 'is fascism'.³⁸

Indeed, although some sought to toe a moderate line, many more *cedistas* followed the DRV towards greater radicalisation. They did so either as individuals or as part of a local CEDA body definitively turning its back on accidentalism, becoming involved in violence or plotting – often in conjunction with the army, the Carlists, or the Falange. But while for some more radical *cedistas* news that a rising against the régime was being planned offered them a channel for political activity, for others it had the opposite effect and the majority of *cedistas* simply did nothing at all: some because they had never been especially committed, others because they were paralysed by the shock of defeat and the inertia of their party or because they were convinced, as news of coup plans filtered through, that their political role had come to an end. These *cedistas*, who had always demonstrated intense deference and respect towards the military, saw giving way to the praetorian defenders of the Fatherland as an entirely appropriate solution: February did not merely represent the failure of the party but the definitive failure of politics itself. Significant chunks of the party leadership felt the

same way. Part of the reason they did nothing was because, consciously or not, they judged it time to stand back and let others take over, led by the army. Meanwhile, even those vast numbers of the party not privy to the coup welcomed it without exception. As one *japista* recalls: 'I didn't know about it but I received news of the rising with satisfaction.'³⁹

This recollection sums up the attitude of most *japistas*. While their experiences, motives and perceptions were broadly similar to those of the CEDA, the reaction of the JAP differed from the rest of the party in that virtually none consciously moderated their position. Given the ideology, activity and rhetoric of the JAP over the previous four years, and the points upon which it differed from the rest of the party, this was only natural. Moderation was neither desirable nor, indeed, possible and although inertia was probably the most common response from *japistas* right up to the rising itself, the youth movement's radicalisation in the wake of defeat was extensive, with members increasingly engaging in violence, joining those conspiring against the régime and adopting an ever-more fascistic political stance. The JAP's activity was definitively transferred to the streets in a battle for public and political space in 'defence' of the 'Fatherland' that was to be a continuation of the election campaign. For others, radicalisation no longer appeared compatible with membership of so limp an organisation as the CEDA. With their party decomposing, these members would look elsewhere for a political home.



The urge to seek extreme solutions and where necessary seek them outside the confines of the party was reflected in, and heightened by, the growth of political violence throughout what Stanley Payne has famously called the 'ominous spring' of 1936.⁴⁰ Although this phrase exaggerates the level of political, economic and civil unrest, it is clear that there was a sharp rise in political tension and this certainly involved the JAP. 'There were disagreeable scenes during the 14 April military parades' wrote one Toledo-based correspondent of an increasingly familiar episode, 'with punch-ups between Socialists and fascists and a few from the JAP. So far, there are only three *japistas* in jail [but] the JAP centre was closed down the same day. There are rumours that the prisoners will be let out after 1 May.'⁴¹ Similarly, in Santander, where the JAP was becoming more frequently involved in violence, one party member was shot after stabbing the socialist who had 'usurped' him in the post-election handover of power, while in Cáceres a fight between socialists and *japistas* ended with one dead and a number injured.⁴²

Pascual Codero, a CEDA parliamentary deputy in Cáceres, spoke of the 'need to put the brakes on all impulse towards violence.' 'We must undo the theories of the exalted who invite the abandonment of those organisations that act within legality,' he insisted, 'because all that will do is lead to the damage of the right.'⁴³ His plea fell upon deaf ears: if violence caused consternation, this rarely meant taking steps to prevent it. Instead, violence was to be met with violence, just as the JAP's 19 Points maintained. An overwhelming fear of impending revolution and the closure of JAP and CEDA centres, together with the imprisonment of militants, hardened anti-republican resolve and more and more members opted for direct action, while those who had given up on political activity of any sort – aware of the plots being hatched – simply awaited the army.⁴⁴

Although the Popular Front government did little to assuage fears about 'communism', public order and state 'repression', *japistas* needed scant encouragement to see Spain's political system in dire terms. That they already equated the whole of the left with communism had been made abundantly clear by the Manichean Spain versus anti-Spain dichotomy which characterised the election campaign and defeat did nothing to change their minds: it merely made such a perception even more unanimous. Pérez de Laborda had written to provincial leaders soon after the elections, claiming that the party was 'faced with a revolutionary moment of a communist type that aims to destroy Spain'. Worse still, this revolution was 'state sponsored'. Extreme situations called for extreme measures: in such circumstances, the desirable reaction for many *japistas* was to fight back. As one CEDA deputy would put it in July, 'the salvation of Spain will come through a national rising . . . we remain always on the side of Spain and if there is blood to be spilled, that will not distress us; we will fight in the streets to die with honour and save Spain.'⁴⁵

State-led 'repression' of the right was both a consequence and a cause of the increased radicalisation of the *Juventud* and its growing use of violence. This violence was, in turn, a reaction to the fear of a 'revolution' considered ever more coterminous with the Republic. It was a vicious circle. Faced with an 'immoral', 'Godless' state, the JAP was more than willing to resort to physical combat or invoke the intervention of the army. Violence was a legitimate – if desperate – tool in defence of the Fatherland. If the JAP had previously respected a legal tactic and been reluctant openly to declare themselves fascist it was only because *japistas* believed military risings and fascist putsches unnecessary: they could achieve their goals without recourse to such a risky policy. Now, however, this was a policy worth pursuing. A Cartagena-based JAP sympathiser, exasperated at what he saw as the persecution suffered by the right, sought refuge in military solutions, taking

inspiration from the conquering and cleansing imperialism of Fascist Italy: 'I never thought we'd sink so low as to have scum [*canalla*] beliefs and criminal execution as norms of life. I wish we could ask general Badoglio to come here with his soldiers and his motorised division when he gets back from Abyssinia.'⁴⁶ Another *japista* summed up much of the youth movement's attitude when he told his provincial leader in May that 'if it is necessary to become fascist because of the Marxist advance and to combat anarchy, well ... we'll become Nazis if we have to.'⁴⁷

Such sentiments were broadly held by *japistas* (and indeed *cedistas*), becoming ever more entrenched as the spring progressed. Even moderates called for action as the situation deteriorated. One middle-of-the-road *cedista* and confidant of Giménez Fernández, unaware of plans for the rising and Gil Robles's acceptance of them, wrote to the former minister of agriculture to urge him to abandon his ostensibly reconciliatory line and Gil Robles's moderate parliamentary profile, in order more faithfully to reflect the position of ordinary members. 'Are we just going to let Spain fall into anarchy?' he asked in frustration, 'the [party] directors may be faithful to Gil Robles but the rank and file are pushing for action [*la gente acosa*].'⁴⁸

This shifting political outlook and hardening of resolve is apparent in the clear change of direction experienced by the CEDA's Mallorca branch, as expressed through the pages of its newspaper, *Acción*. Its editorial team, terrified by the Popular Front and by now informed about the rising, altered its stance by May 1936 to a barely disguised call for arms. This editorial radicalisation was soon accompanied, tellingly, by a return to the newspaper of the island's JAP. The page dedicated to the *Juventud*'s activities and ideology, which had disappeared in the wake of the February elections, reappeared at the end of May, reflecting a shift in the balance of power within the party – back towards those sections that supported the radicalism of the *Juventud*, back towards the *Juventud* itself.

In mid-March, *Acción* had announced its rejection of the use of force, a means of political action it claimed 'not within our reach.' 'Despite the left's violence', it refused to 'abandon our legal track or send our members outside legal means'. Nonetheless, it warned that 'if the current state of subversion is not changed, people will begin to lose faith in legal parties and that will bring grave consequences.'⁴⁹ The warning was a retroactive one, a legitimisation; the 'potential' reaction was in fact already under way. Nonetheless, this rhetorical moderation contrasts strongly with declarations made by the very same newspaper the following month. By May significant members of the party were aware of, and participating in, the conspiracy and consequently the tone had changed dramatically.⁵⁰ 'People continue to believe in politics and the ballot box', read an editorial

published in the middle of the month, but 'the battle will very soon be on the street . . . the ballot slip is a useless weapon.'

That this was a call to arms was displayed by another editorial, which echoed the proclamations of the JAP in attacking those 'comfortable right-wingers' who did nothing in the face of 'communist' violence. Fortunately, there were others who would act with decision. Although the situation was 'grave', *cedistas* should not despair: the party's most decided activists, 'its patriotic sector' – predominantly its *japistas* – would 'erect an impenetrable barrier against the reds.' This sector would fight to the very last, for its members 'know how to give their lives'. They also knew how to win: by adopting a new, muscular approach. 'The lion is not so fierce as they portray it,' concluded the editorial, 'and [it] can be beaten if we respond to their blows [*zarpazos*] with blows of our own.'⁵¹

The JAP's recuperated contribution to the newspaper was awash with calls to arms, employing rather clichéd gendered imagery. Its first editorial after reappearance insisted upon Spain's need for 'men not cry-babies' and should anyone doubt what this meant, the JAP was on hand to clarify matters: 'Those who feel their spirit waver in the face of danger and pain are not real men'. Nor, therefore, could such cowards be true *japistas*, for true *japistas* were 'brave heroes'. This clarion call was followed over the succeeding two months by a series of similar articles that, revealing the growth of political conflict, more unequivocally than ever before glorified party violence, *compañerismo* and the physical strength of Mallorca's *japistas*. Peering out from the blackened lines of the censor, for example, was one JAP account of an altercation in Buñola, where a 'lad of just 17' was rescued from a left-winger's attack by his *japista compañeros*, who administered their political foe 'a *massage* . . . that left him black and blue [*moradito*]'.⁵²

'Massage' became a favourite euphemism for the Palma JAP. The following week it recalled with pride that 'a *massage* was what a seller of those disgusting leaflets [left-wing fliers] in La Puebla received a few days ago.'⁵³ The strength of these JAP activists and the validity of their battle was reaffirmed on the eve of the rising with a further warning from the pages of *Acción*. During a 'left-wing' march in Son Sera militants allegedly shouted 'Death to Spain!' – a verbal affront that the JAP was not prepared to overlook. As the JAP intervened, the march degenerated into fighting, with just three *japistas* allegedly taking on 'almost all of them.' 'Who won?' asked *Acción*, rhetorically: 'the brave JAP lads, of course, who demonstrated clearly the meaning of our programmatic point, the one that says: "First, reason; in the face of violence, reason and force".' The practical meaning of a programmatic point always considered an aggressive threat by political

opponents was thus clarified, supplemented by a promise to 'punish' those who had attacked the AP centre in the previous days.⁵⁴

Yet, despite an increasing taste for administering 'massages', the feeling of persecution at the hands of the Republic was genuine enough, as indeed was *cedista* horror at the escalating violence of the left: if violence from one side was fine, violence from the other certainly was not. Some *cedistas* and *japistas* were also certainly imprisoned on extremely flimsy grounds and few accepted their incarceration – or those of their political colleagues – as being anything other than both arbitrary and partisan. For example, one Acción Popular member wrote from jail, insisting that he had 'no idea' why he was there and complaining that the party's leadership had done nothing to release him,⁵⁵ while a *japista* in Galicia excused himself from a pre-arranged meeting because he was 'still in jail, despite my absolution.'⁵⁶

Political reality here tapped into a persecution complex which justified 'retaliatory' or 'pre-emptive' violence and conspiracy against an 'immoral' régime. So it was that threats were met with threats and violence with violence, as the JAP reached the logical conclusion of an aggressive political stance that had characterised it for four years. Backed into a corner, *japistas* came out fighting. Notwithstanding the veracity of some complaints of unjustified arrests, there is no doubt that *japistas* became involved in violence, even if much of the police information that would clarify events either does not exist or is not party sensitive. Street battles were a natural extension of the JAP's paramilitary identity. In Toledo, one contemporary recalled: 'The CEDA, which was really excitable, wore the khaki shirts of the *Juventudes Hitlerianas* [sic]. At that time there was little love lost between one organisation and another . . . [among the left] there was lots of military training, theoretical instruction, parades . . . and the right did as much, or more.'⁵⁷

This would appear to be a broadly accurate portrait. Julián Chaves Palacios's study of political violence in Cáceres has shown that a significant proportion of those rightists arrested for public order offences in the spring and summer of 1936 were *japistas* and although other provinces await detailed, systematic studies, anecdotal evidence illustrates JAP violence.⁵⁸ A communist pamphlet, for instance, accuses JAP militants of acting as *pistoleros* in the spring-summer of 1936 and more reliable sources also reveal the JAP's implication in episodes such as a fight in Montijo or a punch-up that resulted in the arrest of three *japistas* in Segovia.⁵⁹ In the small Aragonese town of Zuera, meanwhile, nine Acción Popular members were charged with homicide, assault, public disorder and possession of unlicensed firearms.⁶⁰

As important as actual violence was a growing perception of disorder,

which acted as a justification for the coup. An interested right-wing press portrayed the Republic as anarchic and the majority of rebelling generals would cite disorder as a key motive for the rising. This message was so successful as to be internalised even in the absence of direct evidence. One *cedista*, for instance, wrote of his disgust that there were 'conflicts and provocations at every turn', praying that 'God willing the fear that consumes Murcia will soon subside', while at the same time admitting that there was in his home town 'no street disorder, thankfully'.⁶¹

Amongst the most famous expression of this perception of disorder was Gil Robles's widely quoted and statistically questionable speech to the Cortes on 16 June 1936. This speech provided the plotters with the perfect justification for a rising – something of which opposition figures were well aware, the syndicalist deputy Ángel Pestaña Nuñez insisting: 'the anarchy about which so much is said is born here, in parliament, and is propagated and spread all over the country, corroding the organs that are supposed to represent public opinion'.⁶² Gil Robles claimed that in the four months since the victory of the Popular Front, 160 churches had been burned, 269 murders had been carried out, 1,287 assaults had occurred, 69 political centres had been wrecked, 113 general strikes (and 228 partial strikes) had been called, and ten newspaper offices had been sacked. 'A nation cannot live in anarchy', he declared, 'Now, alas, Spain is in anarchy'.⁶³ Some have described Gil Robles's famous speech as a last appeal for moderation against the backdrop of his collapsing, inert party. Rather, it was a justification for a coup that, as the CEDA leader was well aware, had reached a point of no return.⁶⁴ Indeed, all of his parliamentary interventions were coloured by that very realisation. When, on 15 July, he told deputies on the other side of the chamber that 'the violence you have unleashed will be returned to you', he was well aware that his warning had substance.⁶⁵

Public order was an excuse for, not the cause of, the rising, even if unrest encouraged greater numbers to support the 18 July coup. Indeed, it had been an explicit part of the plan. The coup's 'director', general Emilio Mola, wrote prior to the rising that 'the provocation of a violent situation between two opposing political sectors has been attempted to help bring about the conditions [needed] but up until now – despite the assistance given by some political elements – it has not materialised.' Notwithstanding the complaint, the objective of driving the right into the arms of the conspirators was in fact relatively successful.⁶⁶ 'Disorder', however provoked, contrasted powerfully with the ideal conception of a 'strong', ordered state that formed part of the shared notion on the right – from the CEDA to the Falange – of authoritarian nationalism. Regenerationist thought, popular on the right, had long since called for

an 'iron surgeon', 'a strongman to sweep clean our peninsula of all that is not Catholic and in keeping with our traditions.'⁶⁷ That 'iron surgeon' would be the military.

It was in light of this propagandistic campaign that even minor altercations were interpreted by those who witnessed them. It comes as little surprise therefore that such interpretations were invariably politically charged and served to reinforce ideological and class preconceptions. One right-wing woman wrote to her daughters of 'a real kafuffle' (*jaleo*) in Toledo which had begun with a fight between a 'student and a communist newspaper seller.' Rather than lamenting the events themselves, she bemoaned the fact that the altercation had prompted 'all the normal "¡Viva Russia!" stuff, to which the students replied "¡Viva España!"'. 'It seems', she moaned, 'that shouting ¡Viva! to the Fatherland is a crime.'⁶⁸ Wounded national pride mattered more than wounded bodies and culpability was often in the eye of the beholder. In Segovia, for instance, a fight broke out at a dance hall in March when *japistas* and Falangists invaded a left-wing event, only to be ejected by the police, resulting in seven arrests. According to the president of the Segovia AP, Juan de Contreras, 'a group of JAP lads were assaulted by communists at a recreational centre'; according to the local civil governor, in contrast, the JAP had 'provoked' the trouble, 'turning up with a violent attitude and challenging the republican and working class people who were there, as they are every Sunday.'⁶⁹

But while the press was happy to exaggerate disturbances and attribute blame, and although some right-wingers willingly sought to escalate the tension, there is also little doubt that much of the concern was genuine enough. Violence was not always systematic and nor can culpability be solely attributed to those who 'provoked' events or first turned to street politics; to do so would be far too simplistic. Violence and counter-violence took on a dynamic of its own not wholly or even mainly dictated by political or military imperatives. Nonetheless, that disorder played into the hands of the conspiracy is indubitable and the function of violence to the plotters, the fear felt by the right and its outrage at the 'collusion' and weakness of a Popular Front government unable to prevent the spiral of retaliation all underpinned Gil Robles's interventions throughout the spring and summer. The *JEFE*'s appearances in the Cortes were primarily characterised by his stance as an apologist for the coming rising and the turn of his members to catastrophic solutions, while Franco himself remembered that Gil Robles had 'supported and justified the rising from parliament.'⁷⁰ True to his parliamentary profile, Gil Robles' words were chosen rather more carefully than those of many on both sides of the chamber – one deputy shouted out that the CEDA leader would 'die on the gallows'⁷¹ – yet his

message was clear. Rarely was this more apparent than in his most famous speech, delivered in April 1936:

Do not fool yourselves gentlemen, . . . half a nation does not resign itself implacably to die, I can assure you of that. If [half the nation] cannot defend itself by one means, it will defend itself by another. In the face of violence, which they propose over there [on the other side of the chamber], more violence will rise up; violence from the other side. And public authority will be left with the sad role of mere spectator at a civilian battle [*contienda*] in which the nation will be ruined, spiritually and materially. We are being pushed towards civil war by those that wish to achieve the conquest of power by way of revolution and this is being nurtured, sustained and cared for by the apathy of the government . . . if this is not rectified quickly, there will be no other solution left to Spain but violence; either the red dictatorship . . . or an energetic defence by those citizens that will not allow themselves to be trampled upon [*atropellar*] . . . for our *Patria*, we will do whatever is necessary, even disappear if the nation demands it; but not a cowardly disappearance, handing over our necks to the enemy. It is better to die on the street than be trampled by cowardice.⁷²

Such interventions served as warning, justification and advanced notice. Even those members who were unaware of the coup were being groomed to welcome one. As one former *japista* claimed: 'I thought something had to be done soon because Spain was going towards anarchy, but I didn't know the coup was being planned.'⁷³ Gil Robles's speeches were also a way of reassuring those *cedistas* and *japistas* who had turned to violence and conspiracy that they enjoyed the backing, or at least the understanding, of the party leadership. More importantly still, they ostensibly demonstrated that the *JEFE* was not out of step with the rank and file.⁷⁴ The reality, though, was rather different: far from leading his party, Gil Robles had begun rather clumsily to bring up the rear and right-wing politics had passed into a different arena. The army, the Falange and the Carlists were preparing for war. So too were the CEDA and the JAP.



Plans to overthrow Spain's Second Republic had existed since its very inception but only after the Popular Front won the February 1936 elections did a violent rising have a genuine chance of success. Now the right was both mobilised and convinced that democratic means had been made redundant. The CEDA had awoken a political conscience and exhausted the legal means

to the state, creating for the first time the conditions whereby a rising could receive significant popular support. Its political trajectory had also convinced those members of the army previously reluctant to risk a coup that intervention was both necessary and possible. Many of these had become infiltrated by the anti-Republican conspiratorial body the Unión Militar Española which by May 1936 could claim 3,436 active officers, 1,843 retired officers and 2,131 troops and lower ranking officers amongst its membership.⁷⁵

The Falange and the Carlists had long since advocated the violent overthrow of the state and had been in contact with the UME for some time. José Antonio had met Major Barba Hernández, the UME's founder, in early 1935, announcing a rather delusory plan to rise up in Toledo with 1,000 Falangists and march on Madrid from there. The Carlists too had been preparing for a rebellion from the start, and with far greater seriousness. They had fostered excellent links with the UME, which they had helped to fund and which would play a key role in the eventual coup, as well as imposing a military structure upon their youth cadres, creating 'Requetés' of around 250 men that underwent intensive training and secured arms. By early 1935 the Carlists could already boast some 6,000 red berets in Navarra, a figure which grew to 8,000 by 1936 – a body of men capable of being 'mobilised in 48 hours', with far more in reserve. The Carlists represented, in Martin Blinkhorn's words, a 'genuine citizens' army, well trained in the conduct of war in difficult terrain.' Racked by division, however, they lacked a coherent strategy for rebellion, significant popular backing outside their heartlands of Navarra and tangible support from within the army.⁷⁶ The inability of the right to secure power through the ballot box changed that. A definitive conspiracy was a consequence of the failure of Gil Robles's parliamentary tactic; defeat impelled those who sought a coup to act and those who previously thought they could legally secure power without one to join them.⁷⁷

The conspiracy, or conspiracies, began to take shape as soon as the election results were known. The rising that would eventually begin on 17 July was the final unification of three plans: those of the officers and chiefs of the UME, a generals' junta based in Madrid and general Emilio Mola. Known as *el director*, Mola would become the architect of the coup, pulling together these disparate threads into a single operation over the course of the spring and early summer. The former director of state security emerged as the organisational leader after a group of influential generals met on 9 March in Madrid and, having ruled out a number of suggestions, set about putting the plot together and securing civilian involvement.⁷⁸ In this he was helped by the Popular Front government's suicidal decision to post him to Navarra

and send Franco to the Canary Islands, from where he would eventually lead the Army of Africa.

Mola arrived in Navarra on 14 March and made contact with the editor of the CEDA-affiliated *Diario de Navarra*, Raimundo García, who would become his main confidant. He also met the province's UME delegate captain Barrera, who had already established conspiratorial ties with the Carlists. Although he held discussions with Félix Maíz and the UME's Captain Lastra, Mola did not receive the anticipated visit from any representatives of the national directorate of the *Comunión Tradicionalista*. He was well aware of the potential significance of trained Carlists and keen to get them on board but, having been placed in a state of permanent war readiness, they had their own rising to prepare in which they hoped for the benevolent neutrality of the army, securing their political predominance after the rising's successful completion. They planned to take over the ministry of war disguised as Civil Guards. The plot was scuppered when the uniforms were discovered but despite that failure a deal with the Carlists remained extremely hard for Mola to close, so determined was the *Comunión Tradicionalista* to maintain its own power base and programme.⁷⁹ The same was true of the Falange but not, tellingly, the JAP.

Although Mola recognised the need for civilian support, he saw this role as an auxiliary one. It was vital for prevaricating officers to feel that they had the backing of the populace in rising up against the Republic, rather than necessarily to march together as brothers in arms. To this end, his instructions included the order that:

When the State of War is declared, the Civil Committee must have people ready to enthusiastically applaud the [armed] forces, so that they consider themselves to be assisted by the people. It would be convenient for [those civilians] to shout ¡*Vivas!* to the army . . .⁸⁰

In many cases, civilian contributions on 18 July would amount to little more than hanging out the bunting, but they were not entirely limited to enthusiastic cheerleading. Nor was Carlist involvement easily secured. Their demands remained too extreme, their national leader Manuel Fal Conde too reluctant to cede ground. Rather than deferring to the army, he considered this an opportunity to use military intervention in order finally to fulfil the Carlist programme. Even the intervention of Gil Robles, alongside the owner of the monarchist daily *ABC*, Juan Luca de Tena, initially failed to persuade him, not least because Gil Robles made the mistake of revealing his nonchalant assumption that the CEDA, not the Carlists, would simply step back into the breach and once again be the major polit-

ical players in the aftermath of a rising.⁸¹ That very assumption was part of the reason why Gil Robles was subsequently proven so wrong.

With prevaricating officers infuriating him as much as civilian militias with an inflated sense of importance, Mola grew ever more depressed, twice considering suicide. The deadlock was finally broken when he circumvented Fal Conde, appealing directly to the *Comunión Tradicionalista's* leaders in Navarra, the only part of Spain where Carlist support was truly significant and the only sector of the movement that genuinely interested him. Navarran Carlists were desperate formally to join a conspiracy with which they were already collaborating, even at the cost of Fal Conde.⁸² Faced by a *fait accompli* and in the wake of the shooting, on 13 July, of José Calvo Sotelo – whose coffin was borne by the leader of the fascistic Partido Nacional Español José María Albiñana, Valiente, Serrano Mendicuti and Antonio Bermúdez Cañete⁸³ – Fal Conde finally accepted that he had no choice. On 15 July, just two days prior to the rising, an agreement was reached.⁸⁴

The Falange, increasingly run by José Antonio's brother Fernando following the former's imprisonment, was equally keen to join the rising. Like the Carlists, Falangists saw the rising not only as entirely necessary but also as the perfect opportunity to secure for themselves a position of power – especially in light of the party's spectacular growth since February (which will be analysed later in this chapter). The Falange also offered more than mere numbers, providing a cadre of militants willing and able to fight. Despite the imprisonment of many members, it therefore remained in constant contact with the conspirators throughout the spring and summer but its position was as contradictory as the circulars and communiqués it released: José Antonio was fearful that the army might *not* rise up, declaring them 'all chickens and Franco the biggest chicken of all',⁸⁵ yet he also sought to maintain control over a military movement which he did not entirely trust, continuing to elaborate plans exclusive to the Falange. As the head of the DRV rising in Valencia recalled: 'The Falange did not join [us] until July because it was preparing its own rising and did not want to join a rising run by the military.'⁸⁶

Deep down, José Antonio knew such plans were a pipe dream, admitting that without the army it would be 'titanically difficult for us to win'. Falangists therefore continued to conspire extensively in league with the military plotters, while the party's newspaper *¡No Importa!*, published from prison, ran chilling justifications for violence which helped to provide a pretext for the coup. Whilst in Alicante jail, José Antonio also wrote his famous letter to Spanish military, urging the army to rise up against the Republic.⁸⁷ On 19 May he sent an emissary to offer Mola 4,000 men for

the rising although whether he actually had 4,000 men to offer is another matter entirely.⁸⁸ Nonetheless, fear and contradiction continued to pervade instructions issued to members. On 24 June José Antonio dispatched a circular urging co-ordination and appealing for the curtailment of individual plans doomed to failure. Instructions should come from the national command alone, which, in practical terms, meant that they must come via the military conspirators with whom he negotiated. But the Falange's desire to control its own destiny was again made clear. José Antonio wrote that he had become aware of a 'plurality of subversive movements,' adding:

Some, carried away by an excess of zeal or a dangerous ingenuity, have gone ahead to draw up plans for local action, compromising the participation of comrades in certain political schemes . . . The respect and consideration of the Falange for the army have been proclaimed so repeatedly that they need no further elaboration . . . but admiration and esteem for the army as an essential organ of the *Patria* does not mean agreement with all the thoughts, words and projects that every officer or group of officers may profess . . . the political projects of the military (except, naturally, those developed by a well-prepared minority that does exist in the army) are not usually accompanied by accuracy . . .

The participation of the Falange in one of these premature and simplistic projects would involve a grave responsibility and would bring *its total disappearance, even in the event of victory* . . . nearly all those who count upon the Falange for such enterprises merely consider it an auxiliary shock force, a sort of assault troop of youthful militia men, destined tomorrow merely to parade before the arrogantly presumptuous who have installed themselves in power . . .

All comrades must realise how destructive it is for the Falange to be asked to participate as a mere auxiliary in a movement that will not lead to the establishment of the National Syndicalist state.⁸⁹

These instructions were remarkably prescient. In the long term, José Antonio was proven to be quite correct. In the short term, he was right on one count at least: it was precisely as auxiliaries that the conspirators saw the Falange. They were, however, extremely useful auxiliaries – trained, determined and in many cases armed. And despite his suspicions, José Antonio was aware that the Falange needed the army in order to make a grab for power. He therefore called together the party's leaders in Madrid, where they resolved finally to participate in Mola's plot. But even as José Antonio eventually deferred to the military conspirators, final instructions to Falangists circulated on 29 June underlined his desire for this to be a

Falangist assault on the state. They also reflected an awareness of a post-rising scramble for posts, revealing an attitude that would be highly significant for the political future of the party:

The Falange will participate in the movement, forming its own units, with its own natural commanders and emblems . . .

If the provincial or territorial chief and that of the movement agree that it is indispensable, part of the forces of the Falange, which will never exceed one third of the members of the *Primera Línea*, may be placed at the disposal of the military leaders to enter the units under their orders . . .

The military commander must promise his Falangist counterpart in the province or territory that civil government . . . will not be handed to anyone for at least three days after the triumph.⁹⁰

The contrast to the CEDA-JAP could hardly have been more pronounced. Unlike the Carlists and the Falange, *cedistas* made no demands of the military. They were prepared to defer to the army, who they considered a reliable guardian for the Fatherland, and recognised that rising alone was wholly unrealistic. One leading *cedista* in Salamanca, Ernesto Castaño, convinced that the Republic had irredeemably failed, spoke to garrison members in Valladolid about a coup early in the spring but found them indifferent to the idea at the time. When he heard that the city's Falange were considering rising without military support, he quite correctly deemed their idea 'absurd'.⁹¹ Ultimately, the Falange was forced to admit as much and it too was afforded a secondary role: for all the civilian support – and, on occasion, impetus – the rising was a military one in which all parties were obliged to recognise the predominance of the army.⁹² Manuel Hedilla, José Antonio's successor as leader of the Falange, later admitted that he ended up becoming 'a Falangist agent at the orders of general Mola'.⁹³ The difference was that *cedistas* and *japistas* willingly embraced this state of affairs; many Falangists and Carlists did not.

Yet if this obedience should have made the CEDA-JAP natural partners for the conspiring military it did not turn out that way. Committed to a violent overthrow of the state and conscious of the fact that they could not achieve power democratically, the Carlists and the Falange had long-since been talking to the UME, made plans for a rising, hoarded guns and evolved more explicitly as fighters and conspirators. The Falange was also smaller, more tightly controlled and already operating underground, making it an ideal conspirator, whereas the CEDA was a colossal, amorphous party with no central authority undergoing a process of decomposition. It was not possible to secure and coordinate the full backing of the CEDA with the

ease with which the Falange and the Carlists could be delivered: no single person or body could guarantee the comprehensive involvement of a party in such organisational disarray, still less one that maintained a parliamentary profile of sorts.

This meant that there was a certain ambiguity to the CEDA's backing for the rising, which tended to be less unanimous and more *ad hoc* than that of the Carlists and the Falange. For instance, while the DRA candidate Antonio Martí Olucha was heavily involved in preparations in Castellón and plotting generals were put up in the houses of prominent party members all over the region, the *cedistas* who had joined him on the party's electoral slate in February 1936 remained unaware of what was being planned and in Zamora Acción Popular was divided between those who collaborated wholeheartedly with the rising and others, such as Geminiano Carrascal, who were left in the dark.⁹⁴

Franco would later claim that the plotters did not take the CEDA fully into their confidence 'in order to avoid publicity.'⁹⁵ This suggestion makes some sense, given the CEDA's ostensible parliamentary identity, its sheer size and its confused structure, while some military figures also distrusted the CEDA's accommodation with the régime. In September 1936, Ángel Herrera wrote to Gil Robles to tell him that although some generals held him in high regard, the bulk of the army rejected his politics, seeing weakness and collaboration in accidentalism and blaming him for having allowed the left to seize power.⁹⁶ Gil Robles would later remark bitterly that:

Other parties and the military did not count on us. In fact, both the army and the other right-wing organisations systematically hid away from counting on us [even though] . . . on an individual level a very great [*grandísimo*] number of members, including some of my own personal secretariat, were involved . . . military chiefs did not, I repeat not, count on the CEDA – though they did have the collaboration of a great number of members, especially the youth.⁹⁷

Although ignored in the historiography, these were important reasons for the rapidity with which José Antonio's party began attracting *japistas* in the spring of 1936. Many of those who wanted to aid the rising had no choice but to join, or at least collaborate with, the Falange. In some localities the CEDA and the JAP did not have access to the plotters, a frustrated *japista* admitting just before the rising in July that it might be better to join the 'fascists' precisely in order to be able to 'receive instructions.' Another *japista* that started spending time with local Falangists who invited him to

join them notes that the first thing his new friends did was to show him how to use a gun.⁹⁸

Nonetheless, one military historian insists that the CEDA's contribution was 'greater, much greater' than that of the Falange: it, after all, provided sheer numbers, money and a huge network of contacts.⁹⁹ An early meeting between general Enrique Varela and Valentín Galarza held at the home of CEDA deputy José Delgado reflected this, while the CEDA deputy for Zaragoza, Ramón Serrano Suñer, was also heavily involved – not just in the rising but in bringing right-wing politics into the orbit of the Falange.¹⁰⁰ He acted as a point of contact between José Antonio and the conspirators, meeting with both the Falange leader and generals Mola, Franco and Yagüe throughout the spring, as well as securing the involvement in the coup of general Miguel Cabanillas in Zaragoza.¹⁰¹ He also attempted to persuade the CEDA to include both José Antonio and Franco on the slate for a March by-election and mooted the possibility of forming a Falange parliamentary minority alongside two fellow CEDA deserters, José Finat – the Conde de Mayalde, who would later become his personal secretary – and Fermín Daza.¹⁰²

This was just the tip of the iceberg. The documentation that exists to prove the CEDA-JAP's involvement is limited but this alone should not be considered an indication that their involvement was equally limited – certainly not against the relatively fulsome, yet primarily retrospective accounts of the Falange's involvement. The Falange's apparently whole-hearted participation has been exaggerated by circumstance, survival and self-promotion; the CEDA-JAP's apparently dubitative participation likewise. In fact, the CEDA and the JAP were bound up in the coup all over the country. In the middle of May, the leader of the Orense JAP, José Pérez Ávila, received a rather cryptic letter from a Vigo-based man, which was headed with a curious, unexplained symbol that does not appear in any of Pérez Ávila's other correspondence. In his letter, a somewhat panicky 'Carlos' – if, indeed, that was his real name – expressed his concern that 'our common friend S has been detained . . . due to political vengeance.' He added, rather oddly, that this set-back needed to be resolved quickly as 'the exams are near and there is no time to lose,' and he urged the JAP leader to travel to Madrid to find out what the situation was because in the meantime his 'charge' did not know what to do.¹⁰³ Rather like an urgent call for all of Mallorca's JAP leaders to present themselves at the party offices in Palma on 4 July, this seems – with hindsight – more than a little suspicious.¹⁰⁴

But this suspicion could hardly be sustained were it not for more concrete, albeit patchy knowledge of JAP involvement in the conspiracy all

over the country, including Mallorca itself.¹⁰⁵ There is evidence, for example, that Avelino Parrondo, the leader of the JAP's *Movilización Civil*, maintained close contact with the conspiratorial UME as well as putting together a group of *japistas* ready to man the Montaña barracks in Madrid, and that his president, Pérez de Laborda, also provided a bridge between the UME and civilian groups.¹⁰⁶ Likewise, there are accounts that show that the CEDA was involved in the conspiracy and rising in Huesca, that *cedistas* were kept up to date with plans in Seville and that the *japista* Rafael de la Cerdá was a key player in the Murcia rising, as well as demonstrating that civilian mobilisation in Segovia was led by Francisco Martín Gómez, the editor of the CEDA-affiliated newspaper *El Adelantado*, and that the men patrolling the city's streets on 18 July were *japistas* under his charge.¹⁰⁷

Similarly, in Gijón the JAP was due to provide a post-rising *Movilización Civil* in order to keep vital services going in the event of a general strike and 3,000 Salamanca *japistas* were offered to the conspirators for the hours immediately after the *pronunciamiento*.¹⁰⁸ Following mobilisation agreements struck between the JAP and the Falange in Zaragoza, meanwhile, the *Juventud*'s centre on the Paseo de la Mina became the focus of preparations for the rising. There, out on the JAP's sports field, *japistas* and Falangists received training and orders from the military personnel who were responsible for leading the conspiracy in Aragón. Throughout the province, JAP bodies armed themselves in preparation for a rising.

Nonetheless, this was often a defensive measure and the JAP remained absolutely secondary to the true leaders of the coup – the army. So much so, in fact, that the JAP's exasperated military *enlace* in Aragón, Juan Bastero Beguiristáin, grew tired of waiting and irritably sought out the key conspirators to find out what exactly was going on.¹⁰⁹ The experience was alike in Lérida. Here, the JAP had been receiving instructions throughout the early summer, played host to discussions between the military and civilian groups, and prepared to man the town's barracks in order to free the military conspirators for the rising proper. But the instructions given to the JAP secretary Carlos Larrosa Hospital and the local president and candidate on the February slate José Abizan de Puntas, went little further than requiring the JAP to be 'prepared' – much to the frustration of the *japistas* themselves.¹¹⁰

In Toledo, the party's role was rather more hands on. The provincial chief of Acción Popular Silvano Cirujano Cirujano was the key civilian conspirator and AP's headquarters became the epicentre of operations, with the Falange allowed to meet clandestinely in the attic. The erstwhile *japista* Conde de Mayalde, meanwhile, ferried notes to imprisoned Falangists, smuggled guns to José Antonio and kept a cache of weapons at the same

HQ.¹¹¹ In Almería, the CEDA parliamentary deputy Lorenzo Gallardo Gallardo became involved in the plotting in May, at the behest of the leading *cedistas* Federico Salmón and Francisco Sánchez Miranda, the former of whom was one of those *cedista* deputies most prized by the JAP.¹¹² In collaboration with the Falange, Gallardo Gallardo – who hid his activities from Almería's other CEDA deputy, Luis Jiménez Canga Argüelles – put together a force of some 400 young militants in the capital and a further 600 in the town of Berja, which were then split into cells of around forty men. The vast majority were *japistas*.¹¹³ Meanwhile, further west, the Granada-based 'eminently *japista*' deputy Ramón Ruíz Alonso had also begun to take action against a parliament that he derided as 'all lies, all deceit'. Especially galling for Ruíz Alonso was the proposed annulling of his own election in Granada, following accusations of electoral malpractice all over the province. 'How disgusting! How disgusting! How disgusting!' he wrote during the civil war,

And how proud I was!

By then people were talking about a revolution.

I returned to the people, I became one with the people and became again what I had been before.

The people!

I inhaled deeply, taking it all in. I learned what it was like to conspire, because I became a conspirator, because God gave me the honour of watching, weapon in hand, from a trench, with the sky for my roof and the stars as a silent witness.¹¹⁴

Nor were these conspirators alone: the JAP's national directorate also became involved, as indeed did the *JEFE* himself – even though he later tried to deny any genuine participation. In 1968, Gil Robles declared that as soon as he realised that the military rising was unavoidable, 'the only possible solution', the CEDA gave the conspirators 'all the support it could.' The truth, he insisted, was that 'I never wanted the coup to happen . . . because I dislike violence [but] when I saw it was inevitable, I joined the Nationalists because in civil war there are no neutrals.'¹¹⁵ But that rather non-committal statement, made at a stage of his political career when Gil Robles had reinvented himself as a democrat, does not accurately reflect the extent of the *JEFE*'s involvement. Nor does it tally with his admission that he helped Mola persuade the Carlist leader Fal Conde to support the rising or the accounts of some conspiring *japistas*. It is further undermined by his claim in 1942 – doubtlessly coloured by an urge to ingratiate himself with the nascent Franco régime – to have 'cooperated with moral stimulus, secret

orders of collaboration and economic aid.¹¹⁶ 'Economic aid' here referred to an enormous 500,000ptas donation made from the party's electoral funds, which was presented directly to Mola only to end up being employed in the construction of Franco's giant mausoleum, the Valley of the Fallen.¹¹⁷ Gil Robles correctly judged that there was no contradiction in handing over this money on behalf of the CEDA's members in order to destroy the Republic, something that was borne out by the activity of *japistas* and *cedistas* across the country. Indeed, he wrote to Mola in December 1936 to explain his belief that he would 'accurately interpret the feelings of the donators if I gave their contributions to the movement to save Spain.'¹¹⁸

Equally revealing is Gil Robles's assertion that even his behaviour in the Cortes was dictated by the exigencies of the plotters: 'My task was to tire the left in parliament and coordinate the party's forces, which were now broken by the experience of legality,' he insisted.¹¹⁹ The first half of this at least would seem confirmed by his parliamentary agenda in 1936 and when the coup was launched any ambiguity was swept away. Those *cedistas* not already conspiring against the régime were ordered to enlist in its destruction. On the eve of the rising, Gil Robles distributed instructions telling all members to put themselves immediately and publicly on the side of the military, giving their 'fullest collaboration, without the slightest party characteristics'. He also ordered members to abstain from violent repression, 'acting only against the left via ordinary or military tribunals', that they avoid party struggles for hegemony, even at the cost of 'ceding political or administrative positions', and that they give the 'maximum pecuniary support possible' to the military authorities.

For the JAP there were even more instructions. These confirmed an already apparent trend of decomposition and submission to military authority, reflecting Gil Robles's abdication in favour of the army, as well as the extent to which the JAP was already collaborating in the coup. Where these instructions were carried out, they served finally to bury JAP identity, whilst contrasting with the orders issued by José Antonio. All youth elements, Gil Robles ordered, should:

Present themselves immediately at the barracks in order to wear army uniforms and place themselves at the orders of military chiefs, avoiding wherever possible the formation of their own militias or battalions.¹²⁰

Gil Robles later declared his 'great satisfaction that all of these criteria were fulfilled', noting that: 'as soon as the rising started in every province our young men placed themselves at the service of the army and asked to be honoured with the chance to wear the glorious uniform of the army.' Up

to a point, he was right. The JAP did indeed, as he put it, decline to 'wear its own emblems, but [instead] joined the army, becoming an anonymous mass'.¹²¹ What he perhaps did not anticipate was that it would be this that fatally undermined the CEDA as an autonomous political entity of any real importance. It is likely that Gil Robles believed that the JAP did not need to act as an autonomous and visible political force for him to be called upon to play a role in the post-coup political order; he had, after all, been minister of war and a popular one with those who led the rising. But if he held such hopes, he was to be disappointed.

Like Gil Robles, Lucía was at least vaguely aware of conspiracy plans but his reaction to the rising was entirely different. Indeed, the contrasting attitudes of the men who led the two single largest parties within the CEDA provide an eloquent comment on the confused, divided nature of the Confederación and the extent to which moderation and democratic principles, already rejected by much of the party, had become obliterated by the spring of 1936. Rather than order his followers to back the rising, Lucía sent a famous and much-debated telegram distancing himself from those who had conspired against the régime and aligning himself with the Republican government. Dictated in Benicàssim on 18 July, this communication placed Lucía 'on the side of authority, which – in the face of violence and rebellion – is embodied by the Republic'.¹²² It was a brave gesture but it was also an essentially empty one because Lucía's personal position stands in marked contrast to the active conspiring of a significant section of his party in Valencia, which began plotting as soon as the election results were confirmed.

One of the leaders of the DRV conspiracy, Joaquín Maldonado, later claimed that: 'the February elections made coexistence impossible; it was then that the criteria of the *Juventud* began to impose itself upon the DRV . . . the youth had long pushed for direct action'. In a comment infused with the imagery of the JAP's rallies, Maldonado added that a 'march towards a totalitarian form of government . . . was the common aspiration of all healthy Spanish youth'.¹²³ The intended message was clear: the JAP and the JDRV was a firm, long-term advocate of precisely the solution proposed by the Nationalist coalition and what would become the Franco régime. And although political survival and ingratiation was the principal reason that Maldonado was at pains to point this out in his declaration to the Francoist Causa General in 1941, that does not make it any less true: much as the JDRV-JAP had accepted legalism as a tactic during the Republican years, the rising satisfied its political goals. As far as the JAP and the JDRV were concerned, calling upon the military was wholly in-step with their ideology.

But it was not just the youth that plotted in Valencia. According to Maldonado and José Costa Serrano – the other key civilian conspiratorial leader to have left an account of the spring of 1936 – ‘everyone agreed on the need to act [and] . . . the directorate gave us its authority to prepare.’¹²⁴ What exactly this authority entailed is difficult to ascertain however, as are the exact intentions of the members of the DRV who met just eight days after the elections and resolved to structure the party along militia lines in order to, as Costa Serrano put it, ‘face up to the communist threat.’¹²⁵ According to Maldonado, those attending agreed upon the need to be ready for an assault on power: ‘Now that our party [the DRV] cannot act and must disappear, [its members must] break with old moulds and dedicate themselves to fighting the reality of the situation – to defend society by the same means with which it is being attacked.’ Maldonado did not advocate the actual disappearance of the DRV, though: it could be useful, he argued, as a ‘legal façade’, protecting these newfound activities, ones which would be carried out with ‘absolute authority, complete discipline and extreme secrecy’.¹²⁶ Those attending the meeting also reportedly planned to publish a magazine that would ‘prepare the atmosphere for the rising.’ All these decisions were, Costa Serrano alleges, ‘ratified by Lucía’, although Lucía appears not to have shared that opinion and his response on 18 July undermines this claim.¹²⁷

Under the leadership of Manuel Attard, Costa Serrano and Maldonado, links were forged with the UME and conspiracy plans began to take shape in mid-March. The JDRV would unite all similar parties and military elements, setting up *grupos de juventud* as a type of rearguard security force, *grupos de acción* to attack left-wing centres and *agrupaciones de acción* – ‘totally secret’ small cells, thus ensuring that each person involved would ‘only know a few others’. Wherever possible these groups were to have leaders who were not official party directors. ‘We should inform members that this is a counterrevolutionary service, in case of strikes, etc,’ Costa Serrano opined, adding that the party should not reveal the ‘offensive character’ of the *agrupaciones*, ‘only [doing so] in exceptional cases and to unconditional members.’¹²⁸ Naturally, the acquisition of guns was also extremely important. This proved a difficult task, not least because without Lucía’s express permission, central party funds remained out of bounds. Although the DRV conspirators succeeded in gathering an impressive array of local financiers, it was difficult to persuade them to part with their cash so soon after the DRV-CEDA’s election campaign, which the very same men had bankrolled. ‘The result’, remembered Costa Serrano, ‘was scarce’ – particularly because the plotters ‘could not tell the [potential backers] everything we wanted to.’ Costa Serrano’s report did not, though, reveal why the DRV conspira-

tors felt unable to reveal their hand. Had they chosen carefully, there appears to be no reason why a proposition to overthrow the Republic should have met with resistance. After all, money was being diverted to the Falange precisely to this end.

Perhaps the most plausible explanation has been offered by Vicent Comès Iglesia: namely, that Costa Serrano, Maldonado and Attard could not, or would not, reveal their hand because they were acting unofficially; their activity certainly was not a faithful reflection of the political objectives of Lucía. Comès argues that Costa Serrano's report is grossly exaggerated, 'almost fantastical' and this is also true of Maldonado's testimony to the Causa General. But it is not just the tone that does not convince. Comès also insists that the details in the reports imply that the real aim of 'the party' (insofar as there still was one) was the foundation of an aggressive Movilización Civil, not a rising. Not yet, at least.¹²⁹ Comès defends his thesis with the fact that many of the details were even hidden from those whom Costa Serrano, Attard and Maldonado sought to mobilise. The curious insistence on *internal* secrecy as to the role of the *agrupaciones de acción* certainly implies that that official delegates, like some in Almería for instance, either did not know about the groups' real function (perhaps because the conspirators, doubting their acceptance, hid their true meaning) or, less likely, that they had refused to become involved. It is with this in mind that Costa Serrano's choice of words seems revealing: 'only in *exceptional* cases and only to *unconditional* members' should details be divulged, suggesting that some were considered unlikely to join up if they knew the true aims.¹³⁰

Of all the CEDA sections, the DRV was perhaps the one with the biggest gulf between its liberal leadership and its fascistic youth wing as well as many of its members. When six DRV candidates refused to stand at the 1936 elections if Lucía insisted on a declaration of republican loyalty, he backed down rather than splitting his party; by July, it was too late.¹³¹ This supports Comès' interpretation and it is difficult to accept Costa Serrano's claim to have enjoyed Lucía's full backing even if it was his leader, not he, who was out of step with much of the party. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the DRV leader would have shared or accepted some of the conspirators' aims only to declare himself anti-rising on 18 July. Maldonado's insistence, for example, that 'we could and should use the enormous power of the DRV as a façade' but that the party, in parliamentary terms, 'should stop existing' seems highly unlikely to have encountered the approval of Lucía. The leader's democratic outlook would also have been compromised by Maldonado's call for an end to assemblies, 'pernicious mass meetings', and the 'flag of legality' in order to impose 'authority from above'; such meas-

ures would have removed his legacy from a party which was very much his own.

The trouble was, if Lucía wished to continue faithful to a legal approach, much of his party did not. What is not in doubt is that the rising had the enthusiastic backing of the DRV's youth: the *Juventud*, which had experienced a long and profound process of radicalisation and fascistisation, was heavily involved in the plotting, its experience mirroring that of the JAP all over Spain.¹³² As Costa Serrano's assessment has it, the decision to turn decisively against the Republic – a decision he may have exaggeratedly attributed to the *whole* parent party – was a final acceptance of what the youth wing had long been pushing for but which would only be definitively embraced after the February elections. The JDRV was a key player in the conspiracy and mobilised in huge numbers. Costa Serrano famously offered the rising 1,250 youth members upon the outbreak of the coup, 10,000 after five hours and 50,000 within five days. Although this was an exaggeration, the human resources provided by the DRV were impressive, whilst its organisational role encompassed much of Murcia as well. Nonetheless, the JDRV's position, like that of the JAP everywhere, remained subordinate to the military. This was reinforced at the meeting held at El Saler beach in mid-June, during which the conspiracy leaders made it abundantly clear to their 1,200-strong civilian force, made up of members of the JDRV, the Falange and the *Comunión Tradicionalista*, that '*all* orders' were to come from the military, the 'supreme arbiter' which had the power to prohibit manoeuvres as it saw fit: civil organisations were 'subordinate collaborators' who had 'no say in deliberations' and were there to 'provide shock troops and all the support the *Junta Militar* deemed necessary.'¹³³

As in Valencia, the JAP made the most important civilian contribution to preparations for the 18 July rising in Cataluña, even though Barcelona hardly boasted Spain's most numerous *Juventud*. Moreover, evidence relating to the Barcelona rising lays bare the involvement of the *national* JAP leadership and serves to further highlight that Gil Robles was far from unaware of what was being hatched. The motor of the coup in Barcelona was the *España Club*, set up by the UME and ostensibly a sports and social centre but in fact a front for conspiracy whose foundation was aided by the JAP and counted many *japistas* among its members, alongside militants from the *Juventudes Anti-Marxistas* and the yellow union, the *Sindicatos Libres*.¹³⁴ The UME could count on JAP support immediately after the February elections, although the concrete formalisation of a conspiratorial relationship did not occur until mid-March when Juan Aguasca Bonmati, the brother of prominent Barcelona *japista* José María Aguasca Bonmati, approached the city's JAP president José María Balias Hidalgo de Quintana

to sound him out about joining the conspiracy. Balius responded positively but insisted that the decision be ratified by the Madrid directorate and the *JEFE*, so the UME paid for representatives of the Barcelona JAP – the Aguasca Bonmati brothers, José María Balius, Jorge Dezcallar and probably José María Baldrich Gatell – to travel to Madrid in order to discuss the matter with the national leadership.¹³⁵

According to the JAP's Barcelona president, the CEDA leader 'of course gave his consent for the JAP to join the rising, but said that the party [the CEDA] should not figure because it was acting in parliament.' Gil Robles, he claimed, provided 'moral and economic aid' to the rising, the former of which enabled the Barcelona JAP to purchase arms and two radio transmitters.¹³⁶ José María Baldrich Gatell, meanwhile, described the CEDA as 'officially adopt[ing] an inhibitive attitude, but in truth support[ing] the JAP . . . I think because of the political circumstances and the fact that they were still a presence in parliament'. Although he did not travel to Madrid, Carlos Senillosa de la Viana, a member of the JAP directorate in Barcelona later charged with military rebellion by the Republican authorities and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment, confirmed the CEDA's dual approach of public distance and private support.¹³⁷ As well as revealing that the JAP was becoming increasingly autonomous from Cortes-based *cedistas* in its daily acts, and reflecting the drift being experienced by a broken parliamentary minority, this urge to maintain a parliamentary façade would prove a fatal political error once the war began. However, these accounts are contradicted by the José María Aguasca Bonmati's claim that there was 'no contact' with the CEDA leadership in Madrid, a situation he attributed to the parent party's status as a 'decided advocate of parliamentary legality and therefore against' the rising. He added that in discussions with JAP national representatives, Pérez de Laborda, Serrano Mendicuti and Gregorio Santiago, all of whom were 'enthusiastic about the rising', he was told 'confidentially that [the JAP] had broken from the CEDA because of its abstentionist attitude'.¹³⁸ This is possible, yet even if the JAP directorate was acting autonomously, that does not necessarily mean that it had definitively broken from the CEDA or even from Gil Robles. Equally, exactly what – or who – the CEDA was at this stage of its decomposition is difficult to ascertain. Gil Robles's own implicit claim that different tactics were adopted towards the same goal is more convincing and what Aguasca Bonmati's testimony really does is reinforce the extent to which a split between the radical youth and the 'moderate', parliamentary wing of the party existed – or, at least, was perceived to exist. Within the Catalan capital similar divisions were apparent, Baldrich Gatell moaning that some 'CEDA directors didn't exactly help, although that doesn't of course include

[Barcelona leader] Señor Cirera.' There were *cedistas*, he alleged, that 'made obstacles'.¹³⁹

It is striking that none of the Barcelona *japistas*' accounts refer to specific instructions from Madrid, even though there were Madrid-based *japistas* involved in the preparation of the rising – especially in the ferrying of messages, instructions and orders, including the rising codes for Valencia, which were passed on by Pérez de Laborda himself.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, one Barcelona *japista* rather implausibly implies, perhaps with a sudden rush of self-importance, that the impetus for the national JAP's support for the rising came from the Catalan capital.¹⁴¹ In fact, José María Baldrich Gatell got closer to the truth when he recalled: 'there was great enthusiasm in Madrid for the proposition from Barcelona [but] . . . I got the impression that they were already organised and collaborating with the UME.'¹⁴²

Backed by the national directorate, the JAP returned to Barcelona and began to prepare the rising. The España Club remained the centre of activity and a point of liaison for all those prepared to enlist, while *japistas* grouped together in small cells of between ten and twelve men, under the overall command of an Infantry Captain and UME member named Enrique López del Pecho.¹⁴³ The JAP's organisation was run along Movilización Civil lines, rather like in Valencia, with each of the smaller cells, comprised of ten or twelve men, led by key *japistas* – Baldrich Gatell, Senillosa, Balias and Dezcallar – and stationed in cafés and other strategic city-centre points on the night of 18 July. From there, they were due to make their way to the Civil Guard barracks in support of the rising military and wrest control of radio transmitters in the city.¹⁴⁴ In the meantime, the JAP, consisting of around 100 men, practiced with firearms acquired courtesy of a rather unimaginatively nicknamed arms trafficker called 'Pistola'.¹⁴⁵ Its most fundamental role, though, was that of auxiliaries and messengers for the coup. One *japista*, José María Salat, hid arms in his shop,¹⁴⁶ while José María Aguasca Bonmati's commercial premises acted as a safe house for final instructions which, supplied by his brother Juan, were deposited in sealed envelopes, ready for their collection on the night of the rising.¹⁴⁷ Orders were also carried by Dezcallar, Baldrich Gatell and Senillosa for the rising in Tarragona, Manresa and Gerona and hidden in the 'most impossible places':¹⁴⁸ Aguasca's car was fitted with special hiding places because of the frequency of roadblocks and searches, underlining a depth of JAP activity beyond simply awaiting orders, even if that is what appears to have been the case in many locations.¹⁴⁹



The spring and early summer of 1936 saw a fundamental shift in Spanish right-wing politics: from begrudging legalism and democracy towards insurrection, militarism and fascism – away from the CEDA, towards the Falange and the army. Neither the CEDA-JAP's involvement in the coup nor its ever more muscular opposition to the left prevented it from suffering a considerable membership haemorrhage during this period. A patchy and clandestine adherence to determined anti-republicanism was insufficient to convince extremists to remain *japistas* and they turned instead to the Falange or, in smaller numbers, the Carlists. This exodus did not go unnoticed. In fact, it met with sympathy. According to the JAP's first leader José María Valiente, who had by now joined the Carlists, senior CEDA figures even discussed whether they should openly tell members that they were free to join other groups in March 1936.¹⁵⁰ Although no formal resolution was agreed, there was here recognition that the drift away from the party could not be prevented; even mooted the idea of releasing members represented an acceptance of the exodus.

Gil Robles also revealed that the CEDA-JAP was losing members and could do little to prevent it the following month when he publicly justified the use of violence by those who had departed for the Falange, announcing: 'we are staying firm but we have to tell our masses to go to other organisations that offer the attraction of revenge, because there is no defence possible within legality'.¹⁵¹ In doing so, he implicitly confirmed what many members were thinking: that there was no defence within the CEDA, even if many of those who had remained *japistas* and *cedistas* now sought resistance through fighting and conspiracy. Instead, defence would come from the army. The fact that some military figures were by then finalising plans for the rising – plans of which many leading *cedistas* were well aware – only weakened the possibilities of the CEDA recovering a party political profile, leaving those who knew about the plot convinced that there was no longer any need for re-organisation and those not privy to conspiratorial information groping around in the dark.

There were many such members. Luis Belda, a *cedista* in Almería, for instance, told Salmón that the local party was 'reeling' but that, despite 'writ[ing]' to Gil Robles to ask someone to come down here to sort it out', there had been no response. Salmón's evasive reply, which fits with his involvement in preparations for the rising, could hardly have instilled confidence and failed to offer any practical advice: 'the moment is a confused one, due, no doubt, to the lack of attention you noted in Madrid. No one dares predict [*vislumbrar*] what solution this may have, except catastrophic ones. In the short term I'm not optimistic, but in the long term I am.'¹⁵² Gil Robles's statements at a national level did little more to clarify the party's

situation. Asked about Acción Popular's membership in May, he replied inconclusively that there were 'some new arrivals and some departures'. He went on to reveal more in his attempts to differentiate between those perfectly justified members who had left the party and moved towards violence 'believing honestly that this is the way to resolve national problems' and those who had left because the party could no longer offer 'posts or prebends'.¹⁵³ Once again, he was essentially seeking to excuse a trend he either could not or would not reverse and, once again, he had failed publicly to recognise that many Acción Popular members were themselves turning to violence. Moreover, he was now seeking to buy time in parliament with an ostensibly semi-moderate but essentially justificatory stance, well aware of the rising being planned.

While such remarks clearly alluded to the exodus from the JAP, the party rarely admitted openly that it was losing members. Yet, significantly, it did virtually nothing to prevent their departure either. By now cooperating with a rising which it believed to be a higher calling, the JAP's national leadership saw no immediate need to bolster the party along purely political lines. On 16 May three of the JAP's key figures, Pérez de Laborda, Serrano Mendicuti and Bermúdez Cañete, issued a statement in Córdoba, insisting: 'The JAP is where it was and all the rumours circulating about its disappearance or fusion with the Falange are totally false.'¹⁵⁴ Despite the flat denial, discussions of a fusion or, at least, formal collaboration between the JAP and the Falange did indeed take place. Ruíz Alonso visited José Antonio in jail to discuss a union and mooted the idea of joining the Falange himself – on the condition that he receive a salary.¹⁵⁵ Pérez de Laborda also met José Antonio but subsequent talks between him and Fernando Primo de Rivera broke down when the latter insisted that the JAP simply subsume itself into the Falange, revealing the extent to which the *Juventud* had already become a secondary player.¹⁵⁶ The growth of the Falange and the JAP's increasing collaboration with José Antonio's party was also revealed by a by-election slate in Granada which contained five CEDA candidates, this time approved by the JAP, and four Falangists.¹⁵⁷ Besides, even though news of these discussions did not emerge, the very fact that Pérez de Laborda, Serrano Mendicuti and Bermúdez Cañete felt it necessary to make such a declaration was revealing in itself and the paralysis that had afflicted the party since February left few in any doubt that the JAP was *not* exactly where it had been: from the verge of power, it was now in a state of confusion and inertia, of violence, conspiracy and co-operation with the Falange.

In some cases, this new situation suited *japistas*. Insurrectionism, militarism and collaboration with the 'extreme right' and the army was what they had shrilly demanded since October 1934, constrained only by obedi-

ence to the parent party. For most *japistas* it was now time to await final instructions or step aside and let the army do its duty. A month before the rising, the JAP president circulated a message to leading *japistas* and provincial chiefs. Designed to be read by as many members and sympathisers as possible, the circular encapsulated the JAP's activity, experience and attitude since February. It was the perfect summary of the JAP's ever-greater insistence on the 'social justice' question (one which sought to bring it closer to the proletarianised 'revolutionism' of the Falange), its growing division from the CEDA, especially at a provincial level, the falling political star of Gil Robles and the haemorrhage of members, as well as the inertia of leadership and lack of organisation, rumours of its disappearance, talks with the Falange, and – fundamentally – the JAP's rhetorical, ideological and physical radicalisation. The circular also left no doubt as to the implication of senior JAP figures in the preparation of the rising.¹⁵⁸

The JAP, wrote Pérez de Laborda, is 'an imposing spirit [that] will achieve with deeds not words the injection into politics of a new and virile sense of austerity, social justice, national exaltation, sacrifice in service of the *Patria* and harmony between social classes', its task no less than that of 'making Spain great'. He claimed that it did not matter that the JAP's level of internal communication had descended alarmingly since the February elections as even 'without being in constant contact, we *japistas* think the same way about the political future of Spain . . . because we all have the same patriotic and national spirit'. Yet not only was this circular a call to unity on the eve of the rising, it was also a vehicle for informing those ever-increasing numbers of conspiring *japistas* that, while they may not be aware of it, their leadership was fully behind them – and indeed engaging in the same activities. If this clashed with other CEDA voices, it did not matter: the JAP president consciously distanced the *Juventud* from the party's moderates and its more visceral, 'old-style' conservatives, pointedly calling upon '*japistas*', not '*cedistas*'. The chasm in the CEDA had become unbridgeable; the JAP now looked towards the Falange instead and would publicly seek to present its identity as separate from that of the parent party, but not its *JEFE*, throughout the civil war.

While such belated instructions may have surprised and irritated those *japistas* who had suffered isolation over the previous four months, the inertia of the party – at least in parliamentary and organisational terms – was justified by Pérez de Laborda's heavy, if perhaps rather retrospective and disingenuous, hint that this had in fact been deliberate, that political activity and patriotic fervour had moved to a different plane. It was no longer about defending the party but a far loftier ideal – God and the Fatherland – even though the demands of real politics never truly went

away. 'In these moments we could make declarations, publish our magazine, or score points in our favour', he wrote, insisting that the JAP's recuperation required 'no more' than a reminder of 'our programme, the rectitude of our actions, the criticisms that we made public when we were in power [and] our lack of hunger for posts'. But the JAP would not embark upon this act of self-justification, implicitly because of its involvement in a higher calling – the conspiracy.

Despite the 'revolutionary terror' afflicting Spain, nor would Pérez de Laborda join those who queued to accuse Gil Robles of being guilty for 'what has happened'; to do so would be 'indignant', not least because it was other members of the CEDA who had sold out. In contrast, the JAP, which had Gil Robles's support for its involvement in the rising, sought to ratify 'more than ever our adhesion to the *JEFE*, who is taking the blame for things that are not his fault, because the CEDA, the right and society were not worthy of saving themselves or governing'. This declaration of loyalty was designed to show that Gil Robles was backing the conspiracy, after the 'pain and suffering' caused by what the JAP president was by now calling a 'happy and providential' electoral defeat. Should anyone doubt as much, Pérez de Laborda was unequivocal (especially for those who knew of his personal involvement in the coup): 'I assure you that Gil Robles is doing what he must, as the weight of the regions of Spain weighs upon him; regions where the right is annihilated and does not even have the ability to defend itself.' In other words, even those not actively fighting the Republic could rest assured that the *JEFE* was looking out for them. They should not lose faith. Indeed, Pérez de Laborda's circular smacks of a desperation – fruitless, as it turned out – to recuperate the political star of his *JEFE*, allying him to the practical and ideological consequences of an army-led, fascistic coup. His message would be endlessly repeated over the forthcoming three years:

Gil Robles will be in his [correct] position at all times, whatever the situation. He has courage and aptitude [*temple y madera*] and spirit for the future. He is still in the flower of youth [*plena juventud*], yet boasts untold experience. He is the same as ever, the man that Spain singled out as *Jefe Nacional*, above political parties, the man who had huge rallies in his hands, who led a whole national movement, made up of modest classes of healthy, austere Spaniards – those generous and self-sacrificing people who belong to the CEDA and who despite finding themselves disoriented, sceptical, and lacking in enthusiasm have not left our ranks. This alone is the CEDA that must interest us, but it is the CEDA that is so difficult *publicly* to orientate.¹⁵⁹

Although this was not its intention, the circular laid bare the collapse of the *JEFE*'s prestige and the departure of members. It also revealed a willingness to move ever closer to the Falange. Pérez de Laborda's frustration had bubbled under the surface for a long time; now, fearful that the JAP would appear anachronistic in a new post-rising fascistic order, he was at pains publicly to bring it in line with José Antonio's ideological postulates, while insisting upon the continued validity of the JAP's self-identity, its nationalism and its political perceptions. His claims were not entirely without foundation, either: this was essentially the same message peddled since the *Juventud*'s foundation and ever more strongly after 1934, while it did not vary at all from the JAP's output under his presidency. The main difference was simply that the political imperative now dictated that he *emphasise* the JAP's anti-democratic, fascistic outlook rather than tempering it, as had been the case within the Republican parliamentary milieu. 'The JAP,' Pérez de Laborda wrote, 'has no need to rectify any part of its programme', except of course its parent party's tactics:

We propose a movement of national exaltation, of Spanish empire, of national strength, of generation of wealth, of corporative organisation, of implacable social justice above personal interest, above the social-Christian populism that we do not share [with some sections of the CEDA]. A national movement above the ruin of political parties, that rejects liberalism and suffrage, parliament and false legality. And all this we carry out with deeds, not speeches . . . The three notes of National Movement, Social Feeling, Traditional Spirit [*Movimiento Nacional, Sentido Social, Espíritu Tradicional*] are brought together in our programme and are concentrated in the *JEFE* . . .¹⁶⁰

While this closed still further the fine gap between the JAP and the Falange, the former resisted any unification, even if Pérez de Laborda inadvertently revealed that the possibility had been discussed. The continued relevance of the JAP's programme – now expressed in even more Falangist terms – was, he said, the reason why 'even though we aspire to the union of all Spaniards above the indignity of right-left divisions, and [although] we'll unite with all those who feel patriotism over and above political parties, we have no reason to lose our character and personality in a fusion with other parties, whether they call themselves fascist or whatever.' The real reason for rejecting unification, of course, was the more prosaic demand that the JAP subjugate itself to the Falange. As the JAP president put it, the Falange had failed to 'offer the guarantees [to] our people . . . that we can.'

Nonetheless, Pérez de Laborda remained aware of the 'flawed' nature of much of the CEDA's – not the JAP's – membership. This, after all, was an umbrella movement of wildly varying outlooks, in which the youth wing had long-since rejected those it accused of having sullied the *JEFE*'s programme. This was why Pérez de Laborda insisted, not for the first time, on

purify[ing] our ranks of the many ills [*lacras*] that seek to pollute our movement . . . [of those] who were the antithesis of [our] masses; of those who thought the CEDA was . . . there to defend their *cacique* interests, to give them a political career or make them money . . . [those] who thought that our social doctrine was just for show . . . those who wanted to build a Great Wall of China around the *Jefe*, encouraging him to act with false prudence, cowardly caution, . . . clipping the wings of the noble ambition to make Spain great.¹⁶¹

These were messages that Pérez de Laborda sought to carry to all Acción Popular organisations. It was no longer enough for the JAP to fight from within the CEDA, it must now actively lead the way into battle, just as it had claimed to do throughout the Republic. Being the vanguard was no longer about ideas, it was about action. Moreover, the JAP would now lead whether the CEDA willed it or not. The message was clear: while many, perhaps most, members were inactive and scared, they must 'not worry too much about the political future'. The rising would bring a new dawn for Spain and for *japistas* themselves. 'Events will evolve in such a way as to make the disappearance of political parties spontaneous and obligatory,' Pérez de Laborda wrote, and yet 'the enthusiastic masses in our ranks – which must not allow themselves to become disoriented – will remain the basis of the Spanish national movement.' This was exactly what would happen: the CEDA would provide the mass base of the movement and the JAP many of its soldiers, but as a political entity it would disappear.

In order to aid the arrival of this felicitous state of affairs, *japistas* need only be disciplined and obedient:

Follow to the letter the precise instructions that we have given you in private conversations in order to be able to act in the face of the current situation in Spain, a situation of chaotic anarchy, of savagery and indignity. Work with fervent activity, because every minute is decisive in these circumstances.

Spread these ideas to all members of the JAP and all of you be prepared to give your life for Spain.

; *Presente y Adelante!*¹⁶²

A clearer rallying call would be difficult to imagine. The rising was just around the corner and, despite the JAP's involvement in the plotting, it would provoke a civil war that left the Falange as the dominant power in the Nationalist zone. The CEDA and the JAP had provided the conditions which made conspiracy possible; conspiracy and war then provided the conditions in which José Antonio's party could experience an enormous growth, turning it almost overnight into the most significant political movement on the right, the driving force behind the Nationalist war effort and, ultimately, the party of the New State.

In human terms, too, the JAP was to play a vital role in this political shift. The Falange's sudden strength was founded upon, if not wholly consolidated by, an important influx of members from the JAP. According to historiographical orthodoxy, the radicalisation of *japistas* during the ominous spring was fundamentally expressed in the collapse of their party, as members left in their droves to join the Falange. Indeed, the one thing it seems that everybody 'knows' about the JAP is that following the defeat of the CEDA in the 1936 elections, its members passed '*en masse*', '*en bloc*', or 'as one' into José Antonio's party. This has become an accepted 'truth' repeated uncritically and, very often, stated without reference to any source material or documentation whatsoever.¹⁶³ It is, however, problematic. While hugely important, neither the magnitude nor the timing of the haemorrhage, nor the destination of those who did depart, fits the existing model of an *en masse* membership transfer from the JAP to the Falange in the spring of 1936.

It is clear that an extremely significant movement out of the CEDA and the JAP occurred between February and July 1936. It is also clear that the initial departure became apparent very quickly indeed. In March, the leader of Acción Popular in Huesca for instance wrote of his desire to stand firm and reform the local party 'in these moments of depression, destruction and desertion by many people',¹⁶⁴ while a member of the Falange in Zaragoza recalled: 'the February elections totally changed the political outlook. Right-wing groups, or rather their youth, turned openly to violence, joining the Falange in great numbers, either as members or just showing sympathy.'¹⁶⁵ Similarly, Claude Bowyers recalled how 'a little time before, the fascist party was numerically unimportant but with the defeat of the reactionaries in the elections great numbers of the young of the monarchist and CEDA parties, despairing of defeating the democrats at the polls and disgusted with Gil Robles's failure, were turning from ballots to bludgeons and joining the fascist groups.'¹⁶⁶

There is considerable evidence to confirm the exodus. Numerous eyewitness and contemporary accounts refer in broad terms to *japistas* crossing over

to the Falange in the wake of the CEDA's electoral collapse.¹⁶⁷ The JAP's newspaper was not published again after the elections and mention of the JAP virtually disappeared from the pages of *El Debate* and *ABC*, both of which had previously devoted significant attention to it. Meanwhile, some party figures – most famously Serrano Suñer and the Conde de Mayalde – actively encouraged the flight of *japistas* into the Falange.¹⁶⁸ Defeat obliged them to find other ways to capture the state. In Málaga, a civil guard captain reported that 'convinced that parliament was no way of achieving the salvation of Spain, the most energetic elements of AP began to break away, joining the Falange.'¹⁶⁹ And a Falangist recalls how *japistas* 'ashamed by the politics [of the CEDA] passed in bunches into the Falange and the Requetés'.¹⁷⁰

Disillusion and the fear of revolution were high on the right after February and this was certainly true of a significant proportion of *japistas*, already the right's most radical militants. Some blamed the party directorate and even their *JEFE* for being weak, and began to see salvation as coming only from a more active, muscular opposition to the left, the Republic and 'revolution' – meaning a move to those parties that best embodied that combativeness. After all, one *japista* remembered that, in comparison to the Falange, the JAP was notable for its 'passive silence'.¹⁷¹ In Cáceres, for instance, *japistas* joined the Falange to satisfy their desire to engage in street fighting and a *cedista* in Valladolid told the oral historian Ronald Fraser that 'the JAP militants believed we were all acting like cowards in the face of the threat'.¹⁷²

That is, those who were acting at all: the departure of *japistas* was further encouraged by the collapse of their *JEFE*'s prestige and the lack of direction from the party. If they were to do anything 'positive', many *japistas* felt they needed to seek out new avenues and turned to the now-vindicated Falange, which had long called for a violent overthrow of the state. In Elche, in the province of Alicante, the inertia of the local Acción Popular since the election defeat and a subsequent arson attack upon the party's headquarters led *japistas* to seek a new vehicle for their political activity and, ultimately, their assault on the Republic. That vehicle would be the Falange, previously non-existent in the town. 'I joined the Falange not long after 20 February 1936, at the same time as the majority of the people from the JAP, a few Requetés and some others who hadn't been in any party before,' recalled one former *japista*. 'In total there were about a hundred of us . . . we built cells of four or six members, brought in stamps of José Antonio and collected money from factory owners to buy arms. I think we acquired 70 or 80 pistols . . .'¹⁷³

With Gil Robles's credibility severely dented and the parliamentary

route fatally undermined, the Falange, as Herbert Southworth has put it, was 'suddenly projected as the politics of the future.'¹⁷⁴ Its leaders quickly appreciated that the right's electoral defeat could benefit them, although they could not have anticipated either the speed or the extent of the Falange's rocketing growth. As the local chief of Sevilla later wrote: 'After the February elections I had absolute faith in the triumph of the Falange because we could now consider the right, our most difficult enemy, defeated and eliminated. Their failure provided us with a huge advantage as well as the greater part of their best youth.'¹⁷⁵ These hopes were not misplaced. José Antonio's party rapidly benefited from the altered political landscape and the integration of ex-*japistas* it brought. So great was the influx that the Falange leadership, while certainly pleased, displayed concern that such vertiginous growth might affect the party's 'revolutionary' character. In February a circular was sent to local Falange *jefes* insisting that special care be taken to prevent the dilution of doctrine, and ordering that new recruits be denied positions of command within the party.¹⁷⁶ Not that the denial appears to have halted the influx. Indeed, the Falange activist Alejandro Cornero Suárez noted in his diary on 7 March, for example, that:

In my squadron the majority are new; they come from the Federación de Estudiantes Católicos and from the JAP. The Falange is growing by the minute, because the great mass of [those] idealistic people . . . who had faith in the ballot box and in legality now feel cheated.¹⁷⁷

The Falange's growth continued unabated, as did its concerns about 'purity'. In Santander, where the Falange was already more powerful than in most parts of Spain, they received an 'important number of *japistas*', albeit more in the form of a 'drip-drip' influx than an *en masse* transfer. One local Falangist complained that these new recruits were 'Falangists as far as the membership card, the raised arm and the blue shirt were concerned, but nothing else.'¹⁷⁸ Given such complaints, virtually the same instructions as had been issued in February were circulated to Falangists again on 21 March.¹⁷⁹ These fears may have been exacerbated by the Falange's now illegal status and the fact that many of its leaders were imprisoned, thus opening a channel of influence to new recruits, but the party's apparent vulnerability did not halt its continued growth. After all, its principal activities – violence and plotting – were suited to a clandestine existence and republican surveillance was rather slack, with José Antonio receiving literally hundreds of visits in jail in Alicante.

Like the Falange, the Carlists sought to benefit from the JAP's crisis. In March, José Torres Murciano, leader of the JAP-affiliated Juventud de la

Derecha Regional Valenciana, resigned in protest at Luis Lucía's continued efforts to arrest the radicalisation of the party's youth.¹⁸⁰ In a bitter letter to the DRV leader, written on 19 March, Torres Murciano attacked Lucía for having twice suspended the JDRV newspaper *Gulas* in 'the worst possible moments' and for having rarely, 'if ever', taken any notice of the youth movement, except to 'censor or reproach us'. In a defiant Parathion shot, Torres Murciano portrayed the splits within the party as the product of a generational divide between the DRV leadership and its fascistic youth section, and talked of the disillusion at election defeat, the need for violent action and the *Juventud's* 'imperial' mission.¹⁸¹ He spoke for many *japistas*.

The Carlist newspaper *La Unión* did not pass up the opportunity to seek political capital from this split. It devoted a full page to the disillusion of *JDRVistas* and the drift away from the party following the resignation of Torres Murciano. Not unreasonably blurring the lines between the JAP and the JDRV and their respective parent parties, *La Unión* heaped praise upon the JDRV-JAP and talked of the 'absolute disparity' between the *Juventud* and the higher echelons of the CEDA. It launched a scathing – and essentially accurate – attack on the *cedista* leadership for having consistently interfered to the detriment of its youth sections and for now abandoning them, refusing even to provide the resources to sustain their newspaper. The article was primarily an attempt to profit from what the Carlists saw as the trend of decomposition in the JAP and the possibility that it might collapse altogether. 'The JAP's outlook is Traditionalist', *La Unión* proclaimed, which was why Valiente had joined the Carlists when forced to leave the JAP in 1934 and was also why disillusioned *japistas* should now follow his lead and join the Carlists in fulfilling the 'designs of Providence'.¹⁸² Ideologically, this was not far wrong and Carlists' appeal to *japistas'* urge for direction was well placed; the desire for effective leadership was indubitably a factor in the departure of members.

But it is clear that, notwithstanding Carlist opportunism in the wake of Torres Murciano's resignation, most departing *japistas* found their way to the Falange, attracted above all by its dynamism, its mobilisation for war and its willingness to fight back physically. Here, they could satisfy the urge to do something 'positive' about the perilous situation in which they found the *Patria* and encounter a bridge to the plotters. The right's electoral defeat was a much-needed fillip for the Falange and it grew considerably throughout the first half of 1936. Just how substantial the Falange's expansion was is difficult to judge with absolute accuracy. Estimates vary, but perhaps 15,000–20,000 were recruited from February to July and most of the new recruits probably came from the JAP, although it is impossible to calculate precisely.¹⁸³ For these, a change of party did not necessitate a

change of ideology so much as an alteration of tactic. And the election defeat had already proven to most that democratic legalism was redundant.¹⁸⁴

On the eve of the rising in July 1936, José Antonio told the journalist Ramón Blardony that '10,000–15,000 youths from Acción Popular' had joined the Falange since February.¹⁸⁵ In his memoirs Gil Robles offered the same figure, but the fact that he states '*as José Antonio himself admitted*, over 15,000 lads from the JAP had joined [the Falange] since the February elections' suggests that while the figure may be plausible, the calculation was not his own.¹⁸⁶ Fifteen thousand may be an exaggeration, but the numbers joining, given the Falange's previous membership, represented an enormous boost that for the first time gave José Antonio's party the semblance of a mass movement. In just 160 days the Falange had, according to Ricardo Chueca's calculations, increased in size by 170%.¹⁸⁷ Meanwhile, taking the JAP's membership in February 1936 as 200,000 and those joining the Falange as 15,000, the departure from the JAP represented a loss of 7½ percent; doubtless a very significant amount, not least given *who* it was that left, but not consistent with the JAP passing over to the Falange *en masse*.

Such renewed calculations are supported by what limited membership information exists for certain given localities. According to lists in Orense, for instance, ten of 153 pre-war *japistas* passed to the Falange (or 'fascism') and most of these appear to have moved after July 1936, with only three *japistas* definitely changing party between February and the rising.¹⁸⁸ In Almería, Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze's study of the social bases of the right concludes that: 'with regards to the crossing over of members of the JAP to José Antonio's party – so often repeated by historiography – we have calculated that 22 *japistas* went to the Falange; that is, less than 10% [8.6%] of the membership of the JAP in Almería.'¹⁸⁹ Similarly, Rafael Valls argues that in Valencia a pre-civil war drift from the (J)DRV into the Falange 'did not happen' or if it did, it was 'very scarce', and Manuel Suárez Cortina's study of fascism in Asturias concludes that while there was 'some JAP influx, the Falange remained numerically very small.'¹⁹⁰

Cold statistics do not tell the whole story of course, and many *japistas* drifted towards José Antonio's party without officially signing off from the JAP or paying their Falange membership dues, particularly as the latter was operating clandestinely in the spring of 1936. One ex-*japista*, whose experience would appear fairly typical, remembers that he was struck by the activity of Falangists but did not actually join them. Nor did he officially depart the *Juventud*, although he did 'stop going to the JAP centre.'¹⁹¹ Elsewhere there was significant overlap and collaboration, bringing *japistas* closer to the Falange without leaving the JAP or enlisting in new parties. In Santander, the Grupos de Lucha Activa Contra el Marxismo called for the

mobilisation of the province's youth, gathering together propaganda from the JAP, the Falange, and the Nazi party.¹⁹² Street battles were, it would appear, often fought with the JAP and the Falange manning the same barricades,¹⁹³ discussions took place about closer political relations, and those *japistas* and Falangists who allied themselves to plans for the rising certainly worked together – under the army.

For many there was, as yet, no need to leave the JAP; it was necessary only to submit themselves to military authority. When the outbreak of war required political and military mobilisation through the Falange, then and only then would these *japistas* actually move.¹⁹⁴ Ramón Morote Pons has shown that the immense majority of *japistas* who joined the Falange in Mallorca did so after 18 July 1936 rather than before it, usually formalising their membership between the first few days of the war and early September.¹⁹⁵ In Segovia, similarly, the Falange numbered barely a dozen when the coup was launched but, one member recalled, when the war started an 'avalanche' of new recruits went to 'the Falange not the JAP'.¹⁹⁶ For now, collaboration and sympathy were certainly extensive, even if the membership transfer was not as encompassing as has traditionally been believed. As the local Falange chief in Almería summed up: 'Many moved towards the Falange, albeit normally not as members, even though they were sympathisers and acted in our favour.'¹⁹⁷

There can be no doubt that the Falange was massively bolstered by the influx of members from the JAP. But while this gave the Falange life, it did not of itself kill the *Juventud*, or at least not yet. The JAP's paralysis in the spring and early summer of 1936 was not solely a symptom of the drift into the Falange, it was also part of the cause. Moreover, even those *japistas* who did give up on the ballot box did not automatically join the Falange. Many conspired or adhered to the rising from within the *Juventud* – often, it is true, in conjunction with the Falange. Many more, guided by a strong sense of obedience to authority, placed themselves at the service of the armed forces. In the Canary Islands, for example, one report put together for the Causa General insists: 'The Falange did not grow as it might because the *juventud canaria* joined the army or volunteers instead'.¹⁹⁸ More still did nothing at all.

The drift of members, while hugely significant, neither signalled the definitive end for a fatally wounded JAP, nor fully converted the Falange into the mass movement it aspired to be. As civil war broke out the Falange was still a small organisation almost everywhere: the evidence of its minority status on 18 July is absolutely overwhelming.¹⁹⁹ Its day had not yet come in February 1936, or even by early July. By profiting from the CEDA's failure at the 1936 elections and conspiring to bring about the

rising, though, the Falange had hastened the arrival of the day when civil war would finally catapult it into power. The JAP, meanwhile, would play the rather less glamorous, but no less vital, role of Unknown Soldier.

'Selfless auxiliaries, enthusiastic servants'

Joining the Rising

On the night of 17 July 1936 the rebellion began in Spanish Morocco with garrison risings in Ceuta, Melilla and Tetuán. Their successes were reported to general Francisco Franco, the man due to lead the Army of Africa, who immediately made his way to the military headquarters in Las Palmas in the Canary Islands. From there, in the early hours of 18 July, Franco issued a manifesto in the 'sacred name of Spain' and sent a telegram to the country's other military divisions.¹ These communications were rallying cries for the military conspirators on the mainland and on the same day the coup began all over the peninsula.² Spain's republican experiment had been brought to a close by force of arms and the country was plunged into a civil war that would last until April 1939, costing well over half a million lives and bequeathing a dictatorship that lasted four decades.³

José María Gil Robles later claimed that the Nationalists could not have been successful without the CEDA and the JAP. Much as this insistence stemmed from irritation at his exclusion by the Franco régime and desperation to receive recognition for the role he and his party had played, the assessment was essentially accurate. The CEDA-JAP's exhaustion of the democratic process and its intensive, radical mobilisation of by far the most significant body of right-wing opinion over the previous five years had been fundamental in paving the way for military intervention. The party's skilful parliamentary manoeuvres had blocked reform in the Cortes, frustrating the left and quickening appreciably a spiral of radicalisation that played into the conspirators' hands. Allied to the virulence of the JAP's propaganda, this spiral encouraged an increasingly vociferous, aggressive stance from the left which, in turn, frightened rightists into more extreme postures and an ever greater intransigence. This reaction was encouraged still further by the JAP's demonisation of the Republic, synonymous with an 'anti-Spanish' revolution that, sponsored by the state, was infiltrating all areas of the nation. An interview with the future Caudillo ten days after the coup was a clear illustration of the extent to which such attitudes had become

entrenched amongst those who led the rising. 'The cause of the revolution', Franco claimed, 'was preached in schools, fields and workshops'.⁴

In the absence of a concrete common goal – the various declarations of 17 and 18 July were far from uniform – an understanding of what they were fighting *against* united the rebelling generals.⁵ Their shared enemy was communism in the broadest possible sense. This 'communism' included democratic liberalism as well as anarchism, socialism and Marxism, and entailed all sorts of evils, from disorder to 'free love', anarchy, Judaism, atheism and materialism – all of which were 'foreign' to the 'true' characteristics of Spain. Collectively they were, in short, the anti-Spain; the same demons that the *Juventud* had attacked for five years. As one party source self-interestedly put it seven months after the rising: 'the JAP was the first to show the way, [to fight against] . . . the spirit of destructive liberalism, which destroys our national essences, [against] degenerate democracy, anti-Spanish masonry [and] Judaising domination.'⁶

That the right, led by the CEDA, had been unable to capture, tame or destroy the Republic via the ballot box and eliminate the anti-Spain legitimised direct action. Democratic legalism had been 'proven' utterly redundant, a useless tool in defending what the CEDA and the ruling socio-economic classes that it predominantly represented considered their political, religious and economic rights, as embodied by 'Spain'. Cranked up by the aggressive posturing of the JAP, this served to radicalise still further a mass of essentially conservative middle classes, accelerating an already rapid process of fascistisation and militarisation and encouraging a turn towards to the army as the defenders of the Fatherland. This was not such a leap of faith: the praetorian tradition was entrenched in Spain's body politic.⁷ Military intervention had long been considered another means by which to secure political power and had now become both justified and desirable once again. The JAP had done much to create the right conditions.

Military intervention was also legitimised by the tensions of the spring of 1936, a period some equated to that experienced by pre-revolutionary Russia.⁸ For the right, the situation had become intolerable; 'disorder' met with the 'collusion' of the state and something had to be done. Gil Robles insisted that the 18 July rising was 'not a rebellion but a perfectly licit resistance to oppression, to tyranny'.⁹ With public order the pretext for the rising, in the midst of the first six months of 1936 the JAP's long-standing demands for a 'strong state' had become the leitmotiv of an entire swathe of right-wing opinion. As the 'iron surgeon' Spain needed, the army was welcomed with open arms. Beyond disorder and political violence, however, there was a far more simple reason for welcoming the rising: a coup offered

the very access to power that had been denied by electoral defeat. With one avenue closed down, the right had been forced to seek out different routes to conquer the state, something that is reflected in the fact that plotting began immediately after the CEDA's defeat, not as a response to the 'ominous spring'. Nonetheless, the spring did serve not only to tie up plans for the rising but also finally to convince sectors of the population and the military, Franco amongst them, of the necessity of a rising.

Moreover, that sector of the population that would support, practically or tacitly, a rising against the Republic owed its very existence to the CEDA-JAP. If the rising was the last ditch defence of a 'reactionary coalition' as has been argued,¹⁰ such a defence was only possible because of the CEDA's success. Increasingly led by tireless teams of *japistas* responsible for the CEDA's propaganda output, the party's intensive mobilisation and fascistisation over the previous six years had reawakened a political conscience and activism absent at the collapse of the monarchy – a moment of weakness that allowed Spain's Second Republic to be established unopposed and without the collaboration of the right. It had been the CEDA that successfully mobilised conservative and Catholic opinion behind a legalistic project, winning the 1933 elections and achieving a ministerial presence at the heart of a régime in which it did not believe and sought radically to transform. The JAP, meanwhile, had brought a new generation into politics that would alter the identity of the Spanish right. As one *japista* wrote, 'we were just four lads without any experience but with brio and soul we have created a national conscience.'¹¹

If the CEDA's success was significant, its failure was equally important. Its inability to clinch full power in 1936 represented the irreversible failure of accidentalism, strengthening the appeal of different tactics. Capturing the Republic had proven impossible; it must now be destroyed. This was a demand made from a position of strength unthinkable in 1931. The political panorama of the right had changed dramatically. The JAP now called for the army, long conceived of as its ally: the army, in turn, was backed by a politicised public body which no longer saw itself as meek bystander: a million CEDA members had been mobilised, with perhaps 225,000 more in the party's most radical fascistised wing, the JAP. That was why Gil Robles not unreasonably wrote from Lisbon in January 1937, six months into the civil war, that it was

precisely because of the thrust of our propaganda . . . [that] the formation of a true national conscience has been possible. Without the glorious sowing of immutable ideas, which Acción Popular irrigated [*regó*] with its blood many times, the current splendid harvest would not have been

possible . . . The JAP served Spain in the political battles [*contiendas*] in the days when it was necessary to define a doctrine and form a citizens' conscience [and] it serves Spain today, spilling its blood on the battlefields for the triumph of the same ideals.¹²

This insistence upon the continuity between the peacetime struggle of the JAP and the military campaign of the Nationalists became the dominant theme of the JAP's ideological output throughout the war. For those new Falangists who enthusiastically flocked to the Nationalist cause in blue shirts, many of them former *japistas*, it was an uncomfortable reminder of their own past and an accommodation with the Republic that they preferred to forget; for those who had always been opposed to the CEDA's tactic, it represented an essential truth they did not want to admit. This argument became indispensable in the JAP's on-going but ultimately fruitless effort to carve for itself a prominent place in the new order, to 'prove' its Nationalist credentials and gain long-overdue recognition for its sacrifices. Gil Robles demonstrated as much in his memoirs, published in 1968, by posing the question: 'Have the winners of the civil war thought about what would have been if the triumph of the Popular Front of 1936 had caught them in the state they were in in 1931? Could they have crowned themselves with the laurels of victory?'¹³

The answer was, of course, 'no'. The coup, which was certainly not launched in isolation from the political and civil milieu in which it existed, enjoyed a substantial level of public support from, and because of, the CEDA-JAP. And, when the 18 July *pronunciamiento* succeeded only partially it was civilian backing that turned a failed coup into a civil war. The portents were clear: Sanjurjo's 1932 rising lacked support and failed, becoming a decisive factor in Acción Popular confirming its adoption of accidentalism, the Trojan horse policy which paradoxically made the success of catastrophism possible and popular after February 1936 – but not before. Would-be conspirators had learned the lessons of the Sanjurjo debacle and knew that a coup launched without civilian backing was doomed to failure. Most military men would have preferred to dispense with civilian involvement altogether but in the twentieth century any coup d'état that ignored the mobilised and politicised populace did so at its peril.

It was not that the CEDA rejected the idea of a coup in principle but that it considered military intervention premature, unnecessary and risky before its electoral defeat. Prompted by Gil Robles, Franco publicly admitted that prior to February 1936 a coup had been 'impossible': 'the situation in Spain was difficult but not one of imminent danger . . . any action was condemned to failure', while the army 'were not ready' and

lacked civilian support. 'There was no real chance,' Franco conceded, utilising the exact same phrase employed by Gil Robles in the Cortes, 'of a rising against the government until March 1936 when the crimes of the government made half the nation desire it.'¹⁴ The JAP would expend much wartime energy insisting upon this point, exculpating itself from blame. 'The seed of the new Spain,' claimed the JAP's militia chief in March 1937, 'had been sown at El Escorial. What was missing? A big brother to spread the message. That big brother was the army, which gave the war cry.'¹⁵

This was a war cry now welcomed by a significant proportion of the country, not just because of the conditions of the ominous spring but because of the threat of losing permanently any chance to wrest power back from the left. As the Falangist intellectual Dionisio Ridruejo argued: 'Without doubt in the spring they were conspiring in the barracks but not as much, nor with as much haste, as the aristocracy, the high bourgeoisie and the traditional middle class wanted . . . when the military decision – which, incidentally, was far from unanimous – is written about, people often forget the tremendous pressure placed upon the armed forces by a sector of the population which had lost both the civic value and the imagination and patience to ride out the storm by more rational means. Nobody thought that they would get another legal opportunity to bring about political change and, worse still, almost nobody wanted one.'¹⁶

The need to count upon civilian support in an age of mass politics set the 1936 military rising apart from Spain's earlier praetorian tradition. According to one biographer, by 1935 Franco even claimed to no longer 'believe' in 19th-century style *pronunciamientos*, arguing that coups 'must be backed by the public.'¹⁷ Without the political trajectory of the CEDA and the JAP, especially between November 1933 and February 1936, that backing would have been missing. With its success, the CEDA mobilised; with its failure, it convinced.

Despite the fact that the JAP had always seen the road to power as a physical conquest, Gil Robles and the bulk of the CEDA, including even the most radical of *japistas*, would certainly have preferred to avoid a violent uprising. But military intervention was considered another means towards the same goals, entirely appropriate in the circumstances – circumstances partly of the CEDA-JAP's making. Once the futility of the accidentalist assault on power had been brought crashing home few questioned the validity of turning to arms, figures like Luis Lucía proving exceptional. The CEDA's acceptance of the Republic was always dependent upon the ability to capture it; its abandonment of the Republic was thus entirely logical, a continuation of the same idea. Moreover, political consciences had been awoken by the JAP's tireless proselytism, the party making the curious

boast that it had coaxed 'this egotistical and indifferent bulk of neutrals' into action over the course of the Republic.¹⁸ The mass, politicised social base of those who would support the rising – the silent and not so silent partners of Francoism – was supplied by the CEDA-JAP. As Ricardo de la Cierva has insisted, Gil Robles had provided the 'people of the *movimiento*.' Representing over 4 million voters, the CEDA was the Spanish right.



Without exception, *japistas* welcomed the military rebellion; with very few exceptions so too did *cedistas*. This was to be an important factor, as is suggested by the geography of the coup's partial success, which followed closely the pattern of voting allegiance at the February elections. The rising was successful in the right's heartlands of Galicia and Castilla and unsuccessful in strongholds of the left. The huge estates of the South, worked by landless labourers, did not fall. Nor did the country's major cities (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Bilbao), thanks largely to the vital intervention of Assault Guards, Civil Guards and loyal army officers, who did not make decisions in isolation from the population that surrounded them.¹⁹ As Michael Seidman insists, in many locations the military were 'geographically, not ideologically loyal . . . the local climate of hostility or acceptance often determined the success of the military rebellion.'²⁰

Despite this pattern, the JAP became keen to stress the purely military character of the rising, serving as this did to undermine the growing importance of the Falange, its principal competitor (and, equally importantly, its principal tormentor). Instead, the JAP placed the army at the forefront of the rebellion and the new political order. In September 1936 the Acción Popular organ in Segovia wrote:

The army called the crusade and as ever Spain's youth followed it to the battlefield behind the red and gold, the glorious flag, the true flag of Spain – a flag which some Spaniards stained with a purple strip. That strip, though, has once again turned red due to its contact with the glorious blood of our *juventud*. And thus, because Spain wished it, the glorious military, and exclusively military, movement sprung up. [A movement] which all good Spaniards joined.²¹

Naturally, *japistas* could be found at the head of those 'good Spaniards.' But, as Acción Popular's insistence implies, the pattern of the coup's successes – for all its striking similarity to anti-Republican electoral geography – was not so much founded upon *tangible* civilian support as abstract

backing. Broadly, where the right was dominant, it remained so; where the left was dominant, troops stayed loyal to the Republic. Generally unarmed and vulnerable, rarely did popular uprisings or acts of defiance alone determine the outcome of the coup.²²

Although the need for civilian support was recognised, the military coup was supposed to be definitive; few foresaw nor still less desired a long civil war.²³ In areas of right-wing hegemony, the conspirators rose with impunity and the Republic was doomed. The CEDA strongholds of Salamanca, Burgos, and Zamora, for instance, fell without serious fighting. In each case, *japistas* were ready; in each, they were almost superfluous. Their role instead would be to police the rearguard or more often to depart for the front, marching towards Madrid once the battle lines had been drawn. In Burgos, news of the rising prompted right-wingers onto the streets and, as church bells rang out and *japistas* paraded the town, a thanksgiving service was held at the Cathedral. In one town in the province a military commander reported that the 'reds' were out in the street and asked the conspiring lieutenant colonel Marcelino Gavilán what he should do. The reply was to the point: 'arm the right and stop the scum [*gentuza*]'. *Japistas* were amongst those handed arms.²⁴

More typical was the experience of the provincial capital. According to one radio communication, 'in Burgos patriotic ideals are so imbedded that the movement only needed to announce itself in order to triumph,' while the mayor noted that 'no one opposed the rising . . . left-wing individuals concentrated on saving themselves rather than facing [our troops].'²⁵ Similarly, Zamora fell without a shot being fired. Meanwhile in Salamanca – where popular support for the rising was, in Mary Vincent's words, 'enthusiastic', 'immense and immediate', and where the CEDA and the JAP had long boasted membership far in excess of any other political organisation – a cry of '*Viva la República!*' was met with gunfire and no more opposition was encountered, as *japistas* took to the streets. Aware of the coup's success in Salamanca, Popular Front supporters in the province's other major town, Ciudad Rodrigo, were 'dispersed without a shot being fired.' Rebelling soldiers arriving from Salamanca were met by a cheering crowd, while in Béjar Republicans simply awaited troops, and their fate, in silence.²⁶

The experience was similar in other towns and cities where the CEDA boasted real strength. One example was Cáceres. Here, rebelling officers happily reported that they had achieved 'rapid control of the city, where there was no fighting, dissidence or fires'. The reading of the military *bando* was followed by the naming of a former CEDA councillor as mayor and that was it: fewer than one hundred men, civilian rightists included, parading the streets had been all that was needed to take control, and other towns in

the province immediately went over to the rebels as a result.²⁷ Likewise, in Segovia, although there were armed *japistas* patrolling the city, one Acción Popular supporter wrote: 'the rising started here without any resistance at all from the Marxists. With the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard in the street all was calm immediately and the Marxist leaders fled. All the people – the right-wingers, that is – were enthusiastic.'²⁸

The Carlist strongholds of Navarre, meanwhile, became the scene of a popular *fiesta*. One former member of the JONS recalled how he was presented with a case of champagne upon arrival in Pamplona in early July, ready to celebrate the rising.²⁹ In areas such as these, the Nationalist insistence upon a glorious popular rising, always led by the white knight of the army, took on a plausibility lacking elsewhere in Spain. It was possible even to give credence to the excitable recollections of Franco's first biographer, Joaquín Arrarás, who wrote in 1937 that,

Desires long dormant burst forth with cries that were heartbeats, and the chains and shackles that held down the national spirit were broken. It was no longer a crime to love Spain, and these first cheers of liberation were broken with sobs and tears. It was as though patriotic Spaniards had been overcome by a great fever, an organic reaction to recover, to regain their health, and to live. Those who poured into the streets were trembling and inspired. Their hands trembled anxiously to grasp a rifle. Spain was shaken by an electric shock that prepared it for what was to come.³⁰

Although it lacked such exuberant backing, the rising encountered no more opposition in conservative, monarchist Orense. One Falangist remembered that 'on 18 July nothing happened at all. They read out the military *bando* and that was it.'³¹ Similarly, in Salinas, Asturias, a well-heeled young man spoke for many of his generation in describing 18 July as 'a day like any other'.³² The public reaction to the coup had, in most cases, been precisely that – a reaction. Many non-soldiers played active roles in its preparation and course and the coup often owed its success or failure to the local civilian milieu in which it was launched, but the rising was a military one.

The Falange appears to have been more proactive than the CEDA-JAP but the latter aided the coup far more than existing testimonies have allowed. Documentation of the JAP's activities has survived better for those areas where the rising failed, inviting the conclusion that the *apparent* lack of mobilisation in JAP strongholds is a product of self-interested revisionism as well as military and political realism – a snapshot of the CEDA frozen in time before its collapse preserves its real status on 18 July, thus returning it to centre stage, while accounts written with hindsight offer a

very different picture. On the one hand, in the midst of the civil war, with the CEDA-JAP fast becoming the poor relations of the Nationalist coalition, many were at pains to prove their Falangist or Carlist status whilst playing down the role of the CEDA; on the other, in those areas where the CEDA was hegemonic, there was often little need to mobilise civilians at all for a rising whose success was guaranteed.³³

In this sense, the JAP proved a victim of its own success. Those services *japistas* offered remained predominantly auxiliary and explicitly secondary. Unlike the Falange, which initially sought to launch its own attack on the state, there was no contradiction between the aims and objectives of the JAP and those of the military conspirators, no genuine challenge upon military predominance. This auxiliary nature, which would greatly facilitate the JAP's subsequent transfer of obedience from Gil Robles to general Franco, dovetailed neatly with its experiences. Intervention followed lines already laid out by the party's Movilización Civil programme, which had never been perceived as a challenge to an army whose compatibility with the JAP was taken for granted. In the port of Algeciras for example, a 'few good Spaniards,' soldiers backed up by the right's strike-breakers, were able to short-circuit the resistance of the left.³⁴ This experience was repeated elsewhere. On 18 July uniformed *japistas* undertook armed post-rising patrols in Sevilla, Palma, Pontevedra and a host of other cities, while in Lérida *japistas* were called upon to protect the city's historical monuments and in Gijón, as in Algeciras, their aim was to replace vital services in the event of trades unions responding to the coup with the declaration of a general strike.³⁵ Although these were often dangerous tasks, few *japistas* had to fight; fewer still were entrusted with vital, purely military roles.

Nonetheless, while the Falange was in all probability a more useful partner in combat, *japistas* too made contributions. In Málaga for instance *japistas* and Falangists patrolled the city, becoming involved in street fighting and shoot-outs, while the JAP leader, García Moyano, was among those who accompanied Captain Huelín and a rebel Guardia Civil officer by the name of Ruíz Segalvera to the Civil Government to attempt the handover of power.³⁶ The experience was similar in Valladolid. A manifesto was issued on 20 July, triumphantly proclaiming that 'in just a few hours, the myth of the Marxist phantom has been broken' and underlining that civilian involvement, including that of the JAP, had been significant in this success: 'The army, marvellously backed by patriotic groups, has been enough for this to be the case.'³⁷ The coup's leader in the city was general Saliquer, a 'corpulent, rather clumsy' man who boasted an 'enormous grey moustache that almost cover[ed] his mouth completely'. He also boasted the significant support of the *Juventud*.³⁸ It was a local JAP director and

lawyer, Emilio Estafanía, who accompanied Saliquet to the military division, where he attempted to persuade the garrison leader, general Molero, to join the rising. When Molero refused, an argument broke out which prompted the intervention of the armed JAP director who, in the ensuing mêlée and confusion, was shot in the chest, allegedly prompting the melancholy remark from one of his *compañeros*; 'did you know he was getting married tomorrow?' Whether talk of wedding bells was true or not, the JAP had another martyr – and it would form a key part of Saliquet's forces, providing many more.³⁹ With the garrison and civil government secured and much of the population offering enthusiastic support, the city – later dubbed the 'capital of the *alzamiento*' – had fallen to the rebels.

Given their participation in the conspiracy itself, Barcelona's *japistas* were heavily involved on 17–18 July and the confused days that followed. They awaited instructions from their UME liaison officers and the *japista* Juan Aguasca Bonmati and Captain López del Pecho were sent to the Civil Guard barracks to 'persuade' procrastinating officers to second the rising. They would then man the building themselves, freeing up the Civil Guards to impose order in the city. It is significant that the aim was never for the JAP itself to impose order in Barcelona – a role that in many safer locations would be eagerly, belligerently and rather retrospectively taken on by Falangists, infusing them with a power and authority hitherto unknown as well as handing them a leading role in the bloody repression.⁴⁰ In Barcelona there would be no such role to play as the rising failed. The *japistas* were not permitted to enter the barracks and although López del Pecho phoned the JAP director Carlos de Senillosa in the early hours of 19 July, ordering another concentration of men to present itself in the Plaça de las Glories Catalanes, the balance had tipped against the conspirators. Aware that the Civil Guard had remained loyal to the Republic, only a small number of *japistas* answered this second summons. Their basic instinct now was survival and at least one *japista* destroyed orders 'as soon as [he] realised the failure of the rising in Barcelona.' Like many right-wingers caught in the Republican zone, he went into hiding until, a year later, he was able finally to cross into the Nationalist zone.⁴¹

The rising was equally ill fated in the rest of Cataluña, where the collapse of Barcelona was sufficient to render other rebellions stillborn.⁴² This was also true of Valencia, where JDRV members supported the military conspirators. Here, Joaquín Maldonado carried copies of the military proclamation [*bando*] to the Captaincy General on 17 July, ready for what he anticipated to be a straightforward coup the following day, while DRV figures and the conspiring military remained in constant session, with the plans changing all the time. It was not until two days before the coup, for instance, that the

conspirators learnt that general Goded would not be heading the rising in Valencia after all; instead he would lead the rebellion in Barcelona.⁴³ With many pulling out and dithering, the tide thus turned against the Valencian plotters, one rebel complaining bitterly of cowardice amongst his supposed allies: 'they're a bunch of opportunists; they hide behind what everyone else does', he sighed, 'none of them have the bravery to go head first into this.'⁴⁴ Given that civilian support for the Republic and the loyalty of the Assault Guards had been assured, and that the left had mobilised determinedly, arming itself for the fight, this was hardly surprising.

On 19 July the DRV were asked to supply what Costa Serrano later rather vaingloriously but not inaccurately described as 'a select group, ready for anything . . . numerous, armed and unwilling to back down in the face of danger' to accompany general González Carrasco to the captaincy general. These JDRV followers were supposed to meet at the DRV building directly across the road while others manned one of the two cars designated to drive into the Captaincy General and, once the general was inside, flood the balconies of the building opposite, guns at the ready. The aim was to pressure the military authorities to accept the rising as a *fait accompli* but amid continued confusion, changes of heart and nervous wavering, the efficacy of the plan was never even put to the test. Fearful of the outcome, González Carrasco postponed his entry, a fatal mistake as far as the DRV were concerned – one member angrily described him as a 'bastard' [*cabrón*] for delaying. Conspiring youths could only watch as Assault Guards and police forces remaining loyal to the Republic and supported by the left wrestled back the initiative. By 20 July, a general strike had been called, Assault Guards had blocked the DRV's entry into the strategic, centrally-located Plaza Tetuán, and news had come in of the failure of the coup in Madrid and Barcelona. The Valencian rising was as good as over. 'What looked impossible to lose,' Maldonado later wrote, 'now seemed impossible to win.' The situation had appeared 'perfect': the left were 'terrified' and the right had had 'absolute faith in the military.'⁴⁵ That faith was, however, misplaced.

Failure in Valencia served to illustrate that even where it was organised and armed, the civilian right could not go it alone, and for those *japistas* and *cedistas* on the losing side on 18 July the consequences could be fatal. Notwithstanding the involvement of figures like Ramón Ruíz Alonso, in Granada much of the mainstream right was kept out of the conspiracy and responded late. As news filtered through, an editorial in the provincial CEDA-aligned newspaper *Ideal* insisted that its tardiness did not matter:

We are not arriving too late to incorporate ourselves to the army (*bustos*)

of those who have embarked upon the meritorious task of bringing the country out of the current dramatic hours. There is still time to unite with those who fight to save the traditional principles of Spain and return to an organisation where spirit occupies the zenith of hierarchy.⁴⁶

It was significant that the newspaper's editorial expressed a desire to join rather than to lead 'those who fight to save Spain'. As such, it was only half right: there was indeed still time for the party to align itself explicitly with the rebellion, indeed it was imperative that it did so, but such obvious bandwagon-jumping provoked predictable responses and the decomposing CEDA-JAP would never recover its predominant status. *Japistas* had lent both their tacit and explicit support to the rising but this was not enough to prevent power sliding towards an ascendant Falange. It was too late for the CEDA – and by extension the JAP, despite its more virulent anti-republicanism – to portray itself as anything other than tainted by association with the very régime the conspiracy sought to destroy.

While *japistas* wished to join the rising, they rarely led it. This helped to sow the seeds of the JAP's disappearance as an autonomous political force. In Santiago de Compostela, for instance, the first to back the rising were some thirty *japistas*. But rather than set up their own militia, they immediately joined the army, forming the basis of a column of Galician volunteers under the leadership of the CEDA deputy Felipe Gil Casares and eschewing any overt reference to their JAP pasts.⁴⁷ Similarly, immediately after the coup in Salamanca, the JAP presented 3,000 men to the army and in Madrid the rebelling Reserves Barracks was offered the assistance of some 200 *japistas*, while 100 more were destined for the Montaña barracks.⁴⁸ One newspaper noted that the JAP in Calatayud, which had armed itself in readiness for the rising, 'offered itself entirely to the Artillery Regiment' and in Belchite they organised a requisition of arms for the military.⁴⁹

While full figures remain unavailable, the contribution of *japistas* was significant and the army grew. In mid-August general Mola estimated that around 20,000 recruits had been mobilised; 20% of the army in the north were not regulars, while as many as 60% were not regulars in the south. In the first eight months, 5,132 provisional lieutenants had been named, a figure that ultimately reached 22,936. And when mobilisation was completed, some 270,000 recruits of all ranks had been drafted into the army.⁵⁰ This figure came in addition to the party militias raised – and, significantly, in joining the army *japistas* offered themselves simply as soldiers, something that Falangists and Carlists did not do, preferring to found their own militias. Given this attitude and the fact that prior to February 1936 the Falange and the Carlists each boasted fewer than 20,000

members while the JAP claimed 225,000 and the wider CEDA one million, it is logical to conclude that a large significant proportion of those 270,000 military recruits must have come from Gil Robles's party, even accounting for those who signed up having not been politically mobilised before. Indeed, such growth cannot be explained without this reserve of potential servicemen.

Carlists and Falangists sought to strengthen their movements, seeing recruitment as an arm for securing predominance. By enlisting in the army in contrast, *japistas* negated their own political identity to put themselves at the service of the military. This was not because they sought to hide their political roots – that would come later as the CEDA became stigmatised by the *de facto* powers of the new régime – but because it was the natural thing to do. The JAP had always been deferential towards the armed forces and supporting them rather than a rival political party was only logical. This was a war and, notwithstanding the militaristic outlook of the JAP, was therefore best fought by an army. The rising was 'glorious and exclusively military.' It was also the beginning of the end of the JAP as an independent political movement.



By 22 July, Spain was in stalemate. The Republic controlled all of the major cities, except Sevilla, as well as two wide swathes of territory. The first covered the north-east, including Lleida, Barcelona, and Tarragona, as well as the eastern half of Huesca, Zaragoza and Teruel. It also covered most of the south of the country, taking in the bulk of the provinces of Madrid, Guadalajara, Cuenca, Ciudad Real, Badajoz, Albacete, Murcia, Almería, Jaén, Granada (but not the provincial capital), Córdoba and Málaga. The second took in a strip along the northern coast, stretching from San Sebastián in the east to the border of Asturias in the west, covering the provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Oviedo and the mountainous northern fringes of León. The rebels, meanwhile, controlled the central plains of Castilla from Cáceres to Navarre, and a pocket taking in Sevilla and Cádiz, as well as the Balearic Islands. Force would be necessary to break the deadlock as troops marched towards each other, leaving behind strongholds for what had become the front-line.

With the Gibraltar straits controlled by Republican forces, Franco began negotiating assistance from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The aim was to carry out an airlift which would bring Spain's most feared force, the Army of Africa, to the mainland, where it could march upon Madrid. This would have significant political consequences, bringing the conspirators into a

fascist orbit, projecting the Falange as the natural political force of the rising. Meanwhile, the coup's 'director' general Emilio Mola prepared the military and Carlists under his command in Navarra to advance south towards the same destination. The Spanish Civil War had broken out and civilian mobilisation and recruitment now began in earnest. One contemporary in Burgos recalled how 'within two or three days, the entire youth of the [province's] towns came here' ready to be sent to the front.⁵¹ Likewise, a *segoviano* remembered that: 'on about the 22nd, operations in the Guadarrama started; 800 men, mostly artillerymen from Segovia and Valladolid headed off towards Leon, having to beat some Reds on the way ... here they were motivated and enthusiastic – the troops were Falangists, Requetés and *japistas*.' That there were any Falangists at all was due to the rising.⁵²

A Galician Falangist remembered that: 'it wasn't until after [the rising] that we started to mobilise, [when] they called upon us to go elsewhere ... then the numbers started growing; [new Falange members] were coming from everywhere and there were no questions asked about their origins. People turned a blind eye.'⁵³ His recollections were repeated all over Spain. It was not until the failure of the coup to capture control of the whole peninsula that the right truly embarked upon mobilisation for a war which most had not anticipated fighting. As Ángela Cenarro argues, 'neither the Falange nor any of the other right-wing parties gave the rising a ready fascistised base. There was a social base prepared to rise up, but it was the coup itself that set in motion a widespread right-wing mobilisation.'⁵⁴

Up to a point, this was true of the JAP. Within a few weeks, JAP expeditions had set out from Burgos, Valladolid and Salamanca, their destination in most cases the mountains to the north of Madrid, some ending up amongst the force that ultimately took the capital in April 1939.⁵⁵ Elsewhere, militias were also formed. In Galicia JAP militias were founded, despite the initial decision to join the army and Ruíz Alonso founded the Pérez de Pulgar battalion in Granada, based upon *japistas* and, later, 'repentant' Republican prisoners – an initiative that he boasted was an opportunity for them to repay their 'sins' and a concept later institutionalised by the Franco régime's programme of redemption through work.⁵⁶ By October, the JAP officially had seven companies at the front and two in the rearguard, accounting for between 2,000 and 2,800 men.⁵⁷

But although there were almost certainly more *japistas* fighting in their own units, this was an extremely poor return for a movement that had boasted 225,000 militants just six months earlier. Worse still when it is considered that the CEDA claimed a total membership of over a million. 'When the rising came,' one observer recalls, 'the majority [of *japistas*]

joined the army or Nationalist militias. Some, not many, left for the front to form their own units.⁵⁸ As an organisation, the JAP had reacted sluggishly to the recruitment demands of war, the organisational inertia of the spring and summer proving as irredeemable as it was fatal, and it rapidly ceded ground, dramatically reducing its chances of carving out a significant role in the Nationalist zone.

Whilst the JAP had been slow to react, the rising represented an opportunity that the Falange took with both hands. If the post-February turn to catastrophism had helped José Antonio's party, the coming of war truly launched it towards the conquest of the state. As Ismael Saz has written:

Far from making a fascist party 'unnecessary', the civil war made it so that the Spanish fascist party, FE de las JONS, became a mass party *for the first time* . . . as soon as the war became a war of masses, it began to favour those who had a populist approach, were declared enemies of liberalism and had the vocation and structure of a militia . . . the war made [the Falange] an indispensable part of the counterrevolutionary alliance, of the authoritarian project.⁵⁹

Likewise, Michael Seidman has written recently that 'fascism as mass movement', which he also sees as synonymous with the Falange, 'was the creation of a *pronunciamiento*',⁶⁰ while Alfonso Santos Alfonso notes of Lugo: 'The Falange, as in other Galician provinces, was unimportant as a political force in 1936 . . . in reality, it only became important as a result of the military triumph.'⁶¹

On 18 July the Falange was still a numerically weak organisation, albeit one that had gathered momentum. Thereafter, its membership, which had grown substantially in the wake of the right's electoral defeat, rocketed still further and even more quickly, laying bare the comparative paucity of the CEDA-JAP's response to the challenge of wartime mobilisation. Stanley Payne judges the Falange's growth to have been 'very possibly the most rapid' in Spanish political history.⁶² In Zaragoza for instance, whilst the JAP and other right-wing groupings mobilised around 800 in the immediate aftermath of the coup, 3,000 had been raised by the Falange, despite its pre-war insignificance. By early September, the Falange's 5th bandera in Aragón had 4,000 men and within a month they could claim 6,481 volunteers against 1,815 Carlists and 1,417 'others', *japistas* included.⁶³ In Valladolid, the JAP managed to raise two companies in the immediate aftermath of the coup; the Falange raised 23.⁶⁴

According to Rafael Casas de la Vega, by October 1936, when the JAP counted its recruitment somewhere below 3,000, the Falange had mobilised

nearly 37,000 militia men and the Carlists over 22,000. Other militias made up less than 10% of recruits, most of these volunteers without a clear political identity and the JAP could lay claim to only 2.6% of militia volunteers.⁶⁵ Nor did these proportions significantly alter throughout the war, as a total of some 200,000 militiamen would eventually volunteer for service by 1939. Indeed, the Falange continued to grow. By the end of 1936, it claimed 50,000 men at the front with a further 30,000 in the rearguard, where the party had become dominant. At the start of 1937 Manuel Hedilla, the Falange's leader following the execution of José Antonio on 20 November 1936, was boasting of 80,000 at the front, 50,000 in the rearguard and 15,000 more tied up in military services of one sort or another.⁶⁶ By April the new Falangist chief of militias claimed the staggering figure of 126,000. Under the auspices of official patronage the party grew still further. At the end of 1937, by which time the Falange had been forcibly merged with the *Comunión Tradicionalista* to become the official state party, its membership stood at 245,000, reaching 362,000 the following year, 650,000 the year after and 725,000 by 1940.⁶⁷

Across the country, the Falange had become the right's largest political group overnight. This growth, which far outstripped that of the spring, often irritated 'old shirt' Falangists who believed that the party was being commandeered by those who did not truly share its programme. In many cases they had a point; they were less justified in complaining about the *japistas* who joined in large numbers. For these recruits, changing parties was not a huge step. With the JAP's legalism now a thing of the past and the country at war, their programme was virtually indistinguishable from that of the Falange. Indeed, underpinning much of the JAP's propaganda output throughout the war was a desire to demonstrate that it shared the same ideology and experience as the Falange, that it was a valid partner in the Nationalist alliance.

How many new Falangists came from the JAP is impossible to judge accurately. But by early 1937 it is safe to conclude that the vast majority of the JAP's members had departed their former political home and enlisted in the army, the Falange or the Carlists. This was apparent in the tiny proportion that fought in JAP militias and the utter dearth of young men who remained behind in the rearguard: taking the JAP's membership as 200,000 and the CEDA's as one million, and considering the huge growth of military volunteers, Carlist *Requetés* and especially Falange units, the almost ridiculous paucity of JAP militias can only be explained by former *japistas* seeking membership elsewhere. In all probability, *japistas* in the Falange comfortably outnumbered Falangists of the very first hour and, such was their proportionate significance, by the time war broke out the

10,000 to 15,000 *japistas* who had joined during the spring considered themselves 'old shirts'. Mallorca provides a clear example: when Rafael Beltrán Morales left Acción Popular to join the Falange in the town of Pollença in May 1936, he was one of only four Falangists; when the *japista* Joan Oliver Cabonell joined the Falange in Son Severa on 3 July 1936, there were only seven other members; and of nine Falange members in Binissalem in early July 1936, six were *japistas* while only two had joined at all before that date.⁶⁸

Nor is Mallorca an isolated case. In Asturias, one Falangist calculated that only 20% of the party's wartime membership was made up of 'genuine' members, while 60% had come from other conservative parties, i.e. the CEDA, and the previously apolitical, with 25% being 'ex-Reds'.⁶⁹ A census carried out by the Civil Governor in Burgos at the end of the war revealed that only 21% of those enrolled in the FET y de las JONS were 'old shirts', even though over 40% had been mobilised as 'Falangists', against less than 10% who declared themselves *japistas*.⁷⁰ In November 1936, the Acción Popular organ in Segovia, *La Ciudad y los Campos*, stressing yet again both the convergence of the JAP and the emerging régime and the continuity of its aims and objectives, insisted that, 'if anyone thought these lads [*mozos*] had been swallowed up by the earth, they were wrong.' *Japistas* had 'not deserted their posts':

Before, they battled [*se batían*] in the street, with paste and electoral posters, with meetings and propaganda. Now, [they fight] voluntarily in Spanish soldiers' uniforms . . . or in JAP militias, and there is no shortage of those who in the first moments joined other patriotic militias.⁷¹

Japistas were not alone in joining the Falange, of course, and they certainly did not solely account for its incredible growth. It was to the Falange that the newly mobilised, previously apolitical also flocked. Or, indeed, vice versa: in many cases it was they to whom the Falange flocked, in search of converts with which finally to boast the mass base denied to them during the Republic. New members were attracted or won over by the Falange's radicalism and its sheer presence and persistence, not the specifics of its programme. Stanley Payne insists that 'most new members only knew that the Falange was patriotic and stood for something "new" and "social".' For many, even the new and social hardly mattered; what did was the fact that the Falange provided a vehicle through which to join the war effort, a sense of belonging to the Nationalist community and contributing to the destruction of 'communism'. 'The greatest number [of Falangists] had undoubtedly joined up as being the simplest way to help

their country', wrote one journalist, sympathetic to the Nationalists. 'I have questioned dozens of them here, there and everywhere. I found them on duty on the roads, guarding post-offices, banks, etc., and none of them was clear about anything except that they were anti-Red.'⁷²

For others the Falange offered shelter, safety. A German diplomat reported that the Falangists he came across had 'no real aims and ideas; rather they seem to be young people for whom mainly it is good sport to round up communists and socialists.' And yet some socialists and communists caught in the Nationalist zone took to the Falange as a means of survival. Political membership was the best way to disguise their past, prompting one Sección Femenina leader to complain that the party had been 'infiltrated by all sorts of people looking for shelter: those who had never joined anything, those who had never risked their skin, those who had much to hide, the saboteurs, even those of opposing ideas. This mass corrupted the essence of the Falange.'⁷³ Astute contemporaries realised this and, aware of the Falange's status as a refuge, began to combine its name with the anarchist trade union to dub it the FAI-lange. This was one criticism the Falange did not mind,⁷⁴ even if the JAP militia chief sniped: 'unlike the Falange one, our glorious shirt will never be a lifejacket.'⁷⁵ Indeed, the influx of such members gave some credibility to its claim to be a revolutionary movement, and purists and opponents alike began to see José Antonio's party as the Nationalist coalition's 'left-wing'.

More significant was that this phenomenon also existed amongst those whose political allegiance was unquestionably right-wing. It was not just left wingers caught in the Nationalist zone who craved the safety of belonging. 'A blue shirt was a safe pass [*salvaconducta*],' wrote one contemporary, 'and an old shirt . . . conferred power.'⁷⁶ One old shirt remembered that 'war was the worst thing that could have happened to us . . . people were wearing [the Falange's] blue shirts, even though they did not really have anything to do with us. You come back from the front and suddenly everyone's a Falangist.'⁷⁷ But if Falangists of the first hour grumbled about the impurities of their new recruits, they recognised the political opportunity that civil war presented and actively pressed home the advantage, changing the political panorama dramatically. A Falangist returned to Valladolid in September to familiar scenes: 'I found a "blue" Valladolid,' he wrote, 'a veritable flood of "converts" had transformed the atmosphere and profile of the city I once knew. Radio stations, newspapers and speakers at neighbourhood meetings spared no effort in the mobilisation of men and resources for the war or in propagating [*dogmatizar*] the new faith.'⁷⁸ 'Purity' may have been sacrificed but the JAP and the rest of the right had been eclipsed. Only when it provided a solution for a broader swathe of the

right did the Falange enjoy any real success. It was a far cry from February 1936, when the JAP had outnumbered the Falange by at least ten-to-one.⁷⁹

The Falange was not the only winner, though. The Carlists also profited from the outbreak of civil war. The *Comuni3n* mobilised easily in Navarra, although its hold on civilian society was limited elsewhere. In just ten days from 18 July, 10,000 Carlists had been enlisted and converged on Pamplona, whilst a further 1,000 had left the countryside round Vitoria for the fronts. Over 10% of Navarra's male population had been recruited and the party grew at an unprecedented rate in an area where, as one historian puts it, 'popular support became mass enthusiasm.' As early as August 1936, 20,000 men from Navarra were at the front, while Manuel Fal Conde claimed a total of over 50,000 Carlists in combat. Possibly as many as 70,000 Carlists fought at any one time, of which 40,000 were Navarrese – figures which far outstrip the Carlists' significance during the Republic.⁸⁰ Of these, some were certainly former *japistas*.⁸¹

The reasons for the JAP's failure to mobilise with the efficacy or success of the Falange and the Carlists were manifold. As one Zaragoza-based contemporary correctly judged, the CEDA-JAP found itself at an immediate disadvantage. Beyond the Carlists and the Falange, he recalled, 'no party could invoke the right to capture volunteers because the men who could sign for them came from the fields of the various political parties which on 18 July ceased to exist in the faithful and eternal Spain.'⁸² They had not actually *ceased to exist*, of course, but the coming of war made the CEDA-JAP redundant and their association with the Republic left them irrevocably damaged. Despite the services rendered, they were not considered a partner in the rising. The failure of the CEDA-JAP's democratic tactic was seen as part and parcel of the failure of party politics itself, which meant they should play no part in the new order. They represented an old, obsolete model that had to be swept away with the rising. The former CEDA deputy for Valladolid, Luciano de la Calzada Rodr3guez, later wrote privately that at the very start of the war it had already become apparent that:

Our days were numbered, as a collective we did not have any role at all to play in Spain. Everybody else blamed us and events, far more powerful than any reasoning, showed that Acci3n Popular's most noble objective, that of saving Spain without submitting it to the horrors of a civil war, had failed. Upon taking up arms we recognised that this reality [was] . . . the supreme argument that destroyed our existence.⁸³

Nor had the party been helped by the JEFE's response to the outbreak



1 Antonio Bermúdez Cañete, the JAP propagandist who brought *Mein Kampf* to a Spanish audience. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.) **2** Dimas de Madariaga, one of Acción Popular's most prized assets – a propagandist and a 'worker'. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



3 Manuel Giménez Fernández. His brief, frustrating spell as Minister of Agriculture brought divisions between the JAP and the CEDA into the open. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.) **4** José María Pérez de Laborda. The national president of the JAP battled to preserve the JAP's fascistised 'purity' between 1934 and 1936. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



5 The first edition of *J.A.P.* in 1934, immediately after the October Revolution. The headline reads: 'We want a new state!' (Courtesy of Fundación José María Castañé.) **6** The last edition of *J.A.P.* in February 1936, immediately before the general elections. The headline reads: 'To fight. To win. If necessary, to die for Spain.' The divisions within the party are revealed by the text that follows: 'We do not fight for the names on our slates, we do so for God and Spain.' (Courtesy of Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid.)



7 1936 JAP-designed propaganda poster decrying two years of 'anti-national' politics dictated by a Mexico-Moscow axis. The 'anti-Spain', made up of Marxism, Separatism and Masonry, stood accused of plunging a knife into the Fatherland. (Courtesy of Biblioteca Nacional de España.) **8** Despite its social rhetoric, the JAP also sought to appeal to the self-interest of the middle and upper classes during the 1936 campaign. This poster warns them that failing to vote for the right would be tantamount to suicide. Note the caption 'Vote for Spain.' (Courtesy of Biblioteca Nacional de España.)

JUVENTUDES DE ACCIÓN POPULAR
— J. A. P. —

ORENSE
 Don Argemiro Fernández Lopez
 De 17 años de edad
 Domiciliado en Puerto Ambía - B. de Mozas
 Hijo de José y de Rosa
 Estado soltero
 Profesión labrador
 Fué alta en _____

Núm. del carnet 107

9 Wartime identity card of a young *japista* enrolled in a JAP militia in Galicia. (Courtesy of Fondo Pérez Ávila, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Ourense / Biblioteca da Diputación Provincial de Ourense.)

N.º 209

**MILICIAS
 CIUDADANAS
 ESPAÑOLAS**

CARNET DE IDENTIDAD
 A FAVOR

del Caballero
D. JOSÉ PÉREZ ÁVILA
 de _____ años, con domicilio en ORENSE
1.º de AGOSTO de 1936.
 El jefe del batallón, _____
 El interesado, _____
 El comandante militar, _____

OBLIGACIONES DE ESTAS MILICIAS

- 1.º Defender el Orden público, ejerciendo funciones de la policía en todo momento.
- 2.º a) Auxiliar a la fuerza pública cuando ésta lo necesite, como también para ser defendido por ésta cuando sea necesario.
 b) Sustituirla en todos los servicios que ésta tenga que prestar cuando lo ordene el Mando, siempre dentro de la población.
- 3.º Si por cualquier circunstancia el Mando lo creyese necesario, estas Milicias se desplazarán a donde se le ordene en defensa de su Dios y de su Patria.
- 4.º Será obligatorio usar en todo momento la insignia de este Cuerpo, llevándola siempre en sitio visible, pues con esto se consigue, no sólo el mutuo auxilio, sino también el que dicha insignia haga recordar a su poseedor su compromiso ineludible de ser un ciudadano honorable y disciplinado.
- 5.º Los señores que integran estas Milicias están sujetos a la disciplina del Código Militar durante los actos de servicio, considerándosele como fuerza armada, mientras el alto Mando no disponga cosa en contrario.

10 Identity card of José Pérez Ávila, confirming his membership of the Caballeros de Santiago rearguard militia. Pérez Ávila was the leader of the JAP in the Galician town of Ourense. (Courtesy of Fondo Pérez Ávila, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Ourense / Biblioteca da Diputación Provincial de Ourense.)



12 Japistas at the Uclés rally in May 1935. Their banner reads: '¡JEFEE! A group of workers travelled 100km by foot to salute you! In you they trust.' (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



13(a) *Japista* stewards hold back crowds at Uclés. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



13(b) *Japistas* perform the party salute at Uclés. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



14 Uclés, May 1935. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



15 Uclés, May 1935. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



16 Courtesy of Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid. **17** Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.



The JAP rally at El Escorial in April 1934 closed its first national congress and announced the coming of age of the *Juventud* – and the arrival of a new type of right-wing politics, complete with anthems, banners and salutes, that the left equated with fascism.



18 *Japistas* perform the party salute and sing the JAP anthem. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.) **19** Courtesy of Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid.



20



21

The leadership cult that surrounded Gil Robles was intense. Here, he is greeted with salutes by office staff and members as he arrives at the HQ of one local Acción Popular body. In Uclés, a line of women await the arrival of his car, performing salutes as they do so. (Illustrations 20 and 21 courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



22 Gil Robles was an accomplished political orator. Here he addresses crowds at the El Escorial rally in April 1934. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



23 Ramón Serrano Suñer, General Francisco Franco's brother-in-law, at an Acción Popular meeting in early 1936. Serrano Suñer's significance within Acción Popular, both in Zaragoza and nationally, did not prevent him from writing the party out of the new political order when he laid the foundation stone of Franco's New State with the decree of Unification in April 1937. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



24 Programme of events from the JAP's national congress in Alcalá de Henares in December 1935, depicting an idealised image of the *japista*. (Courtesy of Fondo Pérez Ávila, Archivo Histórico Provincial de Ourense / Biblioteca da Diputación Provincial de Ourense.) **25** 'On the march'. Flier for JAP rally at Uclés in May 1935. JAP bodies were instructed to bring flags and their orchestras, while *japistas* were implored to learn the JAP's anthem and display 'Discipline! Enthusiasm! Discipline!' (Courtesy of Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid.)



26 The JAP's most famous propaganda poster covered the entire façade of a building in Madrid's Puerta del Sol during the election campaign of 1936 and depicted the *JEFE* in front of uniformed *japistas*. The slogan ran: 'These are my powers'. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



27 Funeral of a *japista* killed during the 1936 election campaign in Guadalajara. The coffin was draped in the JAP's flag. (Courtesy of Fondo Fotográfico M. Santos Yubero, Archivo Regional de la Comunidad de Madrid.)



28 The left saw in Gil Robles a Spanish answer to Adolf Hitler, as this caricature from September 1934 shows.

of war. Ignoring general Mola's request for prominent politicians to congregate in Burgos, he left San Sebastián for Biarritz during the evening of 17 July. Gil Robles later explained to Ángel Herrera Oria that this was not because he did not want to go but because he considered it risky for the success of the coup; it may also have been motivated by his own doubts and personal fear – Gil Robles was well aware that part of the reason José Calvo Sotelo had been killed was that he could not be found. 'The calling together of a hundred people days before the movement would', he wrote, 'have revealed the military plans.' For many conspirators this was an act of treachery; for Gil Robles, it was a dreadful, fatal mistake. Herrera Oria told the CEDA leader that had he agreed to the meeting he would have ended up as the *jefe de estado* and Gil Robles admitted that his failure to attend put him in 'a difficult position with the rising generals'.⁸⁴ Any plans he had to return to Spain and pick up where he left off had been left in tatters. So had his party. He refused two more invitations to return and, on 24 July, having been expelled from France by the Popular Front government of Leon Blum, took a train to Boulogne where, handed an emergency fund of £12,000 in sterling by the Mallorcan millionaire Juan March, he boarded a boat bound for Lisbon.

Gil Robles's departure was a political error from which he would never recover. Once in Lisbon, he set up an unofficial Spanish embassy, the Agency of the Burgos Junta, working out of the Hotel Aviz on behalf of the Nationalists. Acting in close collaboration with Franco's brother Nicolás, the agency raised over eight million pesetas as well as procuring arms for the Nationalists, smuggling them through Portugal. His role was a valuable one but this was not enough to revive Gil Robles's fallen political star.⁸⁵ By leaving Spain the *JEFE* had left himself open to accusations of cowardice, a charge already levelled at the CEDA for its accidentalism and relative timidity since the February elections and even before. Despite his constant protests to the contrary, he had also distanced himself, metaphorically as well as physically, from the rising. In the context of the heightened passions of a civil war, this was political suicide. A British embassy official reported that: '[Gil Robles's] absence from Spain at the start of the rebellion has momentarily destroyed his prestige and popularity and opened the way to the extremist elements of the Falange'.⁸⁶

This judgment was accurate but for one thing: the destruction of Gil Robles's prestige was to prove far from momentary. He became a pariah who had sunk Spain into a bloody civil war and then turned his back on his native land and his countrymen. As one monarchist student from a Salamancan town put it, the 'chaos' afflicting Spain had been 'provoked by the left and the CEDA'.⁸⁷ This perspective, which came to be widely held, was reflected

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in the frankly bizarre, unfounded accusations that Franco reportedly made to a Mexican journalist. He insisted that Gil Robles had 'told *cedistas* to stand back, allow the two sides to tear each other apart and then step into the breach to claim power.' The Caudillo then allegedly added that, 'disgusted, the youth abandoned him.'⁸⁸ The latter assessment inadvertently got closer to the truth although *japistas*' disgust was not so much at such a plan, which did not exist, as at Gil Robles's failings and his abandonment of them. Many of those who found themselves at the front in non-JAP units, meanwhile, would be reluctant publicly to defend their *JEFE* for fear of the reaction of those around them. The best way to avoid association with a political pariah was to depart and disown his party.

Although Franco rightly recognised that Gil Robles 'helped us a lot', even the very best outcome that the CEDA leader could realistically hope for – that he might be forgotten – was politically damaging. One *japista* told how he had been 'asked by a cretin what Gil Robles was doing now. I gave him the answer: he is in Lisbon, working for God and Spain.'⁸⁹ It was telling that he was even asked. Being forgotten would have been bad enough but many other *japistas* saw things differently, no longer casting their *JEFE* in so positive a light and transferring their obedience elsewhere, theatrical politics and a uniform giving them an easy mechanism through which to do so. 'In Spain there are many of Gil Robles's old political allies who now cover their heads with the [Carlist] red beret or [the army's] green one,' read *ABC*, 'or wear the [Falange's] blue shirt.'⁹⁰ Falangists, meanwhile, saw Gil Robles's flight as proof that they had been right about him, and his party, all along. For many more in the Nationalist zone, Gil Robles had become an irrelevance and the departure and abandonment of his party served to quicken still further the collapse of the CEDA.

The JAP paid dearly for association with the Republic and its failure adequately to respond to defeat. The loss of Madrid, the death of Pérez de Laborda there, and a willingness to defer to the army did little to facilitate its recovery but in many cases right-wing militants simply did not want to join the JAP. They needed to fight a war and judged the *Juventud* – and certainly the CEDA – too soft, too 'passive' in the face of the communist threat. If the JAP had seemed 'photogenic rather than militias of action' or even 'ballerinas' in peacetime, this was an even more damning judgment now.⁹¹ Little wonder that the more aggressive Falange and *Comunión Tradicionalista* seemed so much more attractive than they ever had before. The JAP did not do enough to prove that they were in fact ready to fight, either. With war providing a mobilising opportunity – indeed, a necessity – for other parties, the CEDA's initial disintegration took on truly catastrophic proportions for the JAP. It no longer enjoyed the credibility to

mobilise with the success of the previous five years. Nor, equally importantly, did it have the necessary momentum. The collapse of the party in the spring and summer left some *japistas* awaiting orders, rather than actively seeking to mobilise for the war effort.

When the JAP did respond it met with little enthusiasm. Few seemed eager to fight under the JAP banner. One recruiter complained in the autumn of 1936 that he found 'only one person keen to go to the front' as a *japista* in his town.⁹² Similarly, a *japista* fighting at Villanueva de la Cañada, just to the west of Madrid, scrawled tetchily at the foot of one letter: 'in this front I only see the Falange and Requeté, without having seen a single *japista* in the whole of the Madrid front – Leganés, Carabanchel, Brunete, Navacarnero, not one . . . even at Robledo de Chavela there's only half a company.'⁹³ The fact that they commented on this was in itself telling: these *japistas*, fighting at the front and far removed from the political intrigue of the rearguard, simply could not understand why they suddenly found themselves in a position of such isolation.

But neither rank and file refusal nor the party's decomposition alone explained the JAP's failure. Other factors were significant, such as a genuine desire to unite the whole of the right in a kind of post-political order and the inherent arrogance of the CEDA-JAP leaders – something that was already tentatively apparent during the spring. Following five years as the largest party on the right, some *cedistas* believed that power would simply fall into their lap after a successful coup. There was not a victory to fight for; others, in this case the army, would take charge of the fighting on their behalf, returning them to political predominance thereafter, having performed the necessary 'iron surgery'. Many *cedistas* and *japistas* were not expecting to have to fight to re-establish a position they assumed to be their own and failed to anticipate a long war which would give the Falange the time, impetus and opportunity to wrest the initiative away from them. Even once the war was underway, a quick resolution was expected, as was apparent in Salmón's claim of a bright future on the eve of the rising. A *japista* at the front, meanwhile, rather tragically spoke for many in his party when he requested a copy of the JAP's hymn in late August 1936 on the grounds that 'it can be played on the day of victory, which draws near.'⁹⁴ Such complacency, flying in the face of rapidly falling membership during the spring, and a war that would drag on for two and a half more years, led the JAP to mobilise too late or not at all.

Unlike the CEDA-JAP, the Falange was acutely aware of the importance of mobilisation and struggle. Falangists were number two; they tried harder. As a truly minuscule, utterly marginalised latecomer that sought to carve itself a unique niche, the Falange was conscious of its own

position *within* a power base. Their leaders were fully aware of the existence of a battle for militants and power and aware too that war represented a unique opportunity. They thus attempted to take advantage and to curtail the influence of those who lined up alongside them, in contrast to much of the CEDA-JAP, which took supremacy for granted. Those sectors of the Confederación that did not do so sought out solutions elsewhere.⁹⁵ Many *japistas* – including those who might have helped shake the party out of its inertia in the wake of the February elections – failed to respond to the new political and military environment, either in the spring or in the early stages of the war. Moreover, those more radical, determined members who did respond tended to do so explicitly under the army, in many cases as a gesture of defiance at the cowardice of their own parent organisation or because they felt that the CEDA was no longer an appropriate vehicle through which to act. Even those whose decisions were not so politically conscious moved away from the JAP: because most *japistas* were not regimented when the coup broke out, civilians who wanted to join the rising found themselves bound to enlist in the army, the Carlists or the Falange rather than any JAP groupings.

This represented the continuation of a pattern of decomposition that had afflicted the JAP since the elections the spring and early summer. A JAP option was often unavailable. In most cases there was no real decision to be made: young rightists simply signed up to the first militia to demand their services and very rarely was this the JAP. *Japistas* did not always *chose* to join militias other than their own; some could be found 'wearing the honourable uniforms of our brother militias where circumstances did not allow them to have their own militias', as a press release enigmatically put it.⁹⁶ Indeed, one local member, asked to organise a JAP militia in his *pueblo* in January 1937, seven long months after the outbreak of war (a delay which was itself significant), could only reply meekly:

Sorry, it is not possible, because all the young lads [*jóvenes*] of the right joined the Falange, the only organisation known here since the first moments of the Glorious National Movement. [It was the Falange] which everyone joined – including on my instruction because, not being aware of any other [organisation] in those moments of danger, that had to be my advice. The few rightists that do not belong to the Falange have left here with the military to defend the *Patria*, wherever the [army] High Command demands. So, in this municipality, there is no youth [*juventud*] left at all. As I am sure you will understand, all good patriots that know how to use a rifle are already enrolled in a militia. What matters is defending the *Patria* and winning.⁹⁷

For all 'good patriots', a loaded phrase of which Falangist and Carlist recruiters would make good use, winning was indeed what mattered, not the political identity of the militias in which they served. Few *japistas* balked at joining militias administered by political competitors.

Furthermore, the contrast between the conscripting zeal of the Falange and the Carlists and the relative timidity and inertia of the JAP would prove vitally important. José Antonio's party sprang into action quickly, mobilising intensively in the run up to and immediately after the rising. The aim was political predominance and this involved signing up 'anyone', one Falangist claiming that 'no one [even] cares who they are.' A reported conversation between two Valladolid old shirts, anxious to establish a power base in the immediate aftermath of the coup, illustrates the point: 'Did you know that lots from the CEDA have come and joined us?' asked one, to which the other replied: 'Let them; we'll turn them into Falangists willingly or not [*por las buenas o por las narices*]. We need to get control of the city before the right does, they [the right] are a bit lazy.'⁹⁸ The Falange was also determined to take revenge on the CEDA for the 'stupid biennium' and the problems it had encountered between 1933 and 1936.⁹⁹

The significance of a genuine recruiting zeal is made clear by a study of civilian mobilisation in the Basque-Navarrese province of Álava, which found that volunteering rates were at their lowest in those areas dominated by the CEDA-JAP. Moreover, despite 'barely exist[ing]' prior to 18 July, the Falange's active recruitment saw it provide some 18.5% of volunteers in the province, many of whom are judged to have been virtually 'forced' to enlist.¹⁰⁰ Javier Tusell adds that left-wingers were also subjected to threats and effectively obliged to join the Falange all over Spain, whilst even those who had already enrolled in the JAP militias and were fighting at the front could find themselves worn down by Falange insistence.¹⁰¹ 'The Falangists keep telling us to wear their uniforms which we only do to get some peace,' wrote one cowed *japista*.¹⁰²

The zealotry of the Carlists was just as intense as that of the Falange, as is portrayed in Javier Ugarte's fascinating portrait of the rising in Navarra. As the coup was launched, a fleet of busses went from town to town rounding people up for the war effort, Carlist or not. Those troops carrying out the recruiting sought to project an image of strength and confidence so that, apparent or real, success was self-perpetuating. Few potential recruits would refuse when presented with so positive a message, when the rest of their town had signed up or, even less so, when bluntly told, 'you're the only one left'. Such indirect accusations of cowardice, social pressure and implicit threats were on occasion accompanied by real threats. One young man who publicly told general Millán Astray that he was not planning to enlist was

found dead the next day; prevaricators soon made up their minds. Nor was signing up presented as a party political decision. Recruitment was carried out on behalf of the war effort, for God and the Fatherland rather than for Carlism, and young men were not mobilised on an ideological level but a personal, emotional one. Yet the Carlists were of course the beneficiaries. One local political boss, who had backed the CEDA throughout the Republic, rounded up people in his town on 19 July and sent them in a requisitioned van to the front as CEDA volunteers. When they arrived at the barracks in Vitoria the unit they found themselves joining was a Carlist one, meaning that they automatically became members of the *Comunión Tradicionalista*. Neither he nor they complained.¹⁰³

The speed and exhaustiveness of Carlist and Falange mobilisation left the JAP trailing far behind. In the early stages of mobilisation the JAP found its political and military space rapidly occupied; its potential constituents, and indeed its existing members, already swelled the ranks of their competitors. Others, especially its former members, had volunteered for the army as the natural reaction to the outbreak of war. When the JAP did try to mobilise it was too late. In August 1936, the *Acción Popular* deputy in Oviedo, José María Fernández Ladreda, was asked by military officials to put together a unit to fight in the rearguard, precisely because those who could have fought at the front had already departed. Even this force would not be an AP one, instead wearing blue overalls and a red-and-gold armband.¹⁰⁴ In the same month, the provincial leader of the JAP in Orense, José Pérez Ávila, received a letter from a local party sympathiser, informing him flatly that 'the people we would call upon are already signed up.'¹⁰⁵ A month later he was told that mobilising in another Galician town would be equally fruitless as 'the majority of those who were in the JAP here [already] inclined towards the Falange', leaving 'very few' possible recruits: 'many of them are [now] at the front in the army and as volunteers in the [predominantly JAP-based, but not administered] *Caballeros de la Muerte* militia.'¹⁰⁶ 'The opportunity which could have awoken [people] was not taken advantage of,' Pérez Ávila lamented. A priest in Ribadavia was 'running round the parish forming JAPs', with limited success. 'As you can imagine', he wrote, 'there are not many youths around because some are in the army, some are in other militias.'¹⁰⁷ The JAP had slipped into relative anonymity but that did not mean that *japistas* had disappeared. Rather, it reflected their new-found homes, the fact that they now acted without dependence upon the CEDA. As a CEDA source insisted:

Our *Juventudes* identified themselves with, and melted [*se fundieron*] into, the ranks of the army. In other [places], with their own uniforms, their

characteristic insignias, their flag flapping in the breeze, they fight alongside Spain's soldiers as selfless auxiliaries, enthusiastic servants.¹⁰⁸

By the very end of August 1936, some concerted effort was being made to raise JAP militias to join those already at the front.¹⁰⁹ That this was a belated call, and that the CEDA had failed to anticipate, adequately react to, or embrace the challenge of mobilisation was underlined by a letter from one party member. 'I found out from my friend that they are going to try to organise some militias. The idea pleases me extraordinarily,' he wrote, as if the thought had not even occurred to him. 'I'd like to set one up here, for which I await instructions.'¹¹⁰ Sensing an opportunity for political recovery that had in fact already been extinguished, at the start of September Gil Robles authorised Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez, to whom he delegated 'unlimited powers', to found militias in the name of the JAP.¹¹¹ Calzada Rodríguez had already raised two companies in Valladolid; now he sought to extend JAP mobilisation to the rest of the country. Control of militias at a time of war effectively made him the JAP chief and he would soon become Gil Robles's political arm in Spain, filing reports and keeping the CEDA leader up to date with progress in the war as well as negotiating the JAP's formal adherence to the Nationalist unification, seeking to grab a significant role for the party and his *JEFE*.

The CEDA leader claimed to have abstained from politics throughout the civil war but this is unsustainable.¹¹² If there were any doubts that this appointment represented an attempt to drag the JAP back under the *JEFE*'s control, claw back some of the lost ground and provide Gil Robles with a power base of sorts, these were banished by Calzada Rodríguez's careful efforts to reorganise the JAP formally, channelling its activity through a central body based in Valladolid where the JAP had its own barracks.¹¹³ No sooner had the former deputy received authorisation than he called for all local and provincial militia leaders to meet for 'an exchange of views' in Salamanca, bringing with them all the information they could gather.¹¹⁴ This was followed by concerted efforts to mobilise, which in some cases met with limited success: surviving membership lists in Galicia for instance show that each and every militiaman signed up by the JAP had his membership formalised in October and the Orense JAP actually grew during the civil war.¹¹⁵ The political significance of this campaign was laid bare by Ruíz Alonso's cry that: 'we want battalions to represent all provinces so that when the war is over they can carry the message to homes everywhere. Please give as many men as possible . . . we want a full company from your province. Instead of murmurs, criticism or demands – MORE RIFLES AT THE FRONT.'¹¹⁶

The opportunistic nature of much civil war recruitment was underlined by the fact that recruits in Orense were not pre-war *japistas*. Like Falangist old shirts, *japistas* of the first hour were already at the front when these late-comers arrived. And, despite such clarion calls and some limited success, the JAP's recruitment drive did not even get close to bearing the fruit enjoyed by the Falange. This was partly due to the fact that the momentum had slipped away from it but that was not the sole reason. The JAP also encountered serious, stubborn opposition from the Falange, the army and the embryonic state. An aggressive campaign built up against the CEDA. The Nationalists' new press officer, general Millán Astray, launched a media offensive aimed at discrediting it that was made all the more damaging because of its source.¹¹⁷ But even without an officially sanctioned whispering campaign, the CEDA chief had become the object of popular animosity for having supposedly betrayed right-wing interests with his policy of accidentalism, merely putting off an inevitable military rising against the Republic. 'Anti-gilrrobismo is so fashionable', commented ABC,¹¹⁸ while friends warned him that he had 'as many enemies in the Nationalist zone as the Republican one' and when he returned to Spain to visit Pamplona on 28 July he was insulted by crowds.¹¹⁹

These scenes were repeated in three of the CEDA's former strongholds, now three of the key cities in the Nationalist zone. In Burgos a little over a month later Falangists threatened to beat him up. On a visit to his home city of Salamanca, where the CEDA had been hegemonic prior to the war and where Gil Robles himself had the untouchable status of a local hero, he was forced to hide in the home of a friend such was the level of hostility directed towards him. And in Valladolid he was met with jeers that prompted a political contemporary to remark: 'a few months ago he was the idol of the right; who would have thought he would experience such a thing in the most genuinely right-wing of cities?' 'As there are lots of people who think Gil Robles is responsible for the war,' Franco commented coolly, 'they want to kill him.'¹²⁰ In September, the *JEFE* was warned to 'dissolve the party before they dissolve you.'¹²¹

In terms of Gil Robles's political future, the effects of this unpopularity were devastating. Nicolás Franco had initially contemplated forging a state party based on the CEDA but the open hostility of the rest of the right persuaded him otherwise.¹²² Opposition was especially marked from the Falange, which seized on every opportunity to attack its greatest political opponent. Gil Robles bitterly complained of a 'wave of insults, ingratitude, treacheries and cowardice the likes of which no man in Spain has ever suffered' and this was to become a recurring theme in his correspondence.¹²³ As he was steadily distanced from the real, military heart of power – Franco's

Cuartel General – Calzada Rodríguez criticised the new régime's willingness to leave power in the hands of a 'political force that . . . has no real roots.'¹²⁴ The JAP, meanwhile, suffered in silence, its efforts on the battlefield all but ignored by the Nationalist press. 'The glories, the sacrifices . . . cannot be hidden from the people,' Gil Robles declared quite erroneously, as the JAP not unjustly complained of a 'systematic and suspicious silence from most newspapers' and bemoaned the existence of 'a few "war correspondents" who have forgotten all objective reference to dedicate themselves instead to the cult of rubbish [*bojarasca*], vanity and cliché.'¹²⁵ Such was the JAP's exasperation at the silence with which it was greeted that it was moved rather desperately to cry out: 'JAP lads die too!'¹²⁶

JAP lads did indeed die but that did not prevent the hostility towards them spreading to smaller population centres, making life difficult and recruitment harder on a local level. *De facto* powers, *caciques* and political bosses weary of their own pre-eminence, allowed themselves to be carried along on the winds of political change. They saw in the Falange and the army a novel solution to a more extensive crisis, the new arbiters of a political settlement of which they wanted to form a part.¹²⁷ The Falange had become the vehicle by which to maintain their power, a channel to the state. In cities, towns and villages all over the Nationalist zone, the official founding of militias needed the backing of the local civil and military authorities and, although it is impossible to gauge this precisely throughout Spain, this support appears to have been denied to the JAP. Often this was a product of the virulent opposition of the Falange, which jealously guarded its own emerging power base. '[I] was looking at taking some men into the JAP militias but they said they couldn't as they had already signed up for the Falange. They will not allow the JAP to organise in this municipality,' wrote one recruiter, hinting darkly at his concerns about possible reprisals by adding: 'please use this letter discreetly.' The Falange, he rightly feared, would stop at nothing to achieve predominance.¹²⁸ This was a process that would continue. The foundation of the régime led to a scramble for posts in the new administration in which the JAP was at a disadvantage. In Burgos, one civil guard reported that 'the struggles have continued . . . without thought for ideology or for programmatic content but because of the desire to position themselves.'¹²⁹

If the conquest of power required sabotaging those they were supposed to be fighting alongside, the Falange was prepared to do just that. In Salamanca, Falangists appear to have intercepted and deliberately damaged a truck load of JAP uniforms, an episode about which many *japistas* dared not speak out but which prompted one militiaman based in the city to recognise sadly that 'some have tried to open wounds and foster hate.'¹³⁰ So

tense had relations become that Manuel Fernández, a chaplain serving at the front with a company of *japistas*, requested that no more militiamen be sent to Salamanca. Not wanting to trust his experiences to a letter, which could easily be intercepted, Fernández asked the provincial JAP chief to keep his name a secret and told him that they would have to speak in person at a future date. First, though, he requested intervention to prevent the 'inhuman treatment' of *japistas* stationed in the capital of Nationalist Spain.¹³¹

This does not appear to have been an isolated incident. According to another exasperated recruiter, the Falange launched a damaging whispering campaign against JAP mobilisation in his town too. Here, JAP insistences that it would 'welcome you into its glorious militias and care lovingly for you and your family' were powerless against the Falange's accusations:

They've tried to stop [us mobilising], telling people that they are victims of a con from us, that if they go to the front they will be abandoned in disgrace and will end up having to go begging door-to-door, that if they go to the Guardia Civil posts in Asturias, the Guardia Civil itself will receive them with gunshots, that they won't get more than dinner, etc., etc. I think we should back out and be mere spectators of all this intrigue or we should pull out all the stops to prevent it. We cannot tolerate this passively. We cannot tolerate people trying to put down the new régime in order to gain themselves positions that they do not deserve.¹³²

Most, though, did tolerate it. Faced by such opposition and hostility, the majority of local JAP figures, in contrast to their Falangist counterparts, backed off, concerned with avoiding infighting and rancour, both for reasons of altruism and because of their own inherent weakness.

Japistas were also determined to act in accordance with the military authorities, even to the detriment of raising their own militias. The decomposition of the Confederación and its youth wing at a national level and the concentration of real power in military hands removed much of the pressure to continue the party political struggle for supremacy; extraneous pressures had become far greater and an inability to battle for their own political pre-eminence inevitably cost the JAP. The JAP's deference to the military was intense and it could hardly challenge the army now. Gil Robles claimed that 'our mission is to be the auxiliaries of the army, whose uniforms we are anxious to wear.'¹³³ *Japistas* sincerely believed, or wanted to believe – despite often being disabused of the idea – that the Nationalists were brothers in arms and they were therefore prepared, however begrudgingly, to subsume their identity within that of the coalition as a whole. They were

also sufficiently identified with the military project as to not feel the burning desire that, for example, the Falange did to stamp its party identity on the rising.

Nor, in times of war, did *japistas* want to go it alone. In the face of hostility they would bite their tongues and accept their fate. The antagonism suffered by the CEDA-JAP is striking, and yet it was only very rarely reciprocated. In one town, the CEDA member charged with organising the party militia wrote that 'some were going to join the [JAP column] but because they had already gone' to the front could not. Amongst those was his son, who was 'not allowed to wear our insignias' by local Falangists. The JAP had become a political pariah as much for reasons of expediency as its previous tactical failings, even though it was indeed true that, 'the forces here are of course rightfully [*propiamiente*] ours.'¹³⁴ In Granada meanwhile, Ramón Ruiz Alonso took to a balcony in order to harangue potential recruits during the opening days of the war, only to be told that the only militias permitted would be Falange ones. Although this did not prevent him later raising a militia, he would remain bitter at the way in which the Falange kept him out of local politics even as he, noting which way the wind was blowing, donned their blue shirt.¹³⁵ And in the Galician town of Cea, the instigator of prospective JAP mobilisation noted that due to 'opposition from some Falangists' and the 'lamentable events' this had caused, organising a militia was 'not worth the hassle.' 'It seems,' he remarked sadly, imagining greener grass in the provincial capital, 'that over in Orense everybody fights together for the *Patria* alongside our saviours, the army.' The 'unlike here' went without saying.¹³⁶

Actually, the experience of his town was far from atypical and Orense had witnessed similar scenes. Political power brokers and rank and file militants, seeking to cash in on the Falangist flavour of national politics and Franco's field HQ, continued to back José Antonio's party over the JAP. In one *pueblo*, the 'majority' of *japistas* had been 'inclined to the Falange', due to the support it enjoyed from *caciques* – 'for reasons you can well imagine', as it was bitterly put.¹³⁷ For most local *caciques*, the Falange had become a more appropriate vehicle for mobilising militias than was the CEDA-JAP. Its combative character and its lack of association with the Republic enabled political bosses, and even those who had been explicitly associated with the CEDA, of whom there were many, to disguise their own involvement in the régime that they now sought to overthrow. Just as the Falange had become a 'lifejacket' to left-wingers seeking salvation, a way to 'prove' beyond doubt their Nationalist credentials, so too it became a path towards preferment, advance and safety in the Nationalist zone. The CEDA enjoyed no such prestige.

The Falange was also a party in an embryonic state, a power vacuum easily filled, a weak, less entrenched movement that could be commandeered. One old shirt in Segovia irritably remembered that the 'capacity for infiltration and deception of these people [*caciques*] is unsuspected.' Political bosses, he reported, did not hesitate to 'disguise themselves as National-Syndicalists, wear the blue shirt or the red beret, raise the arm in salute and commit perjury to the 27 commandments of our political law.'¹³⁸ In Tenerife, another old shirt noted how the Falange was 'born here on the same day as the Nationalist rising [and] . . . grew turbulently.' Here, too, the Falange became a vehicle towards preferment: 'those few individuals who provided it with some substance marched with the army to the peninsula, leaving behind selfish people, full of greed and lacking a truly Falangist spirit in charge of the party.'¹³⁹ If the Falange was easily used, commandeering the CEDA would in many cases be almost as difficult as it was pointless.

This newfound *falangismo* extended into local authorities, institutionalising and exaggerating anti-JAP sentiments. The CEDA-JAP may have formed the constituent core, the social base, of the movement but the military were the true arbiters of the Nationalist zone and the CEDA still bore the brunt of those who sought to establish culpability for 'allowing' Spain to descend into 'anarchy'. The more intransigent right, and political opportunists keen mainly to back the winning horse, accused the CEDA of having wasted five years fraternising with the Republic when they should instead have worked solely towards its destruction. They did not dare be seen to support the CEDA.¹⁴⁰ What this current of thought failed to admit was what Gil Robles so insistently repeated: that the Republic's destruction, take-over, or removal before 1936 was but a pipe dream. Dismayed at this campaign, the JAP appealed for 'the representatives of public power' to understand and recognise 'the unconditional loyalty of the JAP, which wants no post or ambition other than that which best serves Spain, nor any triumph other than that of the army and the militias, led by our Generalísimo Franco'. The JAP insisted that 'the day will come when Spain acknowledges what every one of her sons has done for her.'¹⁴¹ Appeals like this responded to a basic desire to be granted recognition – and that day would never arrive.

The greatest opposition came from virulent Falangists determined not to allow the CEDA-JAP back into the saddle. But in light of the JAP's tardy response to mobilisation even the Catholic Church, on occasion, threw in its lot with the Falangists, having hung its hopes on those who had risen up in its defence. In one village, Catholic priests got wind of a local *cacique's* plan to re-found the dormant JAP 'with mostly suspicious people' – rein-

forcing the sense that what mattered was finding an organisation that was functional and easily commandeered. The clergy, 'enthusiastic collaborators of the Glorious National Movement', informed the provincial JAP president, with whom they maintained an excellent relationship, in order to prevent this occurring. Although they insisted that they did 'not oppose militias of the JAP,' they did have a problem with the individual in question. Besides, there was no need for another militia because the Falange was already *in situ*, a party which 'we support because it defends the clergy and works alongside the constituted authorities, while this man is trying to found something more political, aimed at assaulting power.' If the JAP was to be founded, they added, 'it must be made up of those who share the ideals of Gil Robles and the saviours of the *Patria*. It should also be cleared with FE in order to prevent dangerous discrepancies.'¹⁴²

To be accused of playing politics was as serious a charge as existed in the Nationalist zone, especially for a group with so tentative and limited a grip on power as the CEDA-JAP had. 'To play politics now is criminal and degraded [*canallescol*]', as JAP sources insistently put it.¹⁴³ Whilst the Falange clearly sought – and successfully achieved – enormous political capital from their ability to send men to the front, the JAP, initially at least, remained concerned not to be seen as attempting to gain from its actions. Despite what was clearly political manoeuvring by Gil Robles, the JAP thus recoiled from conflict, only occasionally raising its voice in protest. Phrases like 'no one can say that we have spoken out' and 'no one will break the silence that we believe is a duty for Spain' became the stock-in-trade of the JAP, an attitude that served to reinforce its rather meek, irrelevant status and the Falange's predominance.¹⁴⁴ Even as late as April 1937, by which time the JAP had launched an intensive campaign aimed at securing for itself a prominent position in the new political order, it was loudly insisting that there were 'no hidden ambitions in the JAP – just sacrifice.'¹⁴⁵

Such conditions certainly had an effect on the recruiting potential, or lack thereof, of the JAP. Faced by opposition, the JAP backed down and even when it did not, it encountered other problems. Subscriptions to raise funds for the JAP militia and the 'glorious army' were disauthorised by one military commander, while even something so basic as the provision of fundamental materials could prove an obstacle. 'It seems to be one rule for them [the Falange] and another one for us', one *japista* complained, in light of continuous setbacks. 'They're no better than we are but they are armed and we are not – the *milicianos* are not happy about this.'¹⁴⁶ By denying authorisation, support and even basic war *matériel*, it was easy to short-circuit the JAP's plans. The involvement of ambitious, previously non-Falangist political bosses in such episodes, and the effect this had on

the morale, recruitment, political health and lived experience of the JAP is underlined in a letter written to Pérez Ávila in October 1936, which revealed the obstacles the JAP found itself obliged to overcome:

The *cacique* spirit did not resign itself to losing control of the masses of peasants who they have always exploited to their own ends (today they are leaders of the fascists). The honourable job that you gave me to recruit people has been like a hole in the head for them – they see it as a reduction of their privileges. As far as they are concerned only they have the right to mobilise. Either that or there is no recruitment at all.¹⁴⁷

Of course, the dynamics of local politics were not uniform throughout Nationalist Spain and on occasion the weight of local authority could tip the balance in the JAP's favour. One example was Segovia. Here, where the strength of the CEDA forced the Falange to define itself in part by its opposition to the existing power élites, local authorities turned to the CEDA precisely to moderate the tone of the politically and militarily mobilised. Despite its greater speed of mobilisation, the Falange's activities and self-interested political zeal had ended up counting against it. They had, wrote one Acción Popular figure, 'committed many barbaric acts' and this had rebounded on them. Many initially joined the Falange, 'even while still *japistas*' but, he believed, they could be won back. As it transpired, he was right. As soon as August 1936, he was reporting that, 'the military authority, in order to free itself a bit from the activities of FE, has asked seriously for the organisation of the JAP.' Meanwhile, conservative élites leaned back towards the more traditional forces they had supported for five years. 'We are all going about in AP shirts,' this correspondent wrote, 'so that people realise that not everyone is a Falangist [*un azul*] and so that things are looked upon with sympathy.' This had an effect in the local council too: after a period of 'coldness' towards Acción Popular and the JAP, the party found itself 'back in the saddle – no doubt in view of the poor results that the Falange brought with them . . . [In the local council] we are all CEDA members [*de la casa*] now.'¹⁴⁸

Nonetheless, the very fact that the JAP was able to mobilise freely here illustrated the significance of the absence of this freedom elsewhere. Besides, Segovia was certainly the exception rather than the rule. It was a city without the military and political entourage that places like Valladolid, Burgos or Salamanca boasted. Whilst other councils, often founded *ad hoc* and *de facto* at the start of hostilities, were packed with former *cedistas*, their wartime identity was often quite different to that of Segovia based members of Acción Popular. In Salamanca, for instance, the political lead came from

Franco's *Cuartel General*, just as it had done in Burgos, the site of Franco's first military headquarters. Indeed, most local authorities, working towards the predilections of the national arena, backed the Falange. Without official support it was impossible for the JAP to function properly and their identity was short-circuited.

Japistas fought, *japistas* died and *japistas* manned the ranks of the army, the Carlists and the Falange, but the JAP was not a full partner of the rising. It consistently complained that it was overlooked and long forgotten, and the liturgy of the Nationalist zone more often than not excluded the *Juventud*.¹⁴⁹ The JAP would not reproduce the political theatre of El Escorial, Medina del Campo, Uclés and Covadonga. JAP uniforms were improvised and far from uniform, complaints were made that 'only the Falange anthem' was authorised at official events or that 'all the anthems were played except ours', and it took something of a civic battle for one local council even to hang the JAP flag from the balcony of the town hall alongside those of the Falange and the Carlists, while most local JAPs would not go so far as to make such a request. Even authorisation to say mass was refused in one town; 'the Falange,' moaned a local *japista*, 'never ceases laughing at us.'¹⁵⁰ Meanwhile, an order for 500 new JAP emblems, a consignment of khaki shirts and a new recording of the hymn revealed an awareness of the significance of political visibility which the JAP would never recover.¹⁵¹

For the very few that persevered in such circumstances, official recognition was normally, belatedly granted. Although discouraged, *japistas* seeking to raise militias were eventually allowed to do so. After all, men for the front remained the most valuable of resources. Ramón de Soto, the leader of the JAP militias in La Coruña, wrote in December 1936 that: 'after thousands and thousands of hitches and set-backs our patriotic and disinterested labour has finally been recognised. Today we have been acknowledged as a militia like all the rest, with the same rights and duties. Soon we'll form a barracks of our own, if we can.' The task, however, remained 'difficult' and de Soto implored his political colleagues to step up the intensity of their mobilisation, to seek out potential *milicianos* who could travel to La Coruña to join his forces both at the front and in the rearguard; 'we want lots of men in khaki shirts [*camisas pardas*].' Those who signed up for rearguard duty would be clothed, fed and paid a peseta per day. They would be expected to carry out patrols, night watches and policing tasks and would, in theory, encounter the 'same conditions' as others at the front. 'The governor,' wrote de Soto, 'is excellent and will help all he can,' and by January 1937 six expeditions had set off for the front, via the JAP's Valladolid barracks.¹⁵² But by now the Falange and the *Requeté* had already

long-since mobilised – the JAP was picking off the scraps. That much was reflected in the wildly disparate ages of mobilised *japistas* in Galicia; one supposed 'militiaman' was as young as eight, while the oldest was sixty-six.¹⁵³

Nor did authorisation signal the end of the JAP's troubles. At the front, surrounded by Falangists and military officials who were often hugely critical of the JAP, the situation was even worse. 'Carlists showed us how they parodied JAP songs and we did the same,' recalls one Falangist. Despite admitting that *japistas* 'did fight decently', they were subjected to a new version of the JAP anthem in which they offered their lives 'on the altar of our ideal / and offer our arses / to homosexual love.'¹⁵⁴ Among the few surviving papers of *japistas* and JAP militias are endless complaints of mistreatment and requests for authorisation and material recognition, the majority of which appear never to have been granted. Little wonder *japistas* remained bitter. A front-line JAP song ran: 'I am a loyal and brave soldier / I carry in my heart the agony of being misunderstood / my duty is to keep quiet / I am a soldier who expects no reward.'¹⁵⁵ One militiaman complained that Falange requests were simply accepted and never investigated closely while those of the JAP were invariably scrutinised: 'the lads are getting impatient and are not getting credentials as *japistas*. Yesterday the fascists went in a small group towards home and the JAP lads would like to be able to do the same thing.' More absurdly, the JAP was not allowed even to offer a gesture of goodwill towards the army. 'We have got lots of potatoes, which we collected for the army, but no one cares', wrote one disappointed correspondent, 'it's a shame because they are rotting.'¹⁵⁶

Denied the backing they craved, considered unworthy as partners of the rising and dismissed as poor fighters, JAP units were often miserable places to fight. One *japista* at the front appealed for help from his provincial chief, complaining: '*milicianos* here are not going to the parts of the front that they think they are [and] some of the places are full anyway.' The enthusiasm of the militiamen was 'huge and their labour is commensurate with their high spirits', but it was unlikely to stay that way for long given that 'they come without clothes or shoes.'¹⁵⁷ Another moaned that: 'we are in the front with nothing, yet the Falangists have guns rifles, etc – we have not got one rifle between three of us. Or money. And our families at home are getting nothing either.'¹⁵⁸ Sometimes it was difficult for *japistas* to imagine that their suffering was anything other than entirely deliberate. A JAP corporal complained of the 'contempt' [*desprecio*] with which his unit had been treated by a carabineer captain and recited a catalogue of occasions in which *japistas* had been refused authorisation to fulfil their military missions, kept away from their 'calling' at the front and given tasks that they neither antic-

ipated nor were equipped to carry out. Such was the 'abuse' that the corporal foresaw a time 'when we will be bed-bound after spending 24 hours completely soaked' and implored a colleague to do something to alleviate the situation. 'You now have enough proof of what is going on, now that you know what these men are trying to do. I know that everything is a plot [*intriga*],' he wrote. 'The treatment given to us *milicianos* couldn't be worse . . . we work with total faith and we are forever fighting against the elements, soaked and ill, but they say we're worthless and do not trust us at all.'¹⁵⁹

Similar episodes occurred regularly, Calzada Rodríguez telling Gil Robles: 'If you could only witness the terrible sight of them all coming to me, hurt by what they have to suffer in their respective provinces and the constant promises I have to make them to lift their spirits, promises that then can't be fulfilled.' Gil Robles wrote to Franco in an attempt to put an end to the 'persecution' but nothing was done.¹⁶⁰ At times of war, when isolation can mean death, when suspicion can bring imprisonment or assassination and nobody wants to fight alone, such difficulties were bound to have an effect. The JAP had been transformed from political winner to military loser, mistrusted and lacking support, while its leader had gone from the saviour of the Fatherland to a national pariah. In such a hostile climate it was only natural that *japistas*, who had enough on their plate fighting a war, gave up and joined Falange, Carlist or army battalions instead. That the vast majority of potential militiamen chose other paths to the front or that political patronage was now placed in different hands was equally inevitable.

VI

'Militias of sacrifice'

The Crusade for God, Spain and the New State

Greeted by cheering crowds and flanked by soldiers, Falangists and Carlists – but not, tellingly, by *japistas* – general Francisco Franco was officially named head of state in Burgos on 1 October 1936. The bishop of Salamanca, Dr. Enrique Plá y Deniel, immediately sent him an effusive congratulatory telegram and within a few days had placed the episcopal palace at his disposal. The palace became Franco's new *Cuartel General*, effectively making Salamanca the capital of Nationalist Spain and prompting the Falange immediately to shift its command centre there.¹ And yet the bishop of Salamanca had in fact already provided the new Caudillo and the Nationalist cause with something of even greater value: a crusade. The day before Franco's investiture as *Jefe del Estado*, Plá y Deniel had published a pastoral entitled 'The Two Cities' in which he distinguished between the communist evil of the Republicans and the Christian purity of the Nationalists, between an earthly city and a heavenly one. 'It is true that it has taken on the external form of a *civil war* but in reality it is a *crusade*', wrote Plá y Deniel, his Augustinian juxtaposition of two contrasting identities offering an aggressive legitimisation of the Nationalist cause which left no doubt as to whose side God was on:

It was a *rebellion*, but not to cause disruption, rather to *re-establish order* . . .

Up until now no-one has been able to reproach the Church for openly and officially pronouncing itself in favour of *order* against *anarchy*; in favour of the imposition of a *hierarchical government*, against communism; in favour of the defence of *Christian civilisation* and its foundations, *religion, Fatherland and family*, against those *without God and against God, without a Fatherland, the orphans of the world* . . . This is not a civil war, but a crusade for religion and for the fatherland and for civilisation . . . it is the will and prayer that God will bring the redemption of Spain, of the racial and

authentic Spain; of Spain the mother of so many nations; of Spain the immortal paladin of spirituality . . . a lay Spain is no longer Spain.²

Officially sanctioned, crusade was to become the standard definition used all over the Nationalist zone as well as in sympathetic accounts around the world – for one Conservative MP in Britain, Franco was not a military rebel but a 'gallant Christian gentleman'.³ And, ten months later the war was once again explicitly portrayed in such terms in the Collective Letter of the Spanish Episcopate to the Bishops of the Whole World.⁴ This letter similarly legitimised the *pronunciamiento*, rationalising rebellion with the application of a Thomist approach to 'just war' which was strikingly similar to Gil Robles's insistence that the coup was the only solution in the face of anarchy, the refusal of a nation to die. The civil war, the Collective Letter claimed, was being fought by two sides between whom the choice was clear: 'on the side of the insurgents, the spiritual, which aimed at the defence of order, social peace, traditional civilisation and the *patria* . . . [and] the defence of religion; and on the other side the materialist tendency, be it called Marxist, Communist or Anarchist, which wanted to substitute the old civilisation of Spain and all its essences, with the ultra new "civilisation" of the Russian Soviets.'⁵

The Catholic church's institutional adoption of the rising and its characterisation of the war as a blessed calling were to have an enormous impact, providing international and domestic legitimacy and a powerful ideological vehicle through which to unite the partners of the Nationalist coalition and drive the war effort. Frances Lannon has even written that the 'rhetoric of National Catholicism clothed the ideological nakedness of the military rising'.⁶ More accurately, it was already interwoven with the fabric of those who rose against the Republic on 18 July: there was not a political vacuum into which Catholicism stepped, rather religion was a fundamental component of the ideological and self-identifying make-up already shared by the right. For all those who joined the rising, Catholicism was a central element at the heart of Spanishness.⁷ The crusade brought with it dependent notions of Catholic nationalism, reconquest, empire, and the cleansing of the anti-Spain – or the 'new moors' as the JAP had called them.⁸ Neither Plá y Deniel's pastoral nor the Collective Letter invented the crusade; they cemented and institutionalised rather than created a religious definition of the war that became one of the Nationalists' most important legitimising tools.⁹ There was the official consecration of what the right had proclaimed since the rising and, more importantly, throughout the five previous years, thus forming an agglutinate for those who made up the Nationalist coalition, an axis around which they could cohere.

The CEDA and the JAP's political outlook had been informed by aggressive Catholicism from the start. Infused with a persecution complex and a keen sense of religion and the Fatherland being under threat, the party's ideology had long taken on the rhetorical characteristics of a crusade. The 18 July call to the defence of the nation implied a rallying to the side of God, with whom the Fatherland was ideologically and emotionally intertwined. Although the rising had not been explicitly proclaimed in the name of God, it was quickly welcomed by the Spanish church as an institution and by most individual Catholics, including the immense majority of *japistas* and *cedistas*. The anticlerical fury that occurred in the first weeks of the war in the Republican zone, with over 6,000 priests killed, churches burnt and religious imagery desecrated, further justified the evangelisation of the war.¹⁰

With this fury propelling religiously inspired 'analyses' of the war, it had been explicitly labelled a crusade well before Plá y Deniel lent it official sanction. Speaking on Nationalist radio on 15 August, Aniceto Castro Albarrán, a writer on the monarchist intellectual journal *Acción Española* and a fierce critic of the CEDA's accidentalist tactic, dismissed the Republic as 'tyranny', insisting: 'our war is holy. Our battle cry will be that of the crusades: God wills it! [*Dios lo quiere*] Long Live Catholic Spain! *Arriba* the Spain of Isabel the Catholic!' That night Juan Lamamié de Clairac, a Carlist landowner who had also attacked accidentalism, referred to the war as a 'sacrosanct crusade' during a broadcast on Radio Salamanca, a few days later general Emilio Mola adopted the term, and less than a week after that bishop Olaechea of Pamplona continued in exactly the same vein, declaring: 'this is not a war that is being waged, but a crusade.'¹¹

While these were the CEDA's critics, such sentiments echoed the JAP's own five-year anti-Republican campaign. Martín Alfaráz, a prominent *japista* in Salamanca, summarised the *Juventud*'s position when in January 1936 he declared: 'we are all soldiers in this great crusade.'¹² Now they really were. The Nationalist adoption of a crusade embraced the JAP's religious and national rhetoric; the invocation of imperialistic *leitmotifs* and crusading war cries was nothing new to *japistas*. Isabel la Católica had been the subject of eulogy in the JAP's press, *japistas* had already utilised '*¡Dios lo quiere!*' as a campaigning slogan, and the party had adopted the Reconquest as the definition of its struggle both for power and for Spain. It had also explicitly equated Gil Robles with St James the Moor Slayer, adapting the '*¡Santiago y cierra España!*' battle cry to its own fight for political supremacy and portraying the *JEFE* as a modern-day crusader.¹³ Such consciously historical, nationalist Catholic language, and the outright rejection of opponents that it implied, was absolutely central to the JAP's

discourse during the Republic. Despite its mimicry of political trends, the JAP's very identity was to be found in Spanish nationalism and the Catholicism with which it was coterminous, an intense historical awareness infusing its personality at all levels.

'The Two Cities' reflected what was already an integral part of the make-up of those who flocked to the Nationalist cause. The parties that made up the coalition were invariably Catholic in their social base, if not necessarily programmatically so. Similarly, the Spanish church had been a primary motor behind the initial mobilisation of support for the CEDA which had in turn helped prepare the ground for the coup, providing much of the civilian backing for the rising and men for the battlefields. 'Catholicism,' Ángela Cenarro has written, 'was the real social base of the rising.' This should not, she adds, been seen as an explanation for the supposed weakness of Spanish fascism for there existed 'profound similarities' between the mobilisation of Catholics in Spain and that of fascist Italy.¹⁴ Nor was the process limited solely to the process of mobilisation; fascism and extreme nationalism in Spain would be unthinkable without recourse to Catholicism. Indeed, insisted the fascist ideologue Ernesto Giménez Caballero, 'there is no nationalism without Catholicism.'¹⁵ The ideological bases of the right were shared, their self-identities as Spaniards inspired by the same historical myths. Those myths were Catholic ones.

The church's support of the Nationalists was not, despite José Sánchez's argument, merely a response to the anticlerical fury even if this did provide profound justification for a pro-insurgent stance. The church had long been associated with conservatism, nationalism, anti-liberalism and anti-communism and had, with the CEDA as its primary political partner, done much to undermine the Republic.¹⁶ In fact, insists Ricardo Robledo, while its 'delegitimation' stepped up with the outbreak of war, 'mobilisation against the Republic began a year before the arrival of the new régime' in the CEDA heartland of Salamanca.¹⁷ The church presented a moral rather than political struggle between Spain and the anticlerical anti-Spain; as a secular state, this included the Republic itself. At the February 1936 elections, the Catholic press, notes Michael Mann, denounced even conservative Republicans as un-Christian, showing that co-existence had become impossible with moderate opponents. This was, he writes, 'a decisive moment, the throwing of the weight of the church behind an exclusionary organic nationalism, prefiguring its description of the military rising as a "crusade against anti-Spain".'¹⁸ As Lannon succinctly puts it: 'Catholicism's opponents already deserved to be silenced long before they had the blood of martyrs of their hands'.¹⁹

Notwithstanding the posture of some Basque clergy, the church's

endorsement of the Nationalist war effort was unequivocal and broad ranging. Over the course of the war in the Nationalist zone soldiers were blessed, troops wore Sacred Hearts on their uniforms, priests held services at the fronts, Jesuits acted as chaplains to Nationalist soldiers (and confessing, sometimes forcibly so, Republican prisoners), prayers were said for the Nationalist dead, clergy were famously photographed giving the fascist salute, and Spain's saints and holy Virgins were co-opted by the Nationalist forces.²⁰ The military use of the objects of national religious devotion was a common trend. The image of the Virgen de los Dolores was named Generalísima del los Ejércitos Carlistas on 1 August 1936 and a number of virgins had previously received 'maximum military honours'.²¹ Franco's own Catholicism suddenly became more pronounced as the emerging régime quickly adopted the crusade as its central tenet. The JAP had already marched to the front with its own chaplains, prayers were said and religious ceremonies formed part of the daily liturgy of life on the front for *japistas*. 'God's ministers accompany us, making Spain great', as one *japista* in Salamanca put it.²² This was not a new phenomenon: 'God's ministers' had accompanied the JAP's fight from its very inception. For the *Juventud*, the crusade was ready-made.

The official adoption of a crusade gave Catholicism a more explicit, central role, whilst also providing the JAP with renewed resolution and the all-too-brief hope of securing a political position more commensurate with its pre-rising support base. It was unsurprising that the JAP so enthusiastically embraced the crusade. Not only did Catholicism define much of its social base, ideology and liturgy, the pre-eminence of religion served a vital political, psychological and military function too, particularly in light of the campaign to which the JAP found itself subject in much of the Nationalist zone. Because the proclamation of a crusade lessened the apparent, if not the real, importance of radical and more consciously secular national-socialism and increased that of the Catholicism ingrained in the JAP's political and social outlook, it allowed the *Juventud* to present itself as a civilian partner as important as the Falange. Equally significantly, it also served to locate power in the arms of the military and the church rather than in José Antonio's party, bringing the official ideology of the '*Glorioso Movimiento Nacional*' even closer to the JAP's own. The radical fascism of the Falange and its attacks on the CEDA could be tempered by crusade, a task in which all Nationalists had been subsumed and in which all found common ground. 'The fascism of Spain is not fascism but Catholicism,' Giménez Caballero wrote.²³

As José María Gil Robles insisted in a letter to the JAP militias in November 1936, those who 'only fight for God and Spain fight for a

common cause.²⁴ The adoption of a crusade permitted the JAP to wash over the ideological, historical and tactical differences between itself and the Falange. One *japista* eulogised the 'thrusting [*pujante*] resurgence of Spain', a resurgence only made possible through the 'cooperation between Spain's healthy and rigorous youth, inspired by the religion of Christ.'²⁵ This cooperation was aided by the collective ideal of discipline universally held on the right; for all the internal conflicts provoked by jealousy and real politics, the right shared a notion of respect for authority which would help to forge unity and prevent the kind of crippling internal problems that faced the Republic. This was an integral part of the programmes of the Falange, the Carlists and the CEDA-JAP; their models coincided in seeking an authoritarian, Catholic Spain and in adopting a profound leadership cult.²⁶ Meanwhile, a national discourse, which came so easily and naturally to the right and was rooted in Catholicism, was a vital commodity that the Republic failed to foster.²⁷

For the JAP, Christianity helped to fix sights on a terrain other than party political battles, as well as facilitating an insistence upon the continuity that existed between its own five-year 'crusade' and that now being waged. If some doubted the CEDA-JAP's commitment to the rising, the destruction of liberalism or the ideals of National-Syndicalism, nobody could question its Catholic credentials. Throughout the Republic, JAP flags had been blessed, mass was heard prior to each and every rally or meeting and now in war-time it even launched campaigns for more devout Easter services, complaining that other political groups had not taken their duty to God seriously enough. "'¡Viva España!'" is a shout that justifies all sacrifices. Spain is without doubt satisfied with us but God has been a little forgotten. Why does prosperity always make people forget God?' the JAP asked, insisting: 'our fidelity to the Catholic Church is shown by our emblem, our shirt and our black crosses.'²⁸ This echoed Acción Popular's successful campaign, alongside the Church hierarchy and clergy, to reclaim public and spiritual space in Sevilla with its demands for the re-establishment of lavish Easter week celebrations during the Republic. So important an issue was this that one electoral leaflet in 1936 had proclaimed simply: '*Sevillanos*, do you remember when there was no *semana santa*? Don't let it happen again!'²⁹

A crusade ideology, which did not need to be created but merely tapped into, benefited both the JAP and the war effort, providing a locus around which the Nationalist forces could cohere, squaring the circle of *tradicionalistas*, radical *falangistas*, *japistas* and even conservative moderates.³⁰ Thus the whole of the right – by their own definition, the whole of 'Spain' – was incorporated into the same undertaking. As Alfonso Álvarez Bolado has put it: '[The] new system proposed a single national project that inte-

grated religious confession, a single social ethic of reconstruction and public order, a single political course that incorporated the whole of the Spanish nation in a common destiny that was both political and theological.' This was vital for the JAP, offering it a way back into the fold, legitimising its message and reinforcing the positive spin its troops put on the war. To conquer or to die took on a literal meaning. 'The words of our anthem are truer than ever before,' wrote one *japista* in his diary of operations in the Sierra de Guadarrama on the Madrid front. 'Forward, with faith in victory. To conquer or to die. Never retreat. Death is glory. That is our order [*consigna*] and with it we have won glorious battles . . . Everything smells of gun powder and there is smoke everywhere, we continue to advance . . . we clamber over Marxist bodies and stick our bicolour flag in the highest point.'³¹

Political Catholicism provided the Nationalist war effort with an indispensable ready-made ideology of sacrifice, martyrdom, penitence and redemption. The church itself had become a martyr and would be followed by *japistas*, Carlists and Falangists who had already been dying 'for the cause' during the Republic. A crusade gave their deaths meaning; martyrdom provided a positive evaluation of their sacrifice. They were fighting for something just, the 'truth', and had died to bring redemption. The JAP's most valued members had long been its dead ones, 'the martyrs of our ideal', and this was easily and naturally transferred into the Nationalist zone. The martyr was the ultimate expression of the heroic soldier and a fundamental component of the JAP's masculine ideological armoury. One such martyr was the national president José María Pérez de Laborda, a victim of what the party newspaper described as the 'most savage and cowardly of red crimes'. Incarcerated in the Porlier prison in Madrid, he was executed in November 1936. His death, read the JAP's press release, was

the natural corollary of his life, always contested [*impugnada*] in a true Spanish spirit. He toiled for Spain and always thought only of the *Patria* . . . He worked tirelessly against the vile Marxist sleights of hand which sought to rain terror upon the immense majority of Spaniards and tried to manipulate them with its doctrines. His steadfast concern was the achievement of a strong Spain, respected throughout the world . . . a Spain [that] began to find itself with Franco's shout of sacred rebellion from across the Straits.³²

Stories of executions from the Republican zone were commonplace and gripping tales of close shaves and exciting escapades regularly appeared in the Nationalist press. One example was the account of a pharmacy student

and *japista* called Eduardo García who, having escaped Republican authorities at his Madrid home, took refuge in the Argentinian embassy. There, he met up with a Falangist friend who had joined an 'extremist' [left wing] party in order to save his life. With great relish – and, almost certainly, excited embellishment – García told how he had been able to get into a 'Marxist' centre where membership lists were held for the Falange, Carlists and Acción Popular. He claimed to have been on the point of destroying the lists in order to protect his brothers in arms, only to be told it was too late: 'My friend said, "don't bother; they are dead already".'³³ Being a member of Acción Popular was certainly enough to be charged and membership lists did fall into the left-wing hands with fatal consequences.³⁴

The aim of these reports was, of course, to demonise the Republic, contrasting it to the patriotic fervour, Godliness and prosperity of the Nationalists. The JAP was preaching to the converted who, already convinced of the evil inherent in their opponents, readily believed such tales. But reports further discouraged accommodation with the Republic, reaffirming existing preconceptions and the imperative necessity of destroying their opponents – not least for fear of reprisals. One JAP sympathiser, named military delegate in his home town, wrote of 'the need to finish off Marxism at any price, to completely sew them up [*amarrarlos*].' There was a black list of some 150 *cedistas*, *japistas* and local rightists, he wrote, warning darkly that: 'this happens all over Spain, so if the movement is not successful we know what will await us. I repeat, we must extirpate Marxism forever – they are all scum.'³⁵ Because the aim was to demonise the Republic, the details were not spared when the body of Antonio Bermúdez Cañete was found, 'his face smashed to smithereens [*astillas*].' That 'degraded' [*canallesco*] act was yet more proof of the essential evilness of the left.

Those killed fighting for the Republic were slain beasts; those killed fighting for the Nationalists were men of pure hearts. As the poem read out at the funeral of a JAP militiaman had it, there would be 'peace and glory to the *japistas* who one day gave their blood for the Fatherland, victims of the viciousness of the Godless scum'. This particular *japista*, 'a model of Christianity', a 'fervid youth of noble heart', had fought and died for the 'Hispanic earth and the beloved Fatherland', his death opening a 'wound' in the 'souls' of his companions that was healed by the knowledge that as a martyr he would 'enjoy the glory you deserve': 'From the heavens you will see [Spain] triumphant / My dear soul mate / You will have the laurels of a martyr / ¡Presente y Adelante!'³⁶

Only out of suffering, death, could redemption come. War provided the

opportunity for martyrs to earn eternal glory and for Spain to be reborn. Gil Robles wrote an open letter to *japistas* in November 1936, lauding them for spilling their 'blood on Spain's soil, preparing it for a magnificent harvest of glory.'³⁷ Given the need for men to kill and be killed at the front, sacrifice was at the heart of Nationalist rhetoric, just as it was at the centre of the JAP's ideology. Sacrifice, after all, had brought victory over the Moors, the Protestants and the invading French – fights that the JAP had made their own throughout the Republic. The stress was always on historical continuity. The civil war – which, by becoming a crusade, a new *Reconquista*, was not a civil war at all of course – was part of the same 'immortal', timeless battle. 'Only virtuous souls can be great; to put your life in danger for a virtuous cause you need a great soul', wrote one *japista*.³⁸ So it was that the JAP's soldiers became 'pilgrim-like warriors' who, as they rightly pointed out, had declared '*¡Santiago y cierra España!*' back in 1935.³⁹

Sacrifice was especially significant for the JAP and came to be understood politically as well as physically. *Japistas* became martyrs for God, the Fatherland and their party, giving up not just their bodies but also their political identity and the glory of recognition; anonymous suffering was, moreover, the most pious of suffering.⁴⁰ By making the civil war a crusade, the JAP could dull the pain of continuous rejection. For *japistas* at the front, a crusade promised rewards beyond the purely worldly, providing renewed enthusiasm for those dismayed at the campaign launched against them and reinforcing their sense of righteousness amidst criticism and hardship. *Japistas* were told not to 'worry about the silences that can occasionally cause you bitterness' and although they remained hurt by the treatment they received, faith made it easier to comply with such demands.⁴¹ As the party pleaded, 'may God judge us': divine recognition would come, even if military medals and political hegemony would not – and they certainly would not.⁴²

In October 1936, Gil Robles spoke on Radio Segovia, urging *japistas* not to give up in the face of those who refused to recognise their contribution to the war effort, whilst also seeking to raise awareness of that very contribution in the Nationalist zone. 'Lads from the JAP, do not think that the Fatherland is unaware what you are doing,' the *JEFE* implored. 'The JAP is the seed of a new dawn . . . The Cross of Victory will once again be erected.'⁴³ Immediately prior to the unification of all political forces in April 1937 the JAP was still insisting on this point, at the same time desperately seeking to eulogise and earn military acknowledgment for its contribution, to palliate its political eclipse. 'Silent and heroic sacrifice, the seed of victory, is always fruitful – so long as it is a genuine sacrifice . . . so long as it is abnegation, humiliation even, on the altar of the ideal of duty,'

declared a *japista* from Santo Domingo de la Calzada, in La Rioja province, fighting in the 20th Valladolid regiment:

Sacrifice is the rain that falls humbly, imperceptibly, efficient rain, seed of glorious fertility, promise of tomorrow's harvest. In contrast, heavy rain just washes things away . . . only carries disasters . . . those who sacrifice themselves thus [whose sacrifice is unvalued or misunderstood] will be recognised by God. AP has always been like this – and that's the way the lads of the JAP are, lads who know how to forget themselves and think only of God and Spain . . . they do not react to injustices because their own consciences are clear . . . the JAP requests nothing, just to be the first to sacrifice themselves, the first to face danger. And in the end they can go to the tombs of their brothers and say: "brothers, rest in peace. We have done our duty. The wishes of all have been fulfilled." Meanwhile, we give our war cry: 'Franco! Franco! Franco! For God and Spain, ¡Presente y Adelante!'⁴⁴

That the Falange, loudly proclaiming its contribution, ostentatiously battling for power, was represented by heavy rain hardly needed spelling out.

If recognition and redemption would eventually come in the Kingdom of Heaven, triumph would also arrive in Spain. Each victory for the Nationalists was proof of divine benevolence towards their cause. The celebrations of the fall of cities were held to coincide with feast days and thanks were offered to saints for their assistance. 'Miracles' that proved God's protection of the Nationalists were presented regularly. Segovia's JAP-dominated newspaper insisted that the Virgin 'altered the path of bullets'⁴⁵ and a priest serving at the front was convinced that *japistas* had cheated death with the aid of the Virgin. 'Thanks to the most holy Virgin del Pilar, who all the *japistas* had solemnly consecrated only a few days before and of whom they had an image at the front – as well as one of the sacred heart of Jesus – divine grace saved the Third Company,' he wrote. 'Instead of ten or more deaths, there were just six slightly injured.'⁴⁶

The JAP was not alone here. The Virgin del Pilar was a favoured object of Nationalist devotion and much was made of a Republican attack on her shrine in Zaragoza when the bombs which scored direct hits failed to detonate.⁴⁷ Arms clearly could not compete with supernatural forces and this helped foster confidence among the Nationalists that they would win the war. They were, after all, fighting God's fight and He was on their side. General Mola spoke on the radio of the Nationalists' 'sure victory', one that 'we are bound to obtain because truth is assisting us, sane people support us, and He, the all-powerful, is helping us.'⁴⁸ So was Santa Teresa de Ávila,

a quintessentially Castilian and thus Spanish object of devotion – the Saint of the Race [*santa de la raza*], a symbol of the *Patria*, religion and the military, and a guardian of morality, obedience and traditionalism. Her severed and perfectly preserved arm was found in Málaga in February 1937 and quickly became seen as a sign of divine support for the crusade, as well as a guide to the Nationalist forces. Most famously, this particular religious relic was to find its way into the possession of Franco who would carry it to his deathbed in 1975.⁴⁹

If victory was assured, it also had to be total. The religious killings at the start of war meant that it was not possible for the Church to turn the other cheek. Cardinal Isidrio Gomá would claim: 'the war cannot be ended by compromise, by arrangement or by reconciliation. Pacification is only possible by arms'. There could be no coexistence, the 'other' had to be destroyed and total war was entirely justified.⁵⁰ For Franco, victory must be achieved even if it meant 'killing half of Spain.'⁵¹ Yet while this was reinforced by the anti-clerical killings, it had already been implicit in the right's rhetoric and was just a short step from the JAP's pre-July programme; it was ready-made. According to the JAP's most prized, co-opted ideologue, the nineteenth century nationalist essayist Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, the Inquisition had been the glorious foundation stone of Spain's unity.⁵² The same cleansing zeal was now applied to the civil war by the JAP and the rest of the Nationalist coalition, the Church included. Once the crusade had been declared, pity and forgiveness did not form part of Catholic rhetoric. Even if some clergy undoubtedly appealed for clemency, given the political and military reality of the war mercy normally entailed the chance to confess rather than be absolved.⁵³ In Segovia Cathedral, for instance, one priest's sermon preached that, 'the fatherland must be renewed, all evil weed uprooted, all bad seed extirpated. This is not the time for scruples.'⁵⁴ Catholicism could not allow plurality of conscience – to do so would be to deny its own truth – and it had to reassert itself through a new reconquest, a crusade to banish, not merely defeat, the enemy.

The crusade thus brought apocalyptic analogies which not only offered a precedent of just belligerence but also a vocabulary with which to demonise the Republic that the JAP was already familiar with. The Republic was a falsehood that contrasted with Catholic truth. It was the 'Red Beast', the 'Seven Headed Hydra, synthesis of all heresies', the 'satanic gene of evil', 'Cain', or the 'modern-day Jew.'⁵⁵ That these messages were at least partly internalised by those at the front is underlined in the memoirs of a former *japista* fighting in a Falange unit, which note 'the idea that those on the other side really were the foetuses of Lucifer.'⁵⁶ Influenced by the presence of Nazi soldiers fighting for the Nationalists, Judaism – which

had, for the JAP, always been a rhetorical but largely untapped enemy of the Fatherland – was now virulently attacked, a series of articles on the 'Jewish Beast' appearing in the JAP press: the 'ruin of great nations' had been the work of Jews that must be fought 'to the death' and the civil war was a twentieth-century crusade, reconquest, imperial mission and purifying apocalypse, all rolled into one.⁵⁷ The Nationalists rode on white horses of virtue – a favoured image of Franco himself – to do battle with the Beasts of Hell who 'vomited unclean spirits'.⁵⁸ The author of the JAP anthem, José María Pemán, composed a famous poem entitled 'La Poema de la Bestia y el Ángel' which, as its name suggests, saw the civil war as embodying the 'profound apocalyptic significance of the eternal struggle' between Good and Evil.⁵⁹ Not only was death glorious, so was killing. One JAP member, who had had the 'honour of killing eight reds, one of them a woman', insisted that 'if we catch the sons of La Pasionaria, we'll make a potato salad [*ensaladilla rusa*] out of them.'⁶⁰

Such apocalyptic imagery drew upon the notion of redemption and rebirth, giving the Nationalists a millenarian purpose as well as a powerful determination to destroy their enemy. However much the rising had been a defensive one, driving the war effort meant finding something to fight *for* – a new Spain – as well as something to fight *against* and the rhetoric employed echoed the ideology utilised by the right for a number of years. The war therefore became not just a war of annihilation but of purification. 'The blood gloriously spilled by Spain demands a true purge in order to avoid the mixture of sheep with wolves, otherwise the [wolves] will end up showing their teeth,' wrote one *japista*.⁶¹ As had been the case throughout the Republic, this need to cleanse the nation was often presented in organic terms. Another JAP militant announced that 'God wants Spain to cleanse itself and cure itself of this leper, this Marxist-separatist pestilence, and in our *Juventud* He has his greatest surgeons.'⁶²

Purity also referred to the intentions of the *japistas* themselves. In October 1936, the JAP declared itself not a political party – a title that brought notions of shady deals and dark motives, and one the *Juventud* had constantly rejected during the Republic – but 'an authentic movement of youths steeped in patriotism' that 'wants to drink from the pure fountains of the nation, the pure water of Spanish spirituality.'⁶³ The new, purified Spain would be necessarily imperial, already a central plank of the right's ideology. 'These days there is much talk of empire but people don't have a clear concept of what it actually means', ran one JAP press release, noting that some talked of 'vague ides of strength, conquest, and the personality of the nation'. Under subheadings like 'Spain has a universal mission', 'Spain is a moral entity', 'Empire is hierarchy' or 'Spain is the body of

Catholic, western culture', it instead insisted: 'In September 1935 we said it is deeper than that, more ingrained [*entrañable*]. It is not the façade of a nation; it is the cement of the nation. The soul of the nation. The nation itself. Above all, it is a moral concept. It is unity, a universal extension of a national mission. And because it has a mission, Spain must be an empire.'⁶⁴

The crusade helped to provide a common identity for all those fighting for the Nationalists and served to demonise the Republic, despite the contradictions presented by Moorish troops, German aid, and Basque religious devotion.⁶⁵ However, while Catholicism was common currency, it was not the only thing that united the right.⁶⁶ Rather, it was joined by nationalism and a sense of patriotic self-identity. Catholicism supplied a vital rhetoric, a mobilising, agglutinating message – any ideology that can value and find glory in death at times of war is of great significance – but this nearly always functioned within the concept of nationhood, of Spanishness.⁶⁷ A shared notion of the *Patria* was at the heart of the analyses of those who took up arms against the Republic. They did so because republicanism was foreign, liberalism imported, democracy unsuited to Spain. It went against the true essence of a Fatherland, which was historic, traditional, imperial, bellicose and Catholic. It was for this reason that the nationalist coalition did not just mobilise behind the cross but the red and gold flag – a Spanish reaffirmation in the face of the 'foreign' tricolour adopted by the Republic.⁶⁸ For the right, the models to follow were Charles V, Ferdinand and Isabella, and Philip II, during whose reigns the notions of reconquest, empire, catholic orthodoxy, unity and nationalism had come together to cement a conception of Spain that they still held in 1936. For all the differences of emphasis between them, the non-liberal right were part of a counterrevolutionary movement taking as the basis of their programmes the myths and language of Spanish traditionalism, reconquest, and empire.⁶⁹ Spain was 'permanent' and 'organic'.

Catholicism was not merely an expression of faith; it was also an expression of the nation. The JAP wasted little time reminding its coalition partners that Spain was 'the home of the most profound, austere, Christian and authentic of the eternal values of humanity'; 'to be Spanish is a profession of Catholic faith, of faith in Spain . . . Spain is a moral unity: unity of thought, unity of religion, unity of spirit.'⁷⁰ Gil Robles wrote in January 1937 that 'to say Spain is to say paladin, the defence of Catholic faith in the world.'⁷¹ After all, the Sacred Heart of Jesus would 'reign in Spain, and with more veneration than elsewhere', while Spain's mission since the first victory against the Moors at Covadonga had been the defence of Christianity.⁷² The Nationalist ideologue José Pemartín similarly described the perfect state as 'nationalist, fascist and necessarily Catholic'.⁷³ It had

been *Spain's* Inquisition that had been the most zealous defender of Catholicism. Santiago had not only slayed the religious infidel, he had liberated Spain from a foreign invader. The Virgin del Pilar had defeated liberal opponents, but these were French too. And Santa Teresa de Ávila was not merely a symbol of Christian civilisation, but of the Castilianism in which Spain's true identity was sought, of the Reconquest and the discovery of America – the Santa de la *raza*. These threads were drawn together by Menéndez y Pelayo, whose famous history of Spain, published in 1880–81 eulogised the country's Catholic imperial mission in a phrase that would become so commonly repeated on the right as to be virtually a slogan: 'Spain, evangeliser of half the globe; Spain, hammer of heretics, light of Trent, Sword of Rome, cradle of Saint Ignatius . . . that is our greatness and our unity: we have no other.'⁷⁴



Whilst the crusade was a valuable means by which the JAP could align itself ever more explicitly with the rising, this was not the only way in which it insisted upon the continuity and validity of its political programme. Nor, indeed, was it the only point upon which it was justified in doing so. Throughout the civil war, from the rising to well beyond its definitive disappearance as a political entity, the JAP ceaselessly insisted upon its compatibility with the Nationalist cause. This was not solely about ingratiation; it was also rooted in conviction. The ideological currents of the Nationalist zone really were those of the CEDA-JAP. Even the occasional ferociousness of the attacks to which they were subjected was never translated into *japistas* or *cedistas* questioning a rising launched in the 'sacred name of Spain' and, with the exception of those few members whose monarchist leanings later became more pronounced, the desire to be considered 'good Spaniards' on Franco's terms continued even after the war. Then, many former *cedistas* and even *japistas* staffed the new régime and the party's rank and file made up those who would silently support it.⁷⁵ Amidst war and repression, loyalty and submission had become the watchwords of the consolidation of the régime, reinforcing this process, but the JAP had few real reasons to be dissatisfied with the Nationalist project. The Falange won practical control of Nationalist ideological output in the short term but the JAP's rhetoric had been profoundly similar in the proceeding years and with the outbreak of war the two were virtually indistinguishable. The same is true of the JAP's programme and that of the authoritarian journal *Acción Española*, which has often been portrayed as the ideological inspiration for the Franco régime and which on occasion shared authors with the JAP's

cultural journal, the *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos* – a publication that was clearly inspired by its monarchist forerunner.⁷⁶ While sectors of the Falange, particularly amongst the oldest of old shirts, became a focus of discontent and anti-Franco opposition,⁷⁷ the CEDA and the JAP largely had the state it sought.

What the JAP did not have, however, was recognition. The timid complaints of *japistas* focused not on ideology, repression or policy but on the failure of the régime or those who fought for it to embrace them. The JAP's task was thus to prove its status as partners of the Nationalist coalition and recuperate the reputation of those who had marched with them, Gil Robles chief amongst them. Despite the CEDA leader's subsequent reinvention of himself first as a liberal monarchist and later as a convinced democrat, there was no public ambiguity whatsoever in his stance during the civil war. He was concerned only with ingratiating himself with the régime. The bid to re-establish the party, and with it his prestige as a political leader of consequence, took the form of loudly proclaiming his and his followers' complete subjugation to Franco's orders whilst seeking to dampen any urges *japistas* may have to rebel against their treatment. As Gil Robles sought a way back into the fold, what remained of the rump of the JAP took up the mantle for him, defending him even as they disowned other facets of their collective history and identity.

As power and former members slipped away from the CEDA-JAP, the continuity between the Nationalist project and the JAP's pre-war crusade was the dominant theme of its propaganda. Pull-out blocks of text littered newspaper pages, repeating the proclamations of Gil Robles, *cedista* slogans and the programmatic points of the JAP. Loud and familiar sound bites, like 'Work for Spain. Fight for Spain. Die for Spain', were splashed across front pages alongside Francoist slogans and declarations of commitment to the cause.⁷⁸ The JAP's claim that 'this doctrine is not new; it is encapsulated in the 19 Points' summed up in a phrase its entire wartime approach.⁷⁹ 'Our ideals,' it proudly stated, 'are now being sealed with blood.'⁸⁰ Such declarations, whose veracity was unquestionable, served to 'prove' that the JAP had always proclaimed what Franco now did, that its ideals were the same as those of the movement and the Carlist and Falangist militias that made it up. The JAP had, after all, raised its Cross of Victory emblem 'in the Alcázar, amidst the rubble . . . alongside the flags of our brother militias, all founded upon the same desires, the same ideals.'⁸¹ Quotations and programmatic points that no longer applied or were less politically pertinent were simply ignored but these were virtually non-existent anyway. There was little need to hide the JAP's ideological past; all that was required was an explanation of its tactics.

The political speeches of JAP figures, open letters and press communiqués sought to demonstrate the wholeheartedness of the CEDA-JAP's embrace of the Nationalist cause and of general Franco, whilst also eulogising Gil Robles as a pioneer of the crusade. 'Your great merit was trying to save with reason what we are now saving with force,' ran one public letter from the JAP to its *JEFE*, consciously echoing the wording of the *Juventud*'s sixteenth programmatic point.⁸² He was not alone. The entire JAP movement claimed to have been the vanguard of the rising, insisting that: 'the JAP was the first to show the new direction, some time ago now, in an age of abandonment and cowardice.'⁸³ Gil Robles's open letters to the JAP from Lisbon were not aimed solely at *japistas* but also at those who jostled for and held power in Salamanca. In November 1936, the JAP *JEFE* wrote proudly that his disciples on the battlefields were 'the incarnation of the eternal principles which will triumph fully . . . thousands and thousands of Spanish hearts accompany your heroic efforts. We, in the many different posts which Providence has assigned to us, all fight for the same cause.'⁸⁴ Reference to 'many different posts' was of course intended to demonstrate that, although he had fled Spain, Gil Robles too continued to serve God and the Fatherland. Providence had assigned him the role of unofficial ambassador in Portugal, providing the Nationalists with an invaluable link to Dr. Antonio Salazar, with whom he was to develop a close relationship.⁸⁵ Another letter from the *JEFE* to the JAP, published in the press in January 1937, underlined that this approach remained unaltered, proclaiming: 'the JAP serve Spain today, spilling their blood on the battlefields for the triumph of the same ideals which, in days gone by, they propagated.'⁸⁶

This was a double-sided tactic, designed to insist upon the JAP's validity and also temper passions against the *Juventud*. It sought to bring to an end the political persecution of *japistas* at the front, JAP directors in the rearguard and, especially, Gil Robles in Lisbon. That the JAP's press network had become centrally controlled, its campaigns laid out by Gil Robles himself, illustrated the extent to which a primary aim was to rehabilitate the figure of the *JEFE*, responding to a specific strategy conceived in Portugal. Although he had departed Spain, the sacrifices of *japistas* at the front in Spain became the best proof of Gil Robles's Nationalist credentials. Naturally, this campaign also served to legitimise the JAP in the eyes of those whom potential recruiters courted. It was thus both an expression of ideological conviction and of political expediency. To this end, the JAP's press output, channelled through its propaganda department in Valladolid, sought not only to outline its longevity as an anti-Republican crusader but also to defend itself against the most serious of those charges levelled against it. Meanwhile, the glorious episodes of its

history needed highlighting; a case had to be presented for its full inclusion in the Nationalist ranks.

The context of civil war meant the JAP scrambled to declare 16 February 1936, the day of its calamitous electoral defeat, 'glorious'. It was proof of the final, incontrovertible bankruptcy of the Republic, the day when the 'first efficient shout of legitimate rebellion cried out.' It also provided a telling and essentially accurate comment on the party's Republican stance. *Acción Popular* did not, it now claimed, 'go to those elections with great hope in individualistic democracy but because it was a last chance to fight for the ideals of Fatherland and religion, [because] it was imperative for defence.' The JAP and the CEDA had merely used the tools at its disposal; it 'could not act any differently' in the circumstances. In making this point, the CEDA-JAP protected itself against the accusation of having collaborated with the Second Republic. 'Deep down we hated the system but we were succeeding with it,' the JAP explained, 'the army and Spain rose up against those that wanted to destroy Spain. And with the army, all the healthy parts of Spain [joined] . . . a counterrevolution, [which is] Spain's true revolution, against the internationalist and cannibalistic revolution paid for by Jewish gold in order to subject us to Russia.'⁸⁷

Other accusations levelled against the CEDA included its failure to employ an iron fist against the perpetrators of the 1934 October Revolution or launch a coup from Gil Robles's privileged position as minister of war in late 1935. As Gil Robles wrote to a friend who he hoped would provide a bridge to Franco, the suggestion that the general had offered him a plan for a rising that guaranteed success only for him to reject it made 'all this bloodshed my fault', engulfing him 'with the hatred of those who used to trust me'. The situation had, he wrote, 'gone too far'; the 'injustice has reached cruel proportions.' Gil Robles thus pleaded 'in the name of friendship' for a meeting with Franco, insisting: 'all I want is the proof that destroys the evil [rumours] surrounding me.'⁸⁸ Although Franco did eventually write to Gil Robles, the meeting would never take place, leaving the JAP to explain away the CEDA's failures, insisting that 'only the CEDA demanded the death penalty' for the leaders of the October Revolution and insisting that the decision not to launch a coup was in fact 'sadly' taken by general Goded, not by the CEDA.

This laid bare the CEDA's desperation to rationalise and justify its own collapsing popularity – both to others and, indeed, to itself. For many *cedistas* who shared much the same ideology as the catastrophist right, their marginalisation was hard to fathom. For others, defeat proved that their discomfort at accommodation with the Republic and weakness in the face of the Marxist threat was well founded. They sought consolation and reas-

surance that they had nonetheless taken the only path available to them, that there had been little real choice: their decisions had been unavoidable in the circumstances. The subsequent collapse of the party and of its leader was justified as a service, a sacrifice to Spain, as was shown in attempts to legitimise Gil Robles's failure to lead a coup in 1935:

That afternoon the *JEFE* open[ed] talks with an illustrious general [Goded] – today a martyr of Spain, having fallen in the same city as the black treachery of Pérez Farrás [Barcelona] – and said: "My general, we'll only do what you [plural] say" . . . Twenty-four hours later the sad response [was]: "we cannot do anything, it is still not prepared. There's only good will and love of Spain, but that is not enough . . . wait [and] whatever happens, do not leave the government. Spain will reward you for this terrible sacrifice in popularity". That advice was an order for [us] because it reflected the reality – and the country had no right to commit suicide.⁸⁹

The JAP admitted that there had been episodes, such as this one, which were 'not as we would have liked.' But it also insisted that it had written some of the most glorious chapters in Spanish history and was not prepared to consent to these being appropriated by others. It was bad enough that the Falange had seized power, and a social base, that was rightfully theirs; it was even worse that it tried to present itself as the heroes of the dismantling of the October Revolution – a genuine forerunner of the crusade which the civil war had become – when in fact the JAP's *Movilización Civil* had been the organisational, spiritual and political heart of the counter-revolutionary civilian reaction. In an article released by the JAP's Press and Propaganda office, entitled 'Remembering', the JAP countered claims by Falange leader Manuel Hedilla that his party had been the 'only one out on the streets' fighting the revolution. 'We are not doing this to court controversy, we just want to fight until Spain has definitively rid its soil of Jews, masons and Marxists' the JAP insisted. Nonetheless it considered it necessary to provide a reminder – and an accurate one at that – of the roles that the JAP, 'risking death', carried out 'in the face of danger' during the Revolution. 'On 5 October 1934, the JAP organised itself into the first civilian anti-strike force, with inscriptions on calle Serrano, no. 6. Many people from different parties, including the Falange, were directed towards Sr. [Avelino] Parrondo and the spirit of our organisation won a magnificent citizen's battle,' it recalled, adding:

The directors of the Falange – we repeat – came to the JAP's *Movilización Civil* offices and showed magnificent sacrifice on the streets of Madrid.

We recognise this. But at all times it was the JAP that exercised control and direction. Now, like the [Falange], hundreds of lads from the JAP – some as volunteers in the army and the Legion, others wearing the honourable uniforms of our brother militias where circumstances did not allow them to have their own militias – fight and die on all the front-lines.⁹⁰

This role as a civilian militia was doubly significant, enabling the JAP to claim that it was not even a political party at all, and indeed never had been one – a useful tool once political parties had been banned in the Nationalist zone on 25 October. The JAP's contempt for liberal democracy and its obedience towards Franco now went so far as to be translated into a rejection of parts of its own past. 'The JAP today is solely and exclusively a militia,' it insisted, 'nothing remains of that broad national movement' – a movement that, in any case, 'was only a political party in the external form that the moment imposed upon us'. Although the context had been changed by the civil war, the content of these claims was consistent with the JAP's Republic-era output. The JAP even defended itself at the cost of presenting itself as explicitly distinct from the CEDA – not only because it had long felt distanced from elements of its parent party but also because doing so provided the most credible way of justifying its mistakes whilst maintaining its purity. It also underlined just how desperate the *Juventud* had become. 'You only have to look at the past to justify our history . . . a history which maybe was not really ours, but which we defend [because] we will not fall into the trap of cowardly negations that come from judging things in the cold light of day,' it insisted.⁹¹

The JAP's defence was not always so ambivalent and it later complained that it had 'stumbled across elements of old politics' and that the 'healthy intentions of Gil Robles and the JAP' had clashed with the machinations of those *caciques* who, from within the movement, had sought personal gain. 'The JAP', it declared, 'has nothing to do with the shady behaviour of certain people, even if they did once belong to our organisation and continue to say they belong to it.'⁹² While the JAP was happy to reject *cedismo* and the *caciques* that 'sullied' its 'true spirit', public loyalty to Gil Robles remained steadfast, even though he was indubitably the man ultimately responsible for the party's tactics. Indeed, his recuperation, far more so than that of rank and file members of the party, underpinned efforts to reinstate the JAP, despite the fact that he was by now a liability. This also revealed the extent to which propaganda responded to his own political aims, channelled through Calzada Rodríguez, more than the experiences of *japistas* at the front.

In spite of these efforts, the *JEFE* would never make a political comeback – a fact that prompted his later reinvention as a monarchist in opposition to Franco. Even as late as October 1937, by which time the JAP no longer even officially existed, the campaign diary of a *japista* proclaimed Gil Robles 'more of a *JEFE* by the day', dedicating him a poem that sought to glorify him but rather served as a lament for a forgotten, broken politician. It concluded:

I fill with hope when I recall
Covadonga, Medina, El Escorial
And Valencia, and Uclés, the trail of our ideal!
Enlightened by his speeches
Oh, Spanish gentleman, I know how you suffer
The ignorance of oblivion
Fear not, for dawn will come
With each new day, more of a *jefe* you are to me
And, as I fight for Spain, I ask only
That you are understood again.⁹³

On rare occasions the JAP did publicly raise its voice. In November 1936, it responded to an 'unjust allusion', speaking out against the criticisms levelled against it by *El Adelanto de Segovia*, a newspaper which had been *cedista* during the Republic but which now too, in its rush to prove its Nationalist credentials and conditioned by a lingering sense of failure and betrayal in the wake of the February elections, loudly criticised the accidentalist tactic of Gil Robles's party. 'We trust that as [this article] lacked veracity, it will also lack efficacy', retorted the JAP, laying bare its fears over the impact of press campaigns and its awareness that any vociferous, aggressive defence would in all probability be immediately short-circuited by the black lines of the censor. Instead, the timidity of its response was, as it would be time and again, presented as another sacrifice for Spain:

We could destroy with many arguments the gratuitous affirmation . . . we were on the point of doing so, confident that the censor would allow us to defend ourselves. But for reasons of patriotism we will not. These are not times for sterile discussions. After all, time doesn't always belong to he who speaks the most but to he who knows how to keep quiet, who receives criticism without reply. We allow ourselves to concentrate on what matters – saving Spain. May God and opinion judge us. One day these testimonies will be published. . . . Not today: we need the union of everyone against the common enemy, the enemy of Spain. Meanwhile, not a word. We will

remain quiet and our silence will be another sacrifice we offer at the sacred altar of the *Patria*.⁹⁴

The problem was that whilst the insistence that it would remain silent was to prove accurate, such meek acceptance revealed the crisis of the JAP, the weakness of its position. It also helped to guarantee that the JAP would not recover. This rather servile approach was even more apparent in the JAP's dealings with the army, an army that 'knows how the JAP admires it' and to which much of the *Juventud*'s ideological output was aimed.⁹⁵ The army was constantly eulogised as the true guardian of the crusade, not least because it was also the true holder of power and the most likely source of the JAP's protection. The JAP became sickly-sweet in its desire to present itself as willing subordinates, almost sacrificial lambs to the Nationalist cause and this uncomplicated sentiment was often shared by militiamen in combat. A group of *japistas* serving on the Navalparat front, north of Madrid, wrote in December of their 'happiness at being able to fight for the *Patria* under the title of *japistas* and at the orders of the army.'⁹⁶

Lurking beneath this servile surface was an attempt to recover Gil Robles, placing him ahead of the Falange as a true Nationalist whose contribution was free of hidden political agendas; who, moreover, deserved credit for the army's readiness to rise in July, having been minister of war in 1935. 'Spain needed a rising [*golpe*] from the glorious army, the ONLY saviour, the ONLY one that saves Spain. The militias, however strong they are, are simply auxiliaries to the army,' the JAP insisted, adding: 'Gil Robles managed to strengthen the army from the ministry of war. He gave it material, prepared it for these days that it is living now.'⁹⁷ This was true and, of course, when the moment came, Gil Robles's party also provided the army with men for the front – men who gave their lives just as Falangists did, blurring the divisions between the component parts of the crusading forces. This inescapable fact helped the JAP ideologically and organisationally. Its leadership sought to prevent rank and file dissidence by appealing to a kind of front-line brotherhood which in turn served to reflect the JAP's full status as warriors in the crusade:

With us – never against us – fight other militias, also as auxiliaries to the army. Why have resentments with them if we fight for a united, free Spain? We fight together, in unity. The Yoke and the Arrows, in fact, symbolise the unity of the Catholic Kings. We must have a single heart-beat, a single flag, a single desire – to put a superior race on its feet and fulfil the historic destinies which we marked out. Let us sacrifice the rancour, the vanity. And when bad thoughts come to us, look at those who fight, think of the blood

of so many lads in different shirts, their blood running together on the fronts, and forget rancour to remember that we are all just Spaniards. When you come across injustice and incomprehension don't respond with hate . . . we all fight for the same *Patria*. To divide is a crime, a sin, and sacrilegious. This isn't the task of a political party, it is the task of all Spaniards. . . . We are going to create a new unity.⁹⁸

These declarations were not just aimed at *japistas* but also at the army and the Falange, to whom the JAP proclaimed its fraternity.⁹⁹ To do otherwise would be tantamount to political suicide but such timidity merely encouraged the Falange to continue its bullying. Like those made to the army, Franco and the arbiters of the new state, the JAP's pleas were often pathetically weak, a reflection of the extent to which it genuinely struggled to understand the animosity to which it was subjected on the one hand and was powerless to do anything about it on the other. The JAP no longer represented the mass of the right wing, merely a tiny cadre of fighters; its tactics, useless in changing the minds of the Falange, were as much about salvaging some self-belief for the few who remained as anything else. Discrepancies with the Falange were thus presented as the result of politicking behind the lines rather than Falangists at the front – the pure, moral reserve of the nation. 'The essential unity of those who fight for Spain is comforting,' the JAP rather hopefully insisted, for some hostility did filter to the front. And besides,

this unity makes rearguard insidiousness all the more despicable. As we receive newssheets insulting heroic *japistas*, the blood of *japistas* and *falangistas* at the same time runs together in the parapets of Las Navas and Robledo. Eye-witnesses have referred to the enthusiasm with which they have embraced after combat . . . it is pointless to try to foster hate amongst those who have learnt to value each other mutually, fighting together for the most noble of causes.¹⁰⁰

Partly, the JAP presented Falange critiques in this manner because they could not question the roles of those Falangists that laid their lives on the line but it also did so as a way of presenting the Salamanca-based Falangist rearguard as continuing a party political battle with which it would not dirty its hands. The JAP's motives were purer, it fought only for God and Spain. Moreover, the JAP was all too aware that many *japistas* were now to be found in Falangist ranks – more, indeed, than were to be found in their own.

There were undoubtedly examples of such brotherhood at the front and

there were many locations where politicking gave way to fighting the war together and relations were perfectly cordial.¹⁰¹ The memoirs of one prominent Falangist concede that *japistas* 'did fight decently and the local disasters attributed to them could have happened in any unit.'¹⁰² For many *japistas*, however, the experience of the front was altogether bitterer, particularly for those who remained obstinate in maintaining a JAP identity. Worse still was the situation in the rearguard, where national politics were shaped. Here, the JAP's campaign was stillborn. As late as March 1937, one JAP sympathiser complained that two members of his family had been arrested and imprisoned. 'The warrant agent turned up at the house in a most incorrect manner – and if I tell you that he was a Falangist, I think that's all you need to know,' he explained. 'They wanted to avenge their hatred towards the JAP. As they could not do so with me, because I was not there, they took it out on my family.'¹⁰³ The JAP's protests of Nationalist faith, the defence of its history and the death of its martyrs made no difference.



The servility that ran through virtually every declaration the JAP made was a reflection of the profound fear of division and fragmentation that pervaded the youth wing and would ultimately play into the hands of general Franco, making the *Juventud* complicit in its own eclipse. The emphasis on unity, obedience and discipline was not only an implicit criticism of the Falange but indicative of the JAP's weakness and vulnerability, responding to an emotional desire not to rock the boat and to be welcomed into the movement. But this ideological drive was also the visible face of a political campaign aimed at the rehabilitation of Gil Robles in the long term and a cessation of hostilities in the short term. In September 1936, the CEDA leader travelled from Lisbon to Spain. In his memoirs, he describes the journey as 'strictly personal' but he in fact met with Calzada Rodríguez, who he had recently named as chief of militias, and whom he asked to compile a report on the state of the CEDA-JAP and the possibility of its political reconstruction. On 19 October, Gil Robles followed up this meeting with a letter to Calzada Rodríguez in which he laid the framework of an ideological and tactical plan of action to accompany the JAP's drive for recruitment. The JAP would affirm its identity with the *Movimiento*, to which 'many friends joined from the very first moment', willingly subsuming itself within the 'patriotic crusade'. While Gil Robles claimed that 'no one has a greater interest than me in our retaining our political personality,' and insisted that the JAP step up its efforts to create militias,

he also recommended its total subordination to the army. 'Whatever happens,' he wrote, 'blind obedience.'¹⁰⁴

This tactic was, at least in part, born of the realisation that vague plans existed for a political unification in the Nationalist zone and the vain hope that Gil Robles could be a player in the new order, or at least be rescued from his political ostracism. As Franco and the military were the true arbiters of power, 'blind obedience' was the only realistic course of action that the JAP could follow but this did not prevent occasional attempts to put pressure on the régime. 'For the sake of our dignity', the JAP could 'not entertain the slightest approximation to the Falange,' so it tried to forge some sort of accommodation with the Carlists in an attempt to tip the balance away from José Antonio's party and build something of a power base.¹⁰⁵ This was assisted by the JAP's Toledo branch, which went over to Carlism *en masse* in October 1936, declaring that it had 'no interest whatsoever in forming militias which are exclusively ours.'¹⁰⁶ But Calzada Rodríguez and Gil Robles soon became aware that there was little point pursuing the Carlist option, either: the JAP would simply be consumed by their more powerful partner, whose influence, organisation, and sheer numbers they could not match. Nor did Gil Robles have any joy in increasingly desperate attempts to secure a meeting with Franco.¹⁰⁷

These negotiations went hand in hand with a conscious effort to raise the JAP's profile and although Calzada Rodríguez underestimated the extent of the *Juventud's* continuing insignificance, the revival of the party met with some limited success. Delighted, the national militia chief reported to Gil Robles in January 1937 that:

A few months ago, no one wanted to admit to even being a member of Acción Popular here [in Valladolid]; now everyone loves our organisation and wants to be part of it. It used to be dangerous to wear the Cross of Victory, now it is an honour. This miracle has been performed by lads with the true spirit of Acción Popular, that eternal spirit, your spirit.¹⁰⁸

This was something of an exaggeration but the JAP was indeed growing again. Its frontline militiamen increased from 2,800 in early October 1936 to around 6,000 by the start of February the following year, propelled by the recruitment drive of October and November 1936.¹⁰⁹

The success was founded upon three types of members. First, and most significant, were the newly mobilised with no former political status. These recruits had not previously joined any political party, whether for reasons of apoliticism, age or lack of interest. They were, however, right-wingers, Catholics, or simply unable to say no. This is reflected by the membership

of Orense, which grew with the war: recruitment prior to 18 July only made up just over half of those who were registered as *japistas* in early 1937. Whilst considerably more *japistas* left to join the Falange during wartime than in the ominous spring, more too joined the JAP after the rising. Of a total official membership of 325, 153 had joined prior to the February elections, just three joined between the elections and the rising and 130 joined thereafter. In other Galician towns and small villages, available figures also reveal the extent to which mobilisation was often a response to the war. By recruiting the previously non-mobilised the JAP too lost its organisational and ideological purity but it had always been a movement whose prime *raison d'être* had long been the aggressive mobilisation of young men (and, to a far lesser extent, women) as a bulwark against the revolution; a reaction to the challenge posed by the emergence of democracy and the left, not necessarily a bastion of ideological purity.

Second, and far less numerically important, were existing *japistas* who had not yet been enlisted. One *japista* who had not previously been called upon to fight in the civil war recalls, for instance, how JAP recruiters turned up at the University of Santander where he was studying and requested students to go to the Madrid front. Around one hundred joined up.¹¹⁰ Thirdly, the JAP was bolstered by those former *japistas* who had signed up for service in other militias and now sought to return to their previous political home. Often, this 'return' meant little more than a change of uniform, but JAP organisations hungrily added these names to official lists. Antonio Miranda, a former local JAP director wrote from the front, where he was among a group serving as army volunteers, to inform *japistas* that he had raised a JAP militia and to ask his provincial chief to send him a consignment of khaki shirts in order to provide his company with a *japista* identity.¹¹¹ Another serving at the front noted that he had heard that the Acción Popular deputy for Asturias, José María Fernández Ladreda, was forming a column of volunteers to send to Gijón, and wanted to follow suit. 'We're going to request that we get withdrawn from here and join that column so that we can fight under an AP leader,' he wrote.¹¹² Nonetheless, the results were limited: by the time of the unification the JAP still housed an extraordinarily small proportion of those pre-July *japistas* who served at the front or in the rearguard.

This growth, which paralleled the organisational revival of the party, was both a cause and a consequence of a very conscious campaign of visibility in which the JAP – or, more accurately, its leader – attempted to return itself to the political front line. Gil Robles's claims that he never sought a political role for himself are emphatically denied by the public actions and private orders of those that manned the JAP, nationally and locally, in the

final months of 1936. Indeed, in a letter to the Marqués de la Vega de Anzo, Gil Robles openly asked 'whether it would not be legitimate for me to have more contact with the nucleus of people who remain faithful to our ideals in this difficult moment – one that is much larger than people think' and mooted the possibility of holding a meeting and intensifying 'our work'.¹¹³ Having recovered from the inertia of the days immediately following the rising, those who had worked under the leadership of Calzada Rodríguez since the start of September were to be the backroom staff of a political campaign on behalf of a man who had become a pariah. The JAP's loud insistence that to 'play politics' was criminal rings distinctly hollow when confronted with the evidence of calls from the JAP's Press and Propaganda department for information from the provinces, a stated desire to 'unify our propaganda,' and maximise circulation of Gil Robles's open letters, and of orders for JAP emblems, revealing a clear awareness of the importance of political theatre and self-identity.¹¹⁴

Although Calzada Rodríguez rejected proposals for a public reconstruction of the party in January 1937, rightly fearing that this would prompt a renewed outbreak of hostility against them, the JAP's activity was stepped up as the war progressed, especially as awareness grew of Franco's move towards the foundation of a formal political state and single party. By early 1937, while the JAP still hid behind public claims of sacrificial silence, there was no mistaking the efforts made to claw its way back into the national conscience, reflecting and propelling a political recovery. This was carefully choreographed. Julián Dodero, a JAP official in Salamanca, contacted local leaders all over the country, telling them: 'we want to know how clearly you receive radio broadcasts etc – because this could be of benefit to our organisation'.¹¹⁵ Similarly, letters from Gil Robles were circulated amongst provincial JAP bodies and those with media contacts, complete with demands that their receipt was acknowledged, such was the concern to make sure they arrived at their destination and to impose some degree of control.¹¹⁶

Soon after, provincial chiefs were instructed to attend a JAP militia meeting in Zamora on 23 February 1937 at which Calzada Rodríguez would publicly address them for the first time. He was joined by an announcer from Radio Nacional de España and Ramón Ruíz Alonso. In a bid to recapture the essence of the pre-war rallies, the JAP's local leaders were requested to bring their provincial JAP flags with them.¹¹⁷ The event, the JAP claimed, 'demonstrated the power [*pujanza*] and growing strength of the Cruces Negras in liberated Spain.' Six companies of JAP militiamen from Salamanca, Valladolid, Burgos and Zamora, meanwhile, were involved in a parade in celebration of the presentation of credentials by the German

and Italian ambassadors in Salamanca.¹¹⁸ Two days after that meeting, on 25 February, a JAP circular informed its members of the party's intention to put together a book of JAP activities both before and after the rising under the direction of José Costa Serrano, the propaganda chief, reflecting a continued frustration at the failure to recognise the JAP's contribution. 'So,' concluded the note, 'please send information on roles in the preparation of the rising, obstacles/help in foundation of militias, acts at the front, lists of dead in action, etc.'¹¹⁹

Publicly, the JAP continued to insist that it was not acting for its own political advancement. 'Proof' came in its failure, in its utter eclipse. A weekly JAP bulletin, circulated in March, provided a retort to those who had accused Calzada Rodríguez of 'playing politics' in his Zamora speech. 'Some parts of the speech delivered by our national *jefe* in Zamora have been twisted, so we happily reproduce his words here,' the bulletin ran, highlighting the militia chief's declarations that:

Some who don't know us have accused us of playing politics at the moment . . . they are lying . . . anyone who wants to play politics in a moment when so much blood is being spilt is senseless scum for trampling on the blood of our fallen ones. Nobody could doubt the power of AP on 18 July. Have we taken a single step to win the posts that our mass following could have got us? How many town councils do we control? How many mayors? . . . [the JAP] is like Castilla: it knows how to sacrifice itself to save Spain. . . . it is no more than a gigantic militia: we have neither the appearance nor the form of a political party.¹²⁰

There was some truth in these protests but in fact the JAP was indeed seeking to recover its status as a party. Plans were made for the national assembly of the JAP, to be held in Burgos on 19 March, which would, it was hoped, include the creation of a national JAP periodical and the launch of a propaganda poster competition, as well as the naming of committees. The JAP had also produced a record with its anthem on one side and the national anthem on the other, declaring, 'not one provincial delegation, radio or barracks' should be without it. Here, the JAP's aims were explicit. A circular informed the JAP's provincial leaders that: 'From this assembly, we are hoping for the emergence of the foundation [*bases*] and support [*elementos*] necessary for an intense propaganda campaign which will once again put us at the head of all organisations.'¹²¹ This was wishful thinking.

The national assembly brought together the threads of the JAP's propaganda over the eight months of civil war. Its conclusions, ratified by the absent '*jefe supremo*' Gil Robles, echoed what had gone before. The JAP

'affirm[ed] that it is not, nor does it aspire to be, anything other than a militia which, at the orders of the army, consecrates itself at the service of Spain.' It was not a political party; indeed, it insisted that, 'faithful to its consistent desire to fight only for God and for a united, just and imperial Spain, it would 'not allow spilled blood to serve to make political parties reappear ever again.' Power was unequivocally transferred to Franco's hands, with the JAP assuring him that it 'places itself in an absolute and unconditional manner at the orders of the Chief of State, the supreme representation of the army and the spirit of national movement, [and] awaits with a thirst for obedience his orders in order to fulfil them exactly.' It would 'never be an obstacle to the spiritual unification of Spain, which must be the basis of the great task [*magna obra*] of the reconstruction of Spain.' This was no rejection of its identity, however; the JAP proclaimed its continued fidelity to the nineteen points and Gil Robles, 'because we do not turn our backs on him in difficult moments and because we see in him the hope for a united Spain.'

This hope entailed Gil Robles forming part of Franco's new order not him usurping the Generalísimo's power, which was unquestioned. But Franco saw neither hope in Gil Robles nor brothers in the JAP – however much *japista* press reports of the congress were headed by the Nazi-style slogan, 'One Fatherland, One State, One Caudillo'. No matter that the JAP shouted, 'at the front the blood of everyone mixes because, however different they are, Spanish blood courses through the veins of the fallen.' Or that it shrilly declared: 'only one flag triumphs – the glorious flag of Spain.' That the aim of such reports, lyrically extended from the rather more staccato annotations of official circulars, was to blur the lines between the JAP, the Falange and the Carlists, subsuming them all beneath Franco, was made clear in the JAP's stated desire to form part of 'a single movement, free of insane competitions that prevent purification and make possible suspicions filtration.' Its patriotism was presented as being unsullied, implicitly unlike that of the Falange: 'the true patriotism of the JAP is to fight in the glorious army uniform as volunteers.' Continuity was again the theme, with the JAP stressing its wholehearted approval of the Falange's 'revolution'. Indeed, the JAP proclaimed itself the vanguard of that very revolution, of the Nationalist cause:

Our work back then sewed the seeds of the ideas that are now reaping such abundant harvest. . . . Ours is the glory of having initiated the reconstructive labour of Spain which other youth movements followed later with *different tactics and means but identical ends* and similar intentions of fighting *against the criminally egotistical desires of a capitalism without conscience*

and the dissolving labour of destructive Marxism. What is happening now is what we always wanted. [This is] our mission – not just that of the JAP but of all youth movements in Spain. If it is possible to speak, with reason and foundation, of totalitarianism of the state, this is it . . . ; *Viva España!*¹²²

Press releases in April repeated the conclusions from the National Congress, and left the JAP even more prostrate at the feet of Franco; its growth did not provoke a lessening of obedience towards the new Chief of State, rather it was a tool with which to integrate itself more fully with the Nationalist crusade. The JAP's aim was to demonstrate to Franco that it could be *his* power-base, its members were worth counting on. One 'official newsheet', published at the start of April, was headed with screaming declarations, written in capital letters, such as: 'MILITIAS AT THE SERVICE OF GOD AND SPAIN', 'OUR IDEALS ARE PERSONIFIED BY THE GLORIOUS GENERAL FRANCO' and 'TOTAL OBEDIENCE TO OUR SAVIOUR THE ARMY, PIONEER OF THE HOLY CRUSADE'.¹²³ The JAP, it insisted again, 'has always been a new spirit, a revolutionary spirit', even if the CEDA was not. Interestingly, here it cited the demands of its martyred president, recounting almost word-for-word the content of his pre-rising circular – a circular that was never published. In doing so, it sought to distance itself from the 'errors' that had brought such scorn upon it, distancing itself from the CEDA. Franco's programme and that of the Falange 'is what the JAP said within the CEDA,' one communiqué insisted, outlining its 'revolutionary' programme of social justice,

but unfortunately it tripped over many representatives of old politics who, with sleight of hand, attempted to put obstacles in the way of the patriotic labour that the JAP tried to carry out. Now in war the JAP is the only part of that organisation still standing and is more robust than ever before . . . The JAP has nothing to do with the acts of some people, even if they did once belong to our organisation. The JAP has its own personality, totally independent and those who run it now are totally identified with its ideals. The JAP as a militia has only one mission: to help save Spain at the orders of general Franco, the true incarnation of the *Movimiento Nacional*.¹²⁴

The JAP was not more robust than ever. Nonetheless, the tangible result of the JAP's congress was a further increase in its proselytism against a backdrop of discussions regarding the fusion of all Nationalist groups – discussions of which the JAP's higher echelons were aware. In April, Costa Serrano sent a further circular insisting 'we must not lose contact' and

imploping provincial leaders to name their own Press and Propaganda chiefs to provide the national body with information. A sense of historical memory and the JAP's likely obliteration from the story of the glorious *alzamiento* and the crusade now occupied its thoughts. It was vital that the JAP earned recognition: 'Some day, we will write a memoir of our organisation,' Costa Serrano claimed.¹²⁵ Sadly, this never happened.

Nonetheless, JAP figures still counselled a cautious approach to propaganda. A message of servility, based both on deference to the military and a pragmatic awareness of its limitations, continued to prevail. The JAP, still essentially an irrelevance, sought to rile neither the army nor its political brethren. A series of meetings held on 31 March and 1 April, at which its weakness led to the posts of Transport and Social Assistance remaining unfilled following the naming of the JAP's delegates, concluded that the *Juventud* should avoid at all costs aggravating the 'struggles between organisations' and that 'all propaganda should stress the criteria of unity.' The JAP's resolutions also included a desire for military authorities not to 'look upon our organisation with hostility'. This latter aim showed just how sensitive the JAP was to its treatment, whilst also underlining the insecurity of its position and the extent to which it had become utterly dependent upon the political patronage of the real power in the Nationalist zone: the army.

In order to court this patronage, the JAP had to prove its worth. This informed its conscious campaign to remind Nationalist Spain of the JAP's presence and 'heroic work'. The JAP's national committee embarked upon the task of providing uniforms to all *japistas* serving at the front, demanding that JAP companies carry with them the party flag as well as the national, bicolour one and wear the JAP's new official emblem: the Nationalist eagle adorned with its own Cross of Victory. Circulars were distributed requesting that all JAP bodies send lists of front line militias and 'any other information' they could, while the national committee was exhorted not to lose contact with the provincial bodies, providing them with all the help possible. In the case of martyrs, a biography should be supplied at the earliest opportunity and after this initial information had been provided, updates should follow every two weeks. Tentative plans were also put into place for the foundation of a *Movilización Civil* unit to be set up in Madrid once the capital had been taken, in order to provide assistance to those who had escaped the Republican zone and to help families in the name of God, the Fatherland and the JAP. The JAP's feminine section, led by the national chief Marisabel de la Torres Colomina, organised a blood transfusion service for the front.¹²⁶

An internal note released by the Press and Propaganda department

immediately after these resolutions were distributed contained press cuttings for circulation, reiterated that 'marxism and masonry are sworn enemies of Spain' that 'will not cease in their efforts unless they are annihilated,' and informed members that three hundred JAP anthems had been sold and should continue to be distributed 'as widely as possible'. A JAP stamp had also been made, which sought explicitly to foster brotherhood amongst the Nationalist forces and emphasise the validity of the JAP's message. It showed a Carlist, a Falangist, a *japista* and a soldier standing side by side under the legend 'Before the martyrs of our ideal: *¡Viva España! ¡Arriba España!*'¹²⁷ 'We've got thousands now', the communiqué reported happily; 'we need to achieve the maximum diffusion of our stamp.'¹²⁸ According to one historian, Gil Robles even mooted the idea of the formal rebuilding of the party, requesting a study as to the possibility of 'splitting the civil and military jurisdictions of the organisation.'¹²⁹ There was at last some room for optimism, a belief in some kind of political recovery and the promise of a say in the future of Spain after a Nationalist victory. The JAP's death had been postponed. For now.



If rehabilitation promised a significant revival, the hopes of Gil Robles, Calzada Rodríguez and the rest of the JAP were to prove illusory. Despite its renewed growth, the JAP remained a movement of extremely limited significance, far from its pre-war strength. Former members swelled the ranks of the Falange, the Carlists and the army, hardly leaving a party to revive: the 6,000 militiamen that the JAP boasted represented a tiny fraction of the 64,000 frontline militiamen that the Falange could muster by October 1938.¹³⁰ Moreover, the political jockeying and careful lobbying of Calzada Rodríguez also brought scant return and the JAP's organisational contribution remained equally insignificant as plans for a political fusion and the creation of a state party began to take shape. Although it was in all probability closer to Franco's own genuine political predilections than was the Falange or Carlism,¹³¹ the Caudillo had no intention whatsoever of turning to the CEDA-JAP, which carried little weight at government level. Nor was there any sense in bringing a potential rival of Gil Robles's undoubted talent back into the fold. Or reminding people of his former closeness to a now disgraced and unpopular Confederación. The CEDA leader, meanwhile, suspected that the general could not accept the presence of a man who had once been his superior and comments made to Manuel Fraga suggested that, despite his fulsome praise at the time, Franco harboured grudges from when Gil Robles occupied the ministry of war.¹³²

Declarations of discipline, sacrifice and eager obedience made ignoring the JAP's desires even easier. Still largely unpopular, there was little purpose and little need to bring the JAP on board. Meanwhile, the *Juventud's* pandering to Franco, ideological compatibility with the emerging régime and tame response to the campaigns launched against it showed that the youth movement was likely to accept any solution imposed upon it without serious complaint. Besides, for many rank and file *japistas*, the prospect of being subsumed within a broader alliance was a welcome one. This would, they hoped, finally end the divisions that existed within the Nationalist zone; they would no longer be such easy targets. 'It was natural', ran one governmental testimony from Granada 'that the decision to fuse all the groups was met with jubilation.' In fact, these hopes too were in vain. The application of the unification would prove slow and *cedistas* and *japistas* continued to suffer. A Civil Government official in the province of Ávila reported that those who 'enthusiastically' embraced the unification found that their passage into the new FET y de las JONS was blocked despite their 'unquestionable conduct and their arduous and enthusiastic commitment to the *Movimiento Nacional*.'¹³³

Equally illusory were any JAP hopes that may have been stirred by the arrival in the Nationalist zone of Franco's brother-in-law Ramón Serrano Suñer, the former CEDA deputy, a JAP figure of some importance and the man who became the architect of the New State. His political past did not herald a new dawn for the CEDA-JAP. Instead, he was responsible for its final oblivion. This should have come as little surprise. Although a former *cedista*, Serrano Suñer had already encouraged *japistas* to flee to the Falange in the spring of 1936 – suggesting that he considered the Falange a more natural home for these radical youths than the parent party to which they formally owed allegiance. A close friend of José Antonio, Serrano Suñer had long considered the CEDA-JAP's tactics redundant, had embraced (but never actually joined) the Falange, and his own experience in Madrid's Modelo jail at the outbreak of war, allied to the death of his brothers José and Fernando, had made him more determined than ever to smash the Republic and yet more convinced that power should be concentrated in authoritarian hands. His fascist convictions were only deepened by the contribution of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany to the war effort.

Serrano Suñer's own political survival and pre-eminence also dictated that he leave the largely insignificant CEDA behind. The principal public objection of catastrophist monarchists to his presence, for instance, was his *cedista* past, as if that automatically invalidated him for service in the crusade.¹³⁴ In many eyes, it did; there were by now few more damaging political accusations. Serrano Suñer's friendship with José Antonio and

other leading 'old shirts' protected him from similar attacks from Falangists but he nonetheless drew a veil over his political past. During the civil war he commissioned a book to be written about him whose primary goal was to create the veneer of a Falangist pedigree.¹³⁵ For all this, however, the basic ideological postulates he entertained remained those authoritarian, anti-liberal, anti-democratic ideals that he had expressed at the JAP rally at El Escorial in April 1934. The difference now was that the beneficiary of his work would be his brother-in-law. And, of course, himself.

Whilst nowhere near the scale of the conflicts that crippled the Republican zone, leading to the 'civil war within a civil war' in Barcelona in May 1937, Franco had become increasingly aware of political division amongst the rebels. The Falangist poet Dionisio Ridruejo recalled: 'the battle for power and influence in view of the political direction taken in an ambiguous atmosphere was very intense in the Nationalist rearguard, even though it did not create spectacular confrontations.'¹³⁶ Nor were differences only appearing between civilian parties: signs of tension had also emerged between some generals, with Mola growing increasingly powerful in the north and Queipo de Llano practically running Andalucía as a personal fiefdom. Franco needed to find a way to consolidate his position and, by early 1937, vague ideas had already been aired about imposing unity, with political as well as military power concentrated in his hands. In the second week of January, Guglielmo Danzi, the Italian press attaché in Salamanca, informed his superiors that: 'accepting my suggestion, general Franco has decided to found a political association of which he will be the official head. He will endeavour to unite the parties into a political body along the lines of the Fascist party.'¹³⁷ This was no secret and it informed the tactics of all the parties in the Nationalist zone, Calzada Rodríguez remarking that same month: 'everyone knows Franco is planning a union of all the militias sooner or later.'¹³⁸

With Nicolás Franco lacking the sophistry or legal expertise to carry out such a task, it would take the arrival of Serrano Suñer for this promise to be fulfilled. Having escaped from Madrid into France, Serrano Suñer reached Hendaye on the Spanish border on 18 February 1937, from where a car dispatched by Franco took him to Salamanca. He arrived two days later and was put up in the attic of the episcopal palace, where he had unrivalled access to his brother-in-law and set about persuading him of the need to provide a political structure to his military command. Franco, trusting Serrano Suñer far more than he did the sycophants and opportunists who flocked to the Nationalist capital, needed little persuasion. What he did need was a mass base and only two parties could genuinely provide one – the Carlists and the Falange. This was something of which the JAP was well

aware. Indeed, the realisation that it alone could not make any claim upon power underpinned the JAP's eulogies of the army. By insisting upon its obedience, it entertained faint hopes that it would be handed a role that it could not grasp alone, even if Gil Robles rightly reminded Calzada Rodríguez that the party's real human power was greater than the sum of its militiamen.

Although these hopes would prove unfounded, the JAP and those former members who had joined the Falange or the Carlists, or who served in the army, would accept the unification. Most, in fact, would welcome it, as would the various political parties represented in the Nationalist zone – the future 'families' of the Franco régime.¹³⁹ Their acceptance was always likely, facilitated by the fact that the right had much in common; they had all participated in the rising, were Catholic, and shared the broad aim of the imposition of an authoritarian nationalist state, infused with the same historical myths. As Paul Preston has written, they nonetheless also nurtured ambitions of imposing their own identity upon it: 'The monarchists wanted a restoration of a military monarchy along the lines of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship; the Carlists, a virtual theocracy under their own pretender; the Falange, a Spanish equivalent of the Third Reich.'¹⁴⁰ It is no coincidence that Preston makes no mention of the CEDA or the JAP. Its ideological postulates, amply satisfied by the crusade, were far from fully developed (as indeed were those of the Carlists, beyond the unachievable desire for royal restoration for a distant and debated dynasty) and its very accidentalism meant that it had no entrenched, immovable desire to impose a specific structure on the state; it broadly spanned the wishes of all the other coalition forces. What the JAP wanted was what Franco wanted. It made no demands and posed no threat, all it asked was the chance to come on board. Allied to its organisational weakness, there was therefore no need whatsoever for Serrano Suñer, Franco or his staff to court the CEDA, no bargaining to be done.

In fact, there was little bargaining done with any of the forces in the Nationalist zone. The unification was not a negotiated settlement but an imposition, Ridruejo calling it a 'coup in reverse'; the state conquered the party.¹⁴¹ Broad discussions with right-wing politicians began almost as soon as Franco's brother-in-law arrived in Salamanca but there was little actual negotiation. Serrano Suñer had, he claimed, three fundamental aims: to establish the *political* leadership of Franco, bring to fruition the 'programme of José Antonio' and contribute to the regimenting of the national movement in a state of law.¹⁴² His commitment to the Falange's revolution was in fact lukewarm but he knew that it represented the best vehicle through which to bring the mass base of the rebellion under Franco's

control. It now provided the bulk of the civilians at the front and had become the visible political core of the war effort. In February, Franco himself revealed that he had ordered a blue shirt.¹⁴³ Serrano Suñer also knew that the Falange, in the midst of a leadership struggle, could be manipulated, commandeered and adopted as the state party. Manuel Fal Conde, the Carlist leader, had already been tried for rebellion after he set up an independent Carlist military academy, the JAP, like the Alfonsist monarchists, was docile and weak, and now the unsophisticated Falange leader Manuel Hedilla was skilfully manipulated and brought under control. Franco's staff helped to provoke a violent confrontation between rival factions in Salamanca that provided the context for a take-over of the party, ostensibly with Hedilla's blessing. No sooner had he won the battle for control of the party than Franco succeeded him at the head of the Falange.¹⁴⁴

Put together by Serrano Suñer, the unification was declared on April 17, laying the foundation stone of the New State. The Falange and the Carlists were merged into a single state party of which Franco was the leader. The crude fusion was reflected in its unwieldy name: Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista. The other organisations of the right thus officially disappeared at a stroke, their members obliged to join the 'new' party. Other militias were disbanded and the uniform of the Nationalists became a combination of the Falangist blue shirt with the Carlist red beret. The Falange's 26 Points – its 27th, which dealt with political pacts and the 'final bid for power', was now obsolete – became the official programme of the régime, the Yoke and Arrows its emblem and José Antonio, killed in Alicante on 20 November, was sanctified as the absent one, the most glorious of martyrs.

Other militias and political parties were thus expected to sacrifice their identity for God and Spain, and the JAP did precisely that. Franco's speech, made to announce the decree and written by Serrano Suñer, was a rousing call to sacrifice and unity that was deeply reminiscent of the declarations of the JAP. The palengenetic, redemptive ideology and rhetoric of the new state was that of the *Juventud* and its 'eminently *japista*' architect:

To this heroic youth that fights in the trenches, to those worthy soldiers who happily resist the winter on the front and give with admirable generosity their lives for Spain, I affirm that your sacrifices will be worthwhile and that the Spain that is formed in the hard fights of the battlefields will have unity and strength, that nothing will divide national Spain, and that the close union of Spanish youth – generous, noble, and without reservations – will not have to look to those without virtue . . . When all you Spaniards raise your arms in homage to the

Fatherland; when in Spanish homes fire, bread and happiness are not missing, then we will be able to say to our fallen and our martyrs: your blood has been worthwhile, for from a Spain in the throws of death we have created a new Spain that you dreamed of, completing your mandate and honouring your heroic sacrifices.¹⁴⁵

In many ways, this was quite correct. The New State did indeed fulfil the mandate of much of the Nationalist coalition, especially the CEDA-JAP. The Alfonsist monarchists would not get the restoration they desired. Carlism certainly would not see a return of their pretender and many Carlists were infuriated by the decree, even to the point of rumours of a withdrawal of troops. Old shirt Falangists rightly feared the emasculation of their programme, some chanting 'Long live the Falange without the "T"!'¹⁴⁶ but the ideological purity of José Antonio's minuscule, tight-knit coterie had long given way to a broader fascistic alliance, manned by *japistas* and newcomers. The JAP by contrast would bemoan only the eclipse of Gil Robles, a man already discredited in many eyes – and even then its complaints were extremely muted. The Falange manned the theatrical barricades of Francoism, but the new régime represented former *cedistas* and *japistas* too.

The JAP was comfortable with the content and the form of the New State. It had been forced to sacrifice its existence as a party and the political career of Gil Robles was over but the differences that made it a victim within the Nationalist zone were at last hidden within a single party. While the Falange and the Carlists were credited with forming the new state party, the majority of *japistas* had long accepted that they were not going to receive recognition and welcomed the very union they had appealed for, imposed not by the Falange but by the army. Given the hostility to which they had been subjected, anonymity was appreciated. Moreover, the CEDA-JAP had fundamentally been a vehicle for mobilisation towards a goal that was now achieved. The left had been smashed, liberal democracy destroyed and the state it had been largely the one it had fought for: nationalist, confessional and authoritarian, organised along the corporative lines that the JAP had demanded, promising social justice and the unbreakable unity of the *Patria*. The CEDA's political *modus operandi* had been to pursue these goals from within the Republican system, to turn democracy against itself. Electoral defeat and military rebellion made this tactic redundant and contributed to its political downfall but not to the obliteration of its programme. Its political survival had hinged on a tactic but its political project could be satisfied by different means and in the end the CEDA's accidentalism applied to itself. It passed to others to carry out its programme.

'A new era begins', declared one *japista* editorial, published alongside a reproduction of the decree of unification. 'This has always been our aim, before and after the beginning of the glorious liberating movement of the Fatherland. No more, no less.'¹⁴⁷ That this was yet another barely disguised bid to ingratiate itself with the régime does not make it any less accurate. Publicly, Gil Robles enthusiastically welcomed the unification, writing to Franco on 24 April of his satisfaction at being able to 'place in your hands the whole movement'. In doing this, he wrote,

I believe that I interpret with fidelity the spirit of those who, since 1931, died in the civilian battle, the precursor of the current epic, of those that upon the outbreak of this movement of salvation renounced their party personality to fill the ranks of the army as volunteers and of those who, with the emblem of Acción Popular on their chests, know how to fight and die, without expecting a mention or any recompense . . . this is not a dissolution but an integration: the blood of all has been equally generous and no one can debate the right of every combatant to the gratitude of Spain.¹⁴⁸

Gil Robles then sent instructions to members to await orders for dissolution, impressing upon them the need to follow official orders only, reflecting a fear that Falangists would take advantage of the decree to the detriment of the *Juventud*.¹⁴⁹ The JAP's newspaper in Segovia immediately closed down 'just as it was getting read more than ever before', its editorial explaining: 'Acción Popular, here like everywhere in Spain, has reached the end of its historic cycle, leaving history to judge its ideals, its tactics and its men . . . rarely has a political party thrown itself into battle with greater purity of ideals.'¹⁵⁰

While the JAP embraced the unification warmly in public, Gil Robles's insistence upon the party's sacrifice and the bloody generosity of its members hinted at irritation over the failure of the decree to make any mention whatsoever of the CEDA or the JAP. In many cases, this oversight also served to shut the door on the CEDA's full participation in the new state, handing the reigns to Falangists and Carlists. For almost a year, the JAP had demanded nothing but recognition; it had pleaded, almost grovelled, for it. Instead, it had been disbanded in silence, a forgotten irrelevance. Its rhetoric of 'Milicias of Sacrifice' rang truer than ever. That, the JAP declared, 'is how history shall remember us', but history would in fact barely remember them at all.¹⁵¹ Nor, more importantly, had Franco or Ramón Serrano Suñer. The latter's own *japista* past slipped into oblivion.

The bulk of the JAP gladly accepted the unification but the response

was not unanimous. One official of the nascent state in Asturias complained that 'despite being completely undermined in terms of its mass base and popularity, [Acción Popular] continues to resist its disappearance.' Although some would complain that *japistas* who had 'fought honourably in Falange and Carlist units later showed their old colours again,' this was not born of a desire to propose an alternative power base, the report continued. Rather, it was born of distaste at their treatment and fear over those who were now their superiors: Acción Popular operated a kind of 'inoffensive clandestinity, irritated at the influence gathered by some of those that now govern over them.'¹⁵²

On the front, where militias were disbanded, the sensations were similar. Emigio del Fraile Carrillo, 'previously captain of the JAP and now just another militiaman at the service of God and Spain', bade an emotional and bitter farewell to his troops, those 'brave young men' with whom he had served. 'Upon fulfilling the order to leave you, brothers of the JAP, and being obedient to an order that I must not question but accept proudly and contentedly, I wish to say goodbye to those who honoured me with your collaboration . . . to all the heroic provincial *jefes*, whose hearts beat like mine and like yours with an imperial rhythm . . . to the militiamen of the rearguard (so ready to sacrifice themselves, so silently heroic!):

The Generalísimo, upon signing the decree of unification, . . . requires of us blind obedience and I, as a good Spaniard and a good militiaman who wants the best for his Fatherland and the victory of her glorious army, will go wherever they send me. I offer my life in the holocaust of salvation of our beloved Spain, as you all must do. Do not waver on the path providentially laid out by our *Caudillo* – the only one possible for our Patria to become what we all dream of. I want to remind you of our brother who had his arm shot off on 30 May in Alto de Leon, picked it up, waved it and shouted "¡Viva España! For God and Spain!" You must follow [those] who put the name of Spain so highly.

Militiamen! My brothers! Obedience. Sacrifice. Think of God and Spain. Fold away your glorious khaki shirts [*camisas pardas*], like the fields of Castilla, which know how to forget themselves, to think of God and Spain. These shirts of sacrifice, that have known nothing of rancour, of vanity, true to their identity as Catholics and Spaniards in joining this glorious national militia – put yourselves at the disposition of the *Caudillo*, saying to him: For God and Spain, at your orders, my general!

And to you, martyrs of duty and our ideal, brothers who were cut down by bullets! Glorious heroes of the cause! Remembering you, my words fill with emotion. I pray for you, and that is the greatest homage we can pay

to your glorious memory. Long live Spain! Long live the army! Long live [our] national militia! ; *Viva siempre España!*¹⁵³

Calzada Rodríguez, the man who had been the JAP's effective leader for the previous six months, was furious. His complaints at the failure even to mention the JAP earned him an internal exile in Colindres, Santander. 'You [pl.] will have to overcome the absolutely justified desire to protest that has been sparked in your soul by such an unnecessary lack of respect [*desprecio*] and so unjustified an omission,' Gil Robles implored him in a private letter. 'We part having fulfilled our duty in an organisation to which we voluntarily joined. Now we must continue collaborating with this national labour from within the body created by a power that is greater than ours. Do not hesitate on this new path, do all you can with dignity and disinterest.'¹⁵⁴ To the leader of the JAP in Orense, José Pérez Ávila, Gil Robles similarly wrote:

Even though for us it has been, logically, painful, we have the satisfaction of accepting loyally and with discipline the dispositions of the Chief of State. We have given Spain the ultimate service that as a collective could have been asked of us. Now the individual obligation, which we happily fulfil, is to give the Fatherland the service it requires of us. This is what you [pl.] have done from the first moment and what many thousands of our friends, always faithful to the inspiring spirit of our old political activities, have done.¹⁵⁵

Even serving Spain would prove more difficult than Gil Robles imagined. Denouncements against the rump of the CEDA continued.¹⁵⁶ In June, Pérez Ávila wrote to Calzada Rodríguez expressing his disappointment that despite supplying Nationalist officials with complete lists of militiamen under his control, *japistas* were not being allowed to serve in the army. 'You can imagine why', he remarked sadly. Calzada Rodríguez certainly could; his own attempts to make his way to the front from Colindres were consistently blocked. Yet, although the full implementation of the decree of unification would take some time, resentment persisted and some party bodies continued to function in the Nationalist zone as the war raged on until 1939, the JAP had ceased to exist. After five years in the front line, it had served its function, as Pérez Ávila recognised. 'I have got a clear conscience because we have fulfilled our duties at all times,' he wrote. 'We are closing our centre down now, as is natural. All we ask is that God does not forget Spain.'¹⁵⁷

Conclusion

'A magnificent harvest'

The Destruction of Democracy in Spain

The decree of unification formally brought the JAP's brief political existence to a close. With the 'most intense emotion of my life', José María Gil Robles bade farewell to the *Juventud* in an open letter sent to Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez, chief of the JAP militias in Spain – the crumbling remains of a mass movement that had helped to change the country's politics forever but was now virtually an irrelevance. If the JAP's rise had been meteoric, its fall had been even more rapid. Forcibly subsumed within a new state party whose patrons were the very Carlists and Falangists who had themselves been an irrelevance little over a year before, neither the JAP nor the CEDA were so much as mentioned in the decree, even though unification had been the work of an 'eminently *japista*' CEDA parliamentary deputy.

'We were born in especially painful circumstances, obliged to act within a régime that we had not established and carry out our duties within a system which clashed fundamentally with our convictions,' Gil Robles wrote. 'As at that time there was no choice, we began our arduous task with our sights set on God and the Fatherland even though we knew that . . . there was a good chance of failure. So bleak a horizon did not bother us: convinced that the magnificent explosion of national feeling that had to surge up one day would not be possible without the most intense sowing of our ideals in experiences which were as painful as they were necessary, we dedicated it all our effort. Today, as we contemplate the magnificent harvest, we see our work amply rewarded.' There was, he added, just one task left for the movement to fulfil in order to sow the seed of a 'new life': now, it must die a 'blessed death'.¹

This emotional farewell contained a basic truth. The story of the JAP and the CEDA is in a sense the story of Spain's political experience in the 1930s: for the first time the right embraced mass politics, rising against the

Republic and disappearing with its destruction, its task largely fulfilled. Acción Popular was born at a time of disarray for the right, mobilising under a Catholic and patriotic banner and taking inspiration from the anti-liberal tradition of Spanish political Catholicism and the authoritarian trends of European right-wing politics. Although it recognised the new régime as an inescapable reality, it did not go into the Republic with any enthusiasm, instead seeking to reform it in such a way as to wipe out the legacy of its very foundation.

The need for intense mobilisation in order to build a political presence, capture the régime and stand up against socialism meant bringing the previously unenfranchised into politics. Women would provide the voters of the right,² youth would provide its vanguard and many of its activists. While the JAP was initially conceived as a mere appendage of the party, its foundation nonetheless represented a challenge to traditional conservatism, unleashing a new generation on politics that would not settle for a secondary role. The JAP underwent a profound process of radicalisation and mobilisation, bringing paramilitarism to politics and calling with ever more determination for the establishment of an authoritarian, corporatist state that would build a 'new' Spain, not merely protect the status quo. Indeed, 'social justice' became an obsession and a public source of conflict with the CEDA.

The JAP's virulent demands for corporatism – demands that much of the wider party increasingly made their own – contradicted the tactic of accidentalism, playing a vital role in the CEDA's decomposition when the Popular Front won the general elections in February 1936. But the JAP's experience demonstrated that accidentalism and catastrophism were not necessarily mutually exclusive; rather they were different and flexible tactics towards similar goals. The CEDA-JAP was not entirely accidentalist, nor were monarchists, Carlists and Falangists entirely catastrophist, each standing for elections and participating in the political life of the Republic despite their more unambiguous rejection of the régime. Had the CEDA gained power there is little doubt that the catastrophist right would have sought to come on board, just as the accidentalist right joined the armed struggle to overthrow the democratic régime.

Gil Robles twice sounded out the military about a coup and virtually the entire party backed the rising. When the leader of the Derecha Regional Valenciana, Luis Lucía, defended the Republic on 18 July he stood alone: indeed, it is precisely the singularity of his actions that made them noteworthy and the subject of such debate. Furthermore, the CEDA's tactical acceptance of the Republic was very different to its enthusiastic support for the rising, despite Gil Robles's subsequent claims to have backed it only

when he realised it was unavoidable. The CEDA leader and the party's rank and file preferred to avoid violence, taking a legal path to the conquest of the state just as Mussolini and Hitler had done, but they celebrated the rising's aims as their own. Gil Robles ordered all members to immediately put themselves on the side of the rebelling military, while many *cedistas* and *japistas* had conspired to bring the coup in the first place.

Moreover, it was the mobilisation of the right – carried out by the CEDA and the JAP – that had made the Nationalist success possible in the first place, creating the necessary conditions and providing much of the social basis of the rising. At the Covadonga rally in September 1934 José María Fernández Ladreda had eulogised the JAP for awakening 'the dormant conscience of the nation and having infused the masses . . . with love of Spain.'³ The war represented the continuation of the JAP's crusade against the Republic: for many *cedistas* and *japistas*, its outcome was indeed a 'magnificent harvest'. Although some grew frustrated at the lack of recognition they received for their sacrifices, they welcomed the cause as their own, rightly insisting that in war they were achieving through arms what they had previously sought to achieve through the ballot box: a Catholic, nationalist state that would crush the left and forge the resurgence of the Fatherland. The New State was largely what the JAP had always wanted; the price it paid was its own disappearance.

When democracy failed to deliver success in February 1936, it did not bring an end to the JAP's project but it did bring an end to the CEDA's tactic. Defeat was a huge blow for a party that already lacked coherence and was built primarily on the premise of securing power. The relationship between the JAP and sections of the CEDA, which had been fractured for some time, became more precarious and the Confederación began a process of decomposition. Wide swathes of the CEDA and large numbers of the JAP saw the need now to abandon the accidentalism that they had grudgingly accepted, convinced that legalism had become redundant.

Although most *japistas* were inactive during the spring, either prepared to wait for the military to return them to power or paralysed by defeat and the inertia of the party, significant numbers did act. Unshackled by accidentalism, *japistas* now took another step towards fascistisation, engaging in increased street violence and conspiring against the régime. Moreover, both Gil Robles and the JAP's national committee were involved in overthrowing the Republic. José María Pérez de Laborda, the JAP president who had fought to maintain the *Juventud*'s fascistised 'purity' in the face of liberal and conservative 'infiltration', took on an especially active role, providing a link to military and civilian plotters amongst the army, the Falange, and the Carlists, as well as delivering orders to *japistas*. Here, the

JAP achieved the 'pact' with the 'extreme right' that it had called for during the election campaign.

Nonetheless, the CEDA maintained a parliamentary profile and the contradiction between legalism and conspiracy could still be problematic, particularly as Gil Robles had adopted an ostensibly moderate tone in the wake of defeat, designed to buy time and protect himself and his party in the short term. This on-going contradiction was revealed by the Barcelona *japista* who recalled that at a meeting in Madrid to discuss plans for involvement in the conspiracy, the CEDA 'officially adopted an inhibitive attitude, but in truth supported the JAP.' 'The CEDA', recalled another *japista*, 'gave the JAP express permission to take part in the Glorious National Movement [*sic*] but said it needed to appear independent and disconnected.'⁴ This was not an insurmountable problem for those who received such privileged, first hand information but in the context of a party that was undergoing a process of decomposition, communication was far from easy and many *japistas* did not know what was going on. Acting decisively against a régime that they equated with communism therefore meant departing the CEDA and large numbers of *japistas* thus sought out a political home amongst Carlists and, more importantly, Falangists.

However, this membership transfer did not represent the *en masse* departure of *japistas* so often repeated in historiography, although for the Falange it was a colossal boost that offered the prospect of political success for the first time. Rather than occurring in the spring, a definitive exodus from the JAP did not in fact occur until the rising. The JAP had been a more ambiguous conspiratorial partner during the ominous spring than had the Carlists and the Falange and deferred to the military, failing to seek the guarantees of party political independence that José Antonio had done and choosing instead to subsume itself within the army during the spring and the vital early days of the rising. Unlike the other civilian partners within the Nationalist coalition, neither the CEDA nor the JAP had foreseen the political challenge that the rising presented and Gil Robles's already plummeting stock was confirmed by the tactical blunder he committed at the start of the war, earning him the opprobrium of many in the Nationalist zone. While the Falange and the Carlists responded quickly to the war, mobilising intensively, the JAP reacted too late. Any subsequent attempts to become a major political player were stillborn and further undermined by the virulent campaign that built against them. Almost overnight, the JAP had disappeared; soon it would be forgotten.



In the course of an interview with the *Heraldo de Madrid* in February 1934 the JAP's *JEFE* declared that the movement was not fascist 'despite what you think.' The interviewer's response was telling: 'We think that,' he replied, 'because everybody says it.'⁵ This was hardly surprising. The similarities between the JAP and fascism were profound. Its ideology of extreme populist nationalism was based upon the concept of bringing about the salvation and the re-birth of the Fatherland, achieved through a national crusade that would 'annihilate' the anti-Spain, bury liberalism and democracy and impose an authoritarian, corporate state. Stylistically, the JAP was reminiscent of fascism, too, with mass rallies, a uniform, a salute, a leadership cult around Gil Robles, a codified programme encapsulated in 19 Points, and the adoption of violence as a means of political discourse. Even their social profiles were markedly similar.

Yet 'Spanish fascism' has always been seen as synonymous with Falange Española and the *Juventud*'s fundamental significance for José Antonio's political prosperity has been virtually overlooked. Equally, studies of generic fascism, where they have approached Spain at all, have rarely gone beyond the Falange to examine the JAP, while attempts to establish the nature of the Franco régime have tended to reject the fascist label on the basis of the emasculation of José Antonio's party.⁶ But, as Martin Blinkhorn insists, fascism does not cease to be fascism when it broadens its base or compromises in order to win power.⁷ This is all the more true if those new recruits with which it broadens its base are already compatible with its programme and personality, as was the case when members of the JAP contributed to the Falange's spectacular take-off during the spring of 1936 and, more importantly still, after 18 July. While the Falange was swamped with militants that 'old shirts' considered inferior, the influx of *japistas* did not present an enormous challenge to its fascist identity.

That establishing a universally accepted definition of fascism is nigh on impossible has become something of a cliché. And, the JAP can be analysed from within fascist ideal-types, whether Roger Griffin's concept of palenogenesis, Stanley Payne's stress on political and organisational style and fascism's 'negations', or Roger Eatwell's definition of fascism as a syncretic ideology propagating a 'holistic-nationalist radical Third Way'.⁸ Rebirth was central to its ideology, a fascistic style central to its identity, and a desire to exterminate political opponents central to its appeal. Its propagandists claimed constantly to be the vanguard of a 'new' politics not characterised by 'right' or 'left', that would steer a path between labour and capital, uniting them in the fulfilment of Spain's 'destiny'. Indeed, it was the JAP's commitment to 'social justice' on the one hand and authoritarian,

belligerent nationalism on the other that did most to bring its differences with the CEDA to the surface.

Those that have touched upon the JAP have concluded that it was not fascist but merely suffered from what Ricardo de la Cierva has called the 'vertigo of fascism'.⁹ Although the JAP has never been the subject of a full study, it has been assumed that it was neither totalitarian enough nor violent enough to have been fascist or that it was too Catholic, too reactionary. This has often been rooted in the fact that it stopped short of the Falange, which was more radical, more 'fascist' in every way: younger, more committed to state socialism, more violent, and more open in its determination to smash the Republic. Even José Antonio was more charismatic than Gil Robles and considerably better looking. The Falange was certainly more combative than the JAP and José Antonio had a point when it called the *Juventud's* fascism 'decaffeinated'.¹⁰ But the boundary between the JAP and the Falange was both fluid and extremely fine, something that was made clear in the simultaneous collapse of the JAP and take off of the Falange.

This concomitance suggests that the greater radicalism of the Falange does not in itself serve as definitive proof that the JAP was not fascist. Yet historiography seems to have come to exactly this conclusion – as if the fascism of one party automatically negates the fascism of another, as if the existence of two fascist movements is somehow inconceivable. In contrast, a case can certainly be made to argue that when they joined the Falange, *japistas* might have become *more* fascist but they did not *become* fascist or that, if they did, this was merely a logical and very small step. Moreover, ideological nuances played little part in the fears of the left or the political decisions of young right-wingers in the 1930s and, whatever its strict doctrinal position, the JAP served both as a *fascist threat* and a *fascist option* during the Republic. It cannot be removed from the fascist phenomenon in Spain.

The JAP underwent an intense process of fascistisation and what ultimately limited this process was the CEDA. This was not the result of the CEDA making a determined effort to prevent the JAP from taking a more fascistic turn, although some moderate sections of the party did fear its increased radicalisation while hardline conservative sections destroyed its social 'leftism'. Rather, it was a product of the JAP's awkward and increasingly problematic dependence upon the CEDA and the compromise imposed upon it by the legal approach to power. The Falange was a youth movement unconstrained by a parent party, let alone one that formed part of a parliamentary coalition; the JAP was a youth movement limited by its parent party, its fascistic development arrested by the CEDA. This was reflected in José Calvo Sotelo's on-going rejection of Gil Robles and his

support for the JAP, which he clearly believed might take a more decidedly authoritarian turn if it was liberated from the CEDA. It was also reflected in the Falange's attacks on the JAP for not quite cutting it as proper fascists.

When the CEDA collapsed in the spring of 1936 the JAP was liberated, becoming immersed in conspiracy or war. It thus became indistinguishable from fascism. But by then it was too late because it had become subsumed into a broader fascistic alliance. Having returned from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in 1933 Gil Robles asked himself: 'who knows, maybe the task of harmonising the immortal principals of our Catholic tradition with these new currents . . . will fall to our youth.'¹¹ During the Second Republic, that was exactly what would happen, with disastrous consequences for democracy in Spain. And, as war broke out, the task of manning the New State would fall to them too but by then they flooded the ranks of a different party.

Notes

Introduction Responding to the Republic

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- 2 Gil Robles, prologue to José de Medina y Togores, *Un año de Cortes constituyentes* (Madrid: Ibérica, 1932), p. vii.
- 3 Orestes Endériz García, 'Memorias', unpublished manuscript, pp. 13, 70 (I am grateful to Don Orestes for supplying me with a copy of his memoirs and for our discussions).
- 4 José Manuel Gutiérrez Inclán, 'Azaña: "España ha dejado de ser católica"', in *Tiempo de Historia*, no. 23 (October 1976). The Republic's constitution in Enrique Tierno Galván (ed.), *Leyes políticas españolas fundamentales, 1808–1978*, 2nd edn. (Madrid: Tecnos, 1979), pp. 174–91. Vicente Carcel Ortí, *La persecución religiosa en España durante la Segunda República (1931–1939)*, 2nd edn. (Madrid: Rialp, 1990); José M. Sánchez, *Reform and Reaction: The Politico-Religious Background of the Spanish Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962). In contrast, Frances Lannon, 'The Church's Crusade Against the Republic', in Preston (ed.), *Revolution and War in Spain*, pp. 35–58; Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
- 5 *¡Presente!*, no. 1, 31 March 1935; J.A.P.: *Órgano nacional de las Juventudes de Acción Popular de España*, no. 38, 26 October 1935.
- 6 *El Debate*, 29 April 1931; Richard A. H. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic and Revolution, 1931–1936* (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1970), p. 40.
- 7 For a brief outline of how Acción Popular responded so quickly, see Ricardo Chueca Rodríguez and José Ramón Montero Gibert, 'El fascismo en España: elementos para una interpretación', in *Historia Contemporánea*, no. 8 (1992): *Las élites en la España contemporánea*. On the institutional interdependence of the JAP and Catholic bodies, see José Ramón Montero Gibert, *La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la II República*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Revista del Trabajo, 1977), vol. I, pp. 583–95; Luis Miguel Moreno Fernández, *Acción Popular Murciana: la derecha confesional en Murcia durante la II República* (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1987), pp. 124–8, 160–3; Rafael Valls Montés, 'La Derecha Regional Valenciana: burguesía y catolicismo en el País Valenciano (1930–1936)' (Unpublished PhD thesis, Universidad de Valencia, 1990), p.

- 348; Manuel Pérez Montoya, *Las derechas almerienses durante la II República: El primer bienio (1931–1933)* (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses/Diputación de Almería, 1991), pp. 140–2.
- 8 Felipe Alfonso Rojas Quintana, 'Enrique Gil y Robles: La respuesta de un pensador católico a la crisis del 98', in *Hispania Sacra*, vol. LIII, no. 107 (2001), pp. 213–27.
- 9 José María Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1968), pp. 79–80.
- 10 Archivo Gil Robles (hereafter AGR), Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona (copy also held at the Universidad de San Pablo CEU in Madrid), Gil Robles, 'Mi relación con el general Franco', unpublished manuscript, p. 3.
- 11 Archivo Histórico Provincial (hereafter AHP) Cáceres/Fondos Gobierno Civil (hereafter FFGC)/Caja 9, Derecha Regional Agraria.
- 12 Indeed, it was the discovery of a clandestine meeting between Alfonso XIII and Gil Robles's envoy José María Valiente, the leader of the JAP, that led to Valiente's departure from the party in 1934. José María Valiente Soriano, 'Por qué me fui de la CEDA', serialised in *La Actualidad Española*, nos. 943–946, 29 January 1970 to 19 February 1970, respectively pp. 19–24, 75–8, 25–9, 9–12.
- 13 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 48–9.
- 14 *Programa aprobado en el congreso de Acción Popular y entidades adheridas y afines convocado para constituir la CEDA, enero-marzo 1933* (Madrid: Editorial Ibérica, 1933); José Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular (estudios de biología política)* (Madrid: Hermanos Saez, 1935), pp. 447 ff.
- 15 Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 107, 113; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 86; Miguel Artola, *Partidos y programas políticos*, vol. I: *Partidos políticos* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1974), p. 617.
- 16 *El Debate*, 15 November 1934.
- 17 *La Epoca*, 24 February 1934, cit. José Ramón Montero, 'Entre la radicalización antidemocrática y el fascismo: Las Juventudes de Acción Popular', in *Studia Histórica*, vol. V, no. 4, 1987, p. 49.
- 18 Juan Arrabal, *José M^a Gil Robles: su vida, sus ideas, su actuación*, 2nd edn. (Ávila: Sevén Martín Díaz, 1935), p. 36; Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. II, pp. 519–21.
- 19 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 20, 1 March 1934.
- 20 Ismael Saz Campos, *Fascismo y Franquismo* (Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2004), pp. 84–6.
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- 22 Olga Cuquerella Gamboa, 'Las Juventudes de Acción Popular', in Alfonso Bullón de Mendoza and Luis Eugenio Togoies (eds.), *Revisión de la guerra civil española* (Madrid: Actas, 2002); Cuquerella Gamboa, '"Primero la razón. Frente a la violencia, la razón y la fuerza". Juventudes de la CEDA', in *Aportes (Revista de historia de la Universidad de San Pablo – CEU)*, vol. 43, no. XV (2000).

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- 25 Laferriere, 'Estudio crítico', p. 240.
- 26 Julio Prada Rodríguez, '... "Que es la voz de la tierra y los muertos, y es mandato de España y de Dios": Las JAPA en Ourense (1934–1937)', in *Minius* (Ourense), VII (1999).
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- 29 Javier Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana en España* (Madrid: Sarpe, 1986), vol. I.
- 30 Emilio Grandío Seoane, *Los orígenes de la Derecha Gallega: La C.E.D.A. en Galicia (1931–1936)* (La Coruña: Edicions O Castro, 1998); Leandro Álvarez Rey, *La derecha en la II República: Sevilla, 1931–1936* (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla/Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1993); Moreno Fernández, *Acción Popular Murciana*; Mary Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1930–1936* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); Julian Sanz Hoya, *De la resistencia a la reacción: las derechas frente a la Segunda República (Cantabria, 1931–1936)* (Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 2006).
- 31 Francisco Torres García, 'Actuación de Gil Robles en la guerra civil', in *Historia16*, no. 186 (October 1991), which is virtually identical to his subsequent contribution, 'Entre la supervivencia, la reconstrucción y la unificación: la política de la CEDA (Acción Popular), 1936–1937', in Bullón de Mendoza and Togores (eds.), *Revisión de la guerra civil española*. These pieces (and a conference paper) are based on the private papers of Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez. Unfortunately, Torres García's aim to publish these papers with a biographical essay has not happened. Nor have I consulted the papers directly.
- 32 Stanley Payne, *Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977* (London: Wisconsin University Press, 1999); Payne, 'Social Composition and Regional Strength of the Spanish Falange', in Larsen and Hagtvet (eds.), *Who Were the Fascists?: Social Roots of European Fascism* (Bergen, 1980); Javier Jiménez Campo, *El fascismo en la crisis de la II República* (Madrid: CIS, 1979); Martin Blinkhorn, 'The Iberian States', in Detlef Mühlberger (ed.), *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 320–49. Payne, 'Social Composition', briefly mentions the CEDA but does not offer the JAP as an explanation of the paucity of Falange support.
- 33 As well as Preston, Montero and Robinson above, see Antonio Elorza, 'El nacionalismo conservador de José María Gil Robles', in his *La utopía anarquista*

bajo la Segunda República (precedido de otros trabajos) (Madrid: Ed. Ayuso, 1978); José María García Escudero, 'Gil Robles: la tentación totalitaria', in his *Vista a la derecha* (Madrid: Rialp, 1988); Ricardo de la Cierva, *La derecha sin remedio: de la prisión de Jovellanos al martirio de Fraga* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1987). Samuel Pierce's work on the CEDA is forthcoming.

- 34 It is notable how often political affiliation is recorded in these files simply as 'de derechas' (right-wing). The way these reports skewed the reality of involvement in the rising is revisited with specific reference to the JAP in Chapter V.
- 35 Cf. Juan Arrabal, *José M^a Gil Robles*; A. Boissel, *Un jefe: Gil Robles* (San Sebastián: Librería Internacional, 1934); Francisco Casares, *La CEDA va a gobernar (notas y glosas de un año de vida pública nacional)* (Madrid: Gráfica Administrativa, 1934); Tomás de la Cerdá y de Bárcenas, *La negación de España: esbozo de la crisis de nuestra nacionalidad* (Madrid: Publicaciones de la JAP/Ediciones FAX, 1934); Julián Cortes Cavanillas, *Gil Robles, ¿monárquico?* (Madrid?: No publisher, n.d. 1934 [and hereafter for n.d. (no date) and year, no official date given but context allows date alert]; Abelardo Fernández Arias, *¡¡Gil Robles: la esperanza de España!!* (Madrid: Unión Poligráfica, 1936); Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*. This list is not exhaustive. In contrast, there are no biographies of José Antonio Primo de Rivera published during the Republic. See, José Antonio's prologue to J. Pérez de Cabo, *Arriba España*, 2nd edn. (Orense: La Región, 1939 [first published: Madrid, 1935]).
- 36 Cf. Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*; Gil Robles, *La monarquía por la que yo luché (1941–1954)* (Madrid: Taurus, 1976); David Dunthorn, 'The Prieto–Gil Robles Meeting of October 1947: Britain and the Failure of the Anti-Franco Coalition, 1945–1950,' in *European History Quarterly*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2000). This is reflected in the PhD of one Gil Robles apologist, who presents the CEDA leader as a brilliant and sincere Christian democrat, echoing Gil Robles' own judgments throughout. F. Alfonso Rojas Quintana, 'José María Gil Robles: una biografía política' (Unpublished PhD thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 2000).
- 37 AGR/Gil Robles to M. R. A. Du Theil, 1 March 1938.
- 38 Pablo Beltrán de Heredia has given over much of his life to the political memory and rehabilitation of Gil Robles, helping to write *No fue posible la paz*, editing Gil Robles's *Discursos parlamentarios* and privately publishing a number of texts dedicated to the former CEDA leader since his death, which he personally distributes. I am grateful to him for his generosity.
- 39 H. Torres Cava, *¡Presente y Adelante! (hacia el nuevo Estado español): Artículos publicados en el diario Extremadura con motivo del I congreso nacional de Juventudes de Acción Popular* (Madrid: Imp. V. Huerta, 1934); Tomás de la Cerdá y de Bárcenas, *Trabajo y capital: según las doctrinas de Leon XIII y Pío XI* (Madrid: Ediciones Fax, n.d. 1934); Luis Peñafiel Alcázar and José Sánchez Moreno, *¡España: levántate y anda! (Idiario de la JAP)* (Murcia: Editorial La Verdad, 1934).
- 40 AHP Almería/FFGC/Asoc. Pol./Asoc. no. 1427 (Juventud de Acción Popular).

Also, Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze y Muñoz, *Católicos, monárquicos y fascistas en Almería durante la Segunda República* (Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almerienses, 1998), pp. 38–43, 64–8.

- 41 AHP Segovia/FFGC/Libro-Registro de Asociaciones; AHP Pontevedra/FFGC/Libro-Registro; AHP Zamora/FFGC/Libro-Registro. In Pontevedra there were at least ten other bodies organised and in Segovia there were at the very least nine others in late 1935. In Almería, too, there was only one JAP officially constituted, yet there were at least six others in the province. In Asturias, the register shows no entry for the JAP even though the same archive holds three files on JAP organisations; from the capital Oviedo and the towns of Moreda and Casomera. Archivo Histórico de Asturias, Oviedo/FFGC/Libro-Registro and Legs. 20056, 20112, and 20114. There were at least a further eleven JAPs organised in the province.
- 42 Only Julio Prada appears to have fully consulted the Fondo Pérez Ávila, although Emilio Grandío Seoane has made use of it. Xulio Prada, "'Que es la voz de la tierra'"; Grandío Seoane, *La C.E.D.A. en Galicia*.

I The Crusade to Save the Fatherland

- 1 C.E.D.A., no. 24, 1 May 1934; *Gaceta Regional*, 20 April 1934.
- 2 Torres Cava, *¡Presente y Adelante!*, p. 6.
- 3 *La Región*, 11 September 1934.
- 4 C.E.D.A., no. 24, 1 May 1934.
- 5 Arrabal, *José M^a Gil Robles*, p. 278.
- 6 J.A.P. (Ávila), no. 22, 22 April 1934.
- 7 A year later, the JAP claimed that 60,000 had attended but most party sources calculated 50,000. J.A.P., no. 15, 27 April 1935; *El Debate*, 24 April 1934; J.A.P., no. 20, 1 June 1935.
- 8 Henry Buckley, *Life and Death of the Spanish Republic* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1940), pp. 126–7; *Fuerza (El Socialista supplement)*, May 1934. One British left-wing publication declared: 'having promised at least 50,000 . . . only between 15,000 and 20,000 were present, not an impressive mass force.' Harry Gannes and Theodore Repard, *Spain in Revolt* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936), p. 74.
- 9 Casares, *La CEDA va a gobernar*, p. 205.
- 10 C.E.D.A., no. 7, 15 August 1933.
- 11 *F.E.*, 26 April 1934.
- 12 *Luz: Diario de la República*, 23 April 1934. In the same issue, *Luz* published a photograph of a rather smartly dressed man probably in his fifties. The caption read 'Most of the people to be seen were like this', while the daily also carried the impressions of Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, who concurred, stating 'as everyone has noticed, the vast majority of those who attended were older people.'
- 13 *Cieza*, no. 37, 22 December 1935.

- 14 Archivo del Partido Comunista de España, Madrid (hereafter APCE)/Film VI/apart. 91, apart. 97.
- 15 *Política* (Madrid), 13 March 1936, at Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid (hereafter AHN) /Fondos Contemporáneos (hereafter FFCC)/ Causa General (hereafter CG)/Leg. 1500/2. This paper declared that Gil Robles 'has two faces, like Janus' and reminded him that 'all fascists act within legality . . . Hitler used the Reich to destroy it'. Also, *¿Que significan los 19 puntos del congreso de las Juventudes de Acción Popular?* (Madrid: Ed. Juventud Roja [PCE], 1934), at APCE/Film VI, aprt. 91. Paul Preston, 'El "accidentalismo" de la CEDA: ¿aceptación o sabotaje de la Segunda República?', in *Las derechas españolas en el siglo XX: autoritarismo, fascismo y golpismo* (Madrid: Sistema, 1986).
- 16 Mercedes Semolinós, *Hitler y la prensa de la II República española* (Madrid: Siglo XXI/CIS, 1985), p. 152. This book, which is primarily a collection of cuttings, amply reflects *El Debate's* fluctuating but largely favourable response to nazism. Bermúdez Cañete tried to allay fears about freedom of religion, even to the point of highlighting Hitler's own Catholicism [*sic*]. The signing of a concordat with Rome delighted *El Debate*, pp. 151–7, 258–30 and *passim*. This positive reporting did not go unnoticed in Germany. Ángel Viñas, *Franco, Hitler y el estallido de la guerra civil: antecedentes y consecuencias* (Madrid: Alianza, 2001), pp. 157–8.
- 17 Gil Robles claimed 'they call us fascist to agitate opinion against us', *C.E.D.A.*, no. 22, 1 April 1934. *J.A.P.* (Ávila), no. 22, 22 April 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1934; *Arriba*, 13 June 1935 ('we don't doubt that you are yourselves, but what are you?'); *J.A.P.*, no. 25, 20 July 1935. *C.E.D.A.*, no. 21, 15 March 1934.
- 18 Rafael Salazar Alonso, *Bajo el signo de la revolución* (Madrid: San Martín, n.d. 1935), pp. 75–84; Joaquín Arrarás Iribárrén (ed.), *Historia de la cruzada española* (Madrid: Ediciones Españolas, 1940), vol. II, tomo 6º, p. 44; *Gaceta Regional*, 19 April 1934.
- 19 *Antifascismo: frente único contra la concentración fascista de El Escorial* (Madrid, 1934), at Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid, (M/F) A.1305.
- 20 Sandra Souto Kustrín, 'Entre el parlamento y la calle: políticas gubernamentales y organizaciones juveniles en la Segunda República', in *Ayer*, no. 59, 2005 (3): *Juventud y política en la España contemporánea*, p. 112.
- 21 *El Socialista*, 22 and 24 April 1934; *Luz*, 21 and 23 April 1934; *La Nación*, 23 April 1934; Casares, *La CEDA va a gobernar*, p. 206; Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. II, tomo 6º, p. 44.
- 22 *Gaceta Regional*, 24 April 1934; *Luz*, 21, 23, 24 April 1934; *La Nación*, 21, 23 April 1934; *El Debate*, 22, 24 April 1934; *¡Presente!*, no. 1, 31 March 1935; Santiago Carrillo, *Dialogue on Spain* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), p. 38; Victor Frago del Toro, *La España de ayer: recopilación de textos histórico-políticos* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1965), vol. I, pp. 408–9.
- 23 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 24, 1 May 1934; *La Nación*, 21, 23 April 1934; *El Debate*, 22 April 1934; Torres Cava, *¡Presente y Adelante!*, pp. 18–20.

- 24 Cf. Archivo Histórico de la Dirección General de Policía, Madrid (hereafter AHDGP) /H-74805 (Zaragoza) 'Acción Popular (Juventud Feminina)'; J.A.P. (Ávila), no. 5, 30 June 1933; Mary Vincent, 'The political mobilization of women in Salamanca province', in Paul Preston and Frances Lannon (eds.), *Elites and Power in Twentieth-Century Spain: Essays in Honour of Sir Raymond Carr* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Inmaculada Blasco, *Paradojas de la ortodoxia: Política de masas y militancia católica femenina en España (1919-1939)* (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2003), pp. 223-48.
- 25 J.A.P., no. 26, 27 July 1935; *El Debate*, 24 April 1934.
- 26 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 191.
- 27 Ismael Saz Campos, *Mussolini contra la II República: hostilidad, conspiraciones, intervención (1931-1936)* (Valencia: Alfons el Magnanim/Institució Valenciana d'estudis i investigació, 1986), p. 126. *El Debate* openly sided with Italy over Abyssinia. Bowyers, *My Mission to Spain*, p. 155.
- 28 *Gaceta Regional*, 8 September 1933; C.E.D.A., no. 10, 30 September 1933. See also, Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 93, 207-8; Angel Viñas, *La alemania nazi y el 18 de julio* (Madrid: Alianza, 1974), pp. 143-51; Viñas, *Franco, Hitler y el estallido de la guerra civil*, pp. 153-6; *El Debate*, 15 September 1933; Saz, *Mussolini contra la Segunda República española*, pp. 64-5.
- 29 C.E.D.A., no. 7, 15 August 1933.
- 30 *Gaceta Regional*, 8 September 1933; C.E.D.A., no. 10, 30 September 1933.
- 31 Ricardo de la Cierva, *Historia de la guerra civil española*, tomo I: *Perspectivas y antecedentes, 1898-1936* (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1969), p. 260; García Escudero, 'Gil Robles: la tentación totalitaria', p. 212.
- 32 *La Nación*, 17 January 1934; Ricardo de la Cierva, *El fascismo y la derecha radical española* (Madrid: Arc-Eudema, 1997), p. 115; Ian Gibson, *En busca de José Antonio* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1980), p. 98; David Jato, *La rebelión de los estudiantes* (Madrid: Romero-Requejo, 1975), pp. 196-7.
- 33 For a fascist taxonomy stressing style, Stanley Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914-45* (London: UCL Press, 1995, repr. 1997).
- 34 The lyrics were: Forward, with faith in victory / For the Fatherland and for God, to conquer or to die / the laurel of Glory awaits us / because History is with us / the future is with us. / In our hearts enthusiasm burns bright / and in the east another sun rises / May they rise to their feet those that feel / the pride of being Spanish / A past of light and glory /cannot be stained nor lost / because the past is not only memory / but inspiration, order and duty. / Youth of the flourishing Spain, / Fight for the immortal Spain / And offer if necessary, your life / on the altar of our ideal. / Youth, with both arms open / For all who hear this voice, / it is voice of the earth and the dead, / and is the order of Spain and of God. Reproduced, with sheet music, in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 245-9 and C.E.D.A., no. 24, 1 May 1934.

On Pemán, Manuel Tuñón de Lara, 'Cultura y culturas: ideologías y actitudes mentales', in Tuñón de Lara *et al.*, *La guerra civil española: 50 años después*, 3rd edn. (Barcelona: Labor, 1989), pp. 298-9, 472; Alberto Reig

- Tapia, *La cruzada de 1936: mito y memoria* (Madrid: Alianza, 2006), pp. 241–87.
- 35 '26 Points' in *Obras Completas de José Antonio Primo de Rivera* (Madrid: Ediciones FET y de las JONS, 1945), pp. 519–26. English version in Hugh Thomas (ed.), *José Antonio Primo de Rivera: Selected Writings* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), pp. 132–7 and, with commentary, in Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, pp. 127–9. The '27 Points' at AHN/FFCC/CG/Leg. 1501/1, fol. 43.
 - 36 The first reference to the 19 points in *J.A.P.* (Ávila), no. 21, 19 January 1934. Also, *J.A.P.* (Ávila), no. 22, 22 April 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934. English translation in Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 169–70. (My translation differs). The PCE's response in *¿Que significan los 19 puntos?*
 - 37 The *soldado de cuota* system allowed those who could afford it to buy themselves, or their children, out of military service. Stanley Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (London: Oxford University Press/Stamford University Press, 1967), p. 273.
 - 38 This was a response to the Republic's closing of church schools and a direct reiteration of papal teaching. It is analysed below.
 - 39 Instructions for the Santiago rally in Fondo Pérez Ávila (hereafter FPÁv.)/AHP Ourense/Leg. 14703, for Covadonga in *El Carbayón*, 1 September 1934, and for El Escorial in *Gaceta Regional*, 18 April 1934. Manifestos/Instructions for other meetings can be found with the collection of *J.A.P.* at the Hemeroteca Municipal in Madrid, tucked inside no. 41, 16 November 1935; no. 21, 8 June 1935; no. 14, 20 April 1935; no. 15, 27 April 1935. Cf. *C.E.D.A.*, no. 21, 1 March 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 45, 21 December 1935; AHP Lugo/FFGC/Leg. 13051/16, exp. 812; 13051/6, leg. 461, exp. 801; AHN/FFCC/TSR/Leg. 128/1, no. 29; AHN/FFCC/MI/EP/H-13687, fols. 81, 40, 52.
 - 40 *Arriba*, 23 May 1935. For the centrality of paramilitarism to fascism, see Kevin Passmore, "'Boy-scouting for grown-ups'? Para-militarism in the Croix de Feu and the Parti Social Français', in *French Historical Studies*, vol. 19, 1995.
 - 41 Cf. AHN/FFCC/TSR/Leg. 128/1 exp. 8, fols. 6–12; *El Debate*, 12 February 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 2, 10 November 1934; no. 45, 21 December 1935; F. Trigueros Eugelmo, *Los grandes políticos: Gil Robles* (Madrid: Samarán, 1935); Arrabal, *José M^a Gil Robles*; Boissel, *Un jefe*. Amongst the many eulogistic biographies, the most extreme was Fernández Arias, *¡¡Gil Robles!!* (Fernández Arias was also the author of *Hitler: Germany's Saviour*). The JAP also echoed those positive portraits of Gil Robles produced elsewhere, for example, Maurice Lewandowski's article from *Revue des Deux Mondes*, repr. as 'Juicio de Gil Robles', *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos*, no. 6, June 1935, pp. 697–710.
 - 42 *Vidas: biografías anecdóticas*, no 3: *José Maria Gil Robles* (Madrid, 11 February 1936).
 - 43 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 45, 1 May 1934.
 - 44 Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. II, pp. 5–37; *J.A.P.* (Ávila), no. 11, 1 October 1933; no. 22, 22 April 1934.

- 45 *Boletín de Acción Popular Aragonesa*, no. 11, May 1935, cit. Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. II, p. 22.
- 46 Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. II, p. 23, suggests that it is possible but 'unlikely' that 'JEFE' was used to cover censored sections. However, the way it was used – in an *ad hoc*, patchy manner, covering half written articles and often those making personal attacks on figures like Alcalá Zamora – implies that censorship was, originally at least, the motive. *J.A.P.*, no. 45, 21 December 1935; no. 46, 28 December 1935. Robinson considers it a response to censorship, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 362 n. 108.
- 47 *J.A.P.*, no. 45, 21 December 1935.
- 48 *El Socialista*, 25 January 1936.
- 49 *Arriba*, no. 16, 4 July 1935; *Obras Completas de José Antonio*, p. 845.
- 50 Archivo General de la Guerra Civil Española, Salamanca (hereafter AGGCE) Federico Salmón papers, /PS/Madrid/2135, Madrid/1199, *passim*.
- 51 AHN/FFCC/Ministro del Interior (hereafter MI)/ (Expediente Policial (hereafter EP)/H-13687, fol. 40; FPÁv./AHP Ourense/Leg. 14703; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 44, 15 April 1935; *J.A.P.*, no. 47, 4 January 1936; no. 51, 1 February 1936; no. 52, 8 February 1936; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, vol. I, p. 199; Moreno Fernández, *Acción Popular Murciana*, p. 115.
- 52 *J.A.P.*, no. 11, March 1935; Emilio Grandío Seoane, 'A vision da C.E.D.A no xornal "A Nossa Terra" (1931/1936)', in *Historia Nova*, no. I: *Contribución dos xóvenes historiadores de Galicia* (Santiago de Compostela: Tórculo, 1993), pp. 13–14.
- 53 *El Socialista*, 15 February 1936.
- 54 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 48–9. On Gil Robles's oratorical style, A. Boissel, *Un jefe*, pp. 111–17; Trigueros Eugelmo, *Gil Robles*, pp. 11–13; Lewandowski, 'Un juicio', pp. 697–710.
- 55 *Diario de Albacete*, 19 May 1934, cit. Julián Cortes Cavanillas, *Gil Robles, ¿monárquico?* (Madrid?: no publisher, n.d. 1934), p. 151.
- 56 *La Veu de Catalunya*, 1 January 1936, cit. Eduardo Tarragona, *Las elecciones de 1936 en Cataluña* (Barcelona: Bruguera, 1977), pp. 120–1.
- 57 Emphasis added.
- 58 Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 73.
- 59 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 24, 1 May 1934; Rafael Esparza, 'Disciplina – Los jefes no se equivocan', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 254–6.
- 60 Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, p. 199. See also, José Manuel Cuenca Toribio, *Sindicatos y partidos católicos españoles: ¿Fracaso o frustración? 1870–1977* (Madrid: Union, 2000), pp. 127–63.
- 61 Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*, 3rd edn. (London: Arnold, 1993), Ch. 5.
- 62 *J.A.P.*, no. 16, 4 May 1935.
- 63 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 28, 1 July 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934. The monarchist Julián Cortés Cavanillas, *Gil Robles, ¿monárquico?*, pp. 143 n. 1, 180, made this exact same charge against the JAP, describing it as 'a pure fascist-toide copy-cat organisation.'

- 64 C.E.D.A., no. 21, 15 March 1934.
- 65 *Gaceta Regional*, 18 April 1934; *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. II, tomo 6º, p. 44.
- 66 J.A.P. (Ávila), yr. II, no. 22, 22 April 1934.
- 67 C.E.D.A., no. 30, 31 July 1934.
- 68 Photographs of uniformed *japistas* in J.A.P.(Ávila), no. 22, 22 April 1934; *La Nación*, 3 February 1936.
- 69 Endérix García, 'Memorias', p. 71; Letter to the author from Ernesto Andres Vázquez, in annotated response to letter of 25 May 2001.
- 70 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, Libro de Actas; J.A.P., no. 2, 10 November 1934; no. 15, 27 April 1935; no. 25, 20 July 1935.
- 71 J.A.P., no. 1, 27 October 1934; C.E.D.A., no. 21, 15 March 1933. Photos of saluting *japistas* in Ramón Menéndez Pidal (dir.), *Historia de España*, vol. XXXIX: *La Edad de Plata de la cultura española*, tomo I: 1898–1936: *Identidad, Pensamiento y vida* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1993), p. 426; J.A.P., no. 37, 19 October 1935.
- 72 Stanley Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 46.
- 73 Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 333.
- 74 C.E.D.A., no. 46, 15 May 1935.
- 75 *Blanco y Negro*, no. 2226, 11 February 1934; C.E.D.A., no. 19, 15 February 1934.
- 76 Torres Cava, *¡Presente y Adelante!*, p. 6.
- 77 *Informaciones*, 22 January 1934. See, Javier Jiménez Campo, *El fascismo en la crisis de la II República* (Madrid: CIS, 1979), p. 77 n. 98.
- 78 J.A.P., no. 38, 26 October 1935; Tomás de la Cerdá y de Bárcenas, *La negación de España La negación de España: esbozo de la crisis de nuestra nacionalidad* (Madrid: Publicaciones de la JAP/Ediciones FAX, 1934), p. 125.
- 79 C.E.D.A., no. 28, 1 July 1934; Torres Cava, *¡Presente y Adelante!*, pp. 6–7.
- 80 Gilbert Allardyce, 'What fascism is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Concept', in *The American History Review*, vol. 84, no. 2, 1979.
- 81 Douglas W. Foard, *The Revolt of the Aesthetes: Ernesto Giménez Caballero and the Origins of Spanish fascism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989), p. 156.
- 82 J.A.P., no. 45, 21 December 1935. See also, *Gaceta Regional*, 20 April 1934. Onésimo Redondo too rejected the fascist tag because of its foreignness. José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, *Historia de Falange Española de las JONS* (Madrid: Alianza, 2000), p. 89.
- 83 Quoted in David Jato, *La rebelión de los estudiantes*, p. 346. This was also predominantly because of fascism's foreignness. Stanley Payne, 'Spanish Fascism in Comparative Perspective', in Henry Ashby Turner (ed.), *Reappraisals of fascism* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1975), p. 162.
- 84 This has been the accepted orthodoxy since Stanley Payne published *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* in 1961. Also, Payne, 'Spanish fascism in Comparative Perspective'.
- 85 Manuel Álvarez de Toledo, 'Espíritu español. – Pensar en España. – Trabajar

- por España. — Morir por España', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 252–4; *J.A.P.*, no. 15, 27 April 1935.
- 86 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 24, 1 May 1934; *Discurso pronunciado por D. José María Gil Robles en la asamblea de las Juventudes de Acción Popular celebrada en Covadonga el día 9 de septiembre de 1934* (Madrid: Imp. Palomeque, 1934), p. 17. José María Pérez de Laborda repeated Gil Robles's words — adding 'with frenzy' — during the 1936 election campaign: *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 14 February 1936.
- 87 On the centrality of re-birth to all fascist ideologies, Roger Griffin, *The Nature of fascism* (London: Routledge, 1991), chaps. 1 and 2.
- 88 Martin Blinkhorn, 'Spain: The "Spanish Problem" and the Imperial Myth', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1980), pp. 17–18; Blinkhorn, 'Conservatism, Traditionalism and fascism in Spain', pp. 118–37.
- 89 *J.A.P.*, no. 2, 10 November 1934; *J.A.P.* (Ávila) no. 22, 22 April 1934.
- 90 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; no. 6, 5 January 1935; no. 9, 16 February 1935; no. 16, 4 May 1935.
- 91 Archivo Municipal de Sevilla (hereafter AMS) / Archivo Manuel Giménez Fernández (hereafter AMGF) / BVII/18, handwritten notes to speeches made before the JAP.
- 92 Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 9.
- 93 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934.
- 94 Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez, 'Derogación de la legislación sectaria y antiespañola', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 258–61, at 259; Antonio Elorza, 'El nacionalismo conservador de Gil Robles', pp. 262–3.
- 95 Peñafiel Alcázar and Sánchez Moreno, *¡España, levántate y anda!*, p. 21.
- 96 *J.A.P.*, no. 28, 10 August 1935; no. 48, 11 January 1936; Juan Pablo de Lojendio, *El hecho histórico vasco en la unidad imperial de España: conferencia pronunciada el día 8 de febrero de 1935 en el centro de Acción Popular de Madrid por don Juan Pablo de Lojendio, presidente del consejo directivo de Derecha Vasca Autónoma* (Madrid: Estudios Hispánicos, 1935), p. 9.
- 97 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 24, 1 May 1934.
- 98 De Lujendio, *El hecho histórico vasco*, p. 11.
- 99 See, e.g., de la Cerdá, *La negación de España*, pp. 39–79 and *passim*, which locates Spain's identity in the belligerent defence of Catholicism.
- 100 On anti-Semitism, Isabelle Rohr, *The Spanish Right and the Jews: 1898–1945: Antisemitism and Opportunism* (Eastbourne & Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2007), pp. 38–64.
- 101 Douglas Foard, *The Revolt of the Aesthetes: Ernesto Giménez Caballero and the Origins of Spanish Fascism* (New York: Peter Lang, 1989).
- 102 Rohr, *The Spanish Right and the Jews*, pp. 52, 55, 57.
- 103 *J.A.P.*, no. 41, 16 November 1935. Cardinal Gomá described *Hispanidad* as 'something spiritual', founded upon 'tradition, culture, collective temperament [and] history, qualified and harmonised by religio[n]', cit. Mary Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, pp. 223–4.

- 104 *La Ciudad y los Campos* ran articles on 'La Bestia Judia' [the Jewish Beast] throughout the first three months of 1937. No. 263, 30 January 1937; no. 264, 6 February 1937; no. 265, 13 February 1937; no. 266, 20 February 1937; no. 268, 6 March 1937; no. 269, 13 March 1937; no. 270, 20 March 1937.
- 105 *J.A.P.*, no. 35, 5 October 1935.
- 106 *J.A.P.*, no. 8, 2 February 1935; no. 42, 23 November 1935; no. 16, 4 May 1935.
- 107 *Hispanidad* found its most coherent expression in Ramiro de Maeztu's *Defensa de la Hispanidad* (Buenos Aires: Poblet, 1942 [orig. publ. 1934]). *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; de Lojendio, *El hecho histórico vasco*, p. 5.
- 108 *J.A.P.*, no. 36, 12 October 1935; no. 38, 26 October 1935.
- 109 Herbert Southworth sees this as the key distinguishing characteristic between the Falange and the rest of the right (and, indeed, between fascists and conservatives generally). Southworth, 'La Falange: un análisis de la herencia fascista española', in Paul Preston (ed.), *España en crisis: la evolución y decadencia del régimen de Franco* (Madrid: Ediciones FCE, 1977), p. 32 and *passim*.
- 110 *J.A.P.*, no. 37, 19 October 1935. See also, *J.A.P.*, no. 7, 19 January 1935.
- 111 Antonio Santoveña Setién, *Menéndez y Pelayo y las derechas en España* (Santander: Ayuntamiento de Santander/Librería Estudio, 1994), pp. 99–196. Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*, 8 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1945. Orig. published in three vols., 1880–1882), vol. VII, p. 558. Cited from Frances Lannon, 'Modern Spain: The Project of National Catholicism', in *Church History*, no. 18: Stuart Mews (ed.), *Religion and National Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982), p. 567. Carolyn Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), *passim* ('Spain's mission was the defence of Christianity', p. 238).
- 112 AHP Cáceres/FFGC/Asoc./Caja 18, Juventud Católica de Acción Popular, 'Reglamento interno'; Mary Vincent, 'The Martyrs and the Saints: Masculinity and the Construction of the Francoist Crusade', in *History Workshop Journal*, no. 47 (Spring 1999), p. 79. Catholic practice was concentrated among, but not exclusive to, the middle class. Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, pp. 18, 28.
- 113 *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1934; no. 24, 14 July 1935; no. 42, 23 November 1935.
- 114 *J.A.P.*, no. 2, 10 November 1934; no. 5, 22 December 1934; no. 10, 2 March 1935.
- 115 FPÁv./AHP Ourense/Leg. 14703/'Libro de Actas'; AHN/FFCC/MI/EP/H-13687 (no. 2625), fol. 35; *J.A.P.*, no. 24, 14 July 1935; no. 21, 8 June 1935; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 26, 1 June 1934; *Gaceta Regional*, 7 January 1936; *J.A.P.* (Ávila), no. 12, 14 October 1935.
- 116 Xosé Manoel Nuñez Seixas, 'Nations in Arms against the Invader: On Nationalist Discourses During the Spanish Civil War,' in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (eds.), *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish*

- Civil War, 1936–9* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 45–67.
- 117 George Esenwein and Adrian Shubert, *Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 1931–1939* (London: Longman, 1995), p. 169; *J.A.P.*, no. 41, 16 November 1935.
- 118 Gibson, *En busca de José Antonio*, p. 95; Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, pp. 221–5; Ramiro Ledesma Ramos: *Escritos políticos: JONS, 1933–1934* (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1985), p. 49. Gil Robles declared it 'difficult to feel patriotism' if it is removed from its 'spiritual substance', *C.E.D.A.*, no. 35, 1 December 1934.
- 119 Foard, *The Revolt of the Aesthetes*, pp. 78, 155.
- 120 *El Debate*, 24 April 1934; *Gaceta Regional*, 24 April 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1935.
- 121 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 7, 15 August 1933; *J.A.P.*, no. 26, 27 July 1935; *El Debate*, 24 April 1934.
- 122 Peñafiel Alcázar and Sánchez Moreno, *¡España, levántate y anda!*, pp. 11–12.
- 123 *J.A.P.*, no. 12, 30 March 1935.
- 124 *J.A.P.*, no. 19, 25 May 1935; *Cieza*, 3 May 1935.
- 125 Calzada Rodríguez, 'Derogación', in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 260.
- 126 *J.A.P.*, no. 21, 8 June 1935.
- 127 De la Calzada, 'Derogación', in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, p. 259.
- 128 Torres Cava, *¡Presente y Adelante!*, p. 6.
- 129 *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1935; no. 2, 10 November 1934.
- 130 Leaflet repr. in *J.A.P.*, no. 49, 18 January 1936.
- 131 Conclusions reproduced in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 308–9.
- 132 *J.A.P.*, no. 6, 5 January 1935.
- 133 Mary Vincent, 'Spain', in Kevin Passmore (ed.), *Women, gender and fascism in Europe, 1919–45* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 206.
- 134 AHP Almería/GC/Asoc. Pol./Asoc. no. 1427.
- 135 Quirosa-Cheyrouze, *Católicos, monárquicos y fascistas en Almería*, pp. 113–61, 161–7; AHP Lugo/GC/Leg. 13051/16, exp. 812; AHP Logroño/GC/Correspondencia de Santo Domingo de la Calzada, leg. 2.
- 136 Cf. *Estatutos y reglamentos* (Madrid); *Reglamento de la JAP de Córdoba*; AHP Lugo/GC/Leg. 13051/16 (Chantada JAP); AHP Tarragona/GC/Leg. 1790; AHP Almería/GC/Asoc. Pol./Asoc. no. 1427; AHP Logroño/GC/Correspondencia de Santo Domingo de la Calzada, leg. 2; AHP Zamora/GC/Asoc. Pol., leg. 10, no. 1.; FPÁv./AHP Ourense/Leg. 14703, membership lists.
- 137 AHP Almería/GC/Asoc. Pol., asoc. 1427, membership summaries, 1 July 1935, 27 Jan. 1936.
- 138 Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. I, p. 607.; AHP Almería/GC/Asoc. Pol./Asoc. no. 1427; *Arriba*, 11 April 1935; 27 June 1935; 19 July 1934.
- 139 *F.E.*, 19 April 1934; Payne, *Falange*, p. 101.
- 140 Cf. *Estatutos y reglamentos* (Madrid); *Reglamento de la Juventud de Acción Popular de Córdoba* (Córdoba: Imprenta La Española, 1934); AHP Lugo/GC/Leg.

- 13051/16 (Chantada JAP); AHP Tarragona/GC/Leg. 1790; AHP Almería/GC/Asoc. Pol./Asoc. no. 1427 (1934); AHP Logroño/GC/Correspondencia de Santo Domingo de la Calzada, leg. 2; AHP Zamora/GC/Asoc. Pol., leg. 10, no. 1.; AHP Ourense, leg. 14703, Fondo Pérez Ávila.
- 141 J.A.P., no. 17, 11 May 1935.
- 142 C.E.D.A., no. 21, 15 March 1934, pp. 18, 20. Details of the other committees have been gleaned from C.E.D.A., J.A.P., and *El Deute* throughout the period.
- 143 J.A.P., no. 15, 27 April 1935; no. 28, 10 August 1935; C.E.D.A., no. 28, 1 July 1934; no. 45, 1 May 1935; *Gaceta Regional*, 7 January 1936.
- 144 *Gaceta Regional*, 14 January 1936; *Acción*, no. 2, 15 June 1935; J.A.P., no. 26, 27 July 1935.
- 145 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 189–209; Arrabal, *Jose M^a Gil Robles*, pp. 75–82; Casares, *La CEDA va a gobernar*, pp. 208–11; Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 243–50.
- 146 *¡Presente!*, 3 May 1935.
- 147 Adolfo Navarrete, 'Primero la razón. – Frente a la violencia, la razón y la fuerza', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 290–2. The JAP's second programmatic point – 'First reason. In the face of violence, reason and force' – initially envisaged the use of force as the preserve of the 'authorities' or as defensive and the *Juventud* published numerous eulogies of the army and the Civil Guard. See, e.g., C.E.D.A., no. 28, 1 July 1935; J.A.P., no. 5, 22 December 1934; no. 14, 20 April 1935; no. 25, 20 July 1935.
- 148 C.E.D.A., 1 July 1934.
- 149 José Báez, 'Movilización juvenil y radicalización verbalista', p. 96 and *passim*; Báez, 'El ruido y las nueces', *passim*. Others have concurred. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 168; Juan Linz, 'From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain', in Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), *The Breakdown of Democratic Régimes: Europe* (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 192, 207 n. 56.
- 150 Cf. Isidorio Dieguez, 1936: *de febrero a julio: lo que ocurrió en España desde las elecciones hasta la sublevación* (Madrid: Prensa Obrera, n.d. 1936), p. 6; *El Debate*, 26 May 1936; Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, p. 217. See also *No Importa: boletín de los días de persecución*, no. 2, 6 June 1936, which refers to the 'holy crusade of violence'; *Arriba*, 13 June 1935; Eduardo González Calleja, 'Camisas de fuerza: fascismo y paramilitarización', in *Historia Contemporánea*, no. 11 (1994): *La militarización de la política durante la II República*, pp. 54–81 and González Calleja, 'Los pistoleros azules: milicias fascistas y violencia política en la Segunda República española', in *Historia* 16, no. 98 (June 1984), pp. 18–32.
- 151 Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (hereafter USC)/Fondo HISTORGA/Interview with Ángel López Gutiérrez.
- 152 AHN/FFCC/CG/Leg. 1049/1 (Pieza 3), fol. 301; Leg. 1031/1, fol. 180; Leg. 1339/1, fol. 58r; Leg. 1061, fols. 13, 60, 83, 86; *Historia de la cruzada española*,

- vol. II, tomo 9º, p. 529; Gil Robles, *Spain in Chains* (New York: The America Press, 1937), p. 2.
- 153 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 201.
- 154 C.E.D.A., no. 34, 15 November 1935.
- 155 Eduardo González Calleja, 'Aproximación a las subculturas violentas de las derechas antirrepublicanas españolas (1931–1936)', in *Pasado y Memoria: Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, no. 2 (2003): *La II República Española*. González Calleja, 'The symbolism of violence during the Second Republic in Spain, 1931–1936', in Ealham and Richards (eds.), *The Splintering of Spain*, pp. 23–6.
- 156 Passmore, "'Boy-scouting for grown-ups'?", pp. 530, 536–7, 544 n. 80, 555, 531, 532. Like the JAP, the CF was keen to mobilise in working class areas, thus expressing its populism and 'genuine concern' as well as proving it was not afraid to challenge the left on its own turf. Cf. Robert Soucy, *French Fascism: The Second Wave, 1933–1939* (London: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 116–17; J.A.P., no. 41, 16 November 1935; no. 50, 25 January 1936. Passmore adds (p. 542) that 'the combination of populism with a Manichean world populated by good Frenchmen and evil bandits led to pressure for some kind of ill-defined action', which was certainly true of the JAP.
- 157 J.A.P., no. 45, 21 December 1935.
- 158 Bermúdez Cañete, 'Juventud. – Fe. – Arrojo. – Voluntad. – Espíritu joven en la política nueva', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 256–7.
- 159 Paul Preston, 'Spain's October Revolution and the Rightist Grasp for Power', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 10, no. 4 (1975), pp. 555–77.
- 160 C.E.D.A., no. 24, 1 May 1934.
- 161 J.A.P., no. 49, 18 January 1936 sought to 'let it be known right now' that the 'forces of Marxism' would be 'smashed' [*aplastadas*] should they attempt to 'mobilise on the streets.' José María Fernández Ladreda told *japistas* at Covadonga that they should 'react with virility against the enemies of the *Patria*.' *La Región*, 11 September 1934.
- 162 J.A.P., no. 14, 20 April 1935; Saz, *Mussolini contra la II República*, pp. 27–8.
- 163 See, e.g., C.E.D.A., no. 21, 15 March 1934; J.A.P., no. 24, 14 July 1935; no. 43, 30 November 1935.
- 164 Vincent, 'The Martyrs and the Saints', pp. 77–9; J.A.P., no. 8, 2 February 1935; Mariano Serrano Mendicuti, 'Fortaleza de la Raza. – Educación premilitar. – Abolición del soldado de cuota', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 264–8, at 268.
- 165 J.A.P., no. 1, 27 October 1934.
- 166 Serrano Mendicuti, 'Fortaleza de la Raza', in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, p. 265; J.A.P., no. 2, 10 November 1934.
- 167 J.A.P., no. 31, 7 September 1935; *El Ideal Gallego*, 17 August 1934 and *La Región*, 13 April 1934, both cit. Grandío Seoane, *La C.E.D.A. en Galicia*, pp. 197, n. 11, 208; Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, p. 217.
- 168 C.E.D.A., no. 28, 1 July 1935.

- 169 *Acción*, no. 16, 21 September 1935.
- 170 Kevin Passmore, "'Boy-scouting for grown-ups'"; Richard Thurlow, *Fascism in Britain: From Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts to the National Front* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), pp. xii and *passim*.
- 171 Payne, *A History of fascism*, pp. 15, 314–15; Allen Douglas, 'Fascist Violence in France: The Case of the Fascieu', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 19 (1984), pp. 689–712; Passmore, "'Boy-scouting for grown-ups'?", p. 530. Many other features that, following Payne, can be considered non-fascist are also apparent in the Blue Shirts (which he considers *was* fascist). Interestingly, these 'moderating' features were also true of the JAP – as well as a less extensive involvement in violence, the Blue Shirts also rejected Fascist and Nazi 'totalitarianism'/'statism', were accused of being too 'capitalist' and insisted on the combination of national-syndicalism with Catholic integrism. António Costa Pinto, *The Blue Shirts: Portuguese fascists and the New State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
- 172 Cf. *J.A.P.*, 44, 7 December 1935; *ABC* (Seville), 13 February 1936; *Gaceta Regional*, 14 January 1936.
- 173 Fernández Arias, *¡¡Gil Robles!!*, p. 25; *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 14 February 1936; Linz, 'Great Hopes', p. 192.
- 174 *Gaceta Regional*, 7 January 1936; Roger Griffin (ed.), *Fascism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), Part II, Section B. i, pp. 131–41.
- 175 *La Región*, 11 September 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 8, 2 February 1935; Fernández Arias, *¡¡Gil Robles!!*, p. 15.
- 176 Peñafiel Alcázar and Sánchez Moreno, *¡España: levántate y anda!*, p. 9.
- 177 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934.
- 178 *Gaceta Regional*, 24 January 1934.
- 179 'The principal goal of the Movilización Civil is to bring together all citizens of good faith so that in the event of a general strike they can provide those public services necessary, bringing enthusiasm to the apathetic and making sure society can never fall into the hands of anarchy.' Avelino Parrondo, 'Las Juventudes de Acción Popular y los trabajos de Movilización Civil', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, p. 307.
- 180 *¿Que significan los 19 puntos?*
- 181 APCE/Film VI, apart. 92; *La Región*, 11 September 1934.
- 182 *El Debate*, 11 September 1934; Preston, *Coming*, p. 165.
- 183 *El Carbayón*, 22 October 1934.
- 184 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; no. 2, 10 November 1934; no. 35, 5 October 1935; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 33, October 1934.
- 185 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 188; Arrabal, *José M^a Gil Robles*, pp. 281–2.
- 186 Báez, 'El ruido y las nueces', *passim*.
- 187 *J.A.P.*, no. 7, 19 January 1935; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 33, October 1934. On the JAP's 'non subversive' nature, AHN/FFCC/TSR/Leg. 117/1, no. 42, turno 9^o; *J.A.P.*, no. 25, 20 July 1935; *El Carbayón*, 8 November 1934.
- 188 Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain*, pp. 305–6; *J.A.P.*, no. 7, 19 January 1935.

189 C.E.D.A., nos. 36–7, December 1934; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 131.

II Bringing in the New State

- 1 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934.
- 2 *J.A.P.*, no. 8, 2 February 1935.
- 3 AMGF/BVII/24, 'La CEDA en la reciente crisis: información confidencial'; Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 194–5; *J.A.P.*, no. 24, 14 July 1935.
- 4 See, e.g., the cartoon in *J.A.P.*, no. 3, 24 November 1934.
- 5 *J.A.P.*, no. 8, 2 February 1935 (the official figure was 14,217); *J.A.P.*, no. 2, 10 November 1934; Juan Carlos Molano Gragera, 'Acción Popular: la derecha católica en Montijo', in *Actas de las II jornadas de historia de Montijo (9 al 20 de marzo de 1998)* (Montijo, Badajoz: Ayuntamiento de Montijo / Diputación de Badajoz, 1998), p. 87.
- 6 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934.
- 7 *J.A.P.*, no. 3, 24 November 1934; no. 37, 19 October 1935.
- 8 *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos*, no. 9, September 1935. There was greater sympathy for Mussolini than Hitler; Italy was 'universal' and 'looks towards the world', Germany elevated the state to 'God' and 'looks towards a [single] race', Peñafiel Alcázar and Sánchez Moreno, *¡España, levántate y anda!*, pp. 33–4.
- 9 *J.A.P.* (Ávila), no. 22, 22 April 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 3, 24 November 1934; Primo de Rivera, *Obras Completas*, pp. 569, 571. Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis*, p. 169; *J.A.P.*, no. 24, 14 July 1935; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 203; *J.A.P.*, no. 19, 25 May 1935; *La Voz de Asturias*, 22 April 1934.
- 10 *Blanco y Negro*, 11 February 1934.
- 11 Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, pp. 45–6. Olga Cuquerella Gamboa stresses the JAP's Catholicism and its rejection of totalitarianism in 'Las Juventudes de Acción Popular', in Bullón de Mendoza and Togores (eds.), *Revision de la guerra civil española*. Two more articles from the same collection, published by the Carlist editorial *Actas*, concur. In 'Nacionalismos totalitarios en conflicto: las tentaciones fascistas en la España republicana,' Rafael Ibáñez places the CEDA 'outside the absolutist boundaries of fascism', while Stanley Payne claims that had the CEDA taken power 'the worst-case scenario would have been a drastic revision of the constitution with a more authoritarian system. Possibly, republican democracy would have been suspended for a while, a decade or more, but the horrors of the civil war would have been avoided' Payne, 'Los orígenes de la guerra civil española.'
- 12 The CF's anti-statism in education was, writes Robert Soucy, 'a euphemism for encouraging more Catholic and conservative schools, dressed up as an insistence that "the child belongs to the family".' *French Fascism: The Second Wave*, p. 200.
- 13 *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1934.

- 14 *J.A.P.*, no. 48, 11 January 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 43, 30 November 1935. Torres Cava, *¡Presente y Adelante!*, pp. 9–10, described the 'total suppression of the liberty of the press as one of the great acts of madness of [Italian] Fascism', at least in part because he was a journalist himself. An ideological attack on press freedom as the root, historically, of much of Spain's problems in De la Cerdá, *La negación de España*, p. 61. The JAP attacked ABC for suggesting that *El Socialista* be allowed to reappear. *J.A.P.*, no. 18, 18 May 1935.
- 15 *Gaceta Regional*, 29 April 1934.
- 16 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 194–6.
- 17 *J.A.P.*, no. 2, 10 November 1934.
- 18 As Dave Renton stresses, what made fascism important was not only (not *at all*, he argues) its ideology but also its impact, its repressive nature not its quest for national rebirth. *Fascism: Theory and Practice* (London: Pluto Press, 1999).
- 19 Gil Robles, prologue to Ramón Ruíz Alonso, *¡Corprativismo!* (Salamanca: Comercial Salmantina, 1937), p. 25.
- 20 AGR/José María Gil Robles to Francisco Franco, Lisbon, 2 November 1936.
- 21 *J.A.P.*, no. 24, 14 July 1935; *J.A.P.*, no. 12, 30 March 1935.
- 22 *J.A.P.*, no. 38, 26 October 1935.
- 23 *J.A.P.*, no. 42, 23 November 1935.
- 24 *J.A.P.*, no. 38, 26 October 1935.
- 25 Pedro Ruíz Tomás, *Del liberalismo al comunismo* (Valencia: Miguel Juan, 1932), pp. 3–18 and *passim*.
- 26 *J.A.P.*, no. 36, 12 October 1935.
- 27 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 10, 30 September 1933. Gil Robles's doctrinal rejection of liberalism is elaborated in *Cartas del pueblo español*, 4th edn. (Madrid: A. Frodisio Aguado, 1967), Ch. 2: 'Autoridad y pueblo', pp. 31–42.
- 28 *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 12, 30 March 1935.
- 29 *Gaceta Regional*, 20 April 1934.
- 30 AHP Lugo/FFGC/Leg. 13047/27, Leg. 458, Exp. 677, Leg. 13051/6, Leg. 461, Exp. 801; AGGCE/PS/Jaén/Carp. 3, exp. 95; AGGCE/PS/Jaén/Carp. 23, exp. 19.
- 31 *Boletín de Acción Popular Agraria Aragonesa*, no. 13, July 1935, cit. Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. I, p. 603.
- 32 JAP Madrid, 'Organización de Juventudes de A. P.', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, 307–8.
- 33 Cf. Preston, *Coming*; Moreno Fernández, *Acción Popular Murciana*; Álvarez Rey, *La derecha en la II República*; Grandío Seoane, *La C.E.D.A. en Galicia*; Vicent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, vol. I; Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*.
- 34 Federico Salmón, 'Nuestra revolución es de justicia social. Ni capitalismo egoísta ni marxismo destructor', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 275–8; *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934.
- 35 Ramón Serrano Súñer, 'Antiparlamentarismo. – Antidictadura. – El Pueblo se incorpora al Gobierno de un modo orgánico y jerárquico, no por la democ-

- racia degenerada', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 281–4.
- 36 Chueca and Montero, 'El fascismo en España', pp. 232–3, which parallels Southworth, 'La Falange.'
 - 37 *J.A.P.*, no. 16, 4 May 1935; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 24, 1 May 1934; no. 28, 1 July 1934. When the JAP was founded, some Lliga figures joined its directorate. Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. 1, p. 359; AHN/FFCC/CG/Leg. 1630, exp. 1, fol. 247.
 - 38 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934. An indication of the JAP's Castilian bias is given by its happiness at the victory of the Castilian football team against Catalonia. *J.A.P.*, no. 5, 22 December 1934.
 - 39 John Hooper, *The New Spaniards* (Penguin: London, 1995), pp. 40, 383; Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 10.
 - 40 *Acción*, no. 17, 28 September 1935; *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1934; AHP Tarragona/Fons de l'administració perifèrica de l'estat/ Governació govern civil/Leg. 1852. *Desperta Ferro!*, the Catalan title of the Barcelona-based JAP newspaper, referred to the medieval struggle to return Barcelona to the Aragonese crown. *Acción*, no. 15, 14 September 1935.
 - 41 *J.A.P.*, no. 23, 1 July 1935; Similarly, Gil Robles spoke of the 'glorious essence of the Basque tradition, which is the Spanish tradition.' *J.A.P.*, no. 38, 26 October 1935. Also, *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1934.
 - 42 Xosé-Manoel Nuñez Seixas, 'The Region as Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840–1936), in *European History Quarterly*, vol. 31, no. 4 (2001), pp. 483–518.
 - 43 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 24, 1 May 1934.
 - 44 *A Nossa Terra*, no. 369, 8 June 1935, cit. Emilio Grandío Seoane, 'A vision da C.E.D.A no xornal "A Nossa Terra" (1931/1936)', in *Historia Nova*, no. I: *Contribución dos xóvenes historiadores de Galicia* (Santiago de Compostela: Tórculo, 1993), pp. 227–9.
 - 45 Directiva del JAP de Navarra, 'El amor de la región, base del amor a España', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, p. 271.
 - 46 *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1934.
 - 47 *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936.
 - 48 Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 10; *J.A.P.*, no. 37, 19 October 1935.
 - 49 Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, p. 273.
 - 50 Lojendio, *El hecho histórico vasco*, claimed the Basque Country had no history at all beyond the creation of Spain.
 - 51 JAP Navarra, 'El amor de la región,' in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 271–3; Torres Cava, *¡Presente y Adelante!*, p. 30.
 - 52 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 21, 15 March 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 27, 3 April 1935; *El Ideal Gallego*, 11, 21 April 1934, cit. Grandío Seoane, *La C.E.D.A. en Galicia*, p. 206, n. 49; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 189–91; *Gaceta Regional*, 18, 19, 24 April 1934.
 - 53 Quoted in Julio Prada, '"Que es la voz de la tierra"', p. 191.
 - 54 Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. 1, pp. 595–604; *J.A.P.*, no. 36, 12 October 1935;

- Montero, 'Entre la radicalización antidemocrática', p. 56; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 189–91.
- 55 *Discurso pronunciado por D. José María Gil Robles en Covadonga*, p. 17.
- 56 *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 14 February 1936.
- 57 *J.A.P.*, no. 22, 22 June 1935.
- 58 Tomás y de la Cerdá y de Bárcenas, *Trabajo y capital*, *passim*. On fascism as a 'holistic-nationalist radical third way,' Roger Eatwell, *Fascism: A History* (London: Vintage, 1996), pp. xxiv and *passim*. This is profoundly similar to Zeev Sternhell, *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986). Payne also stresses fascism's 'leftism' in *A History of fascism*, discounting various movements for being 'too rightist.'
- 59 Examples of this sort are endless. Cf. *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; Torres Cava, '*Presente y Adelante!*', pp. 25–8; *El Debate*, 1 January 1936; *El Carbayón*, 8 November 1934.
- 60 *J.A.P.*, no. 43, 30 November 1935 ('Dimas talks to his brother workers'). Ian Gibson, *The Assassination of Federico García Lorca* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), *passim*; Gibson, *El hombre que detuvo a García Lorca: Ramón Ruiz Alonso y la muerte del poeta* (Madrid: Aguilar, 2007), pp. 28, 67, 70–71, and Ch. III *passim*; Gil Robles, prologue to Ruiz Alonso, *Corporativismo*, p. 15; José María Ruiz Alonso, *La guerra civil en la provincia de Toledo: utopía, conflicto y poder en el sur del Tajo (1936–1939)* (Ciudad Real: Añil, 2004), pp. 539–40. The social composition of the JAP is analysed in ch. III.
- 61 *Papeles póstumos de José Antonio*, ed. Miguel Primo de Rivera y Urquijo (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1996, repr. 1997), p. 128.
- 62 Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 55.
- 63 *Blanco y Negro: Revista Ilustrada*, no. 2226, 11 February 1934.
- 64 *J.A.P.* (Ávila), no. 1, 30 April 1933; *J.A.P.*, no. 18, 18 May 1935; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 38, 15 January 1935.
- 65 Richards, *A Time of Silence*, pp. 16–19. *J.A.P.*, no. 42, 23 November 1935, declared that 'the salvation [of Spain] is in the countryside, in the masses of peasants that possess the heartfelt and pure sentiment of the race' and Pérez de Laborda referred to an 'austere and magnificent race of peasants who hold inside them all the virtues of Spain', *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 14 February 1936. There was no similar embrace of the urban proletariat. See, Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 63–4 n. 1.
- 66 Ramón Serrano Súñer, 'Antiparlamentarismo.' in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 281–4.
- 67 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; no. 4, 8 December 1934; no. 3, 24 November 1934.
- 68 On Austria and Portugal, the 'non-fascist', 'authoritarian' régimes are normally assumed to be the model for the CEDA's corporativism, cf. Martin Kitchen, *The Coming of Austrian fascism* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), Ch. 11; Jill Lewis, 'Conservatives and fascists in Austria, 1918–34', in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), *Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the*

- Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Payne, *A History of fascism*, pp. 312–17, 245–52; Antonio Costa Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European fascism: Problems of Interpretation* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1995), chps. 1 and 4; Tom Gallagher, 'Conservatism, Dictatorship and fascism in Portugal, 1914–45', in Blinkhorn (ed.), *Fascists and Conservatives*. Of these, only Jill Lewis describes her subject as fascist.
- 69 Quoted in Molano Gragera, 'Acción Popular: la derecha en Montijo', p. 81.
- 70 Ruiz Alonso, *¡Corprativismo!*, pp. 257–82.
- 71 Federico Salmón, 'Nuestra revolución', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 275–8.
- 72 Cf. *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; no. 3, 24 November 1934; no. 7, 19 January 1935; no. 16, 4 May 1935; no. 19, 25 May 1935; no. 28, 10 August 1935; no. 42, 23 November 1935.
- 73 '¡Obras! ¡Obras! El plan quincenal de obras públicas de Acción Popular', 16-page propaganda pamphlet (Madrid, n.d.); *J.A.P.*, no. 3, 24 November 1934; Boissel, *Un jefe*, pp. 125–8.
- 74 *J.A.P.*, no. 4, 8 December 1934 (in which the demand for constitutional revision is made on every page). The campaign is announced in *J.A.P.*, no. 11, 16 March 1935 and expanded in no. 22, 22 June 1935.
- 75 *J.A.P.*, no. 11, 16 March 1935.
- 76 *J.A.P.*, no. 3, 24 November 1934.
- 77 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; no. 2, 10 November 1934; no. 3, 24 November 1934. Even personal relationships with its coalition partners were to be rejected. *J.A.P.*, no. 38, 26 October 1936.
- 78 Cit. Andrew Forrest, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 31; *J.A.P.*, no. 8, 2 February 1935.
- 79 *J.A.P.*, no. 7, 19 January 1935; no. 23, 1 July 1935.
- 80 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934 (emphasis in the original); no. 7, 19 January 1935.
- 81 *J.A.P.*, no. 6, 5 January 1935.
- 82 *J.A.P.*, no. 7, 19 January 1935. Cf. *Estatutos y reglamentos de la Juventud de Acción Popular* (Madrid: Editorial Ibérica, 1932); *Reglamento de la Juventud de Acción Popular de Córdoba* (Córdoba: Imprenta La Española, 1934); AHP Lugo/FFGC/Leg. 13051/16; AHP Tarragona/FFGC/Leg. 1790.
- 83 JAP de Madrid, 'Organización de Juventudes de A. P.', repr. in Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 307–8 (emphasis added).
- 84 Federico Salmón, prologue to Peñafiel Alcázar and Sánchez Moreno, *¡España: levántate y anda!*, p. 7. The book he referred to was Casares, *La C.E.D.A. va a gobernar*.
- 85 *J.A.P.*, no. 47, 4 January 1936.
- 86 *J.A.P.*, no. 7, 19 January 1935.
- 87 Peñafiel Alcázar and Sánchez Moreno, *¡España, levántate y anda!*, p. 21.
- 88 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; no. 14, 20 April 1935.

- 89 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Ramón de Soto to JPÁv., La Coruña, 10 October 1935.
- 90 Ismael Saz, *Mussolini contra la II República*, p. 63.
- 91 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 202.
- 92 J.A.P., no. 24, 14 July 1935; Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. II, pp. 7–12.
- 93 José María Gil Robles, *Marginalia política* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1975), p. 231.
- 94 Claude Bowyers, *My Mission to Spain: Watching the Rehearsal for World War II* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1954), p. 155.
- 95 *A Nossa Terra*, 13 June 1935, cit. Grandío Seoane, *La CEDA en Galicia*, p. 237 n. 203.
- 96 *Diario de las sesiones de Cortes*, 7 November 1935, cit. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 212, 362 n. 104.
- 97 The neo-Francoist polemicist Pío Moa attacks this notion that the left genuinely believed in the CEDA's fascism. Despite the tendentious nature of Moa's arguments, his conclusions are uncritically repeated (with citations) by Rojas Quintana, 'José María Gil-Robles', pp. 147–9 and Cuquerella Gamboa, 'Las Juventudes de Acción Popular'. Pío Moa, *Los orígenes de la Guerra Civil Española* (Madrid: Ediciones Encuentro, 1999), pp. 214–21.
- 98 Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. I, pp. 582–656, quotes at p. 582. See also, Montero, 'Entre la radicalización', p. 62; Montero, 'Las derechas en el sistema de partidos del segundo bienio republicano: algunos datos introductorios', in J. L. García Delgado (ed.), *La II República española: Bienio rectificador y Frente Popular* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1988), p. 29.
- 99 Paul Preston is sympathetic to the left's belief that the JAP's fascistic characteristics reflected the CEDA's real, yet masked, aims. Preston, *Coming*, pp. 186, 193–5, and *passim*. Richard Robinson, on the other hand, sees the JAP as 'young men in a hurry', *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 212–14, 362.
- 100 Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, vol. I, p. 207.
- 101 Báez, 'El ruido y las nueces', pp. 127–8, and *passim*.
- 102 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 203.
- 103 *El Correo de Andalucía*, 6 February 1934.
- 104 J.A.P., no. 9, 16 February 1936; no. 15, 27 April 1935; no. 22, 22 June 1935; no. 35, 5 October 1935.
- 105 Eduardo González Calleja, 'La radicalización de la derecha española durante la Segunda República (1931–1936): violencia política, paramilitarización y fascistización en la crisis de los años treinta' (Unpublished PhD thesis, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Dept. Historia Contemporánea, 1989), p. 733; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, p. 206.
- 106 J.A.P., no. 45, 21 December 1935.
- 107 J.A.P., no. 38, 26 October 1935, claimed to have suffered four suspensions and two fines. *Acción*, no. 12, 24 August 1935, confirms one of the fines. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 212; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 194. Only two suspensions can be established with complete confidence: 15 June 1935 and 24 August 1935. These suspensions are confirmed

- in the following week's editions: *JAP*, no. 22, 22 June 1935; no. 30, 31 August 1935. To judge by the *J.A.P.* collection at the Hemeroteca Municipal de Madrid, which is theoretically complete, if there were two more suspensions these must have been on 7 July 1935, when there was no issue published, and on 14 September 1935, which would have been no. 32 – an issue which is absent (but could simply be missing from the collection). There is no explanation in *J.A.P.* or elsewhere for these absences, however. *J.A.P.* also failed to come out on 14 December 1935, but this suspension (if indeed it was one) comes *after* claims to have suffered four suspensions. It could, therefore, be that *J.A.P.* was in fact suspended as many as five times or as few as twice. *J.A.P.* (Ávila) had also been banned on occasion. *J.A.P.* (Ávila), no. 7, 18 November 1933.
- 108 *J.A.P.*, no. 30, 31 August 1935; *Acción*, no. 14, 7 September 1935. The JAP became obsessed with *El Liberal*, *Libertad* and *Heraldo*, which they constantly provoked. See, *J.A.P.*, no. 24, 14 July 1935; no. 26, 27 July 1935.
- 109 *J.A.P.*, no. 21, 8 June 1935; no. 22, 22 June 1935; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 194.
- 110 Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 212, 362; Saz, *Mussolini contra la II República*, p. 63.
- 111 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 191, n. 3.
- 112 Cf. *J.A.P.*, no. 20, 1 June 1935; no. 23, 1 July 1935.
- 113 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 203.
- 114 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 55, December 1935.
- 115 Báez, 'El ruido y las nueces', pp. 127–8, and *passim*. Certainly, in Cáceres it was made explicit, as late as March 1935, that all *Juventud* decisions required the 'blessing' of AP. AHP Cáceres/GC/Caja 29.
- 116 Carlos Seco Serrano, 'Estudio Preliminar: la experiencia de la derecha posibilista en la Segunda República española', in José María Gil Robles: *Discursos parlamentarios* (Madrid: Taurus, 1971), p. XLIX. Pedro Carlos González Cuevas and Feliciano Montero write: 'the CEDA was not a Christian democratic party . . . [there were] core tensions between an authoritarian tradition and an emerging Christian-Democracy.' 'Los conservadores españoles en el siglo XX', in Antonio Morales Moya (ed.), *Ideologías y movimientos políticos* (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal / España Nuevo Milenio, 2001), p. 62. AGR/Gil Robles, 'Meditaciones en el Retiro', unpublished manuscript.
- 117 Jato, *La rebelión de los estudiantes*.
- 118 Cf. *J.A.P.*, no. 23, 1 July 1935; no. 29 17 August 1935; no. 30, 31 August 1935; no. 31, 7 September 1935; no. 33, 21 September 1935.
- 119 *Acción*, 16, 21 September 1935. Also, González Calleja, 'La radicalización de la derecha', p. 749; Montero, 'Entre la radicalización', p. 55; FPÁv, *passim* but especially FPÁv./AHP Ourense, Libro de Actas and Ramón de Soto to Pérez Ávila, 11 October 1935; APCE/Film VI, apart. 97.
- 120 *J.A.P.*, no. 7, 19 January 1935; Elorza, 'El nacionalismo conservador de Gil Robles', p. 260.

- 121 Real Academia de Historia (hereafter RAH)/Fondo Diego Angulo de Losada (hereafter FDA)/11/8989.
- 122 Private Collection of MGF, undated handwritten note. Meeting with Ana María Giménez Clavijo, Jérez de la Frontera, 30 December 2001.
- 123 Javier Tusell and José Calvo, *Giménez Fernández: precursor de la democracia española* (Seville: Mondadori/Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1990), pp. 70–100; Juan José Castillo, *Propietarios muy pobres: sobre la subordinación política del pequeño campesino: La Confederación Nacional Católica Agraria, 1917–1942* (Madrid?: Servicio de Publicaciones Agrarias, 1979), pp. 377–83; Edward Malefakis, *Reforma agraria y revolución campesina en la España del siglo XX* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1970), pp. 400–9; Preston, *Coming*, pp. 184–5, 191–2; Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, pp. 232–5; Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 200–2; Blinkhorn, *Carlismo y contrarrevolución en España, 1931–1939* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1979), pp. 274–6.
- 124 *J.A.P.*, no. 23, 1 July 1935.
- 125 AMS/AMGF/BXII/71, Garcirrubio to MGF, 6 September 1935; Private Collection of MGF, Pérez de Laborda to MGF, 8 July 1935. Meeting with Ana María Giménez Clavijo, Jérez de la Frontera, 30 December 2001.
- 126 AMGF/BXIII/134, Fulgencio Miñano to MGF, Molina de Segura, 23 June 1935.
- 127 *J.A.P.*, no. 39, 2 November 1935. A number of telegrams are reproduced in *J.A.P.*, no. 23, 1 July 1935.
- 128 Preston, *Coming*, pp. 125–6 and Ch. 6; *J.A.P.*, no. 3, 24 November 1934; no. 23, 1 July 1935.
- 129 *J.A.P.*, no. 22, 22 June 1935.
- 130 AMGF/BXIII/115, Isidoro López Martínez to MGF, Sevilla, 5 September 1935. In a previous correspondence, López Martínez insisted that the *Juventud* represented the only 'healthy element' of the party in Sevilla in the late summer of 1935. However, Giménez Fernández's daughter does not recall him talking about the JAP.
- 131 Álvarez Rey, *La derecha en la II República*, p. 366.
- 132 *J.A.P.*, no. 30, 31 August 1935; *Acción*, no. 14, 7 September 1935 (emphasis added).
- 133 *J.A.P.*, no. 27, 3 August 1935.
- 134 Payne, *Politics and the Military*, pp. 302–8.
- 135 *C.E.D.A.*, no. 28, 1 July 1934; *J.A.P.*, no. 3, 24 November 1934.
- 136 Cf. *J.A.P.* no. 4, 8 December 1934; no. 17, 11 May 1935; no. 22, 22 June 1935; no. 24, 14 July 1935.
- 137 Nigel Townson, *The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics Under the Second Republic, 1931–1936* (Brighton & Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2000), pp. 330–7.

III The general elections

- 1 José María Gil Robles, *Pensamiento político, 1962–69* (Madrid: Hergón, 1970), p. 153. On Alcalá-Zamora's deliberations, Stanley G Payne, *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933–1936: Origins of the Civil War* (London: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 128–39.
- 2 *El Debate*, 3 September 1935.
- 3 Alcalá Zamora, *Memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), pp. 343–4; Joaquín Chapaprieta, *La paz fue posible: memorias de un político* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1971), pp. 344–5, Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, vol. I, p. 319.
- 4 Townson, *The Crisis of Democracy in Spain*, pp. 294–346.
- 5 Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, vol. I., *passim*; García Escudero, *Vista a la derecha*, p. 213.
- 6 Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, p. 221 and *passim*.
- 7 Chapaprieta, *La paz fue posible*, p. 318.
- 8 AGR/Gil Robles, 'Mi relación con el general Franco', unpublished manuscript, p. 13. Gil Robles claims to have told Alcalá Zamora that by stopping him from taking power all that the president would achieve would be to pathe the way for 'violent solutions . . . [to] civil war'. Also, Valiente, 'Por que me fui de la CEDA'; Paul Preston, *A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War* (London: Fontana, 1996), pp. 58–9. Gil Robles complains about Alcalá Zamora's 'distaste, lack of trust and cautiousness' towards Franco and claims that general Fanjul offered to stage a coup but that he turned it down. 'Mi relación con el general Franco', pp. 4, 12–14; *El Debate*, 10–15 December 1935; Pabón, *Cambó*, pp. 459–64; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, 358–76; Preston, *Coming*, p. 201.
- 9 Alcalá Zamora, *Memorias*, p. 336; Townson, *The Crisis of Democracy in Spain*, p. 307; *El Debate*, 3 September 1935; Tusell and Calvo, *Giménez Fernández*, p. 148.
- 10 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 202, 203–4.
- 11 Chapaprieta, *La paz fue posible*, pp. 320–1; Townson, *The Crisis of Democracy in Spain*, p. 282.
- 12 Alcalá Zamora, *Memorias*, p. 340; Tusell and Calvo, *Giménez Fernández*, pp. 134–5.
- 13 *Diario de Granada*, 1 January 1936, cit. Jose Antonio Alarcón, *El movimiento obrero en Granada en la II República (1931–1936)* (Granada: Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1990), p. 150.
- 14 Even José Calvo Sotelo had admitted in May that accidentalism 'might work' but when Gil Robles's bid failed, the right agreed that it had not. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, p. 218.
- 15 *J.A.P.*, no. 41, 16 November 1935.
- 16 *Arriba*, 19 December 1935.
- 17 *J.A.P.*, no. 45, 21 December 1935.
- 18 AMGF/BXIII/76, undated (October 1935) telegram from Gil Robles to provincial CEDA bodies.

- 19 *J.A.P.*, no. 38, 26 October 1935; no. 40, 9 November 1935; no. 41, 16 November 1935; Fernández Arias, *¡¡Gil Robles!!*, p. 29.
- 20 *El Debate*, 5, 26 February 1935. Even *El Debate*, which represented a more gradualist sector of the CEDA, had complained of 'so much discussion, so much energy [and] so much time lost!'
- 21 *J.A.P.*, no. 39, 2 November 1935 (emphasis added).
- 22 Tusell, *La II República en Madrid: elecciones y partidos políticos* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1970), p. 137.
- 23 Valiente, 'Por qué me fui de la CEDA', p. 28.
- 24 AGMF/BXIII/71.
- 25 *J.A.P.*, no. 43, 23 November 1935.
- 26 *Diario de Valencia*, 2 December 1935, cit. Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, p. 216.
- 27 *J.A.P.*, no. 42, 23 November 1936; no. 46, 28 December 1935; no. 47, 4 January 1936; no. 39, 2 November 1935; no. 44, 7 December 1935; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 38, 15 January 1935.
- 28 *Gaceta Regional*, 7 January 1936.
- 29 The clearest photograph of this poster in Javier Tusell, 'La Democracia Cristiana, en la guerra civil española', in *Gentleman*, no. 12, March 1974, p. 67.
- 30 *J.A.P.*, no. 43, 30 November 1935; no. 52, 8 February 1936; no. 46, 28 December 1936 (emphasis added).
- 31 *Diario de Valencia*, 28 January 1936.
- 32 *Acción* (Palma de Mallorca), 25 January 1936.
- 33 *Unión y Trabajo*, 1 February 1936, cit. Julián Chaves Palacios, *Violencia política y conflictividad en Extremadura: Cáceres en 1936* (Extremadura: Diputación Provincial de Cáceres/ Diputación Provincial de Badajoz, 2000), p. 23; *El Obrero*, 9 February 1936, cit. Juan Martínez Leal, *Los socialistas en acción: La II República en Elche (1931-1936)* (Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 2005), p. 141; RAH/FDA/11/8989, 6° Tomo 6.
- 34 *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936.
- 35 Fernández Arias, *¡¡Gil Robles!!*, p. 147.
- 36 *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 14 February 1936; no. 16, 4 May 1935 and throughout the campaign. RAH/FDA/11/8989 (6° Tomo).
- 37 Posters particularly stressed this. See, *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936; no. 50, 25 January 1936. Also, Archivo Municipal, Calatayud, *Arte y propaganda política en vísperas de una guerra: colección de carteles y octavillas de la época de la República hallada en el Archivo Municipal de Calatayud* (Calatayud: Diputación Provincial de Zaragoza/Ayuntamiento de Calatayud, 2009), *passim*.
- 38 *J.A.P.*, no. 46, 28 December 1935; *Acción*, no. 25, 23 November 1935; RAH/FDA/11/8989 (6° Tomo); *Arte y propaganda política*, p. 83.
- 39 *Acción*, 33, 18 January 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 47, 4 January 1936.
- 40 Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, poster collection, no. 265; *Arte y propaganda política en vísperas de una Guerra*, pp. 13, 42-93; RAH/FDA, 11/8989 6° Tomo.

- 41 *J.A.P.*, no. 41, 16 November 1936.
- 42 *Acción*, no. 30, 28 December 1935.
- 43 Fernández Arias, *¡¡Gil Robles!!*, pp. 16, 20, 31, 35, 148 and *passim*. Fernández Arias also wrote *Hitler, Salvador de Alemania*.
- 44 *J.A.P.*, no. 42, 23 November 1936.
- 45 Preston, *Coming*, p. 207 (who mistakenly describes these as 27 reasons); *J.A.P.*, no. 47, 4 January 1936; no. 42, 23 November 1936.
- 46 *Mercantil Valenciano*, 3 January 1936, cit. Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, p. 224.
- 47 *Acción*, no. 31, 4 January 1936.
- 48 Cf. *El Socialista*, 28, 29 January 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 48, 11 January 1936; no. 49, 18 January 1936; *ABC* (Seville), 13 February 1936; FPÁv./Biblioteca da Diputació Provincial de Ourense (hereafter BDPO)/(b) JAP locales y territoriales/(vi) JAP de La Coruña, Ramón de Soto Lemos to JPÁv, 14 January 1935 [*sic*, actually 1936].
- 49 *J.A.P.*, no. 51, 1 February 1936; AHN/FFCC/TSR/Leg. 117/1. no. 42, turno 9º; Valls, 'La Derecha Regional Valenciana' (Unpublished PhD), p. 370, n. 142; *Gaceta Regional*, 2 January, 11 January 1936; Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 72.
- 50 Quoted by *J.A.P.*, no. 50, 25 January 1936.
- 51 *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 14 February 1936.
- 52 *Acción*, no. 30, 28 December 1935.
- 53 *J.A.P.*, no. 47, 4 January 1936; no. 48, 11 January 1936. See the centre page spreads of *J.A.P.*, nos. 47–52, 4 January 1936–8 February 1936.
- 54 *J.A.P.*, no. 50, 25 January 1936; no. 51, 1 February 1936.
- 55 Jesús Bueno, Concepción Gaudó, and Germán Zubero, *Elecciones en Zaragoza capital durante la IIa República* (Zaragoza: Fernando el Católico, 1980), p. 181; Manuel Suárez Cortina, *El Fascismo en Asturias (1931–1937)* (Asturias: Julio Somoza, 1981), p. 141; *Gaceta Regional*, 31 January, 1, 4 February 1936; José Gutiérrez Ravé, *Gil Robles, caudillo frustrado* (Madrid: Prensa Española, 1967), p. 153; *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. II, tomo 5º, p. 661; Arrarás, *Historia de la Segunda República*, vol. III, pp. 39–53.
- 56 *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 14 February 1936; Bowyers, *My Mission in Spain*, pp. 32, 60.
- 57 *J.A.P.*, no. 36, 12 October 1935. Also, *ABC* (Seville), 14 February 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 11, 16 March 1935.
- 58 *El Debate*, 10 January 1936.
- 59 *J.A.P.*, no. 49, 18 January 1936.
- 60 *Acción*, no. 28, 14 December 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 50, 25 January 1936; no. 41, 16 November 1935.
- 61 *Gaceta Regional*, 1 February 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936.
- 62 *J.A.P.*, no. 40, 9 November 1935; no. 50, 25 January 1936; no. 51, 1 February 1936; no. 52, 8 February 1936.
- 63 *J.A.P.*, no. 1, 27 October 1934; no. 14, 20 April 1934; no. 19, 25 May 1935; no. 50, 25 January 1936; no. 51, 1 February 1936.

- 64 Martínez Leal, *Los socialistas en acción*, p. 151.
- 65 *El Socialista* 28 January 1936; *J.A.P.* no. 48, 11 January 1936
- 66 *Gaceta Regional*, 7 January 1936.
- 67 *Gaceta Regional*, 31 January 1936, 14 January 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 50, 25 January 1936.
- 68 *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936.
- 69 FPÁv./AHP Ourense/Ramón de Soto to José Pérez Ávila, 14 January 1936.
- 70 Pilar Fuentes de Estéfan, 'Málaga y el Frente Popular', in Encarnación Barranquero *et al.*, *Estudios sobre la II República en Málaga* (Málaga: Diputación Provincial de Málaga, 1986), p. 227, 228.
- 71 *J.A.P.*, no. 50, 25 January 1936.
- 72 *Gaceta Regional*, 7 January 1936.
- 73 See, e.g., *¡Presente!*, 1 December 1934.
- 74 *Más*, 15 February 1936, cit. Martínez Leal, *Los socialistas en acción*, p. 141.
- 75 *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936; MGF BXIII/236.
- 76 AMS/AMGF/BX/5, BX/3.
- 77 *J.A.P.*, no. 49, 18 January 1936.
- 78 RAH/FDA, 11/8989 6ºTomo. *Arte y propaganda política*, pp. 77–93.
- 79 RAH/FDA, 11/8989 6ºTomo; AHP Cáceres, Caja 9/Asociaciones; *Arte y propaganda política*, p. 75.
- 80 *¡Presente!*, 1 December 1934.
- 81 *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 15 February 1936.
- 82 MGF, BXIII/76, Gil Robles, undated circular.
- 83 USC/Fondo HISTORGA/Interview with Olegario Muñoz; *Gaceta Regional*, 14 January 1936; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 33, October 1934; Molano Gragera, 'Acción Popular: la derecha católica en Montijo', p. 84; Martin Blinkhorn, 'Conservatism, Traditionalism, and fascism in Spain, 1898–1937', in Blinkhorn (ed.), *Fascists and Conservatives*, pp. 118–37.
- 84 *J.A.P.*, no. 50, 25 January 1936; no. 52, 7 February 1936.
- 85 *J.A.P.*, no. 40, 9 November 1935.
- 86 *J.A.P.*, no. 53, 14 February 1936.
- 87 *Arriba*, 13 June 1935.
- 88 *J.A.P.*, no. 46, 28 December 1936; no. 45, 21 December 1935; no. 47, 4 January 1936. *J.A.P.*, no. 45, 21 December 1935 set the tone with a run-through of the cabinet in which every single entry was censored.
- 89 *J.A.P.*, no. 49, 18 January 1936; no. 53, 14 February 1936.
- 90 *La Vanguardia*, 11 February 1936.
- 91 Preston, *Coming*, pp. 203–4.
- 92 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 432; *La Vanguardia*, 11 February 1936, cit. Tarragona, *Las elecciones de 1936 en Cataluña*, p. 110. Javier Tusell, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1971), vol. I, pp. 41–155.
- 93 Julian Chaves Palacios, *Violencia política y conflictividad en Extremadura: Cáceres en 1936* (Extremadura: Diputación Provincial de Cáceres/ Diputación Provincial de Badajoz, 2000), pp. 20–1.

- 94 AGGCE/PS/Madrid/2135/Luis Belda to FS, n.d. but April/May 1936.
- 95 FPÁv./BDPO/ Pérez de Laborda circular, 8 January 1936. Also at AMS/AMGF/BXII/164.
- 96 *J.A.P.*, no. 46, 21 December 1935; no. 47, 28 December 1935.
- 97 *J.A.P.*, no. 38, 26 October 1935; FPÁv./BDPO/ 'D: Elecciones de 16 febrero 1936: asuntos sobre la candidatura', Pérez de Laborda, circular, 8 January 1936; AMS/AMGF/BXII/164.
- 98 *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 7 February 1936.
- 99 Suárez Cortina, *El fascismo en Asturias*, p. 141; Javier Tusell, *La II República en Madrid: elecciones y partidos políticos* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1970), p. 137; Prada, "Que es la voz de la tierra"; FPÁv./BDPO/ 'C: Elecciones de Feb 1936', *passim*.
- 100 Julian Sanz Hoya, 'Las derechas en Cantabria durante la Segunda República (1931–1936): organizaciones y partidos políticos', unpublished PhD thesis, Universidad de Cantabria, Santander, August 2000, p. 381.
- 101 FPÁv./BDPO/ 'D: Elecciones de 16 febrero 1936: asuntos sobre la candidatura', JPÁv. to Pérez de Laborda, h/w draft, n.d.
- 102 Julio Prada, "Que es la voz de la tierra".
- 103 FPÁv./BDPO/ 'C: Elecciones de Feb 1936'. JPÁv. to José María Gil Robles, 30 January 1936.
- 104 FPÁv./ BDPO/ 'C: 'Elecciones de Feb 1936'. Cebo Peláez to JPÁv., 6 December 1935.
- 105 FPÁv./ BDPO/ 'C: 'Elecciones de Feb 1936', *passim*; *J.A.P.*, 1936 *passim*.
- 106 FPÁv. BDPO/ 'C: Elecciones de Feb 1936'. Antonio Miranda to JPÁv., 23 January 1936.
- 107 Grandío Seoane, *La C.E.D.A. en Galicia*, p. 263.
- 108 FPÁv./ BDPO/ 'D: Elecciones de 16 febrero 1936: asuntos sobre la candidatura', Pérez de Laborda circular, 8 January 1936.
- 109 *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936.
- 110 FPÁv./ BDPO/ 'JAP Madrid (b) (ii):' Eduardo García (JAP, Ribadavia) to JPÁv., 7 February 1936.
- 111 FPÁv./ BDPO/ 'C: Elecciones de Feb 1936' [illegible name] to JPÁv., 14 February 1936.
- 112 FPÁv./ BDPO/ 'C: Elecciones de Feb 1936', Ernesto del Campo to JPÁv., 11 February 1936.
- 113 *J.A.P.*, no. 48, 11 January 1935; no. 52, 8 February 1936.
- 114 *J.A.P.*, no. 49, 18 January 1936; no. 51, 1 February 1936; no. 52, 8 February 1936.
- 115 *La Nación*, 3 February 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936.
- 116 Sid Lowe, 'The Juventud de Acción Popular and the "failure" of "fascism" in Spain' (Unpublished Master's dissertation, University of Sheffield, Dept. History, August 2000).
- 117 Julio Gil Pecharromán, *Conservadores subversivos: la derecha autoritaria Alfonsina (1913–1936)* (Madrid: Eudema, 1994), pp. 213–16; Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain*, pp. 115–18, 133–4, 199–200; Blinkhorn,

- 'Fascists and Conservatives', *passim*; Blinkhorn, 'The Iberian States', *passim*.
- 118 Manuel Bueno, writing in *ABC*. Quoted in Jato, *La rebelión de los estudiantes*, p. 318.
- 119 *La Nación*, 17 January 1934.
- 120 Cf. *F.E.*, 26 April, 1 July 1934, 1 March 1935; *Arriba*, 13 June 1934, 30 May 1935. José Antonio saw the JAP's 'attempts' at fascism as like 'trying to make a hare pie without the hare'. Heleno Saña, *El franquismo sin mitos: conversaciones con Serrano Súñer* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1982), pp. 54–5; Ramón Serrano Súñer, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue: Memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), pp. 34–6. For David Jato, *La rebelión de los estudiantes*, p. 170, the JAP was a 'sad caricature' of fascism.
- 121 *F.E.*, 19 July 1934.
- 122 *Arriba*, 13 June 1935.
- 123 Rodríguez Jiménez, *Historia de Falange Española de las JONS*, pp. 183–5.
- 124 *F.E.*, 1 March 1934; USC/Fondo HISTORGA/Interview with Manuel García Manzano.
- 125 Paul Preston, *Las tres Españas del 36* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1998, repr. 1999). p. 132. *F.E.*, 1 March 1934, had noted sadly that the newspapers of the left often made reference to the CEDA and the JAP but not the Falange.
- 126 J. Pérez de Cabo, *¡Arriba España!*, 2nd edn. (Orense: La Región, 1939 [first published Madrid 1935]), pp. 10–13.
- 127 *J.A.P.*, no. 19, 25 May 1935; *Arriba*, 13 June, 30 May, 11 April 1935.
- 128 Hugh Thomas, 'The Hero in the Empty Room: José Antonio and Spanish Fascism', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1966), pp. 174–82.
- 129 Estimates from contemporaries ranged from 25,000 to 'no more than 5,000', cit. Payne, *Falange*, pp. 100–1, incl. notes. According to another Falangist, Ángel Alcázar de Velasco, the party's membership in February 1936 was exactly 5,793. *Los siete días de Salamanca* (Madrid: G. del Toro, 1976), pp. 17–18; Rodríguez Jiménez, *Historia de Falange Española de las JONS*, p. 208.
- 130 Payne, *Falange*; Payne, *Fascism in Spain*; Sheelagh Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era: Falange Española de las JONS, 1936–1976* (London: Macmillan, 1987). There are exceptions (generally, though, with brief treatments). Mary Vincent, 'Spain', in Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (eds.), *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 113–14; Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, pp. 224–5; Blinkhorn, 'The Iberian States', pp. 338–9; Blinkhorn, 'Fascists and Conservatives'; Blinkhorn, *Fascism and the Right in Europe, 1919–1945* (Harlow: Longman, 2000); Chueca and Montero, 'El fascismo en España', pp. 230–8.
- 131 Montero, 'Entre la radicalización', pp. 57–8. Similarly, Preston, *Coming*, p. 130.
- 132 *F.E.*, 1 March 1934.
- 133 Ramiro Ladasma Ramos *Escritos políticos, 1935–1936: ¿Fascismo en España?*, *La Patria Libre, Nuestra Revolución* [¿Fascismo en España?], orig. publ. in 1935 under

- the pseudonym Roberto Lanzas] (Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1988), pp. 50–2. Similarly, the Falangist intellectual Dionisio Ridruejo saw in Gil Robles 'a little Dollfuss, corporate dictator or fascist *jefe*,' albeit one who was 'bathed in Christian moderation.' Ridruejo, *Escrito en España* (Madrid: G. del Toro, 1976), p. 63.
- 134 See, *La Conquista del Estado: antología*, ed. Juan Aparicio (Barcelona: Ediciones Fe, 1939), pp. 16–19, 88–90, 97–9, 131–3, 145–7, 165–8, 184–8, 200–3, 222–4, 248–51; Juan Velarde Fuertes, *El nacional-sindicalismo cuarenta años después* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1972), pp. 129–216.
- 135 Rodríguez Jiménez, *Historia de Falange Española de las JONS*, pp. 87–8, 118.
- 136 José María García de Tuñón Aza, *Apuntes para una historia de la Falange Asturiana* (Oviedo: Fundación Ramiro Ledesma, 2001), pp. 7–9.
- 137 AGGCE/PS/Gijón–J/C11, 'Relación de afiliados a la Juventud de Acción Popular'; FPÁv./AHP Ourense/Leg 14703/membership lists; AHP Almería/FFGC/Asoc. Pol./Asoc. no. 1427, La Juventud de Acción Popular; Quirosa-Cheyrrouze, *Católicos, monárquicos y fascistas en Almería*, pp. 161–7.
- 138 Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 73.
- 139 This information has been gleaned mainly from the right-wing press – *ABC*, *C.E.D.A.*, *El Debate*, *J.A.P.* and *La Nación* – and archival sources.
- 140 The directorate committee in Almería, for example, had a more middle class composition than is suggested by its full membership statistics (though the difference is not huge). There were a number of workers in the Salamanca JAP, yet none appear on the directorate committee list used in the analysis here. Mary Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, p. 225 n. 38; *J.A.P.*, no. 39, 2 November 1935.
- 141 The 24 are: Almería (x2), Villarreal (Castellón), Chiclana de la Frontera, Jimena de la Frontera, Puerto Real (all Cádiz), Tresjuncos, Tribaldos, Fuente de Pedro Naharro (all Cuenca), Villacarrillo (Jaén), Murcia, Salamanca, Teruel, Valladolid (x2), Zaragoza, Cartagena, Valencia (x2), San Martín de Valdeiglesias (Madrid prov.), Loja (Granada), Las Palmas, Lalín (Pontevedra), and Mérida. *J.A.P.*, no. 3, 24 November 1934; no. 11, 16 Mar. 1935; no. 14, 20 Apr. 1935; no. 20, 1 June 1935; no. 22, 22 June 1935; no. 28, 10 August 1935; no. 39, 2 November 1935; no. 41, 16 November 1935; no. 47, 4 January 1935; no. 50, 25 January 1935; *C.E.D.A.*, no. 39, 31 January 1935; no. 48, June 1935; AGGCE/PS/Jaén/Carp. 3, Exp. 95; AGGCE/PS/Jaén/Carp. 23, Exp. 19; Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, p. 121; Valls, 'La Derecha Regional Valenciana' (Unpublished PhD), p. 347 (cit from *Diario de Valencia*, 17 April 1934, 15 January 1936); Moreno Fernández, *Acción Popular Murciana*, pp. 109, 110, 154, 156; Palomares Ibáñez, *La Segunda República en Valladolid: agrupaciones y partidos políticos* (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1996), p. 85 (cit. from *Diario Regional*, 18 January 1934, 1 November 1935).
- 142 Ramón Serrano Súñer, for example, claimed never to have been a member of the JAP, let alone its leader (as some authors have suggested). See his letter in *Equipo Mundo*, *Los 90 ministros de Franco*, 3rd edn. (Barcelona: Dupesa, 1971), p. 345.

- 143 The occupations of the majority of deputies were included in *ABC* on 20 December 1933 and 6 March 1936. Also *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1935. Lawyers dominated republican parties more generally. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 42–7.
- 144 On CEDA support from this social constituency – or, rather, its attempts to woo this support – see, Paul Preston and Eduardo Sevilla-Guzmán, 'Dominación de clase y modos de cooptación del campesinado en España: La Segunda República (Primera Parte)', in *Agricultura y sociedad*, no. 3 (1977), pp. 147–65.
- 145 APCE/Film XI, apart. 125, '¡Campesinos de Castilla!'; Film XI, apart. 97.
- 146 Ramón Morote Pons, 'La Falange a Mallorca entre la República i el primer franquisme: espectre sociopolític' (Unpublished PhD thesis, Universitat de les Illes Balears, 2000), pp. 433–513.
- 147 Montero, *La CEDA*, vol. I, p. 392; Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 976–72; *El Debate*, 14 December 1935. This is plausible – the *minimum* number of centres set up was 27.
- 148 *F.E.*, 1 March 1934.
- 149 Lowe, 'The Juventud de Acción Popular and the "failure" of "fascism" in Spain', pp. 20–2; Payne, *Falange*, p. 101; Payne, 'Social Composition', pp. 423–34, table at p. 425; Jato, *La rebelión de los estudiantes*, pp. 134 and *passim*; Núñez Seixas, 'El fascismo en Galicia: El caso de Ourense (1931–1936)', in *Historia y Fuente Oral*, no. 10 (1993): *Religión y política*, pp. 145, 155, 157–60; Álvarez Rey, *La derecha en la Segunda República* p. 386.
- 150 AGGCE/PS/Gijón–J/C11, 'Relación de afiliados a la Juventud de Acción Popular'; Vicent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, pp. 227; Monge y Bernal, *Acción Popular*, pp. 365, 1088–92; *ABC*, 13 February 1936; Grandío Seoane, *La C.E.D.A. en Galicia*, pp. 205, 310, 334–6.
- 151 Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 73.
- 152 Gabriel Jackson, *La República española y la guerra civil (1931–1939)* (Barcelona: Orbis, 1987), p. 169.
- 153 With the exception of admiration for Mussolini and Hitler, all of these facets are evident in the 19 Points (see above). On attitudes to fascism, José María García Escudero, *El pensamiento de «El Debate»: un diario católico en la crisis de España (1911–1936)* (Madrid: Editorial La Católica, 1983), pp. 453–65.
- 154 *J.A.P.*, no. 14, 20 April 1935.
- 155 Grandío Seoane, *La CEDA en Galicia*, p. 236.
- 156 Juan Carlos Molano Gragera, 'Acción Popular: la derecha católica en Montijo', pp. 78–9.
- 157 Letter to the author from Ernesto Andrés Vázquez, in annotated response to letter of 25 May 2001.
- 158 Martin Blinkhorn, 'Conservatism, Traditionalism and Fascism in Spain', especially pages 134–5. For so many, it was really just a question of right and left, as is made abundantly clear in the Causa General, where countless interviewees responded to the question of their political affiliation with a simple

'de derechas'. AHN/FFCC/CG/*passim*. And see also, Giles Tremlett, *Ghosts of Spain: Travels Through a Country's Hidden Past* (London: Faber and Faber, 2006).

- 159 Ricardo Chueca, 'FET y de las JONS: La paradójica victoria de un fascismo fracasado', in Josep Fontana (ed.), *España bajo el franquismo* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1986).
- 160 USC/Fondo HISTORGA/Interview with Fernando Valencia.
- 161 *El Siglo Futuro*, 24, 28 May 1935, cit. Blinkhorn, *Carlismo y contrarrevolución en España*, p. 281. The significance of local networks and offers of employment is made clear in the papers of Federico Salmón. AGGCE/PS/Madrid/2135, 1119. Also, *El Carbayón*, 8 November 1934.
- 162 J.A.P., no. 53, 14 February 1936.
- 163 Tusell, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular*, vol. II, pp. 26–7; Payne, *Falange*, p. 111; José Luis Rodríguez Jiménez, *La extrema derecha española en el siglo XX* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1997), p. 178; Blinkhorn, 'Iberian States', p. 332; Linz, 'Some Notes', pp. 89–91.
- 164 Tusell, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular*, vol. II, appendix (no page nos., but pp. 282–5). ABC, 17 February 1936 claimed figures of Gil Robles, 186,345 and José Antonio, 4948. The Falange vote in Madrid, like that of the CEDA, was predominantly middle class. Javier Tusell, *La II República en Madrid: elecciones y partidos políticos* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1970), pp. 158, 155; Jiménez Campo, *El fascismo en la crisis de la II República*, p. 309.
- 165 Payne, *Falange*, p. 101.
- 166 Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, p. 248; Tusell, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular*, vol. II, pp. 193–40.

IV The Ominous Spring

- 1 This is echoed by Rafael Valls's work on the DRV and Mary Vincent on Salamanca's AP. Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, pp. 227–8; Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, pp. 234–7 and *passim*.
- 2 FPÁv./BDPO/(b)/(v) Ribadavia, Eduardo García [? illegible] to JPÁv, 7 February 1936.
- 3 See, e.g., AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1630, fols. 248–9.
- 4 AMS/AMGF/BX/1, BX/2, BX/3, BX/4, BX/5.
- 5 Ernesto Andrés Vázquez, letter to the author, in annotated response to letter of 20 July 2001.
- 6 *El Debate*, 10 November 1935.
- 7 *Acción*, 6 June, 1936.
- 8 Preston, *Coming*, p. 255. Those who had bankrolled the CEDA's electoral campaign spent much of the spring seeking to recuperate their money. AGGCES/PS/Madrid/1199 and 2135.
- 9 Michael Mann notes: 'compromise was difficult for the CEDA . . . because of their tendency to demonise opponents.' *Fascists*, p. 332.
- 10 AMS/AGMF/BX/7. Giménez Fernández's annotations were, in truth, more

about his own recriminations than analysing defeat. See Tusell, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular*, vol. II, pp. 195–240.

- 11 AMS/AMGF/BXIII/178, collective letter to MGF, 24 February 1936.
- 12 AMS/AMGF, B-X/7.
- 13 AMS/AMGF, B-XIII/36. Jorge Cera to MGF, 25 February 1936. This 'great mass' of working people actually lined up on the left and, while more sympathetic to Giménez Fernández, were not CEDA supporters under any circumstances.
- 14 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14073, Pérez de Laborda post-electoral circular, undated, February/March 1936.
- 15 Not least because some did not see genuine concern in the JAP. See AMS/AMGF, BXIII/237, José Gato [? illegible] to MGF, 22 February 1936.
- 16 AMS/AMGF, B-XIII/243, Fernando [no surname] to MGF, 19 April 1936.
- 17 Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, vol. I, pp. 195–209 and *passim*, quotation at p. 199.
- 18 ABC, 21 February 1936; *El Socialista*, 20 February 1936.
- 19 *Acción*, no. 40, 14 March 1936.
- 20 Preston, *Coming*, p. 244.
- 21 *Acción*, no. 38, 29 February 1936.
- 22 Manuel Azaña, *Obras Completas* (Mexico City: Oasis, 1966–68), vol. IV, p. 572 (20 February).
- 23 Preston, *Coming*, pp. 244–7.
- 24 Ronald Fraser, *Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War* (London: Pimlico, 1986), pp. 84–5.
- 25 Cit. Francisco Bravo, *Historia de Falange Española de las JONS*, 2nd edn. (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1943), p. 180; Miguel Vidal Santos, *Salvapatrias y cruzados: historia de los golpes de Estado en España* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 2002, p. 163.
- 26 Ramón Garriga, *Juan March y su tiempo* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1976).
- 27 *El Mundo Obrero*, 15 April 1936, cit. González Calleja, 'La radicalización de la derecha', pp. 828–9.
- 28 AMS/AMGF/B-XIII/243. Fernando [no surname] to MGF, 19 April 1936.
- 29 José María de Areilza, in *La historia de la guerra civil española*, no. 25: *Testigos de la historia* (Barcelona: Historia16, 1997), p. 20.
- 30 Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. IV, tomo 15º, p. 166.
- 31 AGGCES/PS/Madrid/2135, AP Murcia to FS 11 July 1936.
- 32 AGGCES/PS/Madrid/2135, Antonio Reverte to FS, Yecla, n.d. Federico Salmón's papers (or, rather, those letters sent to him) make this sense of impotence very clear.
- 33 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, Pérez de Laborda, undated circular, February/March 1936.
- 34 *El Debate*, 24 March 1936.
- 35 AGGCES/PS/Madrid/2135, Federación Local de Sindicatos Católicos to FS, 14 May 1936.

- 36 AMS/AMGF/BXIII/30, MGF to Geminiano Carrascal, 8 June 1936.
- 37 Comès Iglesia, *En el filo de la navaja*, pp. 333–61; Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, pp. 227–36; Preston, *Coming*, pp. 264–5. Also, see below.
- 38 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, Rosario to JPÁv., Viana, 27 June 1936.
- 39 Ernesto Andres Vázquez, letter to the author in annotated response to letter of 20 July 2001.
- 40 Payne, *The Spanish Revolution*, ch. 9, blames disorder on the left and the Popular Front government.
- 41 AMS/AMGF, BXIII/202, Antonio Sanz Gilsanz to MGF, 22 April 1936.
- 42 Sanz Hoya, 'Las derechas en Cantabria', pp. 405–8; Fernando Ayala Vicente, *Las elecciones en la provincia de Cáceres durante la II República (1931–1936)* (Mérida: Editora Regional de Extremadura, 2001), p. 133.
- 43 Quoted in Palacios, *Violencia política*, p. 119.
- 44 The sense of overwhelming violence in Gil Robles, *Discursos parlamentarios*, pp. 626–7.
- 45 *Diario de Valencia*, 8 July 1936, cit Stephan Lynam, "'Moderate" conservatism and the Second Republic: the Case of Valencia', in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), *Spain in conflict 1931–1939: Democracy and its Enemies* (London: Sage, 1986), p. 154.
- 46 AGGCES/PS/Madrid/2135, Bartolomé Ferro, to FS, Los Molinos, 8 May 1936.
- 47 FPÁv./BDPO/'(c) Elecciones de febrero 1936', Victoriano Mateo to JPÁv, Sobrado, 12 May 1936.
- 48 AMS/AMGF/B-XIII/53, Mariano Fernández de Córdoba to MGF, 11 July 1936.
- 49 *Acción*, no. 41, 21 March 1936.
- 50 Antoni Marimoni i Riurort, 'Joventud d'Acció Popular de Balears' and 'Acció Popular Agrària a Mallorca', in *Gran enciclopèdia de Mallorca*, Tomo I (Inca: Promallorca Ediciones, 1989), pp. 25, 219–20.
- 51 *Acción*, no. 49, 16 May 1936.
- 52 *Acción*, no. 51, 30 May 1936; no. 52, 6 June 1936.
- 53 *Acción*, no. 53, 13 June 1936.
- 54 *Acción*, no. 58, 18 July 1936.
- 55 AMS/AMGF/XIII/155, Fernando Ors Martínez to MGF, 25 April 1936.
- 56 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14073, Eduardo Farrás [? illegible] to JPÁv., Ribadavia, 14 July 1936. (It is not clear what his crime was).
- 57 Luis Novillas Navas, *Justificación de mi rebeldía: memorias* (Toledo, 1976), at Archivo Histórico Izquierda Republicana, cit. Ruíz Alonso, *La guerra civil en la provincia de Toledo*, p. 120.
- 58 Palacios, *Violencia política*, pp. 102, 104, 105. See also Julian Sanz Hoya, 'El catolicismo accidentalista en Cantabria durante la Segunda República: Acción Popular, 1934–1936', in Antonio Morales Moya (ed.), *Ideologías y movimientos políticos* (Madrid: España Nuevo Milenio, 2001), pp. 346–7.
- 59 Isidoro Díezgué, *1936 de febrero a julio: lo que ocurrió en España desde las elecciones hasta la sublevación* (Madrid: Prensa Obrera, n.d. 1936), p. 26; Molano Gragera,

- 'Acción Popular: la derecha católica en Montijo', p. 90; AMS/AMGF/BXIII/202, Antonio Sanz Gilsanz to MGF, 22 April 1936.
- 60 AHP Zaragoza/Sumario 108/Rollo 484/Caja 389, cit. Julia Cifuentes Chueca and Pilar Maluenda Pons, *El asalto a la República: Los orígenes de franquismo en Zaragoza (1936–39)*, p. 151.
- 61 AGGCES/PS/Madrid/2135, Antonio Reverte to FS, Yecla, n.d. (spring 1936). Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 15, notes similarly that violence reached 'the whole of Spain', but not actually his town of Calahorra.
- 62 Quoted in Javier Ugarte Tellería, *La Nueva Covadonga insurgente: orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación de 1936 en Navarra y el País Vasco* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1998), p. 62.
- 63 *Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Españolas*, 16 June 1936, cit. Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, revised edn. (London: Pelican, 1965, repr., 1968), pp. 24–5.
- 64 Preston, *Coming*, pp. 273–4; Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain*, pp. 272–6.
- 65 Gil Robles, *Discursos parlamentarios* (Madrid: Taurus, 1971), pp. 633–4.
- 66 Quoted by Alberto Reig Tapia, 'La justificación ideológica del «alzamiento» de 1936', in J. L. García Delgado (ed.), *La II República Española: Bienio Rectificador y Frente Popular, 1934–1936* (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1988), p. 220.
- 67 Remigio Vilariño, *Mensajero del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús* (Bilbao, 1898), p. 526, cit. Frances Lannon, 'Modern Spain', p. 584. See Michael Richards, 'Constructing the Nationalist State: Self-sufficiency and Regeneration in the Early Franco Years', in Clare Mar-Molinero and Ángel Smith, *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg, 1996), pp. 151–7.
- 68 AGGCES/PS/Madrid/1199, Pilar to Elisa and María Jesús, Toledo, 8 June 1936.
- 69 *El Adelanto*, 9 March 1936; *Heraldo*, 15 March 1936; *La Ciudad y los Campos*, 8 August 1936. Cit. Santiago Vega Sombria, *De la esperanza a la persecución: la represión franquista en la provincia de Segovia* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2005), pp. 25–6, 458–9 n. 82, n. 83.
- 70 [Francisco Franco], 'Apuntes' personales del Generalísimo sobre la República y la guerra civil (Madrid: FNFE, 1987), p. 36.
- 71 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 701.
- 72 Gil Robles, *Discursos parlamentarios*, pp. 560–1; *Acción*, no. 46, 25 April 1936.
- 73 Conversation with Ernesto Andrés Vázquez. Murcia, 27 March 2002.
- 74 One *cedista* wrote: 'Gil Robles's words were so emotional I cried like a child because I've been persecuted for two months.' AGGCES/PS/Madrid/2135, Telesforo Sánchez to FS, 18 April 1936.
- 75 On the UME, see Julio Busquets and Juan Carlos Losada, *Ruido de sables: Las conspiraciones militares en la España del siglo XX* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003), Ch. 5.
- 76 Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain*, pp. 221–4, quote at p. 224.
- 77 Gabriel Cardona, 'Militares y República: entre la lealtad y la conspiración', in David Solar Cubillas (ed.), *Biblioteca de la guerra civil: la marcha hacia la guerra*

- (Madrid: Historia16, 1997), p. 93; Joaquín Lleixà, *Cien años de militarismo en España* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 1986), pp. 104–7.
- 78 The generals present were: Franco, Orgaz, Villegas, Fanjul, García de la Herrrán, González Carrasco, Ponte, Saliquet, Varela, Aranda and Valentín Galarza, 'el técnico' and the key link to the UME. Generals Goded, Kindelán and Queipo de Llano did not attend but remained in contact.
- 79 Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis*, pp. 238–9.
- 80 Quoted in Sueiro, 'Sublevación contra la República (III): El desenlace', p. 53.
- 81 Julio Aróstegui, *Por qué el 18 de julio . . . y después* (Barcelona: Flor del Viento, 2006), p. 153.
- 82 Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis*, p. 246.
- 83 Julio Gil Pecharrormán, 'Sobre España inmortal, solo Dios': José María Albiñana y el Partido Nacional Español (1934–1937) (Madrid: UNED, 2000), p. 203.
- 84 Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain*, pp. 331–9.
- 85 Juan Antonio Ansaldi, *¿Para qué . . . (de Alfonso XIII a Juan III)* (Buenos Aires, 1951), p. 122, cit. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 201.
- 86 Archivo Familia Lucia (hereafter AFL), Informe Costa Serrano.
- 87 'Carta a los militares de España', in *Obras Completas de José Antonio Primo de Rivera*, pp. 969–72. See, Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era*, pp. 30–1.
- 88 Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 198.
- 89 *Obras Completas*, pp. 935–7 (emphasis in the original). Also, Eduardo González Calleja, 'Los pistoleros azules: milicias fascistas y violencia política en la Segunda República española', in *Historia16*, no. 98 (June 1984), p. 45.
- 90 The translation is Payne's, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 203.
- 91 Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, p. 85.
- 92 Gabriel Cardona, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la guerra civil* (Madrid: Siglo XXI de España, 1983), pp. 219–47; González Calleja, 'La radicalización de la derecha', pp. 831–2.
- 93 Cit. Sueiro, 'Sublevación contra la República (III): El desenlace', p. 55.
- 94 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1405/2, fol. 21r, testimony of Martí Olucha. Also, AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1389/1, Tomo 70; Miguel-Ángel Mateos Rodríguez, 'Formación y desarrollo de la derecha católica en la provincia de Zamora durante la Segunda República', in Javier Tusell, Julio Gil Pecharrormán and Feliciano Montero (eds.), *Estudios sobre la derecha española contemporánea* (Madrid: UNED, 1993), p. 466.
- 95 'Apuntes' personales del general Franco.
- 96 AGR/Ángel Herrera Oria to Gil Robles, Biarritz, 26 September 1936; Julio Aróstegui, *Por qué el 18 de julio*, pp. 151–2.
- 97 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, carp. 40, testimony of Gil Robles, Lisbon, 27 February 1942.
- 98 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, Amadeo Fernández to JPÁv., 17 July 1936; Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 75.
- 99 Lleixà, *Cien años de militarismo*, p. 109.
- 100 Busquets and Losada, *Ruido de Sables*, p. 58. Also, Ugarte, *La Nueva Covadonga*,

- pp. 66–7. Much of this was carried out via friendship or family ties rather through organised party channels.
- 101 Serrano Suñer, *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar (noticia y reflexión frente a una leyenda)* (Madrid: Ediciones Españolas, 1947), pp. 53, 221; Sueiro, 'La sublevación contra la República: los preparativos' (II), pp. 48.
- 102 Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 199. As Serrano Suñer admitted: 'I know what is being prepared and I am with them.' Suñer, *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar*, p. 221. On José Finat, the Conde de Mayalde, see Ruíz Alonso, *La guerra civil en la provincia de Toledo*, pp. 136–7, 535.
- 103 FPÁv/AHPOu/Leg. 14073, 'Carlos' to JPÁv, Vigo 24 May 1936.
- 104 *Acción*, 4 July 1936.
- 105 Marimoni i Riutort, 'Joventut d'Acció Popular de Balears', 'Acció Popular Agrària a Mallorca', pp. 25, 219–20.
- 106 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, Tomo IB; AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg 1564/2, paquete 18, no. 8: 'Cuartel de la Montaña'; "Apuntes" personales del general Franco, p. 35.
- 107 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1313/1 (Binéfar); Arrarás, *Historia de la guerra civil española*, vol. VI, Tomo 24º, p. 17; Álvarez Rey, *La derecha en la II República*, pp. 441–2.
- 108 Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. III, tomo 12º, p. 426; vol. VI, tomo 27º, p. 335.
- 109 Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. III, tomo 15º, pp. 196, 203; Cifuentes Chueca and Maluenda Pons, *El asalto a la República*, p. 151.
- 110 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1468/1, exp. 1, fols. 66, 72, testimonies of Antonio Ramón Serentill Sans, Joaquín Puig Bayer and Carlos Larrosa Hospital.
- 111 Ruíz Alonso, *La provincia de Toledo en la guerra civil*, pp. 136–7, 163–4, 165, 534.
- 112 *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 7 February 1936.
- 113 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1163/1, Pieza 7, fols 244–5; Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze, *Almería 1936–37: Sublevación militar y alteraciones en la retaguardia republicana* (Almería: Universidad de Almería, 1996), pp. 36–8.
- 114 Ruíz Alonso, *¡Corprativismo!*, pp. 249–50.
- 115 *Ya*, 10 April 1968; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 86–8, 643–714, 773–8; Preston, *Coming*, pp. 241–4; Vicente Palacio Atard, 'José María Gil Robles: No fue posible la paz,' in *Cuadernos bibliográficos de la guerra civil española. (Series 3: Memorias)* (Madrid: Universidad de Madrid, 1969); AGR/Papers referring to the publication of *No fue posible la paz*.
- 116 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, carp. 40.
- 117 AGR/Gil Robles to general Emilio Mola, Lisbon, 6 January 1937 and correspondence between Ángel Herrera Oria and Gil Robles; Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. III, Tomo 13º, pp. 442, 456–7; "Apuntes" personales del general Franco, p. 35 (Franco complained that while the CEDA provided 500,000ptas, he saw 'nothing' from the monarchists); AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, carp. 40; FPÁv/BDPO/E: JAP (4) Después

- del 18 de julio', Hojas Informativas, 20 May 1944. By 1979, Gil Robles had distanced himself even further from the rising, insisting: 'the organisers of the rising never counted upon me to help prepare it, which I think is logical given my constant opposition to the use of force. When I saw that rising was inevitable, I gave it an insignificant [amount of] help . . . to try to prevent it from turning into a long civil war.' Carles Clemente, *Diálogos en torno a la guerra de España* (Madrid: Fasa, 1979), pp. 53–4.
- 118 AGR/Gil Robles to general Mola, 29 December 1936.
- 119 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, carp. 40.
- 120 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, carp. 40.
- 121 AGR/Press cutting from *El Noticiero* (no date), reproducing Gil Robles's open letter to Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez, 7 October 1936; AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, carp. 40.
- 122 Repr. in Joaquín Maldonado Almenar's personal testimony (pp. 197–9) in Aurora Bosch, Rafael Valls and Vicent Comès (eds.), *La derecha católica en los años treinta, en el cincuentenario de la muerte de Luis Lucía* (Valencia: Ajuntament de Valencia, 1996), p. 197. While Lucía's telegram sparked debate it is now agreed that his republicanism was genuine. He paid the price, ending up tried by both sides in the war. Cf. Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, pp. 234–5, 242; Comès, *En el filo de la navaja*, pp. 361–71; González Calleja, 'La radicalización de la derecha', pp. 806–7.
- 123 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1389/1, fol. 49v, testimony of Joaquín Maldonado.
- 124 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1389/1, fols. 2v and 2r, testimony of José Costa Serrano.
- 125 AFL, Informe Costa Serrano.
- 126 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1389/1, fols. 49–51, testimony of Joaquín Maldonado.
- 127 AFL, Informe Costa Serrano.
- 128 AFL, Informe Costa Serrano. Also reproduced in Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, pp. 229–30.
- 129 Comès Iglesia, *En el filo de la navaja*, pp. 350, 353, 361.
- 130 Emphasis added.
- 131 Lynam, "'Moderate' conservatism in the Second Republic', pp. 133–59, 153.
- 132 Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, p. 228, 138–9, 148, 160, 228–9; Comès, *En el filo de la navaja*, pp. 350–61.
- 133 AFL, Informe Costa Serrano; AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1389/1, Tomo 70 (emphasis in the original).
- 134 On these latter two organisations, see Colin Winston, *La clase trabajadora y la derecha en España, 1900–1936* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1989).
- 135 Baldrich Gatell's name does not appear in all the accounts, while each of the others do. AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg 1630, exp. 1, testimonies of Carlos de Senillosa y de Viana, member of the JAP Barcelona directorate committee (fols. 245–6), José María Balias Hidalgo de Quintana, president JAP Barcelona (fols. 134–5), José María Baldrich Gatell, *japista* (fols. 248–9), Ramón de

- Montagut Miquel, ex-vice-president of Barcelona JAP (fol. 247) and José María Aguasca Bonmati, *japista* (fols. 243–4). There is no account from Jorge Dezcallar, the vice-secretary.
- 136 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 134–5, testimony of Balias Hidalgo de Quintana.
- 137 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 248–9, 245–6, testimonies of Baldrich Gatell and Senillosa y de Viana.
- 138 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1630, exp. 1, fols. 243–4, testimony of Aguasca Bonmati.
- 139 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, carp. 40; AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg 1630, exp. 1. fols 248–9, testimony of Baldrich Gatell.
- 140 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1405/2, fol. 21r, testimony of Antonio Martí Olucha, DRV candidate for Castellón. Also AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1513/1, testimony of Ricardo de Rada Peral.
- 141 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 134–5, testimony of Balias Hidalgo de Quintana. Balias says that the Madrid directorate 'agreed to take part'.
- 142 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg 1630, exp. 1. fols 248–9.
- 143 According to Balias and Aguasca Bonmati. AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 134–5, 243–4.
- 144 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fol. 247, testimony of Ramón de Montagut Miguel.
- 145 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 243–4, testimony of Aguasca Bonmati. (This despite suspicions about Pistola's reliability, having been a member of the anarchist FAI).
- 146 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 248–9, testimony of Baldrich Gatell.
- 147 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 243–4, testimony of Aguasca Bonmati.
- 148 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 134–5, testimony of Balias Hidalgo; fols 243–4, testimony of Aguasca Bonmati.
- 149 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 248–9, testimony of Baldrich Gatell.
- 150 Valiente, 'Por qué me fui de la CEDA', p. 29 (iii).
- 151 *El Sol*, 16 April 1936; Gil Robles, *Discursos parlamentarios*, pp. 560–1.
- 152 AGGCE/PS/Madrid/2135, Luis Belda to FS, 19 May 1936 and Salmón's undated reply.
- 153 *El Debate*, 10 May 1936; *Acción*, no. 48, 9 May 1936.
- 154 *El Debate*, 17 May 1936; Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 555.
- 155 Ian Gibson, *El hombre que detuvo a García Lorca*, p. 89.
- 156 Rafael Gil Bracero, 'Conspiración y sublevación en Granada', in *Los nuevos historiadores*, p. 333; Julio Gil Pecharromán, *José Antonio: retrato de un visionario* (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1996), p. 460.
- 157 Gibson, *El hombre que detuvo a García Lorca*, p. 84.

- 158 FPA/BDPO/(a) 'Organización interna' / (i) 'Cuestión derivada de la dimisión de los gestores municipales de la CEDA en el Ayuntamiento de Ourense', Pérez de Laborda circular, 18 June 1936.
- 159 *ibid.* (emphasis added).
- 160 *ibid.*
- 161 *ibid.*
- 162 *ibid.* (emphasis in the original).
- 163 See, for example: Anthony Beevor, *The Spanish Civil War* (London: Cassell, 1999), p. 42 (using *No fue posible la paz* as ref.); Javier Tusell, *Historia de España en el siglo XX*, vol. II: *La crisis de los años treinta: República y Guerra Civil* (Madrid: Taurus, 1998), p. 234; Esenwein and Shubert, *Spain at War*, p. 23; Gil Pecharrromán, *La Segunda República*, p. 188; Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War*, p. 163 n. 3 (using *No fue posible la paz* as a ref.); Jackson, *La República española y la guerra civil*, p. 188 (using *El Sol* as ref.); Francisco Romero Salvadó, *Twentieth-Century Spain: Politics and Society in Spain, 1898–1998* (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 111; Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, vol. I, p. 348; Joan Maria Thomàs, *Lo que fue la Falange* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1999), pp. 59, 78, 95; Vicent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, pp. 239–40; Payne, *Falange*, pp. 114, 120. Palacios, *Violencia política*, pp. 48, 96; Ángela Cenarro Lagunas, *Cruzados y camisas azules: los orígenes del franquismo en Aragón, 1936–1945* (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 1997), p. 64; Vidal Santos, *Salvapatrias y cruzados*, p. 140; Alfonso Santos Alfonso, *La sublevación militar de 1936 en Lugo* (La Coruña: O Castro, 1999), p. 95. This is not a criticism of the authors listed, it is rather an illustration of the extent to which the notion of a full-scale exodus has simply become assimilated knowledge.
- 164 AGGCE/PS/Madrid/Cirilio Martín Retortillo to FS, 28 March 1938.
- 165 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/1426/fols. 80–1, testimony of Alejandro Allanegui Féllez.
- 166 Bowyers, *My Mission to Spain*, p. 253.
- 167 Cf. Gerald Brennan, *The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background to the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge: Canto [CUP], 1990), pp. 309, 331; Santiago Carrillo, *Juez y parte: 15 retratos españoles* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1996), p. 87; Bowyers, *My Mission to Spain*, p. 155; Manuel Aznar, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, 3rd edn. (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1958), vol. I, p. 83; AGGCES/PS/Madrid/2135, Cirilio Martín Retortillo to FS, Huesca, 28 March 1936.
- 168 Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana*, p. 354; González Calleja, 'La radicalización de la derecha española', pp. 805–6; *Pueblo*, 12 March 1959; Ignacio Merino, *Serrano Suñer: historia de una conducta* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1996), p. 6; Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue: Memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977); Heleno Saña, *El franquismo sin mitos: conversaciones con Serrano Suñer* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1982). All of Serrano Suñer's writings and declarations since the war have waved away his *cadista* past, even denying he was ever a member of the JAP. While it was technically true that Serrano Suñer had not been a *japista*, his attempts to distance himself from the party

were as telling as they were dishonest. Given his significance in the CEDA, and the JAP (he was a key figure at El Escorial), his silence can only be interpreted as absolutely deliberate.

169 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1060/1, 2^a pieza.

170 Rafael García Serrano, *La gran esperanza* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1983), pp. 63–4.

171 Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 76.

172 Ayala Vicente, *La violencia política*, p. 131; Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, pp. 84–5.

173 Testimony of Fernando Campos Sánchez, cit. Martínez Leal, *Los socialistas en acción*, p. 157.

174 Herbert Rutledge Southworth, *Antifalange: estudio crítico de 'Falange en la guerra de España' de M. García Venero* (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1967), p. 114.

175 Patricio González de Canales, questionnaire response to Stanley Payne, cit. *Fascism in Spain*, p. 185.

176 *Obras completas de José Antonio*, pp. 964–5; Bravo, *Historia de la Falange*, pp. 156–6.

177 Alejandro Cornero Suárez, *Diario de un rebelde: la República, la Falange y la guerra* (Madrid: Ediciones Barbaroja, 1991), p. 148 (entry for 7 March 1936).

178 Testimony of Manuel de la Mora Villar, cit. Sanz Hoya, 'Las derechas en Cantabria', p. 410.

179 Bravo, *Historia de la Falange*, pp. 167–8. The JAP had issued a similar warning during its own period of expansion: 'last minute members who did not fight in the hours of danger but gave their names to the triumph should be subjected to special observation', *J.A.P.*, no. 46, 28 December 1935.

180 Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, p. 228.

181 Comès, *En el filo de la navaja*, pp. 351–2; Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, pp. 228–9. While Comès says that Torres Murciano resigned, Valls states that Luis Lucía sacked him. The idea that the DRV was split along purely generational lines is rejected by both Valls and Comès, who argue that the (adult) DRV was divided on the same questions, with significant numbers embracing the stance of their youth section. The divide, writes Comès was 'in fact an ideological and strategic one' (p. 351). These are the same divisions that afflicted the party all over Spain. See also, Vicent Comès Iglesia, 'Luis Lucía Lucía y la élite católica de la CEDA: armonías y tensiones de una relación (1931–1936)', in Aurora Bosch, Vicente Comès and Rafael Valls, *La derecha católica en los años treinta, en el cincuentenario de la muerte de Luis Lucía* (Valencia: Ajuntament de Valencia, 1996), pp. 184–5.

182 *La Unión* (Seville), 29 March 1936.

183 Emmet John Hughes, *Report from Spain* (London: Latimer House, 1947), p. 37, estimated an enormous increase of 50,000–70,000 but this has been dismissed since. Javier Jiménez Campo, *El fascismo en la crisis de la II República*, p. 313 n. 106, estimated 10,000–15,000. Ricardo Chueca concurs with this figure, *El fascismo en los comienzos del régimen de Franco: un estudio sobre FET–JONS* (Madrid: CIS, 1983), p. 130. Payne, *Falange*, p. 114, suggests membership doubled in a few months (i.e. perhaps 20,000).

- 184 Ricardo Chueca, *El fascismo en los comienzos del régimen de Franco*, p. 132; Chueca, 'FET y de las JONS: La paradójica victoria de un fascismo fracasado', in Josep Fontana (ed.), *España bajo el franquismo* (Barcelona: Crítica, 1986). Cf. AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1426, fols. 80–1; Leg. 1396/1, fol. 2–7r; Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. IV, tomo 15º, p. 196; vol. IV, tomo 25º, p. 121; vol. V, tomo 23º, p. 536; vol. IV, tomo 15º, p. 166; Testimony of Ambrosio Lucíañez in Glicerio Sánchez Recio, 'La trama de la rebelión en Alicante', in Glicerio Sánchez Recio et al., *Guerra civil y franquismo en Alicante* (Alicante, 1990), p. 23 (no ref. given for this testimony). One study of Marbella also assumes a membership transfer but does not demonstrate it. Lucía Prieto Borrego, *Marbella, los años de la utopía: estudio de una comunidad andaluza (1931–1936)* (Marbella: n.p., 1994), p. 220.
- 185 *Últimos hallazgos de escritos y cartas de José Antonio*, ed. Agustín del Río Cisneros and Enrique Pavón Pereyra (Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1962), p. 127.
- 186 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 555 (emphasis added).
- 187 Chueca, *El fascismo en los comienzos del régimen de Franco*, p. 132.
- 188 FPA/AHPou/Leg. 14703, membership lists. Six have no dates for their transfer, although the figures are put together during the civil war, implying a later departure than February–July.
- 189 Quirosa-Cheyourouze, *Católicos, monárquicos y fascistas en Almería*, p. 73.
- 190 Valls, *La Derecha Regional Valenciana*, pp. 125, 228; 'La Derecha Regional Valenciana' (Unpublished PhD), p. 351; Manuel Suárez Cortina, *El fascismo en Asturias (1931–1937)* (Asturias: Silverio Cañada, 1981), pp. 235–6 (emphasis added).
- 191 Endériz García, 'Memorias', pp. 67–7.
- 192 AGCCE/PS–Santander/Leg. 487, papers of María Asunción Varela, cit. Sanz Hoya, 'Las derechas en Cantabria', p. 410.
- 193 USC/Fondo HISTORGA/Interview with Oligario Muñiz.
- 194 Sergio Vilar goes further, claiming that: 'only after the war did the Falange gain thousands of members'. *La naturaleza del franquismo*, p. 76.
- 195 Morote Pons, 'La Falange a Mallorca', pp. 433–513.
- 196 Vega Sombria, *De la esperanza a la persecución*, pp. 15–16.
- 197 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1159–1, testimony of José Martínez Santistebán Villa de Serón.
- 198 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1563/2.
- 199 Cf. AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Legs. 1049/1, 1405/2, 1630, 1031/1, 1061, 1630. Gil Bracero, 'Conspiración y sublevación en Granada', pp. 335; Javier Cervera, *Madrid en Guerra: la ciudad clandestina, 1936–1939* (Madrid: Alianza, 1998), p. 171.

V Joining the Rising

- 1 Franco's manifesto in ABC, 23 July 1936, reproduced in Fernando Díaz-Plaja (ed.), *La guerra de España en sus documentos*, 8th edn. (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés,

- 2 Paul Preston, *Franco: A Biography* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 146–7.
- 3 Preston, *A Concise History*, p. 215.
- 4 *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 28 July 1936.
- 5 Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, p. 199; Stanley Payne, *The Franco Régime, 1936–1975* (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 104; Díaz-Plaja (ed.), *La guerra de España en sus documentos*, pp. 13–16, 17–19; Paul Heywood, 'Why the Republic Lost', in *History Today*, vol. 39 (March 1989), p. 22.
- 6 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 266, 20 February 1937.
- 7 Cf. Cardona, *El poder militar*; Lleixà, *Cien años de militarismo*; Payne, *Politics and the Military*.
- 8 This was reflected in the reports of the British Foreign Office. See, e.g., Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO) /FO/205525/W7244; PRO/FO/371/20570/W15925.
- 9 *Gaceta Regional*, 18 October 1936, cit. Eduardo González Calleja, 'La radicalización de la derecha española', p. 839.
- 10 Paul Preston, *The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), Ch. 1.
- 11 *Acción*, 20 July 1935. Also, *Vidas: Gil Robles*.
- 12 FPÁv/BDPO/'E: JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', Gil Robles to the JAP, Lisbon, 17 January 1937.
- 13 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, p. 76.
- 14 AGR/Franco to Gil Robles, Salamanca, 24 February 1937; Gil Robles to Franco, Lisbon, 6 January 1937; Estoril, 9 March 1937; *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 272, 3 April 1937 and ABC, 11 April 1937 (ABC at FPÁv/AHPou/Leg 14703). See also, Tusell, *Franco en la guerra civil: una biografía política* (Barcelona: Tusquets, 1992), pp. 85–6. Gabriel Cardona, *El poder militar*, pp. 219–47; González Calleja, 'La radicalización de la derecha española', pp. 831–2.
- 15 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 268, 6 March 1937.
- 16 Dionisio Ridruejo, *Casi unas memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1978), p. 50.
- 17 Luis Suárez, *Francisco Franco y su tiempo* (Madrid: FNFF, 1984), p. 291.
- 18 FPÁv/BDPO/'E: JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', undated address to JAP militias.
- 19 Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, pp. 22–3.
- 20 Michael Seidman, *Republic of Egos: A Social History of the Spanish Civil War* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002), p. 40. Seidman adds: 'Approximately 50% of officers on active duty happened to be in the Republican zone and perhaps half of these worked for the legal regime.'
- 21 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 244, 19 September 1936. Javier Tusell states: 'right from the start the military were the chiefs', *Franco en la guerra civil*, p. 68.
- 22 Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, p. 106.
- 23 Gabriel Cardona, 'La sublevación de julio', in Santos Juliá (ed.), *Socialismo y guerra civil* (Madrid: Pablo Iglesias, 1987), p. 27; Cardona, *El poder militar*, pp.

- 219–47. Reig Tapia, 'La justificación ideológica', pp. 213–19. Luís Bolín describes the Spanish civil war as 'an *alzamiento nacional* against five years of oppression and poor government without parallel in contemporary history. The immediate objective of those who participated was to save Spain from ruin, reaffirm the will of the country and avoid the triumph of communism.' Luís Bolín, *Los años vitales* (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1967), p. 165. 'Although the extent of "popular resistance" was a new phenomenon . . . it should not be over-estimated', states Seidman, *Republic of Egos*, pp. 26–7. Also, Luis Romero, *Tres días de julio* (18, 19, 20 de 1936), 2nd edn. (Barcelona: Ariel, 1968), p. 308.
- 24 Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, pp. 55–6; Seidman, *Republic of Egos*, pp. 27.
- 25 *Diario de Burgos*, 17 July 1937; 20 July 1936. Cit. Luis Castro, *Capital de la cruzada: Burgos durante la guerra civil* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2006), pp. 9–11.
- 26 Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, pp. 234–8; Preston, *Franco*, p. 147; *J.A.P.*, no. 11, 16 March 1935.
- 27 Julián Chaves Palacios, *La guerra civil en Extremadura: operaciones militares (1936–1939)* (Mérida: Junta de Extremadura/Editora Regional, 1997), pp. 21–4; Justo Vila Izquierdo, *Extremadura: la guerra civil*, 6th edn. (Badajoz: Universitas, 2002).
- 28 AMS/AMGF/BXIII/202, Antonio Sanz Gilsanz to MGF, Segovia, 20 August 1936. This is reflected in Vega Sombria, *De la esperanza a la persecución*, pp. 39–46. Only in the tiny town of El Espinar was there any fighting in the whole province.
- 29 Javier Martínez de Bedoya, *Memorias desde mi aldea* (Valladolid: Ambito, 1996), p. 93. See also, Ugarte Tellería, *La Nueva Covadonga insurgente: Orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación de 1936 en Navarra y el País Vasco* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 1998), pp. 143–65.
- 30 Joaquín Arrarás, *Francisco Franco* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1938), p. 181.
- 31 USC/Fondo HISTORGA/Interview with Fernando Valencia.
- 32 José Luis Martín Vigil, *Las flechas de mi haz* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1990), p. 19.
- 33 Even during the civil war, when most rightists were scrambling to present themselves as Falangists, the CEDA accounted for 41% of active 'fifth columnists' in Madrid. Cervera, *Madrid en guerra*, p. 171.
- 34 Seidman, *Republic of Egos*, pp. 41–2.
- 35 Romero, *Tres días de julio*, pp. 308 and 42, 162, 199–200, 205, 259–60, 308, 397; Maximiano García Venero, *El general Fanjul* (Madrid: CID, 1967), p. 246; Francisco Mariñas, *General Varela* (Barcelona: AHR, 1956), p. 72. This was later institutionalised in the JAP's Acción Cívica, a kind of rearguard police for those too old to fight.
- 36 Romero, *Tres días de julio*, pp. 199–200.
- 37 Quoted in Jesús María Palomares Ibáñez, *La guerra civil en la ciudad de Valladolid: entusiasmo y represión en la «capital del alzamiento»* (Valladolid: Ayuntamiento de Valladolid, 2001), p. 24.
- 38 General Queipo de Llano mentions Saliquet in a speech made in July 1939, whilst also stressing the significance of the CEDA. FPÁv./BDPOI/A. vi.

Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', script of Queipo de Llano speech at the *Homenaje al Ayuntamiento de Sevilla*, 20 July 1939. That the JAP kept a copy of this for the simple reason that they were mentioned (fleetingly) shows their desperation for any recognition.

- 39 Romero, *Tres días de julio*, pp. 164–7, 417, 607.
- 40 This can be seen in Granada. Gibson, *The Assassination of Federico García Lorca*, pp. 90–103.
- 41 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1630, exp. 1, fol. 243–4, testimony of Aguasca Bonmati.
- 42 AHN/FFCC/CG/Leg. 1488/1 fol. 72, testimony of Joaquín Puig Bayer. According to this testimony, CEDA representatives had attended meetings prior to the rising and had been assigned local government posts. JAP members reported to the castle on 19 July and were ready to travel to Barcelona if necessary.
- 43 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1389/1, fol. 49v, testimony of Maldonado; personal testimony also in Bosch, Valls and Comès (eds.), *La derecha católica en los años treinta*, p. 197.
- 44 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1389/1, fol. 49v, testimony of Maldonado; AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/Leg. 1389/1, fols. 2v and 2r, testimony of Costa Serrano.
- 45 AFL, Informe Costa Serrano.
- 46 *Ideal*, 18 July 1936, cit. Rafael Gil Bracero, 'Conspiración y sublevación en Granada', p. 337.
- 47 Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. IV, tomo 14º, p. 72.
- 48 Arrarás, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. IV, tomo 16º, pp. 478–81, 427.
- 49 *El Noticiero*, 26 July 1936, cit. Cifuentes Chueca and Maluenda Pons, *El asalto a la República*, p. 151.
- 50 Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain*, pp. 361, 388.
- 51 Pilar Santamaría, *Cuando los cañones duermen: Recuerdos nostálgicos de una madrina de guerra* (Burgos, 1983), p. 12, cit. Castro, *Capital de la cruzada*, p. 13.
- 52 AMS/AMGF/BXIII/202; Vega Sombria, *De la esperanza a la persecución*, p. 15. See also, Palomares Ibáñez, *La guerra civil en la ciudad de Valladolid*, pp. 81, 20, 21.
- 53 USC/Fondo HISTORGA/Interview with Fernando Valencia.
- 54 Ángela Cenarro, *Cruzados y camisas azules*, p. 61.
- 55 Archivo General Militar de Ávila (hereafter AGMA)/Leg 449/Carp. 15/7ª División Orgánica; leg 464/Carp. 11, 4ª Bandera Granada; Leg 455/Cap 7, 71ª División; Leg 464/Carp. 10/1ª Bandera Cruces Negras de la Victoria; Leg. 17/Carp. 6, 7ª División, Sector Norte; FPÁv./AHPOu/Press release, Valladolid, 27 June 1937.
- 56 Gibson, *The Assassination of Federico García Lorca*, pp. 95–6.
- 57 Torres García, 'Actuación de Gil Robles', p. 23.
- 58 García Serrano, *La gran esperanza*, p. 64.
- 59 Saz, *Fascism y franquismo*, pp. 158–9 (emphasis in the original).
- 60 Seidman, *Republic of Egos*, p. 20.

- 61 Alfonso Santos Alfonso, *La sublevación militar de 1936 en Lugo*. (La Coruña: do Castro, 1999), p. 129.
- 62 Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 249.
- 63 Cifuentes Chueca and Maluenda Pons, *El asalto a la República*, pp. 28–9; Payne, *Falange*, p. 153.
- 64 Castro, *Capital de la cruzada*, p. 114; Tusell, *Franco en la guerra civil*, p. 76.
- 65 Rafael Casas de la Vega, *Las milicias nacionales en la guerra de España* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1974), p. 132.
- 66 *La Gaceta de Colonia*, 6 January 1937, cit. Rodríguez Jiménez, *Historia de Falange Española de las JONS*, pp. 249–50.
- 67 Figures in Josep Clara, *El partit únic: La Falange i el Movimiento a Girona (1935–1977)* (Girona: Cercle d'Estudis Històrics i Socials, 1999).
- 68 Morote Pons, 'La Falange a Mallorca', pp. 433–513.
- 69 Cit. Payne, *Falange*, pp. 156–7.
- 70 Castro, *Capital de la cruzada*, pp. 200–1.
- 71 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 252, 14 November 1936.
- 72 Cecil Geraghty, *The Road to Madrid* (London, 1937), pp. 17–18.
- 73 *Documents on German Foreign policy 1918–1945*, Series D, 1937–1945, vol. III: *Germany and the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939* (Washington DC, 1950), pp. 84–9; Mercedes Fórmica, *Visto y vivido, 1931–1937* (Barcelona, 1982), p. 236. Both cit. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 207. Also, Palomares Ibáñez, *La guerra civil en la ciudad de Valladolid*, p. 38.
- 74 Thomàs, *Lo que fue el Falange*, pp. 94–5; Martínez de Bedoya, *Memorias desde mi aldea*, p. 101.
- 75 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi. Propaganda de la JAP: Prensa y notas,' weekly bulletin, 2nd week of March 1937.
- 76 Martín Vigil, *Las flechas de mi baz*, p. 272.
- 77 USC/Fondo HISTORGA/Interview with Manuel García Manzano.
- 78 Martínez de Bedoya, *Memorias desde mi aldea*, pp. 101–2.
- 79 Cf. *La Nación*, 3 February 1936; *J.A.P.*, no. 52, 8 February 1936; Payne, *Falange*, pp. 100–1.
- 80 Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis*, pp. 133–4, 256–7; Ugarte, *Nueva Covadonga*, pp. 143–5.
- 81 Salvador Nonell Brú, *Así eran nuestros muertos del laureado tercio de Requetés de Nuestra señora de montserrat* (Barcelona: Editorial Casulleras, 1965), *passim*.
- 82 José Antonio Martínez Barrado, *Como se creó una bandera de Falange* (Zaragoza: La Académica, 1939, p. 68), cit. Cenarro, *Cruzados y camisas azules*.
- 83 Rough draft of letter from Calzada Rodríguez to Gil Robles, following the unification, n.d. but April 1937. Cit. Torres García, 'La actuación de Gil Robles', p. 24.
- 84 AGR/Gil Robles to Ángel Herrera Oria, Lisbon, 22 October 1936; Herrera Oria to Gil Robles, Salamanca, 21 October 1936; Gil Robles, 'Mi relación con el general Franco', pp. 28–9.
- 85 AGR/Gil Robles, 'Mi relación con el general Franco', pp. 34–5; Preston, *Coming*, pp. 277–81.

- 86 Quoted in Enrique Moradiellos, 'The Gentle general: the Official British Perception of General Franco During the Spanish Civil War', in Paul Preston and Ann L. McKenzie (eds.), *The Republic Besieged: Civil War in Spain, 1936–1939* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).
- 87 Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, p. 173.
- 88 Armando Chávez Camacho, *Misión de prensa en España* (Mexico City, 1948), p. 437.
- 89 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 268, 6 March 1937.
- 90 ABC, 11 April 1937, cutting at FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703.
- 91 USC/Fondo HISTORGA/Interviews with Ángel López Gutiérrez and Manuel García Manzano.
- 92 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, José García Gomez to JPÁv., Molgas, 23 October 1936.
- 93 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Antonio Miranda to JPÁv., Villanueva de la Cañada, 9 March 1937.
- 94 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Sergio Rivera to JPÁv., 30 August 1936.
- 95 See, e.g., Gil Bracero, 'Conspiración y sublevación en Granada', p. 338.
- 96 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi. Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', 'Recordando' press release.
- 97 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Rómulo Carrecedo Martínez to JPÁv., La Vega–Meda, 15 January 1937.
- 98 Romero, *Tres días de julio*, pp. 417–18.
- 99 García Serrano, *La gran esperanza*, p. 74.
- 100 Javier Ugarte, 'El voluntariado alavés en el ejército franquista: estudio sociológico', in *Los nuevos historiadores ante la Guerra civil española*, pp. 58–9, 62–3.
- 101 Tusell, *Franco en la guerra civil*, p. 69.
- 102 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Manuel Franquisa [? Illegible] to JPÁv., Jubín, 28 April 1937.
- 103 Ugarte, *Nueva Covadonga*, pp. 119–39. Also, Casas de la Vega, *Las milicias nacionales en la guerra de España*, pp. 11–12.
- 104 Hermandad de Defensores de Oviedo, *Oviedo invicto y heroico, 19 julio a 17 octubre 1936: LX aniversario de la liberación de Oviedo: 1936 – 17 octubre – 1996* (Oviedo: Hermandad de Defensores de Oviedo, 1996), fols. 16–18; *Velada-Homenaje a la memoria del Excmo. Sr D. José Ma. Fernández-Ladreda (celebrada el 16 de febrero de 1955)* (Oviedo: Diputación de Asturias/Instituto de Estudios Astrianos, 1955).
- 105 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, José Rodríguez Reguerol to JPÁv., Cea, 13 August 1936.
- 106 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Laureano Pelaéz to JPÁv., Verín, 22 September 1936.
- 107 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Manuel Fernández Fernández to JPÁv., Ribadavia, 19 January 1937.
- 108 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 269, 13 March 1937.
- 109 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703 contains ample correspondence revealing a concerted recruitment drive.

- 110 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703 Juan G. M. to JPÁv., 31 August 1936.
- 111 AGR/Gil Robles to Calzada Rodríguez. Calzada *immediately* sent a circular to all provincial JAP bodies. FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Calzada Rodríguez circular, Valladolid, 5 September 1936.
- 112 AGR/Gil Robles, 'Memorias (II parte)', unpublished, handwritten manuscript. This insistence is reflected in F. Alfonso Rojas Quintana, 'El papel internacional de José María Gil Robles en la guerra civil (1936–1939)', in Bullón de Mendoza and Togores (eds.), *Revisión de la guerra civil española*.
- 113 Palomares Ibañez, *La guerra civil en la ciudad de Valladolid*, p. 40.
- 114 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Calzada Rodríguez circular, Valladolid, 5 September 1936.
- 115 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, membership lists and JAP militia identity cards.
- 116 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, undated press release, Ruíz Alonso (emphasis in the original).
- 117 AGR/correspondence. The sense of persecution is a constant theme in Gil Robles's letters. On Millán Astray, see Preston, *¡Comrades!: Portraits from the Spanish Civil War* (London: HarperCollins, 1999).
- 118 ABC, 11 April 1937.
- 119 AGR/Gil Robles, 'Memorias (II parte)' and correspondence between Gil Robles and Ángel Herrera Oria; Tusell, *Franco en la guerra civil*, Ch. 4.
- 120 Preston, *Coming*, epilogue. Conde de Rodezno, notes 28 August 1937, cit. Tusell, *Franco en la guerra civil*, p. 84; Chavez Camacho, *Misión de prensa en España*, p. 391.
- 121 AGR/Herrera Oria to Gil Robles, Biarritz, 26 September 1936.
- 122 Preston, *Franco*, p. 251.
- 123 AGR/Gil Robles to Herrera Oria, 22, 28 October 1936; Gil Robles to Juan Antonio Bravo, Estoril, 19 February 1938; Gil Robles to Cándido Casanueva, Estoril, 28 April 1938.
- 124 Report 23 November, letters 26 November, 9 December 1936, cit Torres García, 'Actuación', p. 27.
- 125 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 250, 31 October 1936; no. 254, 28 November 1936.
- 126 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi. Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', undated transcription from *Diario Regional*.
- 127 On the continuation of *cacique* politics see Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, 'Dictatorship from below: local politics in the making of the Francoist state, 1937–1948', in *Journal of Modern History*, no. 71 (1999).
- 128 FPÁv./BDPO/'E JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', Alvaro Acuña to JPÁv., Manzaneda, 23 September 1936.
- 129 Quoted by Miguel Jérez Mir, *Élites políticas y centros de extracción en España, 1938–1957* (Madrid: CIS, 1982), p. 59.
- 130 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Julio Lage to JPÁv., Robledo de Chavela, 23 December 1936.
- 131 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Manuel Fernández to JPÁv., 7 December 1936.

- 132 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, 1 January 1937; FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Juan Guillem Martínez to JPÁv., Bande, 25 October 1936.
- 133 FPÁv./BDPO/'E JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', Gil Robles to the JAP, Lisbon, 17 January 1937.
- 134 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Laureano Peláez to JPÁv., Verín, 22 September 1936.
- 135 Gibson, *El hombre que detuvo a García Lorca*, pp. 126, 137, 146–7.
- 136 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, José Rodríguez to JPÁv., Cea, 13 August 1936.
- 137 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Verín, Laureano Peláez to JPÁv., Verín, 22 September 1936.
- 138 Archivo General de la Administración, Madrid (hereafter AGA) – G2791, cit. Antonio Cazorla-Sánchez, 'Dictatorship from below', p. 892.
- 139 AGA-G2792 cit. Cazorla-Sánchez, 'Dictatorship from below', p. 892.
- 140 FPÁv./BDPO/'E JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', Manuel Alcántara Borge to JPÁv. (Ayuntamiento Constitucional de) Cortegada, 22 September 1936.
- 141 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 267, 27 February 1937.
- 142 FPÁv./BDPO/'E JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', from a collective of clergy undersigned by father Santos Justo to JPÁv., Avión, 29 September 1936.
- 143 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 252, 14 November 1936; no. 268, 6 March 1937.
- 144 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi. Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', press release to *Diario de Valladolid*.
- 145 *Faro*, 13 April 1937, at FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, press release: 'milicias de la JAP'.
- 146 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, José Cortizo Duván to JPÁv., 19 October 1936.
- 147 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Juan Guillem Martínez to JPÁv., Bande, 25 October 1936.
- 148 AMS/AMGF/BXIII/202.
- 149 Cf. FPÁv. (BDPO and AHPOu), *passim*; *Ciudad y los Campos*, 1936–37 *passim*.
- 150 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Manuel Álvarez to JPÁv., 24 December 1936.
- 151 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, series of letters including Sergio Rivera to JPÁv., 3, 5 September 1936; Ignacio Roman to JPÁv., Palencia, 10 December 1936, 14 January 1937; general Enrique González to JPÁv., 11, 16 November 1936; Manuel Cabaleiro Goas circular, Santiago de Compostela, 10 November 1936; receipt dated 20 November 1936.
- 152 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Ramon de Soto to JPÁv., La Coruña, 18 December 1936; *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 263, 30 January 1937.
- 153 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, membership lists, militia identity cards.
- 154 García Serrano, *La gran esperanza*, pp. 63–4.
- 155 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 263, 30 January 1937.
- 156 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Guillem Martínez to JPÁv., Bande, 26 October, ny (1936).
- 157 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, J. G. Rivera to JPÁv., Villardeves, 31 January 1937.
- 158 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, José Álvarez Sánchez to JPÁv., Monterredondo, 9 March 1937.

- 159 FPÁv./BDPO/'G: Proceso evolutivo de las difuntas milicias', Salvador Carracedo Vallino to JPÁv., Torroso, 5 February 1937. See throughout 'F: Disolución de la JAP' and especially the correspondence and notes in 'G: Proceso evolutivo de las difuntas milicias.'
- 160 October–January reports from LCR and undated letter, cit. Torres García, 'Actuación', p. 28.

VI The Crusade for God, Spain and the New State

- 1 Ellwood, *Spanish fascism in the Franco Era*, pp. 244–5.
- 2 Enrique Plá y Deniel, 'Las dos ciudades', 30 September 1936, in *Boletín Oficial del Obispado de Salamanca*, October 1936 (emphasis in the original). Quoted in Reig Tapia, 'La justificación ideológica', p. 234; Giuliana di Febo, *La santa de la raza. Teresa de Ávila: un culto Barroco en la España franquista (1937–1962)* (Barcelona: Icaria, 1988), p. 25.
- 3 The quote belongs to Sir Henry Page Croft. *The Times*, 23 February 1936, cit. Richard Griffiths, *Fellow Travellers of the Right: British Enthusiasts for Nazi Germany* (Oxford: OUP, 1983), p. 262. Also, *The Listener*, 11 November 1936, p. 917.
- 4 The Collective Letter in Díaz-Plaja, *La guerra de España*, pp. 399–425. Detailed commentary in Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy*, Ch. 7.
- 5 Díaz-Plaja, *La guerra de España*, pp. 399–425.
- 6 Lannon, 'Modern Spain', pp. 567–90.
- 7 Xosé Manoel Nuñez Seixas, *Fuera el invasor!: nacionalismos y movilización bélica durante la guerra civil española (1936–1939)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006), p. 190.
- 8 *J.A.P.*, no. 26, 27 July 1935. The 'other side' was the very antithesis of Spain. The Republic, Ernesto Giménez Caballero declared, 'had destroyed the very measure of our being. The very soul of our Spanishness and our existence as men. Do you not remember that horror and shame? The Catholic in Spain had lost his God; the monarchist, his King; the aristocrat, his manor; the soldier, his sword; the business man, his capacity for initiative; the operative, his possibility of work; the woman, hearth and home [*bogar*]; the child, respect for its father. And even the Spanish language, "companion of empire" as Nebrija called it before the Catholic Monarchs [Ferdinand and Isabella], was a spittoon for all sorts of regional filth. Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *España y Franco* (Guipúzcoa: Editorial Los Combatientes, 1938), pp. 8–9.
- 9 Pierre Vilar, *La guerra civil española* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1986, repr., 1996), p. 126.
- 10 Cf. Julio de la Cueva Merino, "'Si los frailes y monjes supieran . . ." la violencia anticlerical,' in Santos Juliá (ed), *Violencia Política en la España del siglo XX* (Madrid, 2000) and 'El anticlericalismo en la Segunda República y la Guerra Civil' in Emilio La Parra López and Manuel Suárez Cortina (eds.), *El anticlericalismo español contemporáneo* (Madrid, 1998); Mary Vincent, "'The Keys of the

- Kingdom": Religious Violence in the Spanish Civil War, July–August 1936' in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (eds.), *The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–9* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 68–89.
- 11 *El Adelanto*, 16 August 1936, cit. Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, p. 249; Mola's radio speech in Díaz-Plaja, *La guerra de España en sus documentos*, pp. 84–8; Reig Tapia, 'La justificación ideológica', p. 229. Olaechea quoted in Payne, *The Franco Régime*, p. 198.
 - 12 *Gaceta Regional*, 14 January 1936.
 - 13 *J.A.P.*, no. 26, 27 July 1935.
 - 14 Cenarro Lagunas, *Cruzados y camisas azules*, pp. 60–2.
 - 15 Foard, *The Revolt of the Aesthetes*, p. 78.
 - 16 Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy*, *passim*. Sánchez makes the unlikely suggestion that Catholics would have supported *anyone* who did not persecute them, p. 89. Against Sánchez, Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*; Lannon, 'The Church's Crusade Against the Republic'.
 - 17 Ricardo Robledo, 'La iglesia salmantina: rebeldía, cruzada y propaganda: El Centro de Información Católica Internacional', in Ricardo Robledo (ed.), *Esta salvaje pesadilla: Salamanca en la guerra civil española* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2007), pp. 73–82.
 - 18 Mann, *Fascists*, p. 332.
 - 19 Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, p. 204.
 - 20 See, for example, Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, p. 248; di Febo, *La Santa de la raza*, p. 55; *The Spanish Civil War: A History in Pictures*, p. 101. For a brief but illuminating account of the 'battle' for ownership of the Virgin del Pilar, see di Febo, *op. cit.*, pp. 38–9.
 - 21 Di Febo, *La santa de la raza*, pp. 39–40; Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, p. 249. Images of the Virgin del Pilar adorned JAP meetings, alongside portraits of the JEFE, Rafael Roca and the Cruz de la Victoria. *J.A.P.*, no. 39, 2 November 1935.
 - 22 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Julio Lage h/w notes, 'Mañana de domingo en el frente'.
 - 23 Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*, p. 317.
 - 24 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Gil Robles to the JAP, Lisbon, 15 November 1936. This message also carried an implicit criticism of the politicking of the Falange; it did not fight *only* for God and Spain. But Gil Robles's key objective remained to bring the JAP and himself in line with Franco.
 - 25 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Julio Lage h/w notes, 'Mañana de domingo en el frente'.
 - 26 *Fundamentos del Nuevo Estado* (Madrid?: Editora Nacional, n.d.), pp. 12–16, 46.
 - 27 Helen Graham, 'Community, Nation and State in Republican Spain, 1931–1938', in Mar-Molinero and Smith, *Nationalism and the Nation*, pp. 133–47. In contrast, Sandie Holguín, *Creating Spaniards: Culture and National Identity in Republican Spain* (Wisconsin: Wisconsin University Press, 2002). For

fascism's shared nation-statism with the rest of the right, see Michael Mann, *Fascists*.

- 28 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, undated press release, Easter 1937, 'El cumplimiento pascual de las milicias de la JAP.'
- 29 RAH/FDA/11/8989 (1936), 6° Tomo.
- 30 Alfonso Álvarez Bolado, *El experimento del nacionalcatolicismo (1939-1975)* (Madrid: Cuadernos para el diálogo, 1976), pp. 34-5.
- 31 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, undated diary annotation, turned into a press release, 'La Quinta de la JAP.'
- 32 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, 'Una misa', to be published in *La Región*. According to the *Boletín de la ACNdeP*, the final resting place of Pérez de Laborda was never confirmed. 15 June, 1 July 1940.
- 33 *Gaceta Regional*, 16 January 1937.
- 34 Cervera, *Madrid en guerra*, pp. 186, 189; AGR/R. A. Theil to Gil Robles, 28 September 1936 and Gil Robles's reply, 19 October 1936. Theil revealed that he had hidden membership lists to prevent reprisals, while Gil Robles spoke of his satisfaction that Theil was still alive - 'a great number of friends' had not been so fortunate. The existence of membership lists and papers at the AGGCE archive (which is based on republican 'captures') underlines the risks.
- 35 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, José Guerra Fernández to Eladio Pérez Romero and JPÁv., 11 August 1936.
- 36 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 267, 27 February 1937.
- 37 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Gil Robles to the JAP, Lisbon, 15 November 1936.
- 38 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, h/w campaign diary annotations, Julio Lage.
- 39 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, undated press release, 'España Imperio II'.
- 40 See, e.g., on religious practices, penitence and *semana santa*, Timothy Mitchell, *Emotion, Religion and Society in Southern Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990).
- 41 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 268, 6 March 1937.
- 42 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 252, 14 November 1936.
- 43 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 250, 31 October 1936.
- 44 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 272, 3 April 1937.
- 45 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 245, 26 September 1936.
- 46 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Manuel Fernández Fernández to JPÁv., Navas de Marqués, 13 June 1937.
- 47 Di Febo, *La santa de la raza*, pp. 37-40.
- 48 Mola's speech in Díaz-Plaja, *La guerra de España en sus documentos*, pp. 84-8.
- 49 Di Febo, *La santa de la raza*, pp. 63-7; Preston, *Franco*, pp. 219-20.
- 50 Address to International Eucharist Congress, Budapest: May 1938, cit. Vincent, 'Spain', p. 119. For an analysis of the Church's position as rooted in a refusal to accept pluralism, see Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*.
- 51 *Chicago Tribune*, 28 August 1936. When Jay Allen told Franco that he would

- have to kill 'half of Spain' to fulfil his goal of total victory, the general replied: 'I said, whatever the costs'.
- 52 Cit. Boyd, *Historia Patria*, p. 102. See *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos*, no. 1 January 1935. Santoveña Setién, *Menéndez y Pelayo y las derechas en España*.
 - 53 Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy*, pp. 110–11.
 - 54 Testimony of Dionisio Ridruejo in Fraser, *Blood of Spain*, p. 166.
 - 55 See, for example, the poster ('¡Jamás!') reproduced in Manuel Tuñón de Lara, 'Cultura y culturas. Ideologías y actitudes mentales', in Tuñón de Lara *et al.*, *La guerra civil española: 50 años después*, 3rd edn. (Barcelona: Labor, 1989), p. 339; 'Pastoral Instruction' by Cardinal Isidrio Gomá y Tomás, cit. Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy*, p. 77; Di Febo, *La santa de la raza*, p. 57.
 - 56 Endériz García, 'Memorias', p. 141.
 - 57 See, for instance, the concluding instalment, *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 268, 6 March 1937.
 - 58 This kind of chivalrous imagery can be seen in the work of Giménez Caballero, who wrote of the rising: 'One summer day . . . from the horizon came a rider on a white horse. He carried a sword of fire. . . . And with his flaming sword he killed the pests and all the evil spirits. Slowly Spain opened her eyes. She looked at her liberator. She smiled. And, finally, long live Spain!, she rose.' Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *España nuestra* (Madrid, 1943). See *The Spanish Civil War: A History in Pictures*, p. 190.
 - 59 Cited in Tuñón de Lara, 'Cultura y culturas', p. 298. On the poem, Reig Tapia, *La cruzada de 1936*, pp. 262–75.
 - 60 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, José Marquesa Maño to JPÁv., Castañedo, 28 October 1936.
 - 61 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, weekly bulletin, first week of April 1937.
 - 62 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 266, 20 February 1937.
 - 63 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 247, 10 October 1936.
 - 64 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', undated communiqué. For an appraisal of fascism as routed in imperialism see Herbert Rutledge Southworth, 'Un análisis de la herencia fascista española', in Paul Preston (ed.) *España en crisis: evolución y decadencia del régimen de Franco*. (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1977), pp. 29–60.
 - 65 The use of Islamic troops for a crusade, the ban on the publication of the Pope's anti-Nazi pastoral *Mit Brennender Sorge*, the attack on the devoutly Catholic Basques, and the existence of other Christian Republicans, like general Miaja, all served to undermine the crusade ideology. As Antonio María Calero points out in the prologue to di Febo *La santa de la raza*, franquismo 'silenced the word of God more than twice', p. 12. On the Basque 'problem', Sánchez, *The Spanish Civil War as a Religious Tragedy*, Ch. 6. See also, Lannon, 'The Church's Crusade Against the Republic'; Hilari Ragner, *La pólvora y el incienso: la iglesia y la guerra civil española* (Barcelona: Península, 2001).
 - 66 Cf. Ramiro Ladasma Ramos: *Escritos políticos*, JONS. 1933–1934 (Madrid:

- Rivadeneira, 1985), p. 49; [Julián Pemartín], *Teoría de la Falange* (Madrid: Editoria Nacional, 1941), pp. 45–6; *Formación política: lecciones para Flechas*, 6th edn. (Madrid, n.d.), pp. 31–2.
- 67 Nuñez Sexias, *¡Fuera el invasor!*, Ch. III.
- 68 Rafael Cruz, 'Old Symbols, New Meanings: Mobilising the Rebellion in the Summer of 1936', in Ealham and Richards (eds.), *The Splintering of Spain*, pp. 165–70. Also, Nuñez Sexias, 'Nations in Arms Against the Invader' in the same collection.
- 69 Martin Blinkhorn, 'Spain: The "Spanish Problem" and the Imperial Myth', in *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1980), pp. 17–18; Ellwood *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era*, p. 8. On the common ground between the right see Blinkhorn, 'Conservatism, Traditionalism, and fascism in Spain, 1898–1937', which concludes (p. 135): 'those Spanish leftists who . . . saw the various strands of the Spanish Right as brothers under the same skin . . . knew reality when they saw it.'
- 70 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 262, 23 January 1937
- 71 FPÁv./BDPO/'E: JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', Gil Robles to the JAP, Lisbon, 17 January 1937.
- 72 Boyd, *Historia Patria*, p. 238.
- 73 Pemartín, *¿Qué es lo nuevo?* (Santander, 1938).
- 74 Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo, *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*, 8 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1945). Orig. published in three vols., 1880–1882), vol. 7, p. 558. Cf Lannon, 'Modern Spain', p. 567; Reig Tapia, 'La justificación ideológica', p. 234; Boyd, *Historia Patria*, p. 102. By far the most famous passage of Menéndez y Pelayo's immense work, this was also quoted by Plá y Deniel in 'Las dos ciudades'.
- 75 Cf. Jérez Mir, *Élites políticas y centros de extracción*; María Jesús Souto Blanco, *Los apoyos al régimen franquista en la provincia de Lugo (1936–194)* (La Coruña: Ediciones do Castro, 1999); Cifuentes and Maluenda, *El asalto a la República*; Amando de Miguel, *Sociología del franquismo: análisis ideológico de los ministros* (Barcelona: Euros, 1975).
- 76 Cf. Raúl Morodo, *Acción Española: orígenes ideológicos del Franquismo* (Madrid: Tucur Ediciones, 1980); Pedro Carlos Gonzalez Cuevas, *Acción Española: teología política y nacionalismo autoritario (1913–1936)* (Madrid: Tecnos, 1998); Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 409. Cuevas dismisses *Revista de Estudios Hispánicos* as a 'mere plagerism' of *Acción Española*: Cuevas, *El pensamiento político de la derecha española en el siglo XXX: de la crisis de la restauración al estado de partidos (1898–2000)* (Madrid, Tecnos, 2005), pp. 139–40.
- 77 On Falangist opposition to Francoism, Ellwood, *Spanish fascism in the Franco Era*, pp. 135–50.
- 78 See, e.g., *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 254, 28 November 1936 and *passim*.
- 79 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 247, 10 October 1936.
- 80 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', weekly bulletin, second week March 1937.
- 81 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 263, 30 January 1937.

- 82 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, open letter from JAP national *militias* to Gil Robles, 20 April 1937.
- 83 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 266, 20 February 1937.
- 84 Gil Robles to the JAP militias, Lisbon, 15 November 1936, reproduced in *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 253, 21 November 1936.
- 85 José María Gil Robles, *Oliveira Salazar* (Santander: Bedia, 1997); Gil Robles, prologue to Oliveira Salazar, *El pensamiento de la revolución nacional* (Buenos Aires: Poblet, 1938).
- 86 FPÁv./BDPO/'E: JAP (4) 'Después del 18 de julio', Gil Robles to JAP militias, Lisbon, 17 January 1937. That this had a political motive too was shown by the fact that it came via the Press and Propaganda department, affixed with a note requesting that it be given 'as wide a circulation as possible.'
- 87 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 266, 20 February 1937.
- 88 AGR/Gil Robles to [unnamed recipient], 2 November 1936.
- 89 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', transcript for publication in *Diario Regional*, 'Historia'.
- 90 FPÁv./BDPO/'E: JAP (4) 'Después del 18 de julio', press release, 'Recordando'.
- 91 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', transcript for publication in *Diario Regional*.
- 92 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 274, 17 April 1937.
- 93 FPÁv./BDPO/'F: Disolución de la JAP: oficinas etc, propaganda y prensa', handwritten poem 'Cada día más jefe' by Julio Valdés Mateo, 4 October 1937.
- 94 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 252, 14 November 1936.
- 95 See, e.g., *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 269, 13 March 1937.
- 96 FPÁv./BDPO/'E: JAP (4) 'Después del 18 de julio' Luis G. Rodríguez, José Caellos, Celso Blanco Merino, Sergio Santo Frijol, Jesus Loreno López, Tomás Gómez Pérez, to JPÁv., Frente de Navalparat, 22 December 1936.
- 97 Sergio Vilar, *La naturaleza del franquismo* (Barcelona: Península, 1977), pp. 74–6, even goes so far as to describe Gil Robles's ministry of war as the 'true and decisive centre of the rising.'
- 98 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi. Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', weekly bulletin, second week March 1937.
- 99 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 267, 27 February 1937.
- 100 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 274, 17 April 1937.
- 101 Interview with Ernesto Andres Vázquez, Murcia, 27 March 2002.
- 102 García Serrano, *La gran esperanza*, p. 64.
- 103 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg 14703, Manuel Fernández to JPÁv., La Coruña, 22 March 1937.
- 104 AGR/Gil Robles to Juan Antonio Bravo, Estoril, 19 February 1938; Torres García, 'Actuación', pp. 24–5, 29.
- 105 Calzada Rodríguez report, 9 November 1936, cit. Torres García, 'Actuación', p. 28.
- 106 *La Unión*, 14 October 1936.
- 107 AGR/Correspondence between Gil Robles and Franco and between Gil Robles and Cándido Casanueva and Juan Antonio Bravo.

- 108 Calzada Rodríguez, report to Gil Robles, 4 January 1937. Torres García, 'Actuación', p. 28.
- 109 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, membership lists. National figure in Torres García, 'Actuación', p. 29.
- 110 Conversation with Ernesto Vázquez Andres, Murcia, 27 March 2002.
- 111 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, Antonio Miranda to JPÁv., Villanueva de la Cañada, 9 March 1937.
- 112 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, José Marquesa Maño to JPÁv., Castañedo, 28 October 1936.
- 113 AGR/Gil Robles to Marqués de la Vega de Anzo, Lisbon, 26 October 1936.
- 114 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, number of letters, espec. Manuel Cabaleiro Goas circular, Santiago de Compostela, 10 November 1936; receipt, 20 November 1936.
- ¹ FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, Ramon de Soto to JPÁv., La Coruña, 18 December 1936; *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 263, 30 January 1937.
- 115 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, Julian Dodero (JAP *salmantina*) to JPÁv., Salamanca, 11 March 1937.
- 116 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi. Propaganda de la JAP: Prensa y notas', Valladolid, 13 February 1937.
- 117 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, circular from Julio Robles, militias chief in Zamora, 23 February 1937.
- 118 FPÁv./BDPO/'E: JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', undated militia communiqué.
- 119 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, circular from José de Benito, 25 February 1937. Alas, this project appears never got off the ground.
- 120 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi. Propaganda de la JAP: Prensa y notas', weekly bulletin, second week March 1937.
- 121 FPÁv./BDPO/'E: JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', undated prensa y propaganda communiqué.
- 122 FPÁv./BDPO/'E: JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', resolutions from the national assembly of the JAP militias, Burgos, 19 March 1937; reproduced in (and quote from) *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 271, 27 March 1937.
- 123 FPÁv./BDPO/'E: JAP (4) Después del 18 de julio', hoja oficial del Lunes, La Coruña, 5 April 1937 (emphasis in the original).
- 124 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, JAP press release, 13 April 1937.
- 125 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, Costa Serrano circular, Salamanca, 16 April 1937. Although this never occurred, Costa Serrano was an active defender of the CEDA's Nationalist status and Joaquín Maldonado made a point of publicly recalling CEDA/DRV involvement in the rising. See Bosch, Comès and Valls, *La derecha católica en los años treinta*.
- 126 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, 5/6 April 1937, circular from Mariano Serrano, secretary of JAP militias; weekly press and propaganda bulletin, 1st week April 1937.
- 127 Jordi Carulla and Arnau Carulla, *El color de la guerra* (Barcelona: Postermill, 2000), inside cover.

- 128 FPÁv./AHPOu/Leg. 14703, weekly press and propaganda bulletin, 1st week April 1937.
- 129 Torres García, 'Actuación', p. 29 (there is no citation of a primary source here).
- 130 Rafael Casas de la Vega, *Las milicias nacionales en la guerra de España* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1974), p. 39.
- 131 Preston, *Franco*, p. 250.
- 132 Preston, *Coming*, pp. 278–80.
- 133 FPÁv./BDPO/'G: Proceso evolutivo de la disolución de las difuntas milicias'; 'F: Disolución de las JAP: oficios etc'; Jérez Mir, *Élites políticas*, pp. 59–60.
- 134 Tusell, *Franco en la guerra civil*, pp. 161–2.
- 135 Joan María Thomàs, 'Serrano Suñer, el personaje real y el personaje inventado', in Adriano Gómez Molina and Joan María Thomàs *Ramón Serrano Suñer (Cara y Cruz)* (Barcelona: Ediciones B, 2003). The book was Alcázar de Velasco's *Serrano Suñer en la Falange*.
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- 137 Cit. Preston, *Franco*, p. 249; Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, pp. 259–72; Maximiano García Venero, *Historia de la unificación (Falange y Requeté en 1937)* (Madrid: Aagesa, 1970), pp. 173–224.
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- 139 Javier Tusell, 'Familias políticas en el franquismo,' in Santos Juliá (ed.), *Socialismo y guerra civil* (Madrid: Fundación Pablo Iglesias, 1987).
- 140 Preston, *Franco*, p. 249.
- 141 Ridruejo, *Casi unas memorias*, p. 106.
- 142 Serrano Suñer, *Entre Hendaya*, p. 57.
- 143 Preston, *Franco*, p. 257.
- 144 García Venero, *Historia de la unificación*, pp. 199–203; Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, pp. 218, 252, 259–72.
- 145 'Discurso de unificación,' in *Palabras del Caudillo: 19 Abril 1937–31 Diciembre 1938*, 2nd edn. (Barcelona: Ediciones Fe, April 1939), pp. 9–17; *Fundamentos del Nuevo Estado*, pp. 3–7.
- 146 Alfonso Lazo, *Retrato del fascismo rural en Sevilla* (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1998), p. 27.
- 147 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 275, 24 April 1937.
- 148 Letter of adhesion to the unification, Gil Robles to Franco, Salamanca, 22 April 1937. Reproduced in *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 275, 24 April 1937; García Venero, *Historia de la unificación*, pp. 217–18.
- 149 FPÁv./BDPO/'G: Proceso evolutivo de la disolución de las difuntas milicias'; 'F: Disolución de las JAP: oficios etc'.
- 150 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 275, 24 April 1937.
- 151 *La Ciudad y los Campos*, no. 270, 20 March 1937.
- 152 Quoted by Jérez Mir, *Élites políticas y centros de extracción en España*, p. 59; García Serrano, *La gran esperanza*, p. 64.
- 153 FPÁv./BDPO/'A. vi. Propaganda de la JAP: prensa y notas', press note, Valladolid, 27 June 1937.

- 154 Letter from Juan Jesús González to Calzada Rodríguez on behalf of Gil Robles. Lisbon, 21 March 1937, cit Torres García, 'Actuación', p. 30.
- 155 FPÁv./BDPO/'G: Proceso evolutivo de la disolución de las difuntas milicias', Gil Robles to JPÁv., Lisbon, 21 July 1937.
- 156 Lazo, *Retrato del fascismo rural*, p. 85.
- 157 FPÁv./BDPO/'G: Proceso evolutivo de la disolución de las difuntas milicias', h/w draft of letter from JPÁv to Calzada Rodríguez, 11 July 1937.

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- 1 AGR/Gil Robles to Calzada Rodríguez, Lisbon, 25 April 1937.
- 2 Vincent, 'Spain', in Passmore (ed.), *Women, Gender and fascism in Europe*, pp. 201, 205.
- 3 *La Región*, 11 September 1934.
- 4 AHN/FFCC/TS/CG/leg 1630, exp. 1, fols. 245–6, 248–9, testimonies of José María Baldrich Gatell and Carlos Senillosa de la Viana.
- 5 *Heraldo de Madrid*, 21 February 1934, cit. Gibson, *En busca de José Antonio*, p. 93.
- 6 The bibliography on the nature of the Franco régime and fascism is vast. Cf. *Papers: Revista de Sociología*, no. 8: *El régimen franquista*. (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 1978); Juan Linz, 'From Falange to Movimiento-Organización. The Spanish Single-Party and the Franco Régime 1936–68', in S. P. Huntingdon and C.H. Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics and Modern Society. The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*. (New York: Basic Books, 1970); Preston, *The Politics of Revenge*; Javier Tusell, Emilio Gentile and Giuliana di Febo (eds.), *Fascismo y franquismo, cara a cara: Una perspectiva histórica* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2004).
- 7 Blinkhorn, 'Conservatism, traditionalism and fascism in Spain', p. 135.
- 8 Eatwell, *Fascism*, pp. xxiv; Payne, *A History of Fascism*, pp. 3–19; Griffin, *The Nature of fascism*, pp. 1–55. Griffin's 'concise definition' sees fascism as 'a genus of political ideology whose mythic core . . . is a palengenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism', at pp. 26, 44.
- 9 Cit. Payne, *Fascism in Spain*, p. 134.
- 10 Cf. *F.E.*, 1 March 1935; 19 April 1934; 26 April 1934; *Arriba*, 13 June 1934.
- 11 Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz*, pp. 207–8, n. 11.

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